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2Abstract
Historians have generally dismissed the ministry of Henry 
Addington as an absurd interlude in the political career of William 
Pitt, the Younger, and the few attempts to rehabilitate Addington 
have been unable to overcome the weight of this negative 
historiography. The focus of contemporary and historical criticism 
has centred on the foreign and war policies of the ministry, but 
this has failed to take into account the serious and interrelated 
diplomatic, military, social, and political problems faced by the 
government. Social unrest caused largely by high prices of grain, 
political pressure from interests that had been hurt by the closure 
of European markets to British trade, and a poor diplomatic and 
strategic position meant that peace was highly desirable but that 
concessions were necessary to obtain it.
While the end of the war helped to resolve the social pressures 
upon the government and enabled it to implement some useful reforms, 
continued French aggression created new diplomatic problems and led 
to the resumption of war. The disadvantageous terms of the peace 
treaty and the difficulties that the ministry faced preparing for 
a French invasion when the war resumed fostered political opposition 
to the government within Parliament. These opponents of the ministry 
had unrealistic expectations of what the British government could 
accomplish because they did not understand the complexity of the 
problems that it faced. Lacking sufficient debating and 
parliamentary management skills, however, the ministry was unable 
to restrain a political assault led by the most talented and 
influential men in Parliament. Thus despite pursuing policies that 
were largely sensible considering the various political pressures 
and several of which were continued or reintroduced by future 
ministries, Addington chose to resign to avoid defeat in the House 
of Commons.
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8Introduction
Henry Addington became Prime Minister of Great Britain in 
March 1801 owing to a peculiar combination of events, and he 
governed in very difficult circumstances before resigning in 1804. 
Consequently, his ministry received a reputation as one of the 
most incompetent and ill-suited for office in British history. But 
that judgement is unjust. For most modern historians have been 
unable to escape the influence of contemporaries, nineteenth- 
century biographers, and early twentieth century historians who 
expressed contempt for the ministry. The earliest literature 
consisted of biographies, collections of letters, and memoirs of 
William Pitt the Younger and those associated with the political 
opposition, specifically the cliques centred at Holland House and 
Stowe.1 These presentations contained considerable bias, as each 
work attempted to justify the political beliefs and actions of the 
man with whom it was concerned. Similar works on Addington, Lord 
Hawkesbury, and the Earl of St Vincent appeared, but because they 
were not well written and their subjects not considered very 
colourful, they have received less attention.2 Over the years, 
works of Addington's opponents such as the Malmesbury Diaries and
xGeorge Pretyman Tomline, Memoirs of the Life of William 
Pitt (3 vols, London 1821), a fourth volume was printed 
privately in 1904; The Journal of Elizabeth. Ladv Holland. 
1791-1811, ed. the Earl of Ilchester (2 vols, London, 1908); 
Henry Richard, Lord Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party during 
mv Time, ed. Henry Edward, Lord Holland (2 vols, London, 1852); 
Lord John Russell, Memorials and Correspondence of Charles 
James Fox. (4 vols, London, 1853-7); Duke of Buckingham and 
Chandos, Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III (4 
vols, London, 1853-5); Dropmore Papers; The Diary of the Rt. 
Hon. William Windham. 1784 to 1810, ed. Mrs Henry Baring 
(London, 18 66) ; The Windham Papers. (2 vols, London, 1913) .
2Pellew; Charles Duke Yonge, The Life and Administration 
of Robert Banks. Second Earl of Liverpool (3 vols, London, 
1868); E. P. Brenton, Life and Correspondence of John. Earl of 
St. Vincent. (2 vols, London, 1838).
the Dropmore Papers have been quoted far more often than the 
biographies of Addington and Lord Hawkesbury written by George 
Pellew or Charles Yonge and sometimes even when the topic under 
study concerns the Addington ministry.1
The conclusions drawn from these rather anti-Addington 
sources have been that the ministry was quite inept and should 
never have been appointed in the first place, and this view was 
adopted by historians writing during the first few decades of the 
twentieth century. The standard view of the Addington ministry has 
been derived from the works of John Holland Rose and Arthur 
Bryant.2 Holland Rose's intention seemed to be to glorify Pitt. 
But in trying to justify a place for Pitt alongside St George, 
Marlborough, Wellington, and Nelson in Britain's Pantheon of 
heroes, Holland Rose presented a very unbalanced view of events. 
Pitt had to be justified in forcing his successor out of office, 
and so Holland Rose showed Addington as incompetent and the 
continuance of his ministry as a threat to national security. 
Writing during the Second World War, Arthur Bryant seemed more 
concerned about boosting patriotism and morale than presenting 
balanced history. In his works, Napoleon Bonaparte and the 
revolutionaries masqueraded as Hitler and the Nazis, with 
Addington miscast as Chamberlain and Pitt as Churchill. Bryant 
agreed with Holland Rose that Addington was not fit for the task 
and had to make way for the only man who could rally the country.
1For example see A. D. Harvey, Britain in the Early 
Nineteenth Century (London, 1978); Keith Feiling, The Second 
Tory Party, 1714-1832 (London, 1938); A. S. Foord, His 
Majesty's Opposition. 1714-1832 (Oxford, 1964); R. E. Willis, 
"The Politics of Parliament, 1800-1806' (PhD, Stanford 
University, 1969).
2John Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War 
(London, 1911) and "The Struggle with Revolutionary France', 
and "The Contest with Napoleon 1802-1812', in The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy, ed. A. Ward and G. P. Gooch 
(Cambridge, 1922), i. 216-392; Arthur Bryant, The Years of 
Endurance. 1793-1802 (London, 1942) and The Years of Victory 
1802-1812 (London, 1945).
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Criticism of the ministry has centred largely on foreign 
policy, and the most controversial aspect was the decision to 
negotiate the Treaty of Amiens of 1802 . Critics accused Addington 
and Hawkesbury of rushing into an ill-advised peace settlement, 
sacrificing hard-earned conquests in their haste. The general 
consensus was that it would have been in Britain's interest to 
have continued the war retaining the conquests rather than to have 
accepted the terms of the treaty. This criticism begged the 
questions as to whether continuing the war was a viable option and 
whether the ministers' choice was unfettered by other 
considerations.
There were strong diplomatic and military motives for the 
British to seek peace in 1801, but there were even stronger 
domestic reasons. The historiography of social unrest in Britain 
during the French Wars is extensive, and the debate has often 
centred around the question of whether popular agitation contained 
the capacity for social revolution.1 The focus of most historians 
has been largely upon the lower classes: what they thought, what 
they did, and what they had the potential to do. Very little 
attention has been paid, however, to the impact of fear of social
xIan Christie, Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth 
Century Britain: Reflections on the British Avoidance of 
Revolution (Oxford, 1984); E. P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (London, 1963); Peter Holt and Malcolm I. 
Thomis, Threats of Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848 (London, 
1978); J. R. Dinwiddy, "The "Black Lamp" in Yorkshire, 1801- 
1802', Past and Present, lxiv (1974), 113-135; Roger Wells, 
Dearth and Distress in Yorkshire. 1793-1802 (York, 1977) and 
Insurrection: The British Experience, 1795-1803 (Gloucester, 
1983) ; J. Ann Hone, For the Cause of Truth: Radicalism in 
London, 1796-1821 (London, 1983); J. L. Baxter and F. K. 
Donnelly, "The Revolutionary Underground in the West Riding: 
Myth or Reality', Past and Present, lxiv (1974), 113-135; Alan 
Booth, "Food Riots in the North West of England, 1790-1801', 
Past and Present, lxxviii (1977), 84-107; John Bohstedt, Riots 
and Community Politics in England and Wales. 1790-1810 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1983); John Stevenson, "Popular Radicalism 
and Popular Protest, 1789-1815', in Britain and the French 
Revolution. 1789-1815, ed. H. T. Dickinson (London, 1989), pp. 
61-82.
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revolution upon the formulation of government policy, and the 
correspondence of Cabinet ministers demonstrates that it did 
indeed play an important role. Addington and his colleagues 
attributed social unrest largely to consequences of the war and 
believed that the financial and military resources required to 
sustain order detracted seriously from the war effort. Addington 
would have rather rejected the peace terms but felt compelled by 
domestic considerations to end the war.
The relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics 
remained strong even after the peace. Once the war had ended, 
Addington concentrated on restoring the government finances, 
reviving the economy, and alleviating social tension. Afterwards, 
however, the focus of the government shifted to foreign policy, 
and the option of declaring war in 1803 was only made possible by 
the success of Addington's domestic policies.
Set within the context of both the external and internal 
pressures faced by the government, the policies of the Addington 
ministry appear quite reasonable. The conflict between British 
overseas interests and domestic considerations made the 
formulation of policy more complex and difficult than most 
historians have granted. If Addington's policies were justified, 
the question remains as to why his ministry collapsed under 
pressure from the opposition in Parliament. The answer lies in the 
consequences of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the 
resignation of Pitt and the ascension of Addington.
My thesis provides an explanation of the rise and fall of the 
Addington ministry through an examination of the interaction of 
foreign policy and domestic politics. By the term domestic 
politics, I mean both parliamentary politics and extra- 
parliamentary political relations between the central government, 
local government, and local communities. The first chapter 
outlines the military and domestic position of Britain during the 
last few months of 1800 and the first few of 1801. The second 
chapter describes the difficulties that Addington faced while 
forming a ministry after Pitt's resignation. The following six
chapters examine the formulation of the major policy decisions 
within the context of the various internal and external pressures. 
I have included a chapter on the ministry's military policies 
because they were necessary corollaries of the diplomatic decision 
to declare war and they had an important impact on party 
alignments in Parliament. The final chapter gives an alternative 
explanation of the influences that eventually undermined the 
political support of the ministry. My intention is to demonstrate 
that traditional presentations have treated Addington unfairly 
because they have failed to take into account the wider context 
of the domestic pressures in the formulation of foreign policy and 
have mistakenly concluded that the decline of his support in 
Parliament vindicated the charges of the opposition.
Chapter One
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Military and Social Background,
September 1800 to March 1801
'We are however fiddling whilst Rome is burning. Within, & without 
the prospect lowers, & it will not be owing to our own Wisdom, & 
Exertion if it does not burst upon our Heads.1
Henry Addington1
The resignation of William Pitt in 1801 and the reconstruction 
of the government under the leadership of Henry Addington, the 
Speaker of the House of Commons, was a singular event in the history 
of British parliamentary politics. To contemporaries it was sudden, 
inexplicable, and almost unbelievable. Nevertheless, the formation 
of the new ministry and the shift in direction which it took, 
particularly in foreign affairs, were not sudden aberrations but the 
results of a culmination of external and internal developments that 
had been perceptible to many observers for some time. The 
difficulties of pursuing an unsuccessful war and the social 
pressures caused by the scarcity and high price of grain left the 
succeeding ministry with few policy options. Therefore, an 
examination of the military and social background is necessary to 
understand the ministerial manoeuvres of February 1801 and the 
subsequent foreign policy of the government.
The Course of the War
Rather than having weathered the storm, Pitt resigned in 1801 
when Britain faced the worst military and diplomatic crises of the 
war, which since the beginning had been largely unsuccessful as it
Addington to Hiley Addington, 13 Sept. 1800, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl800/OZ48.
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had comprised a series of defeats on the Continent interspersed by- 
victories at sea that had little effect.1 The signing of the Franco- 
Austrian Treaty of Luneville on 9 February 1801, signaled the 
failure of a second coalition of great powers to defeat the French. 
In addition, Portugal, Naples, and Turkey, Britain's only remaining 
allies, were more liabilities than assets. Rather than being able 
to attack France, Portugal was on the defensive, as Bonaparte had 
ordered Spanish troops to invade for the purpose of forcing the 
Portuguese to close their ports to British shipping and to grant a 
more favourable boundary to the French in Guiana. The French, having 
already occupied the Kingdom of Naples, controlled all the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean ports, preventing British access to European 
markets through these outlets. Naples also gave Bonaparte an 
excellent base from which to attack the Morea, which, if undertaken, 
could have precipitated the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.
Historians who have argued that this represented a stalemate 
between the predominant sea and land powers with neither being able 
seriously to threaten the other have overlooked some important 
points.2 French control of western and southern Europe posed a 
considerably greater threat to British interests than British 
command of the sea did to French, as was proved by Bonaparte's 
Egyptian expedition. The Battle of the Nile was fought only because 
Nelson had failed in his assigned task to prevent Bonaparte from 
reaching Egypt. Thus with the invasion Bonaparte had taken the 
initiative by threatening Britain's position in the East so much as
1Edward Ingram, Commitment to Empire; Prophesies of the 
Great Game in Asia. 1797-1800 (Oxford, 1981), p. 2.
2A. B. Rodger, The War of the Second Coalition: A Strategic 
Commentary (Oxford, 1964), p. 277; Holland Rose, vThe Struggle 
with Revolutionary France', p. 304; Paul Langford, The 
Eighteenth Century. 1688-1815 (London. 1976); Paul Kennedy, The
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976), pp. 133- 
43; Ian Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain, 1760-1815 
(London, 1982), p. 258; J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George
III, 1760-1815 (Oxford, 1960), p. 403.
15
to provoke a defensive response.1 Closer to home, it was clear that 
the French had a better chance of successfully invading Britain, 
than the British did of invading France. The French were also 
threatening to occupy George Ill's electoral dominion of Hanover. 
Consequently, far from having fought France to a stalemate, Britain 
was at a considerable strategic disadvantage.
Moreover, Britain's diplomatic and military problems also 
concerned states other than France. Searching neutral ships to seize 
contraband of war destined for the enemy was one of Britain's most 
important naval weapons but was often implemented arrogantly and 
insensitively, causing bitter resentment. Denmark and Sweden tried 
to acquire the belligerent powers' carrying trade that the war had 
interrupted, and by 1800 they had become extremely annoyed because 
the British continually interfered. Consequently, they turned to the 
Russian Tsar, Paul I, to revive the League of Armed Neutrality in 
order to prevent the British from searching their ships.2 Paul 
complied because he wished to take revenge on the British, whom he 
blamed for the failure of the War of the Second Coalition and 
resented for refusing to fulfill the terms of the Anglo-Russian 
agreement on Malta.3 The convention signed between Russia, Denmark, 
and Sweden on 16 December 1800, to which Prussia also later acceded, 
had two important consequences. First, the League denied Britain 
access to Baltic supplies of naval stores such as masts, tar, pitch
•^Ingram, Commitment to Empire, pp. 57-64 and vThe Failure 
of British Sea Power in the War of the Second Coalition, 1798- 
1801', in In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the 
Middle East. 1775-1842 (London, 1984), pp. 67-77.
2Ole Feldbaek, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality. 1800-1801 
(Copenhagen, 1980), pp. 17-54.
3Rescript to Kolychev, 16 Feb. 1801, (Note: all Russian 
dates given in new style) SIRIO, lxx. 37; Rostopchin to 
Grenville, 10 Jan. 1801, FO 65/48; Adam Gielgud, Memoirs of 
Prince Adam Czartorvski and His Correspondence with Alexander I 
(London, 1888), i. 270; Hugh Ragsdale, Detente in the Napoleonic 
Era: Bonaparte and the Russians (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980) , p. 77; 
Feldbaek, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 70-1; Norman 
Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean. 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), 
pp. 142-8.
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and hemp (which were vital to the Royal Navy already in poor 
repair), Swedish iron (upon which the British steel industry 
depended), and grain. This caused the price of grain to rise even 
higher and, more important, led to severe shortages in some areas. 
Second, Britain was virtually in a state of war against all of 
Europe, with the spectre of having to face the combined navies of 
France and the northern powers.1 If the diplomatic situation had not 
been altered, the strain on Britain's military and naval resources 
could have become unbearable.
These military crises were not so much the results of 
mismanagement or faulty strategy as of the limitations on Britain's 
ability to wage war against a Continental power. Considerable wealth 
and overwhelming naval superiority did not provide the means to 
strike an effective blow at French power on the Continent. For naval 
battles and blockades were ineffective in forcing the French army 
to relinquish the territories that it occupied, and the French were 
.equally reluctant to exchange territory in Europe for Britain's 
colonial conquests. In addition, financial subsidies to Continental 
allies failed to give the British control over allied military 
strategy. Therefore, it is important to recognize that British 
ministers were grappling with problems for which they were not 
equipped with the proper tools. They had very little influence on 
the course of events in Europe which did, however, have serious 
political and commercial effects in Britain. Thus they were obliged 
to wait on events and seize opportunities which came along, and 
their success or failure were most often at the whim of Continental 
politics which dominated the course of the war. In early 1801, the 
course of Continental politics left the British in a very dangerous 
situation indeed.2
1S. Vorontsov to A. Vorontsov, 22 Mar. 1801, AKV. x. 89.
2Charles John Fedorak, "Maritime Versus Continental 
Strategy: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon', Proceedings of 
the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. 1750-1850. (1989),
forthcoming.
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The Social Context
Besides these diplomatic concerns, the war had also caused 
serious domestic consequences by January 1801. Granted, to many 1797 
had seemed worse with the naval mutinies and the run on the banks 
resulting in the suspension of cash payments, and Lord Grenville 
later emphasized this argument when contrasting his peace proposals 
of 1797 with the terms of the Preliminaries of London of 1801. 
Nevertheless, in 1801 the social and diplomatic situations were much 
more serious.1 The naval mutinies had involved relatively small 
numbers and had been rather easily suppressed, but the problems of 
1801 were not so easily resolved, as there was general war weariness 
verging on violent dissatisfaction, with the rich pinched by high 
levels of taxation and the poor by the high price of grain.2
The crop of 1799 had been seriously deficient owing to heavy 
rain, cold winds, and late frosts. During 1800, the price of wheat 
per quarter rose from 49s. 6d. in January to 93s. lOd. in December.3 
The crop of 1800 had looked better for most of the year, but rain 
in the late summer ruined the harvest. This caused a domestic 
shortage that was compounded by a deficient crop in Prussia, 
Britain's largest foreign supplier, and the price of wheat increased 
rapidly, peaking in March 1801 at 152s. In many communities, the 
greatest problem was not the price but the scarcity: inadequate
transportation and communication left some localities with very low 
supplies. As the diet of the bulk of the population was comprised 
of bread, some were unable to obtain enough food to survive and 
distress became widespread.
iAnnual Register 1801, "History of Europe', p. 117.
2Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Wars. 1793- 
1815 (London, 1979), pp. 65-90; Watson, pp. 406-9.
3W. F. Galpin, The Grain Supply of England during the 
Napoleonic Period (New York, 1925), p. 10.
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Consequently, beginning in September 1800 food riots spread 
across Britain.1 These disturbances often compromised attempts to 
fix maximum prices for food, action which the masses considered 
justified by the principles of the popular marketing code, the 
"moral economy1.2 Mobs demanding a fair price for bread tried to 
intimidate bakers, corn factors, and farmers. This was not only out 
of desperation but also anger, as many had seen the grain growing 
in the fields throughout the year and had expected a good harvest. 
They did not believe the reports that the crop was deficient but 
rather suspected the existence of a pacte de famine by which corn 
factors and farmers were hoarding to fix prices. Consequently, a 
serious debate arose as to whether the scarcity was real or 
artificial.3 Justified complaints were registered against rural 
farmers who followed the prices set in London at the corn market in 
Mark Lane, which as supplier to the army had the highest prices in 
the country.4 An anonymous letter to Hawkesbury complained that 
"Mark Lane governs all England for that Old Son of a Bitch of a 
farmer dont consider the demand in his neighbourhood but simply what 
London sells for.,5 This appeared to corroborate the accusation that 
the farmers and the corn factors were cheating their customers.
1For regional studies of unrest see Bohstedt; Booth; Andrew 
Charlesworth ed., An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain,
1548-1900 (London, 1982); Marianne Elliott, Partners in 
Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (London, 1982); Hone; 
George Rude, Hanoverian London. 1714-1808 (London, 1971); J. 
Stevenson, "Food Riots in England, 1792-1818', in R. Quinalt and 
J. Stevenson ed., Popular Protest and Public Order. (London, 
1974); Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class; Wells, 
Dearth and Distress in Yorkshire and Insurrection.
2Wells, Insurrection, p. 181; E. P. Thompson, "The Moral 
Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century', Past 
and Present. 1 (1971), 76-136.
Liverpool to Portland, 9 Oct. 1800, Add. MSS 38311, fo.
83 .
4Rose Diaries, i. 285.
5A volunteer to Hawkesbury, 11 Oct. 1800, Add. MSS 3 823 7, 
fo. 28.
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Protest against high prices often merged with protest against 
the war, as many blamed the war for the prices and refused to accept 
arguments to the contrary.1 These criticisms were indeed valid, as 
the consequences of the war did cause higher prices and exacerbate 
distress.2 For while bad weather was responsible for the failure of 
the domestic crop, the war prevented the importing of adequate 
supplementary supplies from the Continent. The war with France 
blocked French exports of grain, limited the number of ships which 
could be used to obtain supplies from other markets, and required 
the government to purchase large quantities to feed the army. More 
important, however, the Russian embargo of November 1800 led to the 
closure of British access to Baltic supplies of grain, which 
hitherto had comprised more than seventy-five percent of British 
imports.3 Therefore, an end to the war would certainly have led to 
greater availability and consequently lower prices of grain.
The grain crisis also precipitated an economic recession, as 
the average worker having to spend most of his money on food caused 
the domestic market for British commodities to collapse.4 This 
coincided with the loss of major overseas markets owing to the war. 
At the local level, this led to industrial and commercial decline 
and greater unemployment, thus increasing the ranks of the 
destitute. These developments also had adverse consequences for the 
middle and upper classes. For the poor and working classes began to 
default on their rents, and from this declining revenue base, the 
wealthier classes were expected to pay higher prices for goods, 
higher taxes to finance the war, and higher poor rates to prevent 
a severe famine. Consequently, a rate crisis developed as thousands 
of the middle class were unable to pay, while others who could pay
1Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, p. 519.
2Wells, Insurrection, pp. 183-4.
3Watson, p. 407.
4Wells, Insurrection, pp. 178-80.
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refused, hoping that the distress of the poor would exert greater 
pressure on the government.1
On the international level, by 1801 Britain was running a trade 
deficit and the pound was severely depreciated on the exchange 
markets of Spain and Hamburg.2 Government borrowing to finance the 
war, especially through exchequer bills, also restricted short term 
credit available to commerce and industry and the incentives to 
purchase government stocks drove up long term interest rates.3 While 
economic historians might argue whether the experience of the war 
helped or hindered British industry, there were many industrial and 
financial interests in 1801 who believed that Britain required 
peace, and the stock market fluctuated in relation to the 
expectation of peace.4
The government was aware of these concerns, for in the autumn 
of 1800 the grain crisis dominated discussion in several 
departments.5 According to the minutes, every meeting at the Board 
of Trade between 24 September and 7 November was entirely concerned 
with increasing the import of grain.6 Officials at the Board of 
Trade investigated and initiated schemes for importing grain from 
Naples, Sicily, and the Barbary States, while Newfoundland was given 
special permission to import food from the United States.7 By March 
1801, the government was so desperate for grain that, despite its
1Wells, Insurrection, p. 183; Emsley, p. 86.
2Watson, p. 4 07; Henry MacLeod, The Theory and Practice of 
Banking (London, 1876), i. 465, ii. 2.
3Arthur Gayer, W. W. Rostow, and A. J. Schwartz, The Growth 
of the British Economy. 1790-1850 (Oxford, 1953), p. 145.
4Glenbervie Diaries, i. 151, 2 04; Yorke to Abbott, 18 Aug. 
1801, PRO 30/9/120, fos. 3-6; The Times. 7 Feb. 1801.
5Rose Diaries, i. 2 81-5.
6Board Minutes, BT 5/12.
7Unwin to Fawkener, 27 Oct. 180 0, and King to Fawkener, 2 0 
Dec. 1800, BT 1/19; Fawkener to Hammond, 22 Dec. 18 00, BT 3/6; 
Board Minutes, 27 Dec. 1800, BT 5/12.
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dispute with the League of Armed Neutrality, it granted exemptions
from seizure to Prussian ships delivering grain cargoes to Britain.1
These were extraordinary measures, as the government had rarely
interfered in the international grain market before, but they were
clearly insufficient to resolve the crisis. Consequently,
considerable controversy arose within the Cabinet over whether to
take further steps. One of the major obstacles was that few believed
that the general welfare of the people was the responsibility of the
government. There were no precedents for large scale intervention
in the market or a comprehensive system of poor relief, and many
local officials would have interpreted such measures as dangerous
innovations that would have increased the power of the executive.
Moreover, many in the evangelical movement felt that the subsistence
crisis was a result of divine retribution and ought to be endured.2
Among the politically powerful classes, however, there was no
consensus to guide the government.
Grenville was the most vociferous critic of any government
interference. For he held stubbornly to the principles of Adam
Smith, arguing that the only certain method of increasing the
production of grain in times of scarcity was to raise the price to
the point at which it would provide incentive to farmers to grow
more. Conversely, he felt that any attempts to decrease the price,
either directly or indirectly, would have the opposite effect.3
On the other side of the question, the Earl of Liverpool,
President of the Board of Trade, tried to convince the Cabinet that
Grenville's position could have caused dangerous consequences:
From long Experience, as well as from deep Reflection, I 
have convinced myself that Dr Adam Smith has pushed his 
Principles to an extravagant Length, and, in some 
respect, has erred. If, however, I should grant that Dr
1Hervey to Fawkener, 3 Mar. 1801, BT 1/19.
2Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of 
Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought. 1795-1865 
(Oxford, 1988).
3Grenville to Pitt, 24 Oct. 1800, Dacres Adams Papers, PRO 
30/58/3/85, also in Stanhope, ii. 373.
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Adam Smith was in all respects right, I am persuaded that 
it is absolutely impossible to convince the common 
People, who suffer so greatly, that these Principles are 
well-founded ... 1
Liverpool had received letters from across the country claiming that
many were already starving and that others would freeze to death
during the winter for lack of raiment. He feared that the
manufacturing towns were ready to rise against the landed interests
and that the yeomanry would not stop them:
If these Insurrections should unfortunately happen, it 
will indeed be very singular, that the French 
Philosophers, by their wild principles in favour of 
political Liberty, should have destroyed the Government 
of their own Country; and the French Oeconomists [sic]
(from whom Dr Adam Smith has borrowed all his Doctrines) 
should, by Principles in favour of the Liberty of Trade, 
carried to as great an Extravagance, shake the 
Foundations of the Government of Great Britain.2
Liverpool acknowledged that war was not necessarily the cause of
high prices, as corn was sometimes as cheap in times of war as in
peace, but government acquisitions to feed the military services did
drive up the price.3
Pitt had greater sympathy for Liverpool's position than
Grenville's, as he was indeed alarmed by the scarcity and the
consequences of the high prices. He spent several weeks at Woodley
discussing the price of grain with Addington and Treasury Secretary
George Rose, who both supported intervention.4 Addington had
financed and administered soup kitchens in the neighbourhood
surrounding his estate in Upottery, Devon.5 He was also preoccupied
Liverpool to Dundas, 11 Oct. 1800, Add. MSS 38311, fo. 84.
2Idem.
3Liverpool to Grenville, 9 Nov. 1800, Add. MSS 58935, fos. 
103-6.
4Pitt to Rose, 25 Oct. 1800, Add. MSS 42772, fos. 124; Rose 
Diaries, i. 279, 282.; Pellew, i. 266-7.
5Addington to Hiley Addington, 1 Sept. and 4 Oct. 1800, 
Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl800/F8 and F10; Cooke to Addington, 11 
Mar. 1800, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl800/OG22.
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by the debate over the cause of the crisis, watching closely the 
price of grain and arguing that the alarm of scarcity was justified 
and that the government should interfere in the market.1 
Consequently, Pitt decided that the government ought to act to 
ameliorate the distress, even if only to demonstrate that it was not 
neglecting the issue.2 A strong nation-wide petition movement was 
demanding the emergency recall of Parliament to deal with the crisis 
and he acquiesced.3 He recalled Parliament prematurely in November 
1800 to pass several acts of legislation to limit excess consumption 
of grain and to promote importing of rice, fish, and other 
foodstuffs.4 He also demonstrated an interest in devising a national 
census to determine the size and distribution of the population and 
how this related to local supplies of grain.5
Nevertheless, the concern of the government over the grain 
crisis was not entirely humanitarian. For throughout British history 
high grain prices and food riots had occurred often without causing 
serious alarm. The revolutionary context of the 1790s, however, 
provided an added dimension, as the example of the French Revolution 
and the radical writings of Thomas Paine gave an ideological impetus 
to criticism of and protest against the existing system of 
government. In response to the threat posed by the political 
organization of the corresponding societies, Pitt's ministry had 
passed legislation curbing their activities, and went so far as to 
arrest the leadership for treason in 1794. The examples of the Navy 
Mutinies of 1797 and the Irish Rebellion of 1798 seemed to confirm 
the government's suspicion of the existence of a revolutionary
3Henry Beeke to Addington 23, 31 Oct., 8 Nov., and 9 Dec. 
1800, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl800/OGl, 3,4 and 5; Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl800/OG8-23.
2Pitt to Addington, 9 Oct. 1800, Pellew, i. 264; Rose 
Diaries, i. 282-5.
3Wells, Insurrection, p. 182.
4Galpin, pp. 22-26.
5Colchester Diary, i. 209.
24
spirit. The problem was particularly acute in Ireland, where Lord 
Lieutenant Marquess Cornwallis believed that as long as the war 
continued the natives would have to be considered as enemies.1 
Throughout the war, Irish rebels had corresponded with the French 
government, and there was a general belief that another rebellion 
would coincide with a French invasion. Consequently, the government 
believed that it could not afford to let these developments continue 
unchecked.
Ministers and local officials believed that there was an 
important connection between food riots and revolutionary 
insurrection.2 While they were certain that the great majority of 
the lower classes were loyal and that most of those involved in food 
riots were only responding to the distress of the moment, they 
believed that a small group of revolutionaries, who aimed to subvert 
the social order, were trying to use scarcity as an excuse to incite 
general discontent.3 With slogans such as 'Peace and Large Bread or 
A King without a Head' the radicals demonstrated their appeal to the 
masses and the danger to the authorities. The government's 
assessment was probably close to the mark. The historiographical 
debate over the threat of insurrection is well argued on both sides, 
but there is no conclusive evidence for historians as there was none 
for contemporaries. Nevertheless, there probably was an organized 
revolutionary movement that was presented with opportunities by the 
problems of the scarcity of grain as described by Roger Wells, but 
at the same it is unlikely that it could have obtained sufficiently 
widespread support to render an insurrection successful and, as Ian 
Christie has noted, there were many other social factors that worked
1Cornwallis to Portland, 2 Sept. 1800, Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Robert Stewart. Viscount Castlereagh, ed. 
Marquess of Londonderry (12 vols, London, 1848-54), iii. 374.
2Simcoe to Addington, 9 Apr. 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl80l/OM34.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 12 79; N. G. Cox, 'Aspects of 
British Radicalism: The Suppression and Re-emergence of the 
Constitutional Democratic Tradition, 1795-1809' (Ph. D.,
Cambridge, 1971), p. 29; Wells, Insurrection, pp. 184-7.
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against the likelihood of a British revolution.1 In the heat of the
moment, however, the government could not have been so confident as
to dismiss completely the threat of insurrection.
While the government responded to the scarcity problem by
ordering magistrates to act to protect food movements to urban areas
where most of the unrest was expected to occur,2 on the whole it
treated the symptoms rather than the causes of the unrest. The Home
Secretary, the Duke of Portland, took a very high-handed approach
to the food riots of 1800, by insisting unwaveringly that acceding
to the demands of the rioters to lower the price of food magistrates
only exacerbated the problem and that the only viable solution was
to punish the rioters severely.3 Nevertheless, as the Home Office
did not possess either the power or the resources to take an active
role in suppressing the riots, he could do little more than play the
role of a glorified cheerleader, imploring the local officials to
enforce existing laws and to make examples of offenders and
reproaching them when they failed to act with sufficient vigour.4 He
considered the ''moral economy' of the mob as a direct attack on the
rights of property which had to be resisted with the full force of
the law, and he was keen to order regular troops to assist the civil
powers when necessary. For,
as much as the cause of the present disturbances is to be 
lamented, it is evident that the attention due to the 
general interests of the Community unfortunately render 
such an alternative absolutely unavoidable, and require 
that the further progress of the rioters should be 
arrested in the most prompt and efficacious manner.5
^ells, Insurrection; Christie, Stress and Stability.
2Charlesworth, p. 104.
3Portland to Haden, 3 0 Sept. 1800, and Portland to Corbett, 
30 Sept. 1800, HO 43/12.
4Portland to Fortescue, 18 Feb. 1801, and Portland to St. 
Aubyn and Williams, 4 Apr. 1801, HO 43/12.
5Portland to Watson, 5 Sept. 1800, HO 43/12.
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He was also determined to punish those who wrote seditious 
pamphlets and attended seditious meetings because he believed that 
unlawful assemblies were planning insurrections, especially in 
Nottingham and Yorkshire.1 These regions, where along with 
Lancashire and Norwich the most serious unrest occurred, were also 
the centres of skilled artisan labour and the most extensive 
activity of the United Irishmen and United Englishmen.2 This mixture 
of radical ideology, underground organization, unstable industrial 
relations, and widespread grievance over the grain crisis appeared 
a possible recipe for social revolution.
The problem with Portland's response to unrest was its reliance 
on armed force. With crises erupting in every region of the kingdom, 
there were insufficient resources to meet all the requirements, and 
employing more to quell unrest left fewer to fight the war against 
France. Ireland had been relatively quiet since the rebellion of 
1798, but the uncertainty which lingered required 16,000 regular 
infantry and 10,000 cavalry just to maintain order.3 Even then, the 
British could never be completely confident that they would be able 
to handle another rebellion, especially if it coincided with another 
French landing. Therefore, Portland's policy tied up such a large 
proportion of British troops that Dundas was able to muster only 
18,000 to drive a French force of more than 3 0,000 out of Egypt.
To release more regular troops, the government often employed 
the volunteer regiments as police forces. The experience of the food 
riots of 1800, however, brought this whole process under question. 
The problem was that the volunteers, who often lived within the 
communities where they were ordered to suppress riots, sometimes 
found that they had conflicting loyalties and consequently disobeyed
1Portland to Smith 18 Sept. 1800, and Portland to 
Fitzwilliam, 20 Jan. 1801, HO 43/12; Fitzwilliam to Portland, 21 
Apr. 1801, HO 42/66.
2Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, p. 517; 
Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, p. 78.
3Littlehales to Castlereagh, 2 Sept. 1800, Castlereagh 
Correspondence, iii. 377.
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their officers. Thus they were highly unreliable.1 Even worse, there 
were several instances in Devon, where members of the volunteers 
played a major role in such riots. For example, in March 18 01 
members of the Exeter volunteers, some even in uniform, aided the 
mob involved in a food riot.2 A number of officers in the Brixham 
volunteers also led a riotous procession which forced farmers to 
sign a paper binding them to sell wheat at a particular price, and 
later acted as delegates to a committee protesting against the high 
price of grain established at Dartmouth.3 In addition, members of 
the corps at Exmouth were spreading seditious pamphlets. These 
incidents alarmed Portland because he believed that "Nothing can 
afford a more dangerous and destructive example than that those who 
are entrusted with Arms for the maintenance and security of the 
publick tranquility, should be left at liberty to use them for its 
destruction.,4
With these words Portland underlined a very frightening 
prospect. In the event that radicals used the scarcity to exacerbate 
considerable social unrest, Britain's military resources might not 
have been able to cope if members of the security forces refused to 
fight and some joined the mob. J. R. Western argues that the 
governing classes were an active minority surrounded by an 
indifferent multitude, and during a crisis the government was likely 
to be deserted by high and low alike.5 Such a scenario was possible, 
if the social, commercial, and military crises were left unresolved 
for an extended period. Having refused to interfere in the grain
xClive Emsley, "The Social Impact of the French Wars', in 
Britain and the French Revolution. 1789-1815. ed. H. T.
Dickinson (London, 1989), p. 219.
2Wright to Northcote and Fenshaw, 31 Mar. 1801, HO 43/12.
3Taylor to Fortescue 12 Apr. 1801, enclosed in Brownrigg to 
Nepean, 16 Apr. 1801, Adm 1/433.
4Portland to Rolle, 24 Dec. 1800, HO 43/12.
5J. R. Western, "The Volunteer Movement as an Anti- 
Revolutionary Force, 1793-1801', English Historical Review, lxxi 
(1956), 603-4.
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market, the government was required to take alternative measures, 
and the most obvious was to pursue peace. Many among the governing 
classes were convinced that only peace could bring general 
contentment.1 For example, in October 1797 Addington had remarked on 
the prospects of peace that he believed, "the state of the country 
as to its interior to be so bad that we cannot, in strict duty 
venture to reject the offer, which may at least give us some 
interval of rest for doing what we have to do at home'.2 An end to 
the war would have restored Britain's access to Continental supplies 
of grain and naval stores, released large numbers of troops for 
service in Britain, decreased the government's financial burden thus 
permitting it to decrease taxes, and eliminated the prospect of a 
French invasion that was sustaining the hopes of many British and 
Irish revolutionaries. One stroke of the diplomatic pen could have 
resolved many of the dangers facing the government. There were few 
alternatives, as Pitt confided in Addington on 8 October 1800 that 
"After all, the question of peace or war is not in itself half so 
formidable as that of the scarcity with which it is necessarily 
combined, and for the evils and growing dangers of which I own I see 
no adequate remedy. '3 The next day Grenville was told by his brother 
Thomas that "the scarcity of bread and the consequent distress of 
the poor, if it continues, will, I believe, force you whether you 
will or no to make your peace with France'.4
Thus both Pitt and Thomas Grenville admitted the essential 
connection between the foreign policy of the government and social 
unrest. The decision of the government to pursue the war had 
crippled certain sectors of British industry and inflated the price
1J. G. Rogers, "Addington and the Addingtonian Interest in 
Parliament, 1801-12' (B. Litt. Oxford, 1952), p. 77; Pellew, i.
363 .
2Addington to Pitt, 8 Oct. 1797, Chatham Papers PRO 
30/8/140.
3Pitt to Addington, 8 Oct. 1800, Pellew, i. 263.
4T. Grenville to Grenville, 9 Oct. 1800, Dropmore Papers, 
vi. 343-4.
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of grain. This had exacerbated the distress of the poorer classes,
convincing many that the only means of feeding themselves required
the use of violence. The economic strain of the war and widespread
distress had hampered the government's ability to finance the war
effort, while the military resources required to quell the unrest
had weakened the forces available to fight. As time passed, the
social strains had become greater and the prospects of winning the
war had diminished. Moreover, the war had become generally
unpopular. While it is difficult to speak with certainty about
popular opinion on the question of peace and war, and it was clear
that different people had different opinions, what evidence there
is suggests that opinion on the whole opposed the war. Addington
certainly thought so.1 Even the French agent sent to London to
negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war, Louis Otto, was convinced
that the British public was universally in favour of peace, and he
attributed this sentiment to unpopular levels of taxation and the
interruption of British trade with Europe.2 Consequently, peace was
the only solution. The Annual Register of 1801 claimed:
Though the difficulties and dangers, that encompassed 
Great Britain, from the commencement of the war, had been 
very great, the situation of this country in the three 
first months of 1801, had become critical and alarming 
almost beyond any former example. ... It was now quite 
apparent, that the country was plunged into a situation 
of difficulty and distress, from which nothing but a 
speedy peace could relieve it.
Quite unexpectedly, however, at the height of the crisis Pitt handed
over the responsibility for negotiating peace to Addington.
1Pellew, ii. 2n.
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The Formation of the Ministry, January to March 1801
"That some parts of the new Administration are greatly inferior 
in Talents & Abilities to those of the former no man living can 
doubt; that it is to be deplored & regretted but it must be 
formed as it is, or Messers. Sheridan, Grey, & Tierney sent for. 
Honesty, right intentions, & true Patriotism will be found, & for 
the rest we must put ourselves on God & our Country.'
Charles Yorke1
The Accession of Addington
Pitt's resignation had serious and enduring consequences for 
the course of British politics that he did not anticipate at the 
time because his complete personal ascendancy during his 
seventeen years in office meant that there was no clear candidate 
who could take his place. Even if it might be more accurate to 
say that Pitt stayed in office that long because there were no 
alternatives, the point remains that there was no one in 
Parliament who was generally assumed to be the next Prime 
Minister. Pitt had no rivals within his ministerial party because 
he had built it himself. He had attained office in 1783 largely 
because he was aloof from party and had to construct his Cabinet 
out of the remnants of former ministries. Nevertheless, as his 
position strengthened he replaced some of the ministers with his 
relatives and friends, many of whom were entirely dependent on 
him for their political careers and most were so personally 
devoted to him that they would never have dared to challenge his 
position. The problem was, however, that Pitt had not groomed a 
successor. Despite the fact that he was only forty years old, he
1Yorke to Mrs Hardwicke, 11 Feb. 1801, Yorke MS Eng. lett. 
c. 60, fos. 3-4.
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must have realised that the day would come when he would no 
longer be Prime Minister, yet he failed to prepare someone to 
take the reins of power. In fact, he gave none of his younger 
colleagues sufficient opportunity to let their talents shine or 
to establish any degree of independence based on their own 
character and abilities. He was also constantly interfering with 
the work of his subordinates when his energies would have been 
better employed elsewhere. By taking on too much responsibility 
for himself he robbed others of chances to bring themselves 
forward as talented speakers. Lord Glenbervie, when considering 
why there were so few men of talent around, pondered, "Is it a 
real dearth of great abilities, or is it not because Pitt with 
the exception of only one or two among his favourites has 
universally, and in all lines and branches, discouraged and 
repressed those who might have come too near himself?'1 The answer 
probably contained an element of both.
Resigning apparently over the single issue of Catholic 
Emancipation even though he retained an almost unassailable 
parliamentary majority also caused further problems.2 For most of 
his closest adherents and the ministers with the most experience 
resigned with him, and of those who remained, there was no one of 
the necessary calibre to run the government. Dundas suggested 
Portland as the most acceptable to the country.3 The Duke had 
filled the office in 1782-3 and would fill it again 1807-9, but 
in both instances he was supported by strong ministerial teams. 
The situation in 1801 was quite different, however, as the
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 150, 189-90.
2I am inclined to accept Piers Mackesy's argument that 
serious divisions within the Cabinet and the poor state of 
Pitt's health played a large role in his decision to resign. 
See War without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt. 1799-1802 
(Oxford, 1984), pp. 174-7.
3Dundas to Pitt, 7 Feb. 1801, in Holland Rose, William 
Pitt and the Great War, pp. 44 0-1.
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ministry was expected to be very weak and requiring strong 
leadership. Portland, who had once been talented and industrious, 
had become physically and mentally exhausted and could not fulfil 
this role.1 Moreover, the party that he had once led had been 
split by his decision to join Pitt's ministry in 1794, and those 
whom he brought into the government with him--Fitzwilliam, 
Windham, and Spencer--had resigned or been dismissed over the 
Catholic issue.
Apart from Pitt's adherents and the Portland Whigs, the 
Foxite Whigs were the only other group that was recognized as 
possessing the talents and abilities required to run the 
government. Charles Fox along with the Earl of Moira, Richard 
Sheridan, Thomas Erskine, and Charles Grey possessed remarkable 
debating talent, and the Dukes of Bedford and Devonshire wielded 
considerable patronage. Nevertheless, the King would have refused 
to appoint them owing to Fox's vehement opposition to the war, 
support for the ideals of the French Revolution, and unwavering 
animosity towards him. Moreover, Pitt certainly did not wish to 
see his rival succeed him, and so he had to find someone to keep 
Fox out of office.
The decision to appoint the Speaker of the House of Commons 
was unusual but not unprecedented. Robert Harley was promoted 
from Speaker to 'prime minister' in 1710, although he did have 
previous experience as Secretary of State. The selection of the 
Speaker in 1801, however, can only be explained on other grounds. 
Ten years in the role of Speaker had given Addington the stature 
and the degree of independence that was required of Pitt's 
successor in the circumstances, as it was clear that the new 
Prime Minister could be neither a close adherent of Pitt, for 
then he would have felt obliged to resign, nor a member of the 
opposition. On the other hand, without a solid party behind him 
he required the respect of both sides of the House of Commons to
1Ziegler, p. 99.
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sustain a parliamentary majority. Although he owed his position 
as Speaker to Pitt, he had also won the respect of the opposition 
through the fair and impartial way he had managed the business of 
the Commons. In fact, he was not considered an ardent Pittite but 
was one of the few MPs who were on good personal terms with all 
leading politicians.1 For example, he had been seen on different 
occasions walking arm in arm with Pitt and Fox, and developed 
friendships with both the Prince of Wales and the King. Moreover, 
his position as Speaker enabled him to develop such a close 
relationship with George III that he was the first to whom the 
King turned to form a new government.
Addington was also Pitt's first choice as his successor. 
Pitt had long sensed that Addington possessed parliamentary 
abilities, and he was the first to persuade the reluctant 
Addington to speak in the Commons in 1786 and promoted him as a 
candidate for Speaker in 1791.2 He also thought enough of 
Addington to offer him the Home Office when Dundas expressed a 
desire to retire in 1793.3 More significant, however, in 1796 and 
1797, when the state of affairs was such that Pitt had serious 
thoughts of resigning because he believed that the French might 
make peace with another ministry but not with his, he suggested 
that Addington take the government.4 Thus when informing his 
brother, the Earl of Chatham, of his decision to resign, Pitt
1Ziegler, p. 55.
2Ziegler, pp. 46, 58.
3Pellew, i. 108.
4Mrs Tomline's Notes, 10 Nov. 1801, Stanhope of Chevening 
Papers, UB/590/S5; Mary Anne Addington's Notes on Lord 
Sidmouth's Career, Sidmouth Papers, Box 51 Public Office 2; 
Pellew, i. 332n.
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declared that he had long expected that Addington would succeed 
him.1
There were further reasons for selecting Addington. For 
throughout the war Addington was one of the best informed on all 
major foreign and domestic developments. Indeed he was virtually 
an honorary member of the Cabinet, although he did not attend any 
of the meetings,2 and Pitt told him more about policy than he told 
even some of his Cabinet colleagues. Addington also conversed 
regularly with other members of the Cabinet and corresponded with 
naval officers and imperial administrators. Thus no one outside 
of the Cabinet knew more about events or the formulation of 
policy. Moreover, Pitt and other members of the government often 
asked for Addington's advice, especially during the latter stages 
of the ministry. Pitt almost always confided in and relied on the 
advice of one or two of his closest friends, usually Dundas or 
Grenville, but by 1800 he had become a little estranged from 
these two and had come to rely on Addington as his sounding 
board. During the autumn of 1800, he had asked for Addington's 
input on the issues of war, peace, and the grain scarcity, and 
when he had become ill he had gone to Addington's Berkshire 
estate at Woodley to recuperate.3 Therefore, although Addington 
had never held Cabinet office, he knew more about the state of 
foreign and domestic affairs than anyone else who might have been 
Pitt's successor.
Regardless of these qualifications, however, Addington did 
not want the position.4 If ever anyone was made Prime Minister
xPitt to Chatham, 5 Feb. 1801, Edward, Lord Ashbourne, 
Pitt: Some Chapters of his Life and Times (London, 18 98), p. 
311.
2Ziegler, p. 66.
3Pellew, i. 260-7.
4Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III, iii. 
137; J.H. Jesse, Memoirs of the Life and Reign of George III 
(London, 1867), iii. 246.
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against his will, it was Addington. As mentioned, he had 
previously declined promotions on at least two occasions. For in 
the first place he was extremely pleased with his position as 
Speaker to which his mild, even temperament was well suited. In 
addition, his performance as Speaker was unanimously acclaimed, 
and the salary and other perks provided him with a comfortable 
living. Taking the premiership, however, meant sacrificing this 
comfort and security for onerous responsibilities and an insecure 
future.1 It also meant that he was bound to make personal and 
political enemies for the first time, a prospect that Addington, 
who cherished being on good personal terms with everyone, found 
particularly distasteful. In the second place, the diplomatic and 
political situation of early 1801 made the premiership 
unappealing, as a term in office at that time seemed more likely 
to ruin than to improve a career.
Addington initially tried hard to avoid taking office. When 
the King first wrote to him explaining the nature of the crisis 
on 2 9 January, he went directly to persuade Pitt to accommodate 
the King. Whatever passed between them appeared to have convinced 
Addington that he had succeeded in resolving the impasse, and he 
told the King that the crisis had been averted.2 Two days later, 
however, when Addington arrived at Kew the King said that Pitt 
had decided to persevere with the Catholic question and that, 
therefore, the Speaker had to take the government. Instead of 
complying, he returned to Pitt but could not move him. Rather 
Pitt, like the King, pressed Addington to take office. After the 
King had said, vlay your hand upon your heart, and ask yourself 
where I am to turn for support if you do not stand by me1 , at a
1Ziegler, pp. 94-5.
2Colchester Diary, i. 222.
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separate meeting Pitt added, "I see nothing but ruin, Addington,
if you hesitate.11 This indeed placed tremendous pressure on him.
After obtaining promises of support from Pitt, Dundas,
Grenville, and Windham, Addington felt that he had no choice but
to comply,2 but he did so reluctantly and mostly out of a sense
of duty to the King. He explained:
I have done no more than my duty; and being actuated by 
that alone, and having no object but the good of my 
country, I have sought no political connections; but 
shall steadily pursue those measures which my own mind 
approves, and which I therefore venture to hope will be 
approved of and supported by parliament and the 
public.3
He also held back until he had obtained a promise from Pitt to 
advise the new ministry, because he did not wish to find himself 
opposed to Pitt, who was both his political mentor and close 
friend.4
The atmosphere surrounding Addington, his family, and
friends was surprisingly downcast considering that he had just
acceded to the highest office. One of his sisters told another:
You may guess how he feels both the arduousness of the 
undertaking and the sacrifice of private comfort: but 
what is for the best in the present crisis can be the 
only consideration, and of that all seem perfectly 
agreed. His own struggle is over, and he seems calm and 
collected, and to look forward with confidence, though 
not without anxiety. The great thing is to keep up his 
spirits, to carry him through what he feels it his duty 
to undertake.5
1Pellew, i. 285-88; Stanhope, ii. 292-5; Colchester Diary, 
i. 222-3, 233; Glenbervie Diaries, i. 161, 2 78.
2Colchester Diary, i. 223.
3Addington to Simcoe, 23 Feb. 1801, Pellew, i. 331.
4Pellew, i. 330; Glenbervie Diaries, i. 333.
5Mrs Bragge to Mrs Goodenough, 5 Feb. 1801, Pellew, i.
297.
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One politician told Addington, "Sir, I cannot do as others are 
doing, give you joy; for I pity you sincerely.'1 Another said he 
was sorry that Addington had taken the government.2 Glenbervie 
commented that within a few days of agreeing to take office 
Addington looked pale and agitated.3 The point to note here is 
that Addington was just as disturbed by the recent turn of events 
as anyone else, and he had not, under a delusion about his own 
abilities, taken advantage of the situation to advance his 
career, as Rose and George Canning accused him.
The reaction to the news of Addington's accession was more 
mixed than has usually been acknowledged. The response of the 
opposition was shock, disbelief, and derisive laughter. Fox was 
confused and believed that Pitt was playing a trick, while 
Sheridan told his wife that the new arrangement was ridiculous. 
In addition, several in the Holland House set thought it was a 
joke.4 Nevertheless, historians have often overlooked the fact 
that, there were others who agreed that Addington was the best 
man in the circumstances. For example, the Earl of Eldon rejoiced 
at Addington's elevation as a man of strong Protestant 
principles.5 Chatham felt that, "the King could not have acted 
more wisely, than in having recourse to the Speaker, on every 
account, and on none more than that, I am sure, no one man, will 
feel a more sincere concern than himself, for the occasion which
1Colchester Diary. i. 23 0.
2Glenbervie Diaries, i. 160.
3Glenbervie Diaries, i. 161.
4Fox Correspondence, iii. 320-1; Sheridan to Mrs Sheridan, 
10 Feb. 1801, The Letters of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, ed. 
Cecil Price (Oxford, 1966), ii. 149; Ladv Holland Journal, ii. 
130 .
5Campbell, ix. 218.
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has called him forth.’1 Even Marquess Wellesley, who showed
contempt for the other members of the new ministry, expressed
great respect for Addington:
I never can conceive any system to be tainted with the 
least touch (of public or private dishonor or 
incorrectness) which is conducted by Addington, in 
whose virtues & talents I place the most cordial 
reliance; I therefore wish him to succeed in his 
Enterprise, if success be attainable with such 
instruments, & under such strange circumstances.2
Some backbench MPs seemed to prefer Addington's personality and
manner to Pitt's. One even thanked God for a ministry "Without
one of those confounded men of genius in it' .3 This is not to say
that Pitt's resignation was not regretted, but that the scathing
comments of a vocal few overshadowed the alternative view that
Addington was the only suitable candidate to fill Pitt's place.
In the words of Edward Cooke, Addington was "not only the best
but the only man that could be found'.4 Granville Leveson Gower,
who was by no means an admirer of Addington, told his mother,
"there is no alternative but Mr. Addington or Mr. Fox' .5 This was
an argument that Addington's opponents failed to address, as they
put forward no candidate as an alternative.
1Chatham to Pitt, 6 Feb. 1801, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/122/2, fos. 151-2.
2Wellesley to Pitt, 6 Oct. 1801, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/188/1; Wellesley to Grenville, 21 Oct. 1801, Dropmore 
Papers, vii. 63-4.
3 Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, pp. 
122-3; Ziegler, p. 103, Watson, p. 404.
4Cooke to Castlereagh, 9 Feb. 1801, Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, ed. 
Marquess of Londonderry (London, 1848-54), iv. 28.
5Leveson Gower to his mother, 13 Feb. 1801, Lord Granville 
Leveson Gower: Private Correspondence. 1781-1821, ed. Castalia, 
Countess Granville (London, 1916), i. 296.
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Forming the Ministry
The process of forming the ministry was also extraordinary. 
Since the accession of George III, the designated first minister 
in consultation with those taking the highest Cabinet posts 
usually selected almost all of the candidates to fill the 
remaining government offices. This ministry, however, was 
constructed by Addington, Pitt, and the King. Pitt's role, 
moreover, was highly unusual. Ministers usually left office in 
circumstances which drove them into the political opposition or 
complete retirement, but Pitt both promised to support the 
ministry in the Commons and actively recruited men for it. In 
fact, there would have been no ministry but for his assistance. 
For having resigned at the height of his power and without losing 
his majority in Parliament, he still commanded the following of 
a solid block in the Commons which was important for the survival 
of a new ministry.
To describe the new government as the King's ministry is an 
exaggeration, but his role in building it was extremely active, 
as he not only proposed several candidates but also personally 
pressed them to accept. In other cases, Addington was very 
concerned that his own selections would be agreeable to the King. 
The reasons for this renaissance in the King's power owed 
something to Addington's inexperience and attachment to his 
sovereign but also to the awareness, made explicit by the 
Catholic crisis, that a government had to avoid fundamental 
differences of opinion with the King in order to survive. His 
active participation in the formation of the ministry made this 
less likely.
Addington required the help of Pitt and the King because 
filling the vacancies in the government was very difficult, as 
Grenville, Dundas, Spencer, Windham, and Camden--all the Cabinet 
members who supported the Catholic measure--had resigned. This 
exodus meant that there were fewer qualified people with whom to
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reconstruct the ministry, and the problem was compounded by the 
resignations of Pitt's friends and adherents from the lesser 
government posts. Rose and Charles Long (Secretaries of the 
Treasury), Canning (Paymaster of the Forces), William Huskisson 
(Undersecretary for War), Viscount Castlereagh (Chief Secretary 
for Ireland), and Cornwallis, along with the ministers in Berlin 
and Vienna, the Earls of Carysfort and Minto, either resigned 
immediately or expressed a desire to be relieved at a convenient 
time. This left Addington an even smaller pool of talent to 
choose from and more posts to fill.
In the initial stages, Pitt acted quite fairly, considering 
the onerous ordeal that he had imposed on Addington, by promising 
his full support to the new ministry and imploring his friends to 
remain in office. Chatham, Portland, Liverpool, and the Earl of 
Westmorland agreed to remain in the Cabinet, while Thomas Steele 
and Dudley Ryder consented to remain as Joint Paymaster and 
Treasurer of the Navy respectively.
Addington's dilemma was to build a ministry upon the 
foundations of the rump of the less talented of the previous 
ministers with very few experienced and able candidates 
available. By 6 February, he had drawn up a provisional list 
which included Thomas Pelham as Secretary for War, Steele as 
Secretary at War, Ryder as Foreign Secretary, and Lord Macartney 
as President of the Board of Control,1 but within a few days, 
Addington was very distressed to find that each had refused. For 
the Duchess of Devonshire had convinced Pelham that the ministry 
would be short-lived, and Macartney's doctor had warned him that 
his health could not stand the strain of office.2
The only appointments he was able to make with little 
difficulty were the law officers, probably because they were
1Colchester Diary, i. 224.
2Duchess of Devonshire to Pelham, 9 Feb. 18 01, Add. MSS 
33107, fos. 12-4; Glenbervie Diaries, i. 163.
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proposed by the King and considered somewhat independent of the 
political side of the ministry. The King had suggested that Eldon 
become Lord Chancellor and be replaced as Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas by Sir Richard Pepper Arden. Addington was able to 
convince Sir John Mitford to vacate the post of Attorney-General 
in favour of Sir Edward Law by becoming Speaker of the House of 
Commons. Sir William Grant agreed to become Master of the Rolls, 
after turning down an offer of a more political office, leaving 
that of Solicitor-General to Spencer Perceval.
Addington's main problem remained filling the more important 
political offices after his first choices had all refused. In 
this he relied heavily on Pitt, with whom he consulted almost 
daily during this period. Pitt suggested several of the 
candidates who finally accepted office, but, more important, in 
personal interviews with each he persuaded them, largely against 
their own inclination, to join the government.1 For example, Lord 
Hobart told Dundas that vNo man can lament more than I do the 
circumstances which have led to my succeeding to the War 
Department.'2 Nicholas Vansittart, who was to be appointed joint 
Secretary of the Treasury, also stated that he would go to Botany 
Bay if it would help to bring back Pitt's ministry.3 Most of these 
men were reluctant to take office after Pitt's resignation 
probably because they considered him to be their political 
leader, felt that they should follow him either in or out of 
office, and preferred not to shift their allegiance to another. 
As with Addington, they were persuaded only by a declaration from
1Yorke to Mrs Hardwicke, 11 Feb. 1801, Yorke MS Eng. lett. 
c. 60, fos. 3-4; Memorandum 18 01, Hobart Papers, D/MH/H/War/B7; 
Memorandum on Speakership, Redesdale Papers, D2 002/X11; Letters 
of Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of St Vincent. 1801-1804. ed. 
David. B. Smith, Navy Records Society (London, 1922), i. 14; 
Rose Diaries, i. 299; Glenbervie Diaries, i. 295.
2Hobart to Dundas, 14 Feb. 1801, Melville Castle
Muniments, GD 51/1/62.
3Colchester Diarv. i. 23 0.
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Pitt that he desired them to take office and that it was their 
public duty to accept.
Hawkesbury, although not a first choice as Foreign 
Secretary, was a reasonable selection in the circumstances, as 
Addington had lately taken him into his confidence and considered 
him one of the few good candidates for Cabinet office.1 For 
Hawkesbury had a variety of experience in minor government 
offices, as member of both the Board of Control and the Board of 
Trade, and on several occasions had demonstrated a talent for 
speaking competently in the Commons.2 He was also on very close 
terms with Pitt and it is likely that he was destined for higher 
office if Pitt had not resigned.3 An efficient administrator, he 
was praised by Pitt, during one of his first speeches in the 
Commons after resigning the seals, as second only to Fox as a man 
of business.4 Hawkesbury also had a close connection to the King 
through his father, Liverpool, who had long been a royal 
favourite. On giving the seals to Hawkesbury the King had said 
that he had never given them away with such pleasure.5 As to being 
qualified to conduct foreign affairs, he had spoken in the 
Commons on them on several occasions, demonstrating some grasp of 
the field, though he was by no means an expert. His father did, 
however, have considerable experience in foreign affairs,
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 14 Feb. 1801.
2Glenbervie Diaries, i. 222.
3J.-M. Alter, "The Early Life and Political Career of 
Robert Banks Jenkinson, Second Earl of Liverpool, 1790-1812' 
(Ph. D., University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 1988), pp. 53- 
136; Patrick Polden, "Domestic Policies of the Addington 
Administration' (Ph. D., Reading, 1975), p. 72.
4Judith Brown, "The Early Career of Robert Banks 
Jenkinson, Second Earl of Liverpool, 1790-1812: The Making of 
the Arch Mediocrity' (Ph. D., University of Delaware, 1980), p.
106; Parliamentary History, xxxv. 1113.
5Glenbervie Diaries, i . 179.
43
particularly relating to trade, and he was able to provide 
valuable guidance and advice, while the poor state of his health 
precluded him from managing the Foreign Office himself.
Owing to Hawkesbury's inexperience, Addington could not 
permit him considerable lattitude, such as was later exercised by 
Castlereagh, Canning, or Palmerston. In fact, Addington had been 
kept more fully abreast of foreign affairs during Pitt's 
ministry. Addington and Hawkesbury thus kept in close personal 
contact, facilitated by the proximity of the Foreign Office to 10 
Downing Street. Moreover, Addington's complete grasp of his 
government's foreign policy was demonstrated in his conversations 
with ambassadors and foreign ministers, and it was he and not 
Hawkesbury who conversed with influential political figures on 
the subject of foreign affairs.1 The Cabinet also took a greater 
role in formulating policy than under Pitt.2 Foreign affairs were 
the subject of frequent, long, and grueling meetings at which 
Hawkesbury had to justify every step he made. Dissent was rare in 
the end, but several of the ministers took a great deal of 
persuading before they would accept some policies.
The circumstances of Hobart's appointment as Secretary for 
War were similar to Hawkesbury's. Addington had first offered the 
post to Pelham at the insistence of the King and the Duke of 
York, but after Pelham refused he offered it to Hobart. He had 
first considered Hobart for the Presidency of the Board of 
Control but Dundas objected and during his years in India Hobart 
had alienated the Court of Directors and Wellesley.3 Hobart had 
five years' experience each as Secretary for Ireland and Governor 
of Madras and a strong anti-Catholic disposition, which was
Malmesbury Diaries iv. 205-12, 226-8; Glenbervie Diaries, 
i. 266-7; Dundas to Addington 4 May 1801, Melville Castle 
Muniments GD 1/556/2.
2Polden, p. 19.
3Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 2 0 Feb. 1801; Malmesbury 
Diaries, iv. 8; Aspinall, iii. 505n.
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pleasing to the King.1 Addington also believed that he would work 
well with St Vincent, who had agreed to take the Admiralty, and 
it was vital for a successful war effort that the War Office and 
Admiralty coordinate strategy without serious disagreement.2 
Nevertheless, Hobart was very uncertain about taking office, and 
only accepted after consulting Pitt.3
With a new minister coming into the War Office, Addington 
had decided that it would be better to separate it from the 
Presidency of the Board of Control, as the work load of both was 
too great for one official. Dundas had found it onerous. A new 
problem arose, however, in that, with the likelihood of peace 
being negotiated in the near future, Hobart was worried that his 
post as Secretary for War would become redundant.4 Addington was 
determined to make the office permanent, however, because he 
believed that the business of the government would require a 
third Secretary of State. The solution was to transfer 
responsibilities for the colonies from the Home Office to the War 
Office. In 1794, Pitt had intended to keep the colonies in 
Dundas ' s hands when he created the office of Secretary for War so 
as to accommodate the Portland Whigs, but Portland had refused to 
accept the Home Office unless it retained all its former 
responsibilities. With the expectation that Portland would be 
shuffled out of the Home Office to facilitate the new Cabinet 
arrangements and that the Home Office would acquire more business 
as a result of the Union with Ireland, Addington felt that a 
transfer of the colonies would be appropriate. This was only
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 10 Feb. 1801.
2Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 19 Feb. 1801.
3Auckland Correspondence, iv. 12 8; Memorandum 1801, Hobart 
Papers, D/MH/H/War/B7.
Memorandum 1801, Hobart Papers, D/MH/H/War/B7.
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delayed by the unexpected tenacity with which Portland clung to 
the Home Office for another six months.1
After Hawkesbury had refused the Admiralty, Addington 
consulted Pitt who suggested both St Vincent and Admiral Hood.2 
Spencer also recommended St Vincent and the King agreed that he 
would be the best choice.3 Everyone was aware that professional 
seamen tended to make poor political administrators, but St 
Vincent had a record of success in battle and maintaining ship 
discipline, and with the war having taken a desperate turn with 
the likelihood of further naval action, the Admiralty required an 
administrator of vigour and ability.4 He also possessed a detailed 
knowledge of the workings of the Admiralty and expressed a 
fervent desire to reform many of the apparent abuses in the 
system and improve the supplying and maintenance of the fleets at 
sea. As Addington saw a need for reform in many branches of the 
government, he was keen to appoint men who would fulfill these 
tasks.5
St Vincent's relationship with the rest of the ministry was, 
however, somewhat peculiar. First, he was more renowned for his 
career as an officer than as a politician. Second, his closest 
political ties were with Charles Grey and the Foxite opposition, 
and he certainly was not one of Pitt's followers. Third, in the 
circumstances of Pitt's resignation, St Vincent's avowed support
3Addington to Pelham, 2 Aug. 1801, Add. MSS 33107, fo.
212; Aspinall, iii. 589-91.
2Pellew, i. 300n.
3Charles B. Arthur, The Remaking of the English Navv bv 
Admiral St. Vincent--Kev to Victory over Napoleon: The Great 
Unclaimed Naval Revolution. 1795-1805 (London, 1986), iv; The 
King to Addington, 9 Feb. 1801, Aspinall, iii. 494.
4Addington to the King, 9 Feb. 18 01, Aspinall, iii. 491-3.
5John R. Breihan, ^The Addington Party and the Navy in 
British Politics, 1801-1806', in Craig L. Symonds, ed., New 
Aspects of Naval History. (Annapolis, 1981), pp. 164-5.
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for abolition of the Test Acts would seem to have ruled him out 
for any office. Nevertheless, it was quite clear that he was not 
a party man and did not take a strong interest in political 
questions. This gave him a certain degree of independence and 
facilitated his being admired by members from both sides in 
Parliament, but also meant that he felt able to work within the 
ministry only by separating his administration of the navy from 
the political administration of the ministry. After consulting 
his close friend, the Marquess of Lansdowne, and Pitt, he decided 
that he could accept office despite differences of opinion with 
ministers on the condition that he did not to become involved 
with political questions and that the rest of the ministry did 
not interfere with his administration of the navy.1 As a 
consequence, he chose to attend only those Cabinet meetings at 
which matters relevant to the navy were discussed. But this type 
of independence had drawbacks, as it prevented cohesiveness 
within the Cabinet and meant that Addington had to act as a 
liaison between the administration of the navy and the rest of 
the government.
Addington had better fortune filling the office of Secretary 
at War, even though the position was stripped of the Cabinet rank 
that had been granted to Windham. Charles Yorke was a hard­
working, although unimaginative administrator, well suited to the 
role of implementing the policies of the War Secretary and 
coordinating the supply of men, equipment, and food between the 
different military departments. He possessed no experience of 
high office, but was very active in the Cambridgeshire militia 
and was the brother of the Earl of Hardwicke, who possessed a 
modest degree of patronage and descended from a family with 
considerable political and administrative experience. 
Nevertheless, like several others in the ministry, Yorke accepted
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 15 Feb. 1801; St Vincent 
to Lloyd, 19 Feb. 1801, Add. MSS 31170, fo. 16; Ziegler, p.
101; Polden, p. 42.
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office reluctantly and with reservations. For he was a follower 
of Pitt and much regretted his resignation. He consulted Pitt 
after Addington offered the post and only accepted after Pitt 
assured him of continuing support to the ministry. Indeed he 
spoke for many others including Addington when he told his 
mother:
the consenting to fill the Breaches ... is considered 
by us all as a matter of necessity & Duty, not of 
Choice, as a means of preventing the country from 
falling into the very worst hands & the K[ing]. from 
being delivered up to some of his worst enemies. For my 
own part, I reflect upon it as a most arduous, 
responsible & difficult task which I have undertaken; 
that my situation is equally unlooked for, & 
precarious; & that one ought not to calculate upon
remaining in it for six months. perhaps not for six 
weeks. But I think as a great and terrible conflict may 
be expected that it is more glorious to combat in the 
front Ranks than in the Rear.1
Addington also appointed Hardwicke to replace Cornwallis as 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The King originally suggested Chatham 
for the post, and Addington was obliged to ask several others, 
including the Earl of Winchelsea and the Duke of Montrose before 
offering it to Hardwicke.2 Addington knew that Hardwicke supported 
the repeal of the Test Acts, but believed that this would not 
interfere in the administration of Ireland, as long as the Lord 
Lieutenant realized that the issue had been shelved indefinitely. 
Hardwicke might even command more respect from the Catholics in 
Ireland because of these sentiments, while his military 
experience prepared him for dealing with violent unrest. 
Therefore, he seemed to possess the right balance of attributes 
to manage the difficulties of Ireland. In support, Addington sent 
Charles Abbot as Chief Secretary. Abbot had considerable 
experience in minor law offices and was a personal friend of
1York to his mother, 11 Feb. 1801, Yorke MS. Eng. lett. c. 
60, fos. 3-4.
2Pellew, i. 303, 346-7; Colchester Diary. i. 240-2.
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Addington. He had also demonstrated some skill in debate, and 
Addington hoped that he would spend time in London when 
Parliament was in session to help the ministry in the Commons, 
particularly on Irish issues.1
Addington had more trouble filling the post of President of 
the Board of Control. After Macartney, Pelham, Grant, and 
Glenbervie had refused, Addington offered the post to Lord 
Lewisham at the request of Pelham.2 Lewisham had little experience 
in administration, but had worked on the Secret Committee of 
Indian Affairs, had been offered the post of Governor-General of 
Bengal,3 and was also a close friend of the King and Pelham. He 
was not a renowned speaker and he did not even possess a seat in 
either of the Houses of Parliament,4 but this was resolved by 
promoting him to the Lords as Baron Dartmouth (though shortly 
after he succeeded to his father's title of the Earl of 
Dartmouth). Addington was not concerned about placing a weak 
candidate at the Board of Control because he thought Dundas would 
continue to play a large role in both Indian and Scottish 
affairs, and felt that he could handle Indian affairs in the 
Commons along with his other responsibilities. Moreover, he was 
in considerable haste to fill all the positions and did not have 
the time to search for better candidates after so many had 
refused.5
The influence of the King and Pitt in these arrangements, 
while providing many advantages, was also detrimental in some 
ways. The King had decided as early as 1799 that he wanted Eldon
1Colchester Diary. i. 237.
2Cyril Philips, The East India Company. 1784-1834 
(Manchester, 1940), p. 112.
3Philips, p. 242.
4Lewisham to Pelham, 12 Feb. 1801, Add. MSS 33107, fo. 17.
5Aspinall, iii. 503n; Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, vii. 2 
September 1802.
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to be the next Lord Chancellor and had extracted a promise from 
him that he would accept the post if it were ever offered.1 Eldon 
had a distinguished legal career, having under Pitt climbed the 
ladder from Solicitor-General to Attorney-General and then to 
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Thus from his experience, he 
was certainly the best qualified for the office of Lord
Chancellor. Nevertheless, he was content with his post at the
Common Pleas and was very reluctant to give it up for fear of 
being left out in a future Cabinet shuffle, if Addington's 
ministry did not last.2 He was also a devoted follower of Pitt and
did not wish to transfer his allegiance to a new leader. But
Addington and the King pressed him to fulfill his promise, and 
after consulting Pitt and obtaining a promise of a pension of 
£4,000 if he were dismissed as part of an arrangement to bring 
Pitt back into office, he complied.3 These circumstances, however, 
created some ambiguity in his relationship to Addington, as Eldon 
felt that he had been appointed by the King and was, therefore, 
'indebted to the King himself, and not as some supposed, to Mr 
Addington'.4 He believed himself to be the King's Chancellor, not 
Addington's, and consequently responsible for his actions only to 
the King. From this point of view he assumed a degree of 
independence, which in the end was to undermine Addington's 
leadership.5
The most difficult member of the new Cabinet was Pelham, and 
that he was in the Cabinet at all was entirely the King's 
responsibility. He was not Addington's first choice but both the
Horace Twiss, The Public and Private Life of Lord 
Chancellor Eldon, with Selections from his Correspondence (3 
vols., London, 1844), i. 367.
2Glenbervie Diaries, i. 201.
3Rose Diaries, i. 310.
4Twiss, i. 368.
5See below, chapter 9, p. 292.
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King and the Duke of York, insisted that he be included in the 
Cabinet.1 Pelham, like St Vincent, did not have strong political 
ties, as he was neither a follower of Pitt nor a member of the 
opposition, and his closest political connection was the Earl of 
Malmesbury. He was, however, a cousin of the Duke of Newcastle, 
whose patronage Addington probably hoped would be an asset to the 
ministry, which apart from Portland was short on magnates. Like 
Hobart, Pelham had official experience as Secretary for Ireland. 
Therefore, he was not unqualified for office, and his political 
independence would help the ministry to be less dependent on 
Pitt.
However, Addington found making a satisfactory arrangement 
for Pelham almost impossible. He first offered him the War 
Office, at the behest of the King and the Duke of York, who as 
Commander-in-Chief of the forces had to work closely with the 
Secretary for War,2 but fearing that the ministry would not last, 
Pelham twice refused. Afterwards, the King pressed both Addington 
and Pelham to come to an arrangement. Addington was exasperated 
by all the pressure to conciliate a man who could hardly be 
considered a great asset to the ministry and had appeared so 
adamantly opposed to joining it. He asked Lord Sheffield, 'Would 
you have me go on my knees to him? '3 Nevertheless, he reluctantly 
recommenced negotiations, but as he had already granted the War 
Office to Hobart after Pelham's second refusal, this left only 
the Board of Control open. Pelham insisted, however, on a Cabinet 
office.
Addington would have preferred to let the matter rest there, 
but the King and the Duke of York continued to insist that some 
provision be made for Pelham, and the new Prime Minister wanted
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 14 and 16 Feb. 1801; 
Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 6.
2Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 6.
3Glenbervie Diaries, i. 164.
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to avoid making political enemies at such an early stage. He 
convinced Hobart to relinquish the War Office in return for the 
Home Office by shifting Portland to Lord President of the Council 
held by Chatham, who was to become Master General of the Ordnance 
upon Cornwallis's resignation.1 Pelham then decided that he wanted 
the Home Office instead. This meant that the arrangement could 
not be made for several months until Cornwallis returned from 
Ireland. In the meantime, Addington promised Pelham a peerage and 
the leadership of the House of Lords on his accession to the Home 
Office. Addington and Hawkesbury later tried to shuffle Pelham 
off to the embassy at St Petersburg, when diplomatic relations 
resumed with Russia in April,2 but after consulting Malmesbury, 
Pelham insisted that he receive his appointment to the Home 
Office before setting out for St Petersburg.3 As that would have 
defeated the purpose of sending him, Addington dropped the 
subject.
Contemporaries and historians both unfairly ridiculed 
Addington for employing some of his friends and relations in 
minor posts in the ministry. This was common practice, as every 
Prime Minister since Robert Walpole had promoted such 
connections. Pitt, for example, brought his brother Chatham and 
first cousin Grenville into the Cabinet along with university 
friends like Earl Camden. Addington's use of personal patronage 
was quite mild, however, in comparison with previous ministries. 
He appointed his brother Hiley as Secretary to the Treasury, 
which was not out of line considering that as early as January 
1800 the King had expressed a desire to see him appointed to 
higher office and Pitt had promised him a post at the Treasury in
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, v. 17 Mar. 1801; Aspinall, 
iii. 499n.
2Hawkesbury to Pelham, 17 Apr. 18 01, Add. MSS 33107, fo.
31.
3Pelham to Hawkesbury, 18 Apr. 1801, Add. MSS 33107, fo. 
43; Malmesbury Diary, iv. 54.
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September.1 Addington also promoted school friend Nathaniel Bond 
to a Lord of the Treasury, and after Long and Ryder resigned 
appointed Vansittart as the other Secretary of the Treasury and 
his own brother-in-law Charles Bragge as Treasurer of the Navy. 
Neither had previous experience, but Vansittart had an interest 
in and aptitude for finance. Addington can hardly be accused, 
therefore, of filling important offices only with his friends, 
and it is important to note that he never brought any of them 
into the Cabinet.
The strain of filling vacancies in the government in these 
circumstances was immediately overshadowed by the difficulty of 
obtaining the seals of office. Hawkesbury, St Vincent, and Yorke 
kissed hands on 2 0 February, but Pitt was to remain in office 
until Addington had made all the arrangements, which were 
expected to be completed during the next week.2 On 22 February, 
however, the King began to suffer a renewed attack of porphyria, 
and his physical and mental health deteriorated to such a state 
that he was unable to conduct the business of government.3 This 
caused confusion over whether the old or new ministry was really 
in power. As far as the business of government was concerned, the 
problem was resolved by having both the old and new ministers 
attend Cabinet meetings together.4 Pitt continued to control 
policy, as Addington was perfectly willing to defer to his 
decisions, but only Addington had personal access to the King.
The King's illness caused several administrative problems as 
well. Addington had resigned his parliamentary seat to facilitate
xPitt to Addington, 29 Sept. 1800, and Addington to Hiley 
Addington, 2 Jan. 1800, Sidmouth Papers 152M/cl800/OZl and 
OZ4 7.
2Colchester Diary, i. 224.
3Willis Manuscript Diary, Add. MSS 41692, fos. 4-21.
4Cabinet Minutes, Aspinall, iii. 510-lln.
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the reelection required on his accepting office, but with the 
King unable to hand over the seals before the date of the by- 
election, he had to repeat the whole process after the King 
recovered.1 In addition, Hobart had practically taken control of 
the War Office although he had not received the seals, but owing 
to the state of uncertainty, had to return the office and the 
dispatch boxes to Dundas.2 Hobart became so exasperated with the 
delay that he offered to wager Glenbervie £100 if the latter 
would give him a guinea for every day until Addington became 
minister.3 The financial business of the government was also 
stalled as the King was unable to sign any of the money bills.
As the King's condition deteriorated towards the end of 
February, it became clear that the government would probably have 
to prepare for a regency as it had in 1788-89. Consequently, the 
Prince of Wales and the Foxite opposition stirred immediately 
into action. Convinced that the King would not recover, they set 
about preparing to distribute the spoils of office among 
themselves.4 The Prince sent for Addington on 22 February to 
discuss the conduct of affairs, but Addington, unsure about his 
status, replied that he did not consider himself empowered to 
make such arrangements. The Prince then sent for Pitt, who 
cooperated on the condition that he would not repeat what passed 
between them to Fox and his friends. He then offered a regency 
bill on terms similar to those of 1789.5
1Pellew, i. 345.
2Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, iv. 15 Feb. 1801; Malmesbury 
Diaries. iv. 24.
3Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, v. 10 Mar. 1801.
4Fox to Lauderdale, 4 Mar. 1801, Add. MSS 47564, fo. 87; 
The Correspondence of Georcre. Prince of Wales, 1770-1812. ed. 
Arthur Aspinall (8 vols, London, 1963-71), iv. 183-4.
5Colchester Diary, i. 24 6; Malmesbury Diary, iv. 24; 
Stanhope, ii. 409-10.
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The scene then took another sudden turn, as Addington fell 
dangerously ill with rheumatic fever during the first week of 
March, while the King began slowly to recover. Having heard that 
the King blamed his madness on the distress caused by the 
Catholic issue, on 6 March Pitt told George Ill's physician to 
assure the King that he would never again raise the question.1 
When Pitt's friends heard of this pledge, they believed that he 
was no longer obliged to step down and tried to restore his 
ministry. Canning, Rose, Dundas, and others convinced Pitt to 
stay in office,2 but he was very concerned how his actions would 
look to the public. He wished to appear to be a man of principle 
and, therefore, did not want to seem to be grasping at office. He 
believed that the only solution was to make it appear that he had 
been compelled by both Addington and the King to remain in his 
position.3 This meant, however, that Addington would have had to 
agree to suffer public humiliation and the loss of his position 
as Speaker without adequate compensation. Thus he was supposed to 
pay the price of Pitt's carelessness and vacillation. Pitt could 
have avoided all this trouble, however, if he had merely agreed 
to shelve the Catholic issue at the end of January in the same 
way he was willing to do at the beginning of March.
Dundas and Canning devised a plan to inform Addington of 
Pitt's change of sentiments and implore him to sacrifice his 
position, so that Pitt could retain office. Addington heard of 
these deliberations and agreed to step aside if asked by the 
King, but refused to make the first move. Pitt's friends knew 
that the only way that their scheme could succeed was if 
Addington did move first, so they arranged for Portland to press
Htfillis Manuscript Diary, Add. MSS 41692, fo. 41.
2Colchester Diary, i. 258-9; Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 26-7,
34-6.
3Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 39.
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him once again.1 Pitt heard of these plans by 10 March, however, 
and told Dundas to stop Portland.2 Unlike his followers, Pitt 
realized how unfair this would have been to Addington, who had 
only agreed to take office at his insistence. Pitt had only 
stated a willingness to return to office, if Addington and the 
King truly desired it, and he must have realized how it would 
have looked if these underhanded dealings were discovered by the 
public.
By 14 March, the King was well enough to receive the seals 
from Pitt and Addington was well enough to accept them. The 
King's health, however, continued unstable, and he was not well 
enough to take a full part in Council meetings and he could only 
deal with limited government business.3 To ease the strain on the 
King, Addington acted as the sole intermediary between him and 
the Cabinet, causing Glenbervie to remark that this rendered 
Addington a first minister the way it was understood formerly 
under the French system.4 This restriction was relaxed later in 
the life of the ministry,5 as both Eldon and Hawkesbury held 
private meetings with the King, but direct access to the King was 
not nearly as free for other ministers as it had been under Pitt.
The King's faltering health continued for a few months to 
cast a shadow over the future of the ministry. Fox and the Prince 
of Wales continued to prepare for a regency, and Eldon refused to 
accept the seals until he was sure the King was fully recovered. 
While no longer driven to fits of madness, the King sometimes 
made peculiar statements which worried the ministers about his
Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 41.
2Dundas to Pelham, 11 March 1801, Add. MSS 33107, fos. 27-
8 .
3Colchester Diary, i. 2 67.
4Glenbervie Diaries, i. 220.
5Polden, p. 42.
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sanity. But by 14 April, Eldon felt that it was finally safe to 
take office, and after May the King's health ceased to be a 
matter of concern and more people began to believe that the 
ministry might last. At first, many had believed that it was 
merely a temporary expedient. This is not to imply that Addington 
considered himself a locum tenens, for despite Leveson Gower's 
allegation, everything Addington said on the subject indicated 
that he believed that Pitt had resigned for good, and his refusal 
to make things easy for Pitt's return in March belied the notion 
that he was merely a stop-gap. Nevertheless, many in political 
circles did not believe that the ministry had either the ability 
or strength to survive.
The Prospects for the Ministry
Although Pitt bequeathed to Addington a large government 
majority in Parliament, the new ministry was not properly 
equipped to maintain it. Glenbervie remarked that 'The new 
Government seems to me to want the sufficient proportion of three 
things--brains, blood, and gold, i.e. abilities, family and 
property.'1 The new ministers did not lack ability in 
administration, but Glenbervie was probably referring to debating 
talent, and this was the ministry's greatest drawback. For no one 
on the front bench was a truly eloquent and convincing speaker. 
Every day the House was in session the ministry was on trial, and 
some MPs measured its fitness for office by its ability to 
promote and defend its measures in debate. During the first few 
months of the ministry, Pitt provided valuable assistance in this 
area, but Addington could not rely on Pitt forever.
The problem was not so much that Addington had appointed 
poor speakers, but that, as mentioned, the best debaters were not
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 170-71.
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available for the job. Addington and Hawkesbury could speak
effectively at times, but they were very inconsistent, as were
Eldon, Hobart, and Pelham in the Lords. Nevertheless, Addington
had not overlooked any talented speakers when forming his
ministry. Regardless of whom else he might have chosen the
problem would have remained.
On the other hand, it should also be stressed that many MPs
were tiring of the elaborate eloquence of Pitt and Fox. Sidney
Smith remarked that, "At the close of every brilliant display an
expedition failed or a kingdom fell. God send us a stammerer!'1
According to Robert Southey, some MPs found Addington's simple
and more direct manner more reassuring.2
Glenbervie's comment about blood and gold referred largely
to parliamentary patronage. The ministry was short on landed
magnates who commanded control of parliamentary seats. While
Portland had a considerable pedigree and several members in his
pocket, he was the only one in the Cabinet. Hardwicke' s patronage
was modest, and while Pelham, being a cousin of the Duke of
Newcastle, helped to a certain extent he did not control the
seats himself. Of the biggest magnates, Fitzwilliam, Bedford, and
Devonshire were in the opposition, while Lauderdale, Buckingham,
and Rutland were independent.
As to blood, Addington and the rest of the ministry were of
little or short pedigree, and this may have made the magnates
less disposed to support him. Liverpool explained:
There is no man who holds nobility without Talents, in 
greater Contempt than I do; But nobility joined to 
Talents, produces a wonderful Effect upon the Minds of 
men; and Talents, where there is no Nobility, must be 
very conspicuous, to compensate for the Want of it;-- 
This is exactly the State of Mr Addington: a worthy and 
good man, and with a certain Degree of Talents, but not
1Ziegler, p. 11.
2Robert Southey, Letters from England, ed. Jack Simmons 
(London, 1951), pp. 71-4.
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sufficient to hold him up, against the Aristocratic
Feelings of Mankind ... 1
Addington would have required extraordinary talents to overcome 
his lack of pedigree in the eyes of many in the aristocracy.2 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the greatest 
concentration of talents and magnates was in the Foxite 
opposition whose parliamentary support was nevertheless small and 
whose hopes of attaining office appeared non-existent as long as 
the King lived.
Addington also lacked a strong foundation in the Commons. He 
had no personal following because he himself had been a follower 
of Pitt. Moreover, his dependence on Pitt during the early months 
of 1801 created an ambiguity over the allegiance of the ministry 
which Addington should have clarified from the start. Most 
contemporaries and historians were confused over whether Pitt was 
a minister behind the curtain, pulling all the strings or 
Addington was really in charge. Fox was justified in supposing 
that the whole arrangement was merely a juggle or a "dessous des 
cartes'. In fact, Addington was in control. For from the start, 
he was determined to be the effective head of the government with 
complete direction over government policies, which he intended to 
pursue even if Pitt differed with them.3 When preparing to discuss 
the major questions facing the government at the end of February 
with his colleagues, Addington noted that they had to be ready 
for tough debates and could not rely on the support of the 
previous ministers.4 Nevertheless, Addington continued to meet 
almost daily with Pitt. For Pitt was both his political mentor
Liverpool to Hawkesbury 1 June 1803, Add. MSS 38236, fo.
259.
2Ziegler, p. 110.
3Cooke to Castlereagh, 7 Mar. 1801, Castlereagh
Correspondence, iv. 78.
4Colchester Diary, i . 248.
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and personal friend, and he probably would have felt it more out 
of place if he had not consulted him. The regularity of their 
conduct and Addington's tendency to lean on Pitt for support, 
however, demonstrated to the public a considerable degree of 
dependence. At the time, Addington did not seem to mind because 
he had accepted office against his own inclination, and only 
found it bearable because Pitt had promised to support him. Thus 
he probably expected that he would never find himself fighting 
against Pitt in the Commons.
Addington was also deficient in some of the qualities of 
leadership. His calm, temperate, and conciliatory nature 
permitted him to get along well with everyone, but he lacked 
dynamism and assertiveness. For example, while he dealt with 
Loughborough sternly enough,1 it took him five months to get 
Portland to vacate the Home Office for Pelham, and he never 
adequately resolved the dispute between Pelham and Hardwicke over 
Irish patronage. Addington was also so concerned to sustain 
personal friendships with everyone, that he had difficulty making 
some of the tough decisions required for the survival of his 
ministry. Malmesbury remarked that Addington in desiring to 
please everyone would end up by pleasing no one, and Wilberforce 
added that he was 'not qualified for such rough and rude work as
^•Loughborough saw no reason why he should not continue in 
office but it was clear that the Chancellor had betrayed Pitt's 
ministry by advising the King on the Catholic issue without the 
concurrence of his fellow ministers. Addington, who knew that 
he could not command the personal loyalty of the majority of 
the Cabinet in the way Pitt had done, could not afford to have 
any of his ministers pursuing a different course of policy 
behind his back. Therefore, he shuffled Loughborough out of the 
Cabinet with an earldom as compensation. When Loughborough 
continued to attend Cabinet meetings after his resignation, 
Addington quickly made it clear that he was not welcome. See 
Colchester Diary, i. 228-9 and Addington to Loughborough, 25 
April 1801, Campbell, vi. 327.
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he may have to encounter'.1 Being a successful Prime Minister 
required ruthlessness and a tough skin which Addington did not 
possess.
The unusual composition of the ministry meant that it did 
not work well together, as several of the ministers did not 
interact well on a personal or administrative level. For example, 
St Vincent wanted to manage the navy on his own, consulting only 
with Addington and occasionally with Hobart, but this meant that 
the other members of the ministry, including its best debaters, 
Hawkesbury and Eldon, were not well informed about naval affairs. 
In addition, Pelham was constantly in dispute with his colleagues 
over the jurisdiction of his office. He tried in vain to retain 
and increase as many responsibilities as possible, and this put 
him at odds with Hobart over the colonies and the leadership of 
the House of Lords and with Hardwicke over Irish patronage. 
Consequently, Addington had to work hard to avoid resignations at 
different times by both Hardwicke and Pelham. Therefore, the 
ministers were not able to defend each other in Parliament as 
well as they might have been, if they had worked more closely 
together and possessed a greater sense of loyalty to the ministry 
and its leader.
These deficiencies should not overshadow the ministry's 
several important attributes. Primarily, it had the confidence 
and support of the King which no other party in Parliament could 
claim. Moreover, the ministers were also both competent and 
businesslike, certainly no less so than many who had preceded 
them.2 While they would not have been promoted so high so soon if 
Pitt had continued in power, it is clear that at least Hawkesbury 
and Eldon were destined for the Cabinet eventually. The most
Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 12; R. I. and S. Wilberforce, The 
Life of William Wilberforce, (London, 1838), iii. 2.
2Robin Reilly, William Pitt the Younger, (New York, 1979), 
p. 392.
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important point once again is that at the time there were no 
better alternatives to these ministers.1
As many politicians looked back on Pitt's ministry as an 
ideal example of a strong ministry, in using it as a touchstone 
by which to measure the new government they were misleading 
themselves. While it had included several experienced and 
talented individuals, the ministry as a unit had lapsed into a 
state of virtual paralysis. For it was so racked by dissent over 
policy that the administration of government had become seriously 
affected, and the strain on Pitt's health had rendered him an 
ineffective leader.2 The new ministry, on the other hand, was 
healthy and, at least at the beginning, united in terms of
policy, which was quite surprising considering the different 
backgrounds of the ministers.
In summary, the prospects for the ministry were not as
gloomy as many contemporaries believed. Historians appear to have 
concluded from hindsight that because the ministry eventually 
collapsed it was destined to do so. In fact, after it survived 
the series of initial crises, more people began to think that the 
arrangement might continue. Lady Holland wrote, "The first laugh
over people begin to think this Administration may last, and if
they commence a negotiation they will even become popular.'3 Pitt 
and Grenville believed from the start that even though Addington 
was not a great orator, the ministry could survive, if it were 
well supported.4 Even though Addington did not have a strong 
following of his own, this did not matter as long as Pitt
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 195; Stanhope, ii. 404; Ziegler,
p. 102.
2Mackesy, War without Victory, pp. 174-7.
3Ladv Holland Journal, ii. 130.
4Glenbervie Diaries, i. 160; Grenville to Carysfort, 17 
Feb. 1801, Dropmore Papers, vi. 450.
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continued to support him. Glenbervie even prophesied that if
Addington could
stand up firm for a few weeks while attacked by all the 
invective, vehemence, sarcasm, virulence, menaces, 
affected contempt and ridicule which will be used in 
order to bully or laugh him out of his place, the 
Opposition or the House will get tired of that sort of 
warfare, and men of property, rank, and talents will 
then cling to him.1
The greatest threats to the ministry were the military,
diplomatic, and political dangers left over from Pitt's
government, and in the short term, the survival of the ministry
depended on the effectiveness of its policies in extricating the
country from the problems which arose under its predecessor.
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 174.
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The Pacification of Europe:
Foreign Policy February-October 1801
"Le but principal du Cabinet de Londres est de tout tenter pour 
detacher la Russie de la France ...'
Count Starhemberg1
Upon hearing of the impending change of ministries in early
February, many assumed that Addington would seek peace immediately.2
Liverpool even expected that the French would consider the new
ministry pledged to it.3 Nevertheless, Addington did not have a
"thirst for peace'.4 Although he was alarmed by the diverse
consequences of the war, he consistently supported Pitt's policies,
and claimed that even though Britain had arrived at a great crisis
... it is only by measures wisely concerted and 
vigorously executed, and by steadiness and firmness in 
the government, in parliament, and in the feelings and 
opinions of the public, that its difficulties can be 
surmounted.5
The reason so many expected him to make peace was that they thought 
that the critical state of Britain's internal and diplomatic 
positions gave any new ministry little option: without the
experience of the existing ministers, a new government could not 
continue the war. For example, when the rumour that Pitt might
^•Starhemberg to Colloredo, 19 Mar. 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
2Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 28; Morley Manuscript Diary, Add. 
MSS 48247, fo. 5.
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 25 Mar. 1801, MS Loan 72/51, fo.
23 .
4Feiling, p. 225.
5Addington to Sir William Scott, 14 Jan. 1801, Pellew, i.
277.
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resign reached the City on 2 February, the stocks rose two percent 
on the expectation that any new ministry would make peace.1 These 
prophesies were correct but were based on the false assumption that 
there was a substantial difference in attitudes or policy options 
between Pitt and Addington.
Pitt was in fact just as eager as Addington to end the war, but 
he had failed owing to two major obstacles. First, his Cabinet was 
so divided that it could not agree on terms.2 Grenville's attitude 
both prior and subsequent to the Treaty of Amiens indicated that he 
would never have consented to terms which the French could accept.3 
Second, the French did not trust Pitt because they perceived him as 
the arch enemy of the revolution, the mastermind behind the royalist 
cause. This was to a great extent a result of war propaganda, but 
even as sharp a man as Louis Otto, the French representative, was 
convinced that Pitt's ministry could never make peace.4 Therefore, 
in seeking to end the war Addington was following a policy of which 
Pitt approved but had been unable to implement himself.5
The pressure for peace came not from an inherent pacifism on 
Addington's part but from the desperate nature of the political and 
economic environment into which the new ministry was thrust. 
Addington and Hawkesbury had to unravel a dangerous diplomatic 
tangle, while the government's ability to finance the war was 
becoming exceedingly hampered. This along with popular 
dissatisfaction with the war and the revolutionary threat posed by 
social unrest convinced the administration that Britain required an
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 151; The Times. 7 Feb. 1801.
2Mackesy, War without Victory.
3Grenville to Auckland, n.d. 1801, Add. MSS 34455, fos. 
462-3 .
4"Coup d'oeil politique sur 1'Angleterre' in Otto to 
Talleyrand, 4 Floreal IX (24 Apr. 1801) , AE Angleterre/595; 
Otto to Talleyrand, 7 Fructidor IX (25 Aug. 18 01), AE 
Angleterre/595.
5H. M. Bowman, Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens 
(Toronto, 1901), p. 68.
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interval of peace1 and the only reasonable course was to negotiate 
with all of its enemies. Unfortunately, obtaining peace was very 
difficult. For previous attempts to resolve the dispute with the 
League of Armed Neutrality had failed, and finding terms which were 
honourable, conformable to British popular opinion, and acceptable 
to the French was a difficult and delicate task.
The League of Armed Neutrality
When Hawkesbury took the Foreign Office in February 1801 
Britain was in a dreadful diplomatic position. As mentioned, the war 
with France was at its lowest point, but, more important, the 
dispute with the Northern Powers over the League of Armed Neutrality 
had become even more pressing. The closure of the Sound, which cut 
the vital Baltic supplies of grain and naval stores, and the 
alliance formed to enforce the rights of neutral shipping posed a 
greater threat to British wealth and naval power than did France. 
Furthermore, British naval supremacy was threatened by the union of 
the strongest navies of Europe. Thus the new ministry had to respond 
quickly to avoid a major military and economic disaster.
Britain's dispute with Denmark and Sweden concerned the rights 
of belligerent and neutral powers on the seas. As maritime law was 
not codified, but governed by precedent and convention, each side 
interpreted the law in its own favour. The neutrals supported two 
main principles to which the British could never consent: that
neutral flags protected all goods but contraband of war--referred 
to as "free ships make free goods'--and that convoys of ships of war 
protected merchant ships from search and seizure. As British power 
was based on maritime and commercial dominance, the government could 
not accept any principles of maritime law that would undercut its 
economic weapons. For example, blockades of the enemy's coast would 
be ineffective, if neutral powers could carry on the enemy's trade
1Ziegler, p. 77.
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uninterrupted. On the other side, the neutral countries were 
affronted by the high-handed manner in which the British carried out 
search and seizure, and appalled by the obvious pro-British bias in 
the Admiralty Courts, particularly those in the Caribbean. Thus, the 
dispute was a matter of national prestige as well as maritime power.
In response to the professed determination of the League of 
Armed Neutrality to resist by force of arms search and seizure, Pitt 
had decided to send a fleet to Copenhagen to secure passage of The 
Sound and to coerce the Danes into renouncing the treaty. 
Consequently, a large force under Sir Hyde Parker with Admiral Lord 
Nelson as second in command assembled at Yarmouth in February 1801 
under orders to proceed to the Baltic as soon as it was free of ice, 
as the fleet had to arrive before the Swedes and Russians could send 
their navies to support the Danes. As the British approach to the 
League of Armed Neutrality was to deal with one member at a time, 
once the Danes had surrendered, the fleet was to sail to Revel and 
Kronstadt to attack the Russians.
Addington and Hawkesbury had no alternative policy and were 
convinced by Pitt and Grenville that this aggressive action was 
absolutely necessary.1 Nevertheless, a few days before Grenville 
resigned the seals, the Foreign Office received an anonymous letter, 
believed to have been sent by Prince Charles of Hesse, father-in-law 
to the Prince Royal of Denmark, that indicated that the Danes wished 
to settle the dispute.2 These sentiments were supported by 
dispatches from William Drummond, the British minister in 
Copenhagen.3 Grenville was skeptical of the truth of the assertions 
in the letter, but Addington and Hawkesbury wished to take advantage 
of this opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully.4 For if
Addington to Sir William Scott, 14 Jan. 1801, Pellew i.
277.
2Hawkesbury to Carysfort, 10 Mar. 1801, FO 64/60.
3Drummond to Grenville, 9 and 20 Jan. 1801, FO 22/40.
4Hawkesbury to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, 23 
Feb. 1801, inclosed in Hawkesbury to Drummond, 25 Feb. 1801, FO
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negotiations were successful, war would have been averted; if not, 
having demonstrated a desire to resolve the dispute peacefully would 
have rendered the British position more justified in opinion both 
at home and abroad. Moreover, as the fleet could not reach 
Copenhagen until at least the end of March, nothing could have been 
lost in the attempt.
Addington and Pitt chose Vansittart as special envoy.1 At the 
Foreign Office on 17 February, Addington, Hawkesbury, and Grenville 
briefed Vansittart on his mission. They instructed him to meet 
Prince Charles of Hesse in Schleswig to determine whether 
satisfactory negotiations with the Danes were possible. If his 
interview with Prince Charles indicated that the mission had a 
reasonable chance of success, he was then to proceed to Copenhagen 
to join Drummond in negotiating directly with the Danish government. 
The goals of the mission were first to persuade the Danes to abandon 
their position of hostility to Britain (and even to form an alliance 
if possible), and second, to regulate permanently the question of 
neutral law. On the two main issues of the maritime dispute, 
Vansittart was given permission to negotiate on the convoy question, 
but in no circumstances was he to agree that free ships made free 
goods. In addition, if at any time during his discussions with 
Prince Charles or the Danish government it appeared that the mission 
would fail, he was to return immediately to London.2
While Addington and Hawkesbury wished to appear conciliatory, 
they wanted to convince the Danes that they were not acting out of 
weakness. Britain could accept nothing less than the termination of 
the League of Armed Neutrality. In order to present a position of
211/6 .
1Hawkesbury to Grenville, 15 Feb. 1801, Add. MSS 58936, 
fos. 7-8. Hawkesbury had asked Lord Hervey, one of his under 
secretaries, who refused owing to the chance that his wife 
might miscarry, and had also considered William Wallace and 
Charles Arbuthnot, but appears to have been overruled by 
Addington and Pitt.
2Grenville to Vansittart, 17 Feb. 1801, FO 22/40.
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firmness prior to the negotiations, Hawkesbury sent a stern note on 
25 February to the Danish government via Drummond, warning that, if 
it did not accommodate the British, they would take strong action 
in response to their grievances.1 That same day he sent an order to 
the Admiralty "to capture or destroy the Navy & weaken as much as 
possible the Maritime Resources of Denmark in the Port of 
Copenhagen, or wherever they may be found and can be attacked'.2
Vansittart left for Cuxhaven on 21 February and arrived at 
Gottorp Castle, the residence of Prince Charles, on 4 March, but his 
reception was not encouraging. For Prince Charles had very little 
influence on Danish policy, and it was clear that European opinion 
did not believe the British would attack. Nevertheless, Vansittart 
proceeded to Copenhagen (contrary to his instructions), because he 
believed that the difficulties could be overcome: "I ... consider 
the moment of the arrival of a British fleet in the Sound, as 
extremely critical; & that it may probably be turned to the greatest 
advantage, even if no previous appearance of accommodation should 
exist.'3 Thus he hoped that gunboat diplomacy would grant success to 
his mission.
Vansittart arrived in Copenhagen on 9 March and concerted with 
Drummond for several days before meeting with Christian Bernstorff, 
the Danish foreign minister for two hours on 14 March. Bernstorff, 
however, was exceedingly difficult. He first demanded that the 
British remove the embargo and release all Danish ships before he 
would even accept Vansittart's credentials. When the two British 
agents offered to agree to these demands on the condition that 
Bernstorff would guarantee to accept Vansittart's credentials and 
begin negotiating, he refused, claiming that he could not enter into 
an arrangement without the agreement of Sweden and Prussia. He
1Hawkesbury to Drummond, 2 5 Feb. 1801 and inclosure, FO 
22/40.
2Hawkesbury to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, 23 
Feb. 1801, inclosed in Hawkesbury to Drummond, 25 Feb. 1801, FO 
211/6 .
3Vansittart to Grenville, 26 Feb. 1801, FO 22/41.
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nevertheless reiterated his demand that the Danish ships be released 
unconditionally.1
Bernstorff was merely stalling for time because he had decided 
before Vansittart had arrived not to consent to separate 
negotiations.2 It is unfair, however, to accuse him simply of trying 
to cheat the British. For Denmark was also in a very dangerous 
diplomatic position. As one of the lesser powers of Europe, it was 
subject to the influence of the great powers, especially Russia, the 
predominant Baltic power which also exercised influence over Sweden 
and Prussia. Thus the Danish government could not afford to alienate 
the Russian government on the issue of the League of Armed 
Neutrality, especially with the apparently volatile Paul I on the 
throne. In addition, as a signatory of the convention with Sweden 
and Prussia, Denmark would not only have lost face if it abandoned 
the League, but would also have created considerable animosity among 
two of its closest neighbours. The Danes particularly did not want 
to give the Swedes an excuse to invade the Danish province of Norway 
which they coveted. The consequences of the Danes willingly 
abandoning their allies on Britain's terms, therefore, would have 
been much greater than the price to be paid by war.3
Hawkesbury sent Drummond an ultimatum with his note of 25 
February stating that, if the Danes did not come to agreement within 
forty-eight hours of receipt of the dispatch, the entire British 
mission in Copenhagen was to depart for London.4 As the Danes could 
not comply, Vansittart left on 21 March, but Drummond chose to 
remain, claiming that the British should have a representative on 
the spot in case the Danes changed their minds before hostilities
1Drummond to Hawkesbury, 14 Mar. 1801, and Drummond and 
Vansittart to Hawkesbury, 19 Mar. 1801, FO 22/40.
2Feldbaek, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, p. 135.
3Feldbaek, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 102-65.
4Hawkesbury to Drummond, 25 Feb. 1801, FO 22/40.
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began.1 The fleet which had left Yarmouth on 12 March arrived off 
Copenhagen eight days later. After some preliminary scouting, the 
British attacked Danish shipping and artillery in Copenhagen harbour 
on 2 April thus commencing the first Battle of Copenhagen.2
From this point, Hawkesbury and Addington lost all control of 
events and the outcome of the dispute was left to the navy. After 
a successful naval engagement Nelson and Parker obtained an 
agreement with the Danes on 9 April which deviated considerably from 
the one that Vansittart had been instructed to obtain. It did not 
comply with the terms set out by Hawkesbury, as it was merely an 
armistice of fourteen weeks which provided for direct negotiations 
between Copenhagen and London on the condition that the British 
fleet be allowed to obtain provisions in Copenhagen and free passage 
of the Sound, and that the Treaty of Armed Neutrality be suspended 
during the negotiations. Addington, Hawkesbury, and St Vincent were 
not completely satisfied with the terms as they had expected a 
Danish capitulation not a ceasefire, but chose to accept them 
despite an unfavourable public reception.3
At this point the focus of British foreign policy shifted 
towards Russia where it was often to return during the course of the 
ministry. British historians of the period have often treated Anglo- 
French diplomacy in isolation, under the assumption that because 
Britain and France were the only combatants left in the war, France 
had become Britain's absolute diplomatic priority.4 This has
1Drummond and Vansittart to Hawkesbury, 19 Mar. 1801, FO 
22/40 .
2A naval account of the battle can be found in Roger C. 
Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic during the Sailing Ship 
Epoch. 1522-1850 (London, 1910), pp. 302-12, and Feldbaek, 
Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 144-65.
3Thomas Grenville to Spencer, 22 Apr. 18 01, Althorp Papers 
G42; Starhemberg to Colloredo, 2 8 Apr. 18 01, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
4The most recent example of this is John C. Clarke,
British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. 1782-1865 (London, 1989)
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distorted the picture, however, because it ignores the particular
care and attention Hawkesbury gave to cultivating Russian
friendship. Although Addington and Hawkesbury had to deal with
Denmark first for tactical and strategic reasons, they knew that
Russia was the power behind the League of Armed Neutrality and the
real threat. Only Russia had the power to close the Baltic to
British trade, and the size of Russia's navy and army enabled it,
if allied with the navies of the north, to challenge British power
on the seas or, if allied with the French army, to expel British
influence from the Continent. Consequently, in early 1801 Russia
posed a greater threat to British interests, than did France.
Therefore, a rapprochement with Russia to strengthen Britain's
political and military position was both a necessary prerequisite
to peace with the French,1 and an end in itself.
While the new Cabinet was deliberating over whether to propose
peace to the French, it also decided to make an overture to the
Russians. As there had been no British representative in Russia
since the expulsion of Lord Whitworth in June 1800, Hawkesbury sent
the offer on 24 March via the British minister in Berlin, Carysfort,
who was in contact with Russian representatives in Prussia.
Hawkesbury sent Carysfort full powers and instructed him:
to endeavour, in the first instance to negotiate a Treaty 
on Maritime Law, similar to that which Mr. Vansittart is 
instructed to negotiate with the government of 
Copenhagen, but if you should find the Russian Government 
unwilling to enter into Engagements of this nature, His 
Majesty will be satisfied with a formal Renunciation of 
the Convention signed at [St] Petersburgh on the 16th: of 
December, and will, on this Condition, and on that of the
who appears to have overlooked Ole Feldbaek, Denmark and the 
Armed Neutrality and "The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement of 1801: 
A Prelude to the Peace of Amiens' Scandinavian Journal of 
History iii (1978), 205-27. In both works, Feldbaek 
demonstrates clearly the primacy of Russia and the Armed 
Neutrality in the foreign policy of the first few months of 
Addington's ministry.
1Feldbaek, "The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement', p. 208.
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Embargo being immediately taken off, consent to the Terms 
which have been proposed respecting Malta.1
This intended overture to the Russians has often been 
overlooked, probably because it was superseded by new developments 
while still in transit. For on the day that Hawkesbury wrote the 
dispatch, Paul I was murdered in St Petersburg. The new Tsar, 
Alexander I, was more favourably disposed to Britain, because he did 
not have the personal stake in the questions of Malta and the League 
of Armed Neutrality which his father had, and he was determined to 
turn away from foreign entanglements to concentrate on retrenchment 
and reform in Russia.2 This did not mean that he wished to reverse 
Russia's foreign policy and align himself with Britain but rather 
to make peace with all powers and withdraw from Europe. To this end 
he sent indications through Count A. P. Pahlen, his chief minister, 
and Count Simon Vorontsov, former ambassador to London, that he 
desired to reestablish diplomatic relations and resolve Russia's 
outstanding disputes with Britain.3
This news, received on 13 April, stirred the British government 
into a frenzy of activity. That evening, Addington interrupted Pitt 
at dinner at Dundas's in Wimbledon to tell him, and the next day, 
Addington arrived at Pitt's home in Park Place to consult further 
on the change in Britain's diplomatic situation. Addington and 
Hawkesbury continued to discuss Russian diplomacy with Pitt
hawkesbury to Carysfort, 24 Mar. 1801, FO 63/60. 
Hawkesbury was probably referring to the Anglo-Russian 
agreement of May 1799 which stipulated that the island would be 
garrisoned jointly by British, Russian, and Neapolitan troops 
until the peace when it would be restored to the Knights of 
Malta. On 3 April Hawkesbury changed his mind for a reason he 
never explained and instructed Carysfort in a private letter to 
withhold temporarily the offer concerning Malta. Hawkesbury to 
Carysfort, 3 Apr. 1801, Jackson Papers, FO 353/44.
2Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of 
Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian 
Diplomacy. 1801-1825 (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1969), pp. 66- 
103 .
3Pahlen to Hawkesbury, ? Mar. 1801, FO 65/48; Hawkesbury 
to Pahlen, 19 Apr. 1801, FO 65/48.
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throughout the spring and summer. Although it is not clear precisely 
what advice Pitt gave during this period, it is reasonable to assume 
that it coincided with the policy followed by the government. 
Hawkesbury also consulted Grenville but ignored much of his advice, 
as Pitt suggested throwing many of his cousin's written 
recommendations into the fireplace.1
Hawkesbury and Addington then took pains selecting an 
ambassador to St Petersburg to congratulate the new Tsar on his 
accession and to begin negotiations to resolve the dispute over the 
League of Armed Neutrality. On 21 April, at the direction of 
Vorontsov Hawkesbury ordered Benjamin Garlike, Carysfort's charge 
d'affaires at Berlin and a personal acquaintance of Count N. P. 
Panin, the Russian foreign minister, to proceed immediately as a 
temporary representative to St Petersburg.2 For ambassador, 
Addington and Hawkesbury chose Lord St Helens, who was the most 
experienced diplomat after Malmesbury and Whitworth,3 having been 
envoy extraordinary to the Court of Catherine the Great, and a 
personal friend of George III. The ministers evidently believed that 
he carried both sufficient weight to flatter the new Tsar and the 
diplomatic expertise to negotiate a treaty favourable to British 
interests.
Britain's diplomatic position having improved considerably 
since the Battle of Copenhagen and, more important, the death of 
Paul,4 Hawkesbury and Addington felt that they did not have to make 
as many concessions to gain an agreement from the Russians. 
Nevertheless, they could not by any means bully the new Tsar as 
Grenville seemed to suggest. He strongly opposed any concessions
1Glenbervie Diaries. 220-1, 2 95; Starhemberg to Colloredo, 
28 Apr. 1801, HHSA, Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
2Hawkesbury to Garlike, 21 Apr. 1801, FO 63/61.
3These two could not have been considered for the post 
because Malmesbury was in poor health and Whitworth had 
recently been expelled from Russia.
4Ragsdale, pp. 101-2; Ingram, "The Failure of British Sea 
Power', p . 69.
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being made to Russia on behalf of Denmark, thought British interests 
were 'very much concerned in leaving at Copenhagen a strong 
impression of the certain loss which Denmark incurs when she embarks 
in any such confederacy as the present', and believed that the 
Russians had no intention of supporting the Danes, if the British 
kept the issue off the table.1 Addington and Hawkesbury wisely 
ignored this advice. For when the Tsar first heard of Carysfort's 
overture, while being prepared to postpone the question of Malta in 
order to concentrate on the issue of the League of Armed Neutrality, 
he was determined to fight the British if they demanded unreasonable 
terms.2 As he wished to sustain Russian prestige with the Baltic 
powers by appearing to arrange the resolution of their dispute with 
Britain,3 he required as many concessions as he could obtain for his 
allies before abandoning the League of Armed Neutrality. Thus for 
the British, there was much to lose by adopting Grenville's 
position.
Addington and Hawkesbury were prepared to compromise, provided
that their primary goals were achieved. As a peace settlement was
the first priority, Hawkesbury instructed St Helens
to propose an arrangement which shall place every thing 
between the two Countries on the same footing on which it 
was, previous to the Departure of Lord Whitworth from 
Petersburgh; or at any other Period subsequent to the 
expiration of The Armed Neutrality of 1780, and 
antecedent to the signature of the Convention of Armed 
Neutrality of December last, which may be preferable in 
the Estimation of the Russian Government.4
The next priority was to resolve the question of maritime law in a
way that would permit British ships to continue to use effectively
1Grenville to Addington, 8 May 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl80l/OZ8.
2Alexander I to Krudener, and Alexander I to Pahlen, 2 0 
Apr. 1801, VPR, i. 13, 16-7.
3Alexander I to S. Vorontsov, 6 April and 2 May 1801, AKV, 
x. 252, 255, 257; Nelson to Addington, 27 May 1801, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl801/ON6.
instructions to St Helens, 30 Apr. 1801, FO 65/48.
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their most potent weapons, including the blockade and search and 
seizure of enemy property on neutral ships. This required that the 
Russians abandon the Treaty of Armed Neutrality, but as a 
concession, Hawkesbury was willing to grant that the right to search 
a merchant vessel under convoy of a ship of war be restricted to 
ships of war of a belligerent state excluding privateers, and that 
the British follow a set of regulations in the process of searching 
to prevent it becoming a source of disagreement in the future. He 
also agreed to return ships and colonies captured from Denmark and 
Sweden. As to Malta, Hawkesbury hoped that any discussion could be 
postponed, but if the Russians refused, he instructed St Helens to 
offer to restore the property and privileges of the Knights of 
Malta, as long as British troops continued to occupy the island, 
because the Knights could not protect it from the French.1
St Helens arrived in St Petersburg via Denmark on 18 May, and 
the Russians immediately demonstrated a willingness to establish 
cordial relations by granting him the first audience with the new 
Tsar given to any foreign minister.2 On 2 June, St Helens met for 
the first time with Count Panin, the Russian negotiator, who agreed 
to acknowledge the rights of searching neutral vessels sailing under 
convoy and seizing contraband of war. Nevertheless, a few days 
later, he presented a counter proposal which qualified the right of 
search to such point that it would have lost all its value. His 
project also proposed that the Anglo-Russian convention include an 
transcript of the Treaty of Armed Neutrality with only slight 
modifications. He then demanded that the British fleet leave the 
Baltic before the Convention were ratified.3
1Idem.
2St Helens to Hawkesbury, 31 May 1801, FO 65/48.
3St Helens to Hawkesbury, 5, 9, and 18 June 1801, FO 
65/48.
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Fortunately Panin did not prove intransigent, and after two 
weeks of bartering, signed an agreement with St Helens on 17 June.1 
The treaty granted the British as favourable terms as they could 
have hoped to achieve. For the convention recognized the rights of 
search and seizure, subject to restrictions the British had been 
willing to make all along. St Helens also obtained a relatively 
loose definition of blockade, while the Tsar had even consented to 
ignore temporarily the question of Malta so not as to impede the 
agreement.2 On the other side, the Russians' main concern was to end 
hostilities with their most important trading partner, and they were 
pleased to obtain enough concessions from the British to be able to 
save face with their Baltic allies.3 Agreement was reached so 
quickly because both dreaded war. Moreover, the Russians were 
concerned mostly about how the convention appeared to the rest of 
Europe, while the British cared more about how it would work in 
practice, and each was willing to sacrifice one for the other.
On the whole, the British government was very pleased with the 
treaty that St Helens had concluded. When Hawkesbury perused it on 
14 July with Sir William Scott, judge of the Admiralty Court, 
however, three points arose which worried them. First, although St 
Helens1s explanation of the article on coastal trade was 
satisfactory, the wording was rather ambiguous. Therefore, 
Hawkesbury hoped that the Russians would agree to add an explanatory 
article that declared that "the trade of one port of an Enemy to 
another was not to be considered as free1. Second, there was no 
reference to colonial trade in the treaty. Although this was of 
little concern to Russia, it was essential that France's colonial 
trade should not be open to Denmark and Sweden. Thus, as any 
arrangement between Britain and them was likely to be influenced by 
the contents of the Russian treaty, it was necessary to include some
1A copy of the terms of the treaty is in Parliamentary 
History, xxxvi. 18-25.
2St Helens to Hawkesbury, 18 June 1801, FO 65/48.
3Czartorvski Memoirs, i. 272.
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reference to colonial trade. Third, Hawkesbury and Scott were 
worried that, as the enumeration of contraband of war did not 
include naval stores, it might be interpreted that the British were 
acknowledging this as a principle of international law. Therefore, 
Hawkesbury suggested that a simple declaratory article should state 
the contrary. After discussing these alternations with Vorontsov, 
Hawkesbury concluded that the Russians would have no objections, but 
he directed St Helens to state that the British government would not 
delay the ratifications on account of these proposed alterations.1
Hawkesbury was very disappointed to learn on 6 September that 
St Helens did not believe that the Russians would consent.2 
Fortunately for the British, however, the Russians were only holding 
back for purposes of public opinion. They felt that their relations 
with Denmark and Sweden would be hurt, if they made any further 
concessions in the treaty itself, but when the ratifications of the 
treaty were exchanged in St Petersburg on 15 August, the Russians 
told St Helens that they would accept the British interpretation of 
the articles concerning coastal trade and contraband.3 They refused, 
however, to make this acknowledgement public for two months, but on 
23 October, St Helens signed a new convention which corresponded to 
the British interpretation of the original articles.
With the Anglo-Russian convention of 17 June the League of 
Armed Neutrality was effectively terminated, but in order to avoid 
future disputes it was still important that the other signatories 
of the Treaty of Armed Neutrality recognize the British 
interpretation of maritime law. Although, the Danes and the Swedes 
were determined to obtain some concessions before they acceded to 
the Anglo-Russian convention, the British were in a strong position. 
For example, Bernstorff tried to take advantage of Nelson's 
armistice to reach a compromise with the British government. On 23 
May, he left Copenhagen to negotiate directly with Hawkesbury in
1Hawkesbury to St Helens, 14 and 18 July 18 01, FO 65/4 8.
2St Helens to Hawkesbury, 7 Aug. 1801, FO 65/48.
3St Helens to Hawkesbury, 19 Aug. 1801, FO 65/48.
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London, hoping to obtain an agreement without renouncing the Armed 
Neutrality. At their meetings that commenced on 15 June, Hawkesbury 
grew impatient with Bernstorff's unreasonable demand of an immediate 
return of the Danish colonies. He was content to ask that the Danes 
accept the British interpretation of maritime law, or to wait until 
the outcome of the Russian negotiation, which he was confident would 
conform to British interests. Thus Bernstorff was unable to make 
Hawkesbury budge on any issue. The British Foreign Secretary held 
all the high cards--Danish ships and colonies in British possession 
and the large British fleet still in the Baltic--and was in no hurry 
to play them. When the news of the Anglo-Russian convention arrived 
on 11 July, Bernstorff's mission was effectively over. Hawkesbury 
was content to leave to the Russians the job of pressing the Danes 
to accede to the convention. The Danes held out for a few months, 
but under increasing Russian pressure eventually acceded to the 
convention on 23 October.1
The Anglo-Russian reconciliation was a laudable achievement, 
made more remarkable by the customary difficulties in communicating 
with St Petersburg. Dispatches could take from four to six weeks to 
arrive depending on the weather. This meant that from the time of 
sending the dispatch, the answer could take two or three months. 
Consequently, British ministers were not able to monitor the success 
or failure of their Russian policies and adopt new ones, as they 
were with courts closer to London. Despite this success,
however, Hawkesbury was unable completely to reverse Russian policy. 
The reason that Addington and Hawkesbury wanted to was because they 
realized that Britain could not curtail French expansion without the 
help of European allies, and as it had proved impossible to get all 
of the European powers to join forces against France, it was 
necessary to concentrate diplomatic efforts on one of the major 
powers and build a coalition around it. Russia was the strongest 
power, but it required the permission of Austria or Prussia to put 
its troops into central Europe. Austria was closer to the centre of
1Feldbaek, Denmark and the Armed Neutrality, pp. 189-201.
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the conflict, but wished to avoid committing all of its military 
resources in the war against France because it had to monitor 
Russian and Prussian activities in eastern Europe and by 1801 it had 
become financially and militarily exhausted.1
Hawkesbury and Addington chose to pursue a close Russian 
alliance, after the death of Paul I gave them the opportunity, 
because Russia was "the only Power on the Continent capable of 
balancing the Influence of France'.2 For on one hand Russia 
possessed enormous military potential, owing to a large population, 
and on the other it exercised considerable influence in Austria, 
Prussia, Turkey and the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, as these 
lesser powers could not become close allies of Britain if Russia 
were hostile, any coalition had to be build upon the foundation of 
Russian support.3
Hawkesbury had hoped that once the grievances which stood 
between good Anglo-Russian relations had been removed, Russia could 
be led back into the struggle against France. Holland Rose, citing 
instructions to Simon Vorontsov in November 1803, claimed that the 
Russians precipitated the first moves towards the Third Coalition, 
but H. Beeley, following Otto Brandt, countered that Hawkesbury 
concentrated on constructing an anti-French alliance immediately 
after the signing of the Treaty of Amiens and sent a proposal to 
Russia in September 1802.4 Brandt and Beeley were correct so far as
3Karl Roider, Baron Thucrut and Austria1 s Response to the 
French Revolution (Princeton, 1987), pp. 107ff; Paul W. 
Schroeder, "The Collapse of the Second Coalition' Journal of 
Modern History, lix (1987), 248-50; Michael Duffy, "British War 
Policy: The Austrian Alliance, 1793-1801' (D.Phil. Oxford, 
1971), pp. 13, 30-5, 187-8.
2Hawkesbury to St Helens, 11 Dec. 1801, Fitzherbert 
Papers, 239M/O630.
3Liverpool to Glenbervie, 25 Feb. 1802, Add. MSS 38311, 
fo. 121; Hawkesbury to Warren, 11 Sept. 1802, FO 65/51.
4John Holland Rose, Napoleonic Studies (London, 1906), 
appendix iv.; Otto Brandt, England und die Napoleonische 
Weltpolitik, 1800-1803 (Heidelberg, 1916), pp. 204ff; H.
Beeley, "A Project of Alliance with Russia in 1802', English
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they went but overlooked evidence that Addington and Hawkesbury were
thinking along these lines much earlier. Although, Hawkesbury did
not consider a third coalition to be feasible in 1801, he hoped that
the Russians would be willing to join the British in a defensive
role.1 Consequently, having received intelligence of a rupture in
Franco-Russian relations, Hawkesbury and Addington decided to pursue
the closest relations with the new Tsar. On 19 May, Hawkesbury
instructed St Helens to inquire whether the Russians would guarantee
jointly the province of Egypt to Turkey, stipulating the proportion
of force each country would send, if Egypt were attacked by France
in the future. To gain the consent of the Russians, Hawkesbury
warned that it was important to 'impress on their minds, that His
Majesty is actuated by no views of ambition and aggrandizement, but
solely by a desire of restoring Peace to Europe on Terms which may
insure its duration'.2 Addington also expressed a desire for a
strong alliance to Vorontsov.3 These and other examples of the
courtesy and deference displayed by the ministry towards the
Russians might be dismissed by critics as customary diplomatic
practice or mere platitudes that meant nothing, but a comparison of
the communications with other foreign diplomats demonstrates a
considerable difference in tone that suggests strongly that the
British genuinely wished to win Russian favour.
The successful negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention in
June, raised the hopes of Addington and Hawkesbury that they could
persuade the Russians to join them in imposing a peace settlement
on France and the rest of Europe. Count Starhemberg, the Austrian
minister in London, speculated that
le projet est certainement de s'entendre avec la Russie, 
a fin de forger les autres Puissances continentales sous
Historical Review, xlix (1934), 499.
hawkesbury to Carysfort, 8 May 1801, FO 64/61.
hawkesbury to St Helens, 19 May 1801, FO 65/48.
3Addington to S. Vorontsov, 13 July 1801, Sidmouth Papers 
152M/C1801/OF2 6.
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le pretexte d'un concert a adopter en commun a proposer 
a la France, les armes a la main, les conditions de paix, 
dont le Cabinet Anglais voudrait etre le principal 
arbitre.1
Unfortunately for the British, the Russians refused. For while
recognizing that Britain was one of their vallies naturels', owing
to the benefits of their close commercial relations and common
interests in Europe, the Russians wished to avoid new military
commitments that might provoke a violent reaction from France.2
Alexander I had not made peace with Britain to renew the war with
France.3 In his own words:
Je m'etuderai surtout a suivre un systeme national, 
c['est] a d[ire] un systeme fonde sur les avantages de 
l'Etat, et non, comme cela est souvent arrive, sur des 
predilections pour telle ou telle autre puissance. Je 
serais, si je le jugerais utile pour la Russie, bien avec 
la France, tout comme ce meme interet me porte maintenant 
a cultiver l'amitie de la Grande Bretagne.4
At that time, the Tsar's priorities were to promote agriculture and
industry while reforming the administration of government, all of
which required "que le premier principe du systeme politique doit
etre le maintien de la paix.'5
France and the Preliminaries of London
Hawkesbury's initial overture to Otto came as no surprise. The 
new ministry did not discuss the peace proposal, however, until
1Starhemberg to Colloredo, 24 July, 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
2vDu systeme politique de 1'empire de Russie' 28 July 
1801, VPR, i. 65-6; Instruction to Morkov, 9 July 1801, SIRIO, 
lxx. 214.
3Grimsted, pp. 66-103.
4Alexander to S. Vorontsov, 12 Nov. 1801, AKV, x. 300 and 
VPR. i. 60.
5^ Du systeme politique', VPR, i. 63.
80
after all the administrative changes had been formally completed on 
14 March. This was probably owing to the desire of the ministers to 
avoid discussing the topic in the presence of members of the 
previous government, particularly Grenville, whom they expected to 
be hostile to the measure.1 The government was also preoccupied with 
Vansittart's mission and preparing the fleet to sail to the Baltic, 
and there might simply have not been enough time to discuss the war 
with France before the King became too ill to conduct business until 
the middle of March. For an important decision such as opening a 
negotiation for peace could not be made without the concurrence of 
the King. Nevertheless, Hawkesbury had already begun to lay the 
foundations of a general European peace in late February by advising 
Portugal and Naples to make peace with France on any terms they 
could, even if it involved accepting stipulations detrimental to 
British interests.2
The Cabinet made a final decision on 19 March, and Addington 
communicated the result to the King who, although previously the 
strongest opponent of treating with Revolutionary France, 
reluctantly granted his consent.3 The next day, Hawkesbury invited 
Otto to his home in Sackville Street on 21 March, when he offered 
to begin negotiations at Paris, or elsewhere, to conclude a treaty 
of peace.4 Otto relayed the offer to Bonaparte, who requested 
passports for an extraordinary courier to speed up the negotiations. 
Hawkesbury provided the passports immediately, having ordered 
Foreign Office spies to keep Otto under surveillance as of 24 
March.5
1Colchester Diary. i. 248.
2Hawkesbury to Frere, 2 7 Feb. 1801, FO 63/36; Hawkesbury
to Paget, 28 Feb. 1801, FO 70/15.
3Addington to the King with a Cabinet Minute, Aspinall, 
iii. 512.
4Hawkesbury to Otto, 21 Mar. 1801, FO 27/66.
5F0 27/57. This volume contains a report of Otto's
activities from 24 March to 2 Oct. 1801.
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The two met again on 2 April, when Otto declared that Bonaparte 
was eager for peace and wished the negotiations to continue in 
London, to which Hawkesbury agreed. Hawkesbury then suggested that 
the negotiations should be frank, but that they should make written 
records only by mutual consent. For he wished to keep secret the 
deliberations of the negotiations as he was concerned that some of 
the peace proposals would leak out resulting in popular outbursts 
which might prejudice his bargaining position, and rumours of 
progress during the course of previous negotiations had caused 
considerable fluctuation in the funds. Considering the economic and 
financial circumstances of the time, Addington wished to preserve 
stability in the money markets.1
Bonaparte had told Otto to suggest a maritime armistice as a 
preliminary to the peace, but Hawkesbury refused because it would 
have allowed the French to reinforce their army in Egypt and deprive 
the British of their strongest weapons, while the French would have 
continued unimpeded on the Continent.2 As to the terms of the peace, 
Otto said that the main point would be Egypt "and the question for 
discussion will be, whether France should relinquish Egypt, Great 
Britain relinquishing the whole, or some part of her Conquests; or 
whether France should retain Egypt, Great Britain preserving her 
Conquests'.3 Hawkesbury stated that the British could never allow 
France to keep Egypt because it would pose a threat to British 
India. Otto argued that this was foolish because it was evident that 
command of the sea was sufficient to protect India. As an example, 
Otto claimed that "le commerce ancien et tres solide des Venitiens 
par alexandrie [sic] avait ete renverse completement par la 
superiority maritime des Portugais'. Hawkesbury replied that he 
could not discuss the matter any longer without the authorization
10tto to Talleyrand, 30 Ventose IX (21 Mar. 1801), AE, 
Angleterre/594; The Times. 23 June, 2 July, and 2 Oct. 1801.
20tto to Hawkesbury 2 Apr. 1801, FO 27/66; Otto to 
Talleyrand, 13 Germinal IX (3 Apr. 1801), AE Angleterre/594.
3Note of discussion 2 Apr. 1801, FO 27/66.
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of his Cabinet, but asserted privately that, if the French wanted 
to keep Egypt, they would have to consent to Britain keeping all her 
conquests. He added that he would be willing to trade a French 
evacuation of Egypt for the return of some of the colonies that 
Britain had captured from France, Spain, and Holland.1
This was Hawkesbury's first serious error, for although he was 
evidently using it as a bargaining ploy to get Otto to accept the 
second proposal, the first gave the French hope that the British 
would permit them to remain in Egypt. Consequently, it took longer 
for the French to give up the idea than if Hawkesbury had remained 
firm all along. Secondly, the first proposal was disadvantageous to 
the British, who did not want to keep all of the conquests anyway, 
because these colonies certainly could never compensate for a French 
presence in Egypt.
The British government would not have permitted France to 
retain Egypt, so Hawkesbury, even unofficially, should never have 
said that it would. Dundas had argued convincingly that a French 
presence was a threat to British strategic and commercial interests 
in the East. Consequently, the previous government had sent the 
Egyptian expedition at great cost to dislodge or at least to 
neutralize the French presence, so that the French Army would be 
removed as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.2 However, the 
British did not intend to keep Egypt. As Hawkesbury explained to the 
Russians and the Turks, the British had always intended to restore 
Egypt to the Porte once a general peace was made.3 For any advantage 
to be gained by keeping Egypt, could not outweigh the costs of 
Russian and Turkish animosity.
10tto to Talleyrand, 14 Germinal IX (4 Apr. 18 01), AE 
Angleterre/594.
2Glenbervie, Diaries, i. 60; Charles John Fedorak,
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3Hawkesbury to St Helens, 5 May 1801, FO 65/48; Hawkesbury 
to Elgin, 19 May 1801, FO 78/31.
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Hawkesbury and Addington were determined to restore Egypt 
through either war or diplomacy. As long as the French under General 
Menou held out against the British troops, Hawkesbury was content 
to offer many of Britain's overseas conquests. He hoped to keep most 
of the more commercially and strategically important posts, such as 
Ceylon, Trinidad, Tobago, Martinique, and Malta, but was prepared 
to return many of the rest. For the British had never planned to 
keep all the conquests: Dundas had always intended to use them as 
bargaining counters during the negotiations for a general peace,1 
and many were expensive and troublesome to maintain.
At their next meeting on 12 April, Otto responded to 
Hawkesbury's proposals with two very different alternatives. The 
first was that the French should keep Egypt and the British should 
keep their principal conquests in India, while Malta was to be 
restored to the Knights of St John and the Cape of Good Hope to the 
Dutch as a free port. In addition, Britain would relinquish the rest 
of her conquests in the West Indies and return Minorca and Trinidad 
to Spain, who would return to Portugal any conquests.2 The second 
alternative was that France would evacuate Egypt if Britain returned 
all her conquests.3
These proposals constituted the starting point of the 
negotiations of the Preliminaries of London. Otto put forward an 
extreme case so as to leave room for concessions, but his 
correspondence with the French foreign minister, Prince Maurice de 
Talleyrand demonstrates that he was convinced both of the justice 
of the French offer and that accepting the terms Hawkesbury 
suggested unofficially would have been a betrayal of France. Thus 
the view that Bonaparte was merely trying to bully the British, 
fails to take the French position into account. Consequently, any
Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sucrar, and Seapower: The British 
Expedition to the West Indies and the War Against Revolutionary 
France (Oxford, 1987), pp. 359-ff.
2Ingram, Commitment to Empire, pp. 153-191.
Memorandum, 12 Apr. 1801, FO 27/66.
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assessment of Hawkesbury's skill as a negotiator or the terms to 
which he agreed must consider how far the French were persuaded to 
move from their original position.
The course of the negotiations was immediately interrupted on 
13 April by Pahlen's letter to Hawkesbury announcing the death of 
Paul I. Hawkesbury postponed further meetings with Otto, to give the 
government a chance to reconsider its diplomatic priorities because 
the friendly disposition of the new Tsar removed some of the 
pressure to make peace.1
Nevertheless, the internal pressures remained, and according 
to Otto, the government seemed obsessed by Jacobinism.2 Food riots 
continued in the West Country with dockyard workers involved in 
Plymouth and the Somerset militia abetting disturbances in 
Weymouth.3 In response on 1 April, Addington had moved in the 
Commons for a secret committee to examine evidence of disaffection 
in Ireland and England. By 13 April, the committee had concluded 
that there was a strong connection between Jacobinism and distress 
and that revolutionaries had been encouraged by the possibility of 
a French invasion and the expiry of the Suspension of Habeas Corpus. 
Therefore, it recommended that the government once again suspend 
Habeas Corpus and to renew the Act against Seditious Meetings.4
Consequently, the Cabinet decided to make a counter offer to 
Otto, which Hawkesbury presented on 14 April. He explained that the 
Cabinet had rejected the French offers because in the instance of 
France evacuating Egypt, Britain kept nothing to compensate for 
French territorial acquisitions. He then proposed that if France
hawkesbury to Otto, 13 Apr. 1801, FO 27/66; Otto to 
Talleyrand, 22-25 Germinal (12-15 Apr. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/594.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 3 Germinal IX (3 0 Mar. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/594.
3St Aubyn and Williams to Portland, 31 Mar. 18 01, HO 
42/61; Portland to St Aubyn and Williams, 4 Apr. 18 01, and
Portland to Poulett, 15 Apr. 1801, HO 43/12.
4Wells, pp. 210-11.
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restored Egypt to the Turks, Britain would return all conquests
except Ceylon, Malta, Trinidad, Tobago, Guadeloupe, and Martinique
on the condition that
In the event of other intelligence previously to the
signature of preliminaries, of the evacuation of Egypt by 
the French forces or of a convention having been agreed
to for that purpose, His Majesty will not consider
himself bound to adhere to the above conditions in their
full extent.1
Otto understood that the accession of Alexander I and the news from 
Denmark, which arrived on 15 April, had considerably strengthened 
the British position, but he tried to find a new bargaining chip to 
counter the ones being played by Hawkesbury.2 Thus on 15 April he 
said that the British proposal was unacceptable. The next day he 
accused the British of being involved in an attempt to assassinate 
Bonaparte and demanded the extradition of the royalists M. Dutheil 
and Georges Cadoudal, hoping to put the British on the defensive so 
that they might make concessions in the negotiations.3
At this point all meaningful negotiations were effectively 
suspended and did not resume until June. Hawkesbury and Otto 
continued to meet periodically but did not make any new proposals. 
Otto believed that this was because "Tous les yeux sont fixes sur 
I'Egypte.'4 This was confirmed by Starhemberg, who informed 
Colloredo that "I'Egypte etait le seul veritable objet, qui arretait 
encore la negociation'.5 The British were reconsidering their 
position, hoping that favourable news from Egypt might break the 
deadlock. This persuaded Otto that as long as the fate of Egypt was
3Note of Hawkesbury delivered 14 Apr. 1801, FO 27/66.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 22-25 Germinal IX (12-15 Apr. 1801),
AE Angleterre/594.
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undecided it would be impossible to obtain better terms from them.1 
The first reports appeared favourable to the French for by 23 April 
unconfirmed rumours reached London that the British invasion had 
been defeated.2 Otto continued to believe they were true until a 
contradictory message arrived on 3 0 April: Charles Locke, the
British consul in Naples had just returned to London via Paris, 
where he had heard from Baron Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador 
to France, that the French had been defeated and General Menou taken 
prisoner.3 Thus the British were slightly disappointed to learn on 
14 May that on 21 March their army had won only a battle but not the 
war, and that the commander, General Sir Ralph Abercromby, had been 
killed. Nevertheless, the ministry appeared generally confident that 
the final defeat of the French in Egypt was only a matter of time, 
though privately Hawkesbury told his father on 15 May that "The 
Chances of Success or Failure are perhaps equal. ... The French army 
is represented as discontented. If they receive no Reinforcements 
& our army does not become sickly the Enterprise may still 
succeed.'4
Although peace with France had become less pressing, owing to 
the remarkable reversal in Britain's diplomatic position, Hawkesbury 
and Addington did not believe that continuing the war indefinitely 
was a viable alternative. Hawkesbury explained this decision to 
Minto, minister at Vienna, in a frank dispatch of 24 April. He 
stated that although prospects were brighter, the government was 
still determined to seek peace on "fair and honourable terms',
1Otto to Talleyrand, 7 Floreal IX (27 Apr. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/595.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 3 Floreal IX (23 Apr. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/595.
3Hawkesbury to the King, 3 0 Apr. 18 01, Aspinall iii. 523; 
Thomas Grenville to Grenville, 3 0 Apr. 1801, Dropmore Papers, 
vii. 11-12; Otto to Talleyrand, 11 Floreal IX (1 May 1801), AE 
Angleterre/595.
4Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 15 May 1801, Add. MSS 3 8235, fo.
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because Britain could not carry on the war alone and there was no
prospect of another European power entering the war in the near
future. He added:
It is impossible not to lament, for the Sake of Europe, 
that the Two great Confederacies of which this Country 
made a part, should have unfortunately failed in the 
attainment of the End which they had in view--but, to 
whatever cause their Failure may be ascribed, it is by no 
means probable, that, at this time, a third Confederacy 
could be formed, which would have the same Chance of 
success as the Two preceding ones; and, even if it could, 
the Difficulty of raising the necessary Supplies 
(notwithstanding the abundant Resources of the Country) 
is become so great [sic] from the long Continuance of the 
War, that it could not be wise, under existing 
Circumstances, to run the Risk of a Third Failure, unless 
we were forced to it by absolute necessity.1
Failure was likely as the Russians were determined to avoid war
because their country was in a financial and administrative mess,
the Austrians could not fight because the discipline of their army
had been shattered at Hohenlinden, and the Prussians had proved
completely unreliable and untrustworthy. Nevertheless, Hawkesbury
believed it important to cultivate good relations with these powers,
even if they could not be of help in the immediate future, for
whatever their Sentiments may be respecting Peace, We 
ought never to forget that it is possible we may have no 
Choice, and that we may be reduced to the necessity of 
trying again the Chances of War; and, even if Peace 
should be concluded, the Power of France, on the 
Continent of Europe is become so formidable, that it is 
of the utmost Importance that a good understanding should 
subsist amongst the other Great powers of Europe.2
This line of argument demonstrates the different approach
towards diplomacy taken by the Addington ministry and its
predecessor. Grenville was far more impatient with the allies, and
he rarely missed an opportunity to chastise them when their
behaviour did not meet his expectations.3 Consequently, his
hawkesbury to Minto, 24 Apr. 1801, FO 7/63.
2Idem.
3Starhemberg to Colloredo, 21 Oct. 18 03, HHSA, 
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attitude, combined with Dundas's policy of scooping up colonial 
conquests while their allies faced the brunt of the French army, 
caused jealousy and resentment, rendering Britain very unpopular in 
Europe.1 Hawkesbury at least demonstrated some understanding of the 
limitations of the other Europeans powers and diminished his 
expectations accordingly.
Addington and Hawkesbury were also more realistic in their 
approach to the negotiations with France. On 17 April, Grenville 
sent Addington a copy of a Cabinet memorandum of late 1800 on the 
subject of peace.2 The project stated that Britain should keep the 
Cape, Ceylon, and Cochin, but that the other conquests could be 
bartered away for one of four proposals on a settlement of the 
Netherlands. That Grenville supposed that these terms could be used 
as a basis for negotiation demonstrated how little he understood the 
international situation. For colonial conquests were not equivalent 
to territorial acquisitions in Europe.3 On the contrary, the French 
had achieved their long sought "natural boundaries' and would not 
sacrifice them for the small islands which the British could offer. 
Bonaparte might have ruined his political career, if he had accepted 
Grenville's plan. The French were willing to exchange colonial 
conquests for the evacuation of French and Spanish troops from the 
territories of Britain's allies, Portugal, Naples, and Turkey but 
nothing else. On the other hand, if the British refused to 
relinquish many of their conquests, France would have continued to 
hold Italy and Iberia, threatening British commercial and strategic
3A. D. Harvey, "European Attitudes to Britain during the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic Era', History, lxiii (1978), 
356-65; Duffy, Soldiers. Sugar, and Seapower, pp. 377-8, and 
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2Pellew, i. 257-60.
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interest in the Mediterranean. These then were the boundaries within 
which Hawkesbury could manoeuvre, and if he had taken Grenville's 
line he probably would have scuttled the negotiations.
It is easy to criticize Hawkesbury and Addington's negotiating 
tactics: they certainly granted more concessions than they received 
in return. Nevertheless, there were several good reasons to keep the 
negotiations alive despite the intransigence of the French. One 
important concern was improving Britain's image abroad and regaining 
the trust of its former allies, particularly Russia. British war 
policies, which strengthened their maritime superiority, expanded 
their commerce, and extended their empire, caused serious 
antagonism, and so if they continued the war, they ran the risk of 
being perceived as war mongers. Therefore, it was necessary to 
demonstrate a real desire to make peace, and in the event of a 
rupture in the negotiations, they had to be able to direct all blame 
at the French.1
By 1 June the French had grown impatient with the course of the 
negotiations, and so Otto demanded that they take a more official 
nature and offered to submit new proposals in writing.2 Hawkesbury 
agreed and suggested two peace proposals. The first was that the 
British would return all their conquests if European boundaries were 
restored to status quo ante bellum. but recognizing that the French 
would not accept this offer he once again offered the terms of 14 
April arguing that, as Britain's diplomatic position had improved, 
this constituted a concession.3 Otto tried to water down the British 
demands, however, by threatening blackmail over Portugal. For Spain 
and Portugal had signed a treaty, but the First Consul refused to 
ratify it, leaving Portugal subject to further conquest, unless the 
British became more amenable. Therefore, Otto offered that the
British keep their East Indian conquests, if the status quo ante
1Pellew, ii. 54-5.
20tto to Hawkesbury, 1 June 1801, FO 27/66.
3Hawkesbury to Otto, 6 June 1801, FO 27/66; Otto to
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bellum for Portugal were exchanged for the same in the Mediterranean 
and America.1
Hawkesbury replied on 25 June that the British could not accept 
the status quo ante bellum in the Mediterranean and America for the 
restoration of Portuguese territory, because the French had made 
great gains in both southern Europe and the Caribbean which made the 
term status quo ante bellum inapplicable. Having argued that even 
keeping all the conquests would not have compensated Britain for the 
increase in power given to France by her Continental acquisitions, 
Hawkesbury proposed a new plan by which the terms for the East 
Indies and Mediterranean remained the same as in the former British 
project, but Britain would restore all conquests in America except 
Martinique, Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, and the status 
quo ante bellum for Portugal would be exchanged for the same for 
Spain.2
At this point the negotiations reached a stalemate, because the 
French were willing to allow the British to keep only Ceylon, which 
was unacceptable.3 Instead of discussing terms, each side tried to 
intimidate the other with accusations and threats. Each accused the 
other of presenting proposals that were a step backward in the 
negotiations. Moreover, the French threatened to occupy Portugal, 
if the British did not make concessions, and the British warned that 
a third coalition would be formed, if the French did not come to 
terms.4 Otto tried to put Hawkesbury on the defensive with 
accusations about the British government's complicity in the anti- 
French press, and threatened to break off the negotiations and to 
leave London.5 Having failed to move Hawkesbury, he became quite
1Otto to Hawkesbury, 18 June 1801, FO 27/66.
2Hawkesbury to Otto 25, June 1801, FO 27/66.
3Otto to Hawkesbury, 26 July 1801, FO 27/66.
4Otto to Hawkesbury, 14 July 1801, FO 27/66; Otto to
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despondent, admitting to Talleyrand that at that time the French 
were unlikely to get better terms.1
This was a decisive point in the negotiations for the British. 
Addington and Hawkesbury wished to avoid further concessions but 
dreaded the alternatives. For it was clear that the new Tsar would 
not provide any military aid, and although the League of Armed 
Neutrality had been dissolved, Britain's strategic position was once 
again deteriorating. Prussian troops had occupied Hanover at French 
insistence and were considering annexing the electorate, while the 
French were threatening to overrun Portugal as they had Naples. The 
only theatre where the British were enjoying any success was Egypt, 
but even there the campaign was slow and there was little hope of 
a final capitulation in the near future. St Vincent predicted that 
the French would hold out in Alexandria until their water supplies 
ran out, which would not be until October.2 The Egyptian expedition 
in fact had already achieved its main objective: the French had
realized that their position was hopeless and had demonstrated 
willingness to evacuate the province as part of the peace treaty. 
Moreover, the whole process of negotiating for peace seemed to have 
a momentum of its own. For once Addington and Hawkesbury had opened 
the negotiations, they could not break away without losing face with 
British and foreign opinion which desired peace.3 They also 
understood that commercial and financial interests were represented 
by a considerable number of MPs who would only support the measures 
of the government, if it demonstrated that it was more disposed to 
make peace than its predecessor.4 In addition, they had begun to
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Angleterre/595.
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take seriously the threat of a cross-channel invasion, as they had 
become convinced that the French could succeed if the wind and 
weather were favourable.1 Nevertheless, Hawkesbury felt obliged to 
suspend the negotiations if the French would offer no more than 
Ceylon.2
The British were hampered by their inability to determine with 
certainty Bonaparte's calculations and policy. While the government 
had been able to intercept and decipher the correspondence of the 
Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Austrian ministers there is no 
evidence that it had been able to obtain copies of Otto's 
dispatches.3 The British government received intelligence from 
France but its informants were not well placed to know the details 
of government policy. The information that the Foreign Office did 
receive, however, appeared to indicate that there were domestic 
pressures which might persuade Bonaparte to seek peace.4 For France 
was experiencing a bread shortage smaller in scale but similar to 
that of Britain, and there was evidence of war weariness. Moreover, 
it had been Bonaparte who had sought peace negotiations with Britain 
in December 1799, and he had made a promise to the French people in 
1801 to secure peace. Nevertheless, Otto's negotiating tactics did 
not suggest that the French were anxious for peace. In fact, his 
instructions from Bonaparte were to maintain a firm line, as the 
First Consul was determined to obtain a peace glorious to France or 
to continue the war.5 Had Hawkesbury maintained a firmer line he
Memorandum on War with France, Add. MSS 3312 0, fos. 110- 
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would more likely have ruptured the negotiations than have forced 
the French to back down.
After a long Cabinet meeting on 2 8 July, the ministry decided 
to attempt once more to get better terms, and Hawkesbury had to move 
first, because it was clear that the French were not as anxious to 
make peace. Bonaparte would gladly have accepted a triumphant and 
glorious peace which would have improved his prestige, but he was 
very leery of any terms which might be criticised in France. For his 
position was not secure, and one wrong move could topple him from 
power like his predecessors. On the other hand, as long as the war 
continued ambitious generals were kept at a safe distance from 
Paris, armies could be paid and equipped from the spoils of foreign 
lands, and satellite powers could remain occupied under the excuse 
it was for their own defence. Thus peace would have brought many 
unwelcome responsibilities.1
Therefore, on 5 August Hawkesbury played one of his strong 
cards to breach the impasse. Soon after taking office, Hawkesbury 
and Addington had recognized that they could not retain both Malta 
and the goodwill of Russia.2 Consequently, in the initial peace 
overture to the Russians, Hawkesbury had offered to fulfill the 
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1799, and, although the question of Malta 
was postponed during the discussions over the Armed Neutrality, it 
was clear that some arrangement over Malta would be necessary in the 
future. Hawkesbury had tried to avoid conceding Malta in the 
negotiations with Otto but only to discuss Malta's future with the 
Russians. Therefore, ignoring the plea of the Earl of Elgin, the 
ambassador at Constantinople, "for Heaven's sake, keep Malta',3
1Bonaparte's diplomatic position is explained in Deutch, 
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Hawkesbury decided to offer the neutralization of the island as an 
apparent concession to the French.1 This was less satisfactory than 
dealing directly with the Russians, but he hoped to achieve the same 
result. As the Knights of Malta were not strong enough to defend the 
neutrality of the island, Hawkesbury proposed that it should be 
garrisoned by a third power, ideally Russia. Contingent upon this 
offer, the French were to accept one of two options on the West 
Indies. The first was that the British would keep Trinidad and 
Tobago with Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice restored to the Dutch 
on the condition that they were made free ports. The second was that 
the British would keep St Lucia, Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo, and 
Berbice.
Otto received Bonaparte's response to this proposal on 11 
August but could not present it until Hawkesbury returned from 
Weymouth, where he had accompanied Vorontsov on his official 
reception by the King. Bonaparte had in fact agreed to Hawkesbury's 
offer on Malta but claimed that Britain did not require more 
territory in the West Indies and he felt that it would not be fair 
for Britain to have the same domination there as in the East 
Indies.2 Hawkesbury was pleased upon his return with the change in 
tone demonstrated by the French but demanded that Britain keep more 
than Tobago in the West Indies. For although the British government 
was desirous of peace, it wanted better terms.3
At this point the negotiations were sent into turmoil by more 
conflicting reports from Egypt. When an unconfirmed report of the 
fall of Cairo arrived, Otto decided a quick agreement was necessary 
and requested permission from the French government to accept 
Hawkesbury's second alternative of 5 August, with Britain keeping 
Tobago and St Lucia and Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice rendered
10tto to Talleyrand, 17 Thermidor IX (5 Aug. 1801), AE 
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free ports. He decided not to accept any terms, however, if Egypt 
fell.1
Unfortunately, Bonaparte wanted to remain firm and instructed 
Otto to water down as many of the British demands as possible. On 
Malta, Otto tried to get Hawkesbury to relinquish the third power 
guarantee and restore the island simply to the Knights of Malta. 
Hawkesbury replied, however, that the British troops would not leave 
the island until a Russian or Austrian garrison arrived. The French 
negotiator also tried to renege on a formal guarantee by France of 
the cessions made by Spain and Holland. Nevertheless, Hawkesbury 
remained firm, insisting that Britain would make no restitutions 
unless the concessions to her were guaranteed. Otto also stalled on 
another of Hawkesbury's concerns, the representation of Portugal and 
Turkey at the peace congress, and tried to take a new initiative by 
bringing up the question of the Newfoundland fisheries. Hawkesbury, 
however, would admit of nothing new, agreeing only to put the 
fisheries on the same footing as before the war.2
Once again the negotiations ground to a standstill, even though 
the negotiators met daily and were eager to conclude a settlement 
quickly.3 On 11 and 12 September, the Cabinet held two long meetings 
during which members expressed anger at Hawkesbury for giving up 
Malta, Martinique, and the Cape, and afterwards he spent two days 
recuperating in the country. When he returned on 17 September, Otto 
delivered a note which claimed that any further concessions would 
be to the detriment of France. But as Talleyrand had given 
permission to offer Trinidad as early as 23 July, Otto proposed that
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the British could keep the island, if they renounced Tobago, 
Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice.1
By 17 September, Bonaparte had decided that the negotiations 
could not be protracted any longer because he had to know whether 
there would be peace or war. For the equinox was approaching and, 
if there was to be war, he had to campaign before winter. Thus peace 
had to be signed before 10 Vendemiaire (2 October) . He directed Otto 
that if the British insisted on keeping Tobago, he was to break off 
the negotiations.2 Otto delivered the ultimatum on 22 September 
along with a project for a treaty of peace, but Hawkesbury still was 
not satisfied.3
On or about 27 September, the critical decision to make peace 
was finally taken. The reasons for closing the deal were not quite 
the same as those for which the government had sought it in the 
first place. Britain's diplomatic position had been partially 
salvaged, and the revolutionary threat posed by the high grain 
prices had subsided with the reopening of the Baltic trade and the 
prospect of a good harvest, but Britain's domestic position would 
have remained very uncertain and unstable as long as the war 
continued. Two new issues had also moved to the forefront. First, 
the threat of invasion, which had been remote at the beginning of 
the year, Addington had begun to take more seriously by the end of 
August, and during September he had discussed preparations for the 
defence of southern England in conjunction with Pelham, Pitt, and
3Note to Otto, 23 July 1801, Correspondance du Napoleon 
Premier publiee par ordre de l'Empereur Napoleon III, (32 vols, 
Paris, 1858-70), vii. 259; Otto to Hawkesbury, 19 Sept. 1801,
FO 27/66; Otto to Talleyrand, 2 jour complementaire (19 Sept. 
1801), AE Angleterre/595.
2Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 17 Sept. 1801, Correspondance du 
Napoleon, vii. 323-6.
3Hawkesbury to Otto, 22 Sept. 1801, FO 27/66; Otto to 
Talleyrand, 5 jour complementaire (22 Sept. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/595.
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Colonel Twiss of the Royal Engineers.1 On 26 September, Glenbervie 
noted in his diary that, vThe expectation of an invasion is greater 
than I ever remember.12
Addington's predominant concern, however, was the future of the 
country's finances.3 He doubted whether the economy could stand the 
strain of the demands of war, and there was some question as to 
whether the government could secure another loan on reasonable 
terms. Those who controlled the money markets in the City seemed to 
desire peace, as it was generally believed that Bonaparte would 
reopen European markets to British goods. The income tax also was 
extremely unpopular, and Pitt had borrowed heavily using the 
projected yield of the tax as security.4 Consequently, Yorke noted 
that, if they carried on the war for two more years, the financial 
position might get so bad as to require the government to make peace 
on even worse terms.5 Addington and Hawkesbury stayed up most of the 
night discussing these issues with Pitt, who through much of the 
summer had stayed at their homes advising them on the negotiations.6 
By this time a strong difference of opinion had arisen between 
Addington and Hawkesbury over whether they should make any further 
sacrifices to obtain peace: Hawkesbury wanted to refuse any further 
concessions, but Addington insisted that peace was worth the price.7
^Addington to Hiley Addington, 29 Aug. 1801, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/C1801/OZ134; St Vincent to Nelson, 14 Aug. 1801, 
Add. MSS 31169, fo. 36; Pelham to Addington, 23 Sept. 1801, 
Add. MSS 33120, fos. 41-51.
2Glenbervie Diaries, i. 253.
3Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i. 186; Malmesbury 
Diaries. iv. 53.
4Pellew, ii. 55.
5Yorke to Abbot, 18 Aug. 1801, PRO 30/9/120, fos. 3-6.
6Glenbervie Diaries, i. 251, 262, 295.
7Starhemberg to Colloredo, 25 Sept. 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
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Pitt and Addington, however, were able to persuade Hawkesbury to 
give way.1
Consequently, on 2 8 September, Addington intervened in the 
negotiations in order to hasten a settlement. He took charge of the 
meeting between Hawkesbury and Otto, asserting that the peace they 
were all working towards was not merely to cease hostilities but to 
reconcile their two nations. Addington probably did not really 
believe this but used it as an argument to obtain what he hoped 
would be an adequate, secure solution for Malta. He also pointed out 
that stipulating the accession of Britain's allies to the treaty was 
a matter of diplomatic courtesy to which Otto could not object. He 
succeeded in resolving the impasse in the negotiations because Otto 
found him to be much more amicable and persuasive than Hawkesbury.2 
In response, Otto delivered another draft treaty the next day, but 
Hawkesbury objected to the wording about the guarantee for Malta and 
the stipulation for the French Guiana boundary, made some minor 
modifications, and returned the treaty claiming it to be Britain's 
final offer.3 Otto replied the day after that Bonaparte wished to 
negotiate separately with Portugal and Turkey and it would take too 
long for their representatives to get to the peace congress.4 When 
Hawkesbury replied that the British wanted the allies at the 
conference, but that it was not necessary to wait for them, all 
disagreement was overcome.5
On 1 October, Addington and Hawkesbury met a divided Cabinet 
but won over sufficient support to sign the treaty. Then Addington 
told the King that he must make peace or resign, as better terms
3Ziegler, p. 123; Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i. 
184; Holland Rose, Pitt and the Great War, p. 468.
20tto to Talleyrand, 6 Vendemiaire X (28 Sept. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/596; Same to same, 7 Nivose X (28 Dec. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/597.
3Hawkesbury to Otto, 2 9 Sept. 1801, FO 27/66.
4Otto to Hawkesbury, 20 Sept. 1801, FO 27/66.
5Hawkesbury to Otto, 3 0 Sept. 1801, FO 27/66.
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were impossible.1 Consequently, early that evening, Hawkesbury and 
Otto signed the Preliminaries of London at the Foreign Office. 
Starhemberg stated that it would have been impossible for anyone to 
have taken more pain and effort than Hawkesbury had in the 
negotiations with Otto,2 and the British Foreign Secretary's 
diligence had finally succeeded.
Under the terms of the treaty, Britain returned all French, 
Spanish, and Dutch conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, with the 
Cape opened as a free port. Egypt was returned to The Porte, whose 
territorial integrity was guaranteed. The French agreed to evacuate 
Naples and the Papal States and to restore Portugal's European 
territory, but the Brazil-Guyana border was recognized in a secret 
article as that agreed to in the Treaty of Badajoz. Britain returned 
Malta to the Knights of St John under the guarantee of an unnamed 
third power, with the details to be worked out at the peace 
congress. Payments for charges incurred in maintaining prisoners of 
war were to be settled in a bi-lateral tribunal to be appointed 
later. Finally, the Newfoundland fisheries and French factories in 
India reverted to their prewar status.3
The diplomacy of the new ministry from its inception until 
October 1801 was remarkably successful. Hawkesbury and Addington had 
achieved their three important goals of neutralizing the League of 
Armed Neutrality, reestablishing cordial relations with Russia, and 
terminating the war with France even though both sides had at times 
nearly broken off the negotiations. Having come to power at the 
darkest moment of the war, the new ministry resolved the most 
pressing external and internal threats within eight months. 
Conscientious and careful diplomacy, combined with military good
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 255.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 25 Aug. 1801, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 26-8.
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fortune and an abundant harvest, had succeeded where the arrogant 
and uncompromising methods of their predecessors had failed.
Nevertheless, while publicly exuberant about the peace, 
Addington was privately downcast and apologetic. For only his 
minimum objectives had been achieved: Britain's allies were provided 
for; the French were out of Egypt; and Britain had obtained some 
small compensation for the increase in French power. For this, 
however, he had to pay a large price. Most of Britain's conquests 
were surrendered without a corresponding decrease in the extent of 
French territory on the Continent, and the solution for Malta was 
less satisfactory than could have been achieved by direct Anglo- 
Russian negotiation. Hawkesbury and Addington knew the terms would 
leave them open to severe criticism by some members of Parliament, 
and they were aware that the period of peace might not endure. 
Nevertheless, they considered it an 'experimental peace',1 and the 
experiment had to be attempted and given time to produce a result.
xDraft Memorandum on the State of Affairs, 18 02, 
Castlereagh Papers, D3030/1738/7.
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Chapter Four
Parliament and the Congress of Amiens, 
October 1801 to March 1802
"The fact is that the overthrow of an administration 17 years old, 
had necessarily loosened an infinite number of political Ties, and 
it will be some time before such new arrangements can be made as 
will present the Idea of a firm & settled Government.'
George Tierney1
The Reception of the Preliminaries
The Addington ministry was uncertain of how the news of the 
peace would be received. Addington told Abbot, "My mind is greatly 
relieved, as you must suppose; but it is not yet free from 
Solicitude, as much remains to be done to enable us to bring the 
Ship safe into Port. '2 Addington and Hawkesbury felt that the terms 
might be unpopular, for in the Cabinet, Eldon, Pelham, and 
Westmorland had approved of the treaty only with great reluctance. 
There was no doubt that it was going to be difficult to sell the 
treaty to Parliament. The best hope of the ministry was that the 
general dissatisfaction with the war would lead to approval of the 
peace. Addington was counting on a coalition of the loyal supporters 
of the ministry and the opponents of the war to outnumber the 
critics of the peace.
The popular reaction to the announcement of peace was as 
favourable as Addington could have wished, and possibly too 
favourable. For general rejoicing erupted throughout the country.
1Tierney to Grey, 22 Oct. 1801, Grey Papers.
2Addington to Abbot, 16 Oct. 1801, Colchester Papers, PRO 
30/9/110, fos. 24-5.
102
In Bath, the mob shouted, 'Long live the King, Addington for Ever' .1 
In London, the populace celebrated in the streets for days. 
Moreover, as part of the celebration of the peace, all houses there 
were expected to be illuminated, and stones were thrown at the 
windows of those that were not lit, on the assumption that the 
resident was demonstrating disapproval. For example, William Cobbett 
was one of those who deplored the peace, and his home was stoned 
until he illuminated his house. When the French envoy, General 
Lauriston, arrived in London with the French government's 
ratification of the preliminary treaty, the mob disengaged his 
horses and pulled his carriage through the streets. Otto put up in 
his window a banner that read "concorde', but some of the semi­
literate in the street misread it as "conquered' and stoned his 
house until he took the sign down. The government was pleased at 
this demonstration of approval for its policy, but was very 
concerned about the uncontrollable nature of the popular 
demonstrations. Yorke, for example, told Pelham, "This wretched 
London Mob would have done as much or more for Massena, or Augereau 
if they [had] entered the Capital at the head of a victorious 
army.'2 Yorke was obviously exaggerating, but this comment 
demonstrates the alarm felt by some members of the government.
Although the activities of the London "mob' were not 
necessarily an accurate indicator of public opinion, the public 
celebrations and the lack of any demonstrations of dissatisfaction 
appeared to indicate that the country on the whole either supported 
or at least did not oppose the peace. In addition, it was quite 
clear to foreign diplomats such as Otto and Starhemberg that the 
peace was extremely popular.3 Eldon was convinced by the general 
reaction to the peace that the ministry had made the right decision:
3Mrs Ord to Mrs Goodenough, 12 Oct. 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1801/F14.
2Yorke to Pelham, 13 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 35701, fo. 120.
3Otto to Talleyrand, 21 Vendemiaire X (29 Oct. 1801), AE 
Angleterre/596; Starhemberg to Colloredo, 13 Oct. 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
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'I think I have discovered that we ought to be hanged, and that 
Parliament had so forewarned us, if we rejected such a Peace, as we 
have made.'1 Some members of the government were not convinced, 
however, that the peace would be permanent. Hobart told Auckland, 
^having made Peace, I think it better at least to affect a belief 
in its permanency, altho1 I might be prepared for a different 
result, than to put on a face of mortification & Disappointment.'2 
Considering Addington's downcast mood after the signing of the 
treaty, it seems likely that the Prime Minister's sentiments were 
similar to Hobart's.
The real political significance of the peace was, however, its 
influence on parliamentary party politics. For this one issue 
scrambled party alignments, creating instability where there had 
once been order, and the results were to affect the course of 
British politics for the next twenty years. After Pitt ascended 
power in 1783, Parliament had divided largely into two groups, one 
led by Pitt, the other by Fox. Pitt's supporters were not 
necessarily personally devoted to him, but as Fox was the only 
alternative, a majority in Parliament chose to remain firmly behind 
Pitt. Fox's seemingly unpatriotic stance during the war strengthened 
Pitt's position and because of it some of Fox's most influential 
allies even crossed the floor to join Pitt's government. Thus by the 
time that Pitt retired in 1801 his parliamentary position was almost 
invincible. For although some of his colleagues may have disagreed 
on policy, none would have challenged his leadership.
When Addington took over, there was no fundamental realignment 
of parties: virtually the same members of Parliament continued to 
support or oppose the government. Pitt's party was still in power, 
there were just different men in some of the offices. The news of 
the peace destroyed the unity of Pitt's party, however, and 
undermined the division between Pittites and Foxites in Parliament.
1Eldon to Addington, endorsed Oct. 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl80l/OZ95.
2Hobart to Auckland, 14 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 34455, fo. 442.
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Pitt, himself, fully supported the peace and Addington and
Hawkesbury had regularly consulted him during the negotiations,
including sending him a 150 page report on the preliminaries.1 After
the conclusion of the treaty, he told Addington that he would have
signed on those terms with pleasure.2 He continued to advise
Addington, offering suggestions to improve the King's speech to be
delivered at the opening of Parliament in November 1801 and helping
him with the government finances. Dundas noted that he had seen Pitt
vloitering about London in daily intercourse with ministers.'3
During the first year of the ministry Pitt had acted magnanimously,
even though he must have realized that if Addington concluded peace
successfully it would have reflected poorly on his own management
of the war and failure to procure a peace. Thus his personal
position was very difficult yet he could not have acted better
towards Addington than he did. For not only did he support the
peace, but also wrote to his friends to convince them to support
it,4 and many of them complied. Rose, although resenting Addington
for displacing Pitt, told the Prime Minister,
I have no Hesitation in expressing the most un-qualified 
approbation of the Terms of the Peace which you were so 
good as to communicate to me; they are according to my 
Judgement most highly creditable to the Country; and on 
the whole as advantageous as could reasonably be 
expected; I should have thought so even if the Cape had 
been un-conditionally restored, and I am confident that 
no Hope of getting something better terms [sic] Twelve
3Pitt to Hiley Addington, 28 Sept. 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1801/OP44.
2Glenbervie Diaries, i. 268.
3Dundas to Spencer 17 Nov. 1801, Cyril Matheson The Life of 
Henry Dundas. First Viscount Melville. 1742-1811 (London, 1933), 
p. 319.
4Pitt to Bathurst, 18 Oct. 1801, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission: Report on the Manuscripts of the Seventh Earl 
Bathurst (London, 1923), 26; Pitt to Mulgrave, 2 Oct. 1801, 
Stanhope, iii. 28; Pitt to Grenville, 5 Oct. 1801, Dropmore 
Papers, vii. 49-50; Pitt to Canning, 26 Oct. 1801, Canning 
Papers, 30.
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Months hence could have justified the incurring another 
Year's Expense with the Consequences thereof.1
Earl Bathurst, Ryder, and Canning all wrote expressing similar
sentiments,2 but not all of Pitt's former colleagues felt the same
way.
The first blow was the response of Grenville. Pitt's cousin has
always been very difficult for historians to fathom and this episode
is indicative. After resigning in February, Grenville accepted
Pitt's argument that the old ministry ought to support the new so
as to keep the Foxite opposition out of office. Moreover, Grenville
understood the difficulties that the new government faced and tried
to convince his colleagues that it would be unjust to cause
Addington trouble. He had told Carysfort at that time,
I will not conceal from you that I have a personal 
interest in making these suggestions to you, considering 
as I do, our own honour as very deeply concerned in the 
avoiding all (even the slightest) appearances, of giving 
either by ourselves, or by those intimately connected 
with us in alliance & friendship, any trouble to those 
who, at a crisis so very arduous, are to undertake a task 
from which the strongest nerves might shrink.3
He continued to support and advise the new ministry until the
summer. According to Glenbervie on 24 October, 'Lord Grenville six
weeks ago said he knew no measure of this Ministry that he did not
approve of, and that he could not easily foresee any which he could
bring himself to oppose.'4 Nevertheless, soon after the peace was
announced Grenville wrote to Addington, Pitt, and the King to say
that he disapproved of the peace and was determined to oppose it in
Parliament, stating that 'nothing but a sense of indispensable duty
1Rose to Addington, 4 Oct. 1801, Sidmouth Papers,
152M/C1801/OP4 8.
2Bathurst to Addington, 4 Oct. 1801, Ryder to Addington, 2 
Oct. 1801, and Canning to Hiley Addington, 2 Oct. 1801, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl80l/OP54, 61, and 75.
3Grenville to Carysfort, 6 Feb. 1801, Dropmore Papers, vi.
437.
4Glenbervie Diaries, i . 2 68-9.
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could have led me to this separation from those for whom I entertain 
sentiments of friendship and regard, and whose measures I was most 
sincerely desirous of supporting'.1 He professed that he believed 
that he could oppose the ministry on the issue of peace without 
going into systematic opposition or endangering the position of the 
government, even though Pitt warned him that his opposition would 
hurt the ministry.2
The question remains why Grenville decided to take such an 
outspoken stance in opposition to Addington and Pitt. The short 
answer is that he genuinely thought that the peace was unwise. The 
terms of the treaty did not fulfill Britain's war aims of reducing 
France to its prewar boundaries and imposing upon her a government 
that would respect those boundaries.3 He had been the strongest 
opponent of accepting Bonaparte's peace overtures of December 1799, 
and he was simply trying to be consistent. He may have also believed 
that supporting Addington and Hawkesbury's peace would have been a 
public acknowledgement that they had succeeded where he had failed. 
Therefore, in order to justify his previous conduct, he had to argue 
that the new ministry had accepted disadvantageous terms to which 
he would never have agreed. His view of the issue was so narrow that 
he did not realize that his war aims were totally unrealistic, and 
that the consequences for continuing the war could have been grave. 
Nevertheless, he was extremely stubborn and believed that it was his 
public duty to state his convictions regardless of the difficulties 
it might cause his political allies and himself. He had wanted to 
support the government and had pledged his support, but became 
annoyed when it did not follow his policy. Thus, he was only happy 
as long as he was consulted on foreign policy. Moreover,
1Grenville to Addington, 14 Oct. 1801, Pellew, i. 459-60.
2Grenville to Dundas, 5 Nov. 1801, Melville Castle 
Muniments, GD 51/1/556/15; Pitt to Grenville, 9 Oct. 1801, 
Dropmore Papers. vii. 55-6.
3Grenville to Auckland, [1801], Add. MSS 34455, fos. 462-3.
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Buckingham's group took an irrational dislike to Addington and 
placed pressure on Grenville to oppose the Government.1
The other major opponent of the peace was Windham. Addington 
had expected that Windham might be adverse to the treaty but he had 
hopes of persuading him that the peace was in the country's best 
interests. He wrote to Windham immediately after the treaty was 
signed, 'I think when I see you which I hope I shall before you 
leave London I can satisfy you that it is not clear even upon your 
own Principles that we are wrong. '2 But Windham replied that he 
condemned the peace without even knowing the terms: "the Country has 
received its death blow.'3 Later Pelham also tried to win over 
Windham:
I am not surprised at the anxiety you feel about the 
Peace, & I am inclined to think that after the first 
effusisms [sic] of Joy at the return of Peace, that the 
country in general will not be less so--at the same time 
I think you must have seen & known enough of our means of 
carrying on the War & of the preparations for defence, to 
be satisfied that we were not in a state capable of 
effecting either with Success.4
Windham, however, would not change his opinion.
Windham was one of the most loyal disciples of Edmund Burke,
and had adopted his mentor's hatred of Revolutionary France. His
first priority while Secretary at War had been to support the
royalists. Thus while his colleagues debated whether to send troops
to Egypt or central Europe, he had supported a direct invasion of
France to overthrow the regime, and he would never have been
satisfied until the royalists had been restored. His position,
therefore, was even more unrealistic than Grenville's. Despite this
3Peter Jupp, Lord Grenville. 1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 
306-8 .
2Addington to Windham, 1 Oct. 18 01, Add. MSS 3788 0, fo.
160 .
3Windham to Addington, 1 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 37880, fo.
171.
4Pelham to Windham, 20 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 37880, fos. 175-
6.
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opposition, however, he did try to keep on good personal terms with 
Addington, and they continued to correspond and meet socially. In 
1809, when both men were out of office, Windham would admit to 
Addington that he had been wrong all along. Many years later, 
Addington told his son-in-law and biographer, George Pellew, that 
during dinner at the White Lodge in July of that year Windham 
admitted, VI have for some time wished to tell you, that I am 
thoroughly convinced, if it had not been for the peace of Amiens 
this country could never have maintained the struggle to the present 
period.'1 Thus Windham acknowledged that the peace provided an 
important breathing space, which was one of the major reasons that 
Addington sought it in the first place.
Some other prominent politicians also decided to oppose the 
peace. For example, Spencer decided to follow the lead of Grenville 
and Windham. As a member of Pitt's war Cabinet, his reasons were 
probably similar to Grenville's, though he stated that he would have 
been satisfied if the Cape had been retained.2 Fitzwilliam, once a 
Foxite Whig and later a member of Pitt's ministry, also criticized 
the terms, but his reasons more closely resembled Windham's. For he 
did not believe that any peace would be permanent until the French 
government had changed.3 Nevertheless, as J. R. Jones points out, 
these contemporary critics who favoured continuing the war had lost 
touch with the realities of Europe and persisted in unrealistic 
aims. There was no way that the British negotiators could have 
achieved real security at that time.4
There were others whose opinions fell in the middle. Dundas 
supported the peace in principle but disliked the terms. For he did 
not care so much about Europe or the royalists, but he disapproved
1Pellew, ii. 52-3.
2Spencer to Camden, 14 Oct. 1801, Althorp Papers, G42.
3E . A. Smith, Whig Principles and Party Politics: Earl 
Fitzwilliam and the Whig Party. 1748-1833 (Manchester, 1975), p. 
261.
4J. R. Jones, Britain and the World (London, 1980), p. 275.
109
of returning the colonial conquests, especially the Cape and Malta. 
He had always believed that colonial warfare was the best means of 
promoting Britain's interests, and he felt that two of the most 
important conquests of his administration were being given away for 
little in return. Nevertheless, he was too personally devoted to 
Pitt to differ from him in public, and so while expressing his views 
to colleagues in private, he decided not to attend the session of 
Parliament, in order to prevent placing himself in the position of 
having to vote against his conscience or against Pitt.1 In fact, 
Dundas was even considering retiring completely from politics.2 For 
loyalty to Pitt was more important for Dundas than any political 
point. Camden and Bathurst felt the same. Moreover, they perceived 
the danger of members of Pitt's party taking a position in 
opposition to their former leader. If the party split, Pitt's power 
would subside and the chances of him returning to office in the 
future would diminish, and so Camden and Bathurst tried desperately 
to patch up the differences and keep the party together but to no 
avail. The split that arose between Pitt on one side and Grenville, 
Spencer, and Windham on the other, however, was never to be healed.3
While members of the former ministry were withdrawing support 
from the new government, members of the former opposition were 
beginning to support it. For the war had been the most important 
political issue that had held the Foxite Whigs together, and by 
successfully negotiating peace, Addington had caused confusion in 
their ranks. Thus after a decade of opposing every measure of the 
government, the Whigs were faced with an issue which they were 
obliged to support. Indeed the whole premise of their being in
dundas to Pitt, 6 Oct. 1801, Melville Castle Muniments, GD 
51/1/64/2.
2Dundas to Hope, 23 Dec. 1801, Hope of Luffness Muniments, 
GD 364/1/1135/2/1.
3Bathurst to Pitt, 16 Oct. 1801, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/112/1, fos. 40-2; Camden to Grenville, 9 Oct. 1801, Pratt 
Papers, U840/C23/2; Camden to Spencer, 9 Oct. 18 01, Althorp 
Papers, GD 42; Feiling, p. 22 6.
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opposition was undermined by a government that pursued policies that 
they supported. Nevertheless, they could hardly join the government 
benches. As a result party unity began to dissolve, as it had among 
Pitt's party.1 Fox had once been the unifying force behind the 
party, but his influence had waned since his voluntary secession 
from Parliament in 1797. Moreover, morale was low. For even though 
their two greatest aspirations had been achieved, Pitt out of office 
and the war ended, they were still as far as ever from obtaining 
office themselves.
This was the political environment when the new session of 
Parliament opened in October. Addington had planned to call the 
session for 2 9 October regardless of whether peace was signed by 
then, as the government would require another vote of supplies. With 
peace having been signed on 1 October, the ministry had four weeks 
to prepare the defence of its measures. But even though popular 
demonstrations in favour of the peace began early, Addington was 
still unsure of the disposition of Parliament. For he knew that 
Grenville and Windham would oppose the peace, but he was uncertain 
of how many members they would carry with them or how the Foxite 
Whigs would react. Therefore, it was unclear how many votes the 
government could win in a division, and some predictions were not 
very optimistic. Yorke told Pelham, "We shall certainly have a rough 
Session, & I believe much envy, hatred and uncharitableness are on 
foot.'2 Glenbervie indeed thought that Addington would not survive 
the session.3 Consequently, the ministry worked hard to gather 
supporters for the forthcoming debates and votes. Addington pressed 
Abbot, Hobart worked on Auckland, and Pitt persuaded Castlereagh to 
lend the government active support.
Parliament opened on 29 October, and Windham could not wait to 
attack the peace. He took the opportunity of the debate on the
XE. A. Smith, Lord Grev. 1764-1845 (Oxford, 1990), p. 83.
2Yorke to Pelham, 30 Sept. 1801, Add. MSS 35701, fos. 110-
5.
3Glenbervie Diaries, i. 255.
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address of thanks for the King's speech to open a tirade against the 
government, "who, in a moment of rashness and weakness, have fatally- 
put their hands to this treaty, have signed the death-warrant of 
their country. They have given it a blow, under which it may 
languish for a few years, but from which I do not conceive how it 
is possible for it ever to recover.'1 Addington responded quite 
graciously that Windham's comments were out of order, as the terms 
of the peace had not yet been set before the House, and that the 
present debate concerned the King's speech only. Sheridan then stood 
up and spoke as if he had not heard a word that Addington had said, 
and made his famous remark, which he had stolen from Francis Horner 
that it was "a peace which every man ought to be glad of, but no man 
can be proud of'.
The next day, Hawkesbury presented the terms of the peace along 
with the convention signed with Russia, and the debate on the peace 
treaty began in earnest on 3 November. After the motion in support 
of the peace was seconded, Leveson Gower rose to criticize 
Hawkesbury's reference to the terms offered by Malmesbury at Lille 
in 1797 in justifying the Preliminaries of London because he claimed 
that the situation faced by the government then had been worse and 
the terms that it had offered better.2 There were two problems, 
however, with this argument. First, despite the naval mutinies and 
the suspension of cash payments in 1797, the economic and domestic 
political situation was much worse in 1801.3 Second, although 
Grenville had offered terms that were more favourable to Britain, 
they were irrelevant because the French had rejected them. 
Nevertheless, in his response to Leveson Gower, Hawkesbury skirted 
the issue. He neglected to mention any reference to internal 
difficulties, probably to avoid admitting publicly the role played 
by social unrest in the formulation of policy because it might alarm 
the country or encourage political radicals. Instead he concentrated
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 14.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 36-7.
3See above, chapter 1, pp. 17-2 9.
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on the future prospects of the war and the terms of the treaty. He 
argued first that another grand coalition was impossible, and that 
the British could not achieve their war aims without one. He then 
referred to the time and the tone of the treaty, arguing that the 
time was suitable because the British had enjoyed recent military 
success, "in the hour of victory it became the spirit and 
magnanimity of the government and the people, to listen to the voice 
of peace1.1 This was rather empty rhetoric because he would have 
signed in March before these military successes, if the French had 
then agreed. He was on more solid ground, however, in dealing with 
the terms, which, he argued, were both honourable and advantageous. 
He belittled the concessions that he had granted and emphasized the 
value of what had been retained in Trinidad and Ceylon. It would 
have been fairer if he had said that the terms were not 
dishonourable or disadvantageous, which is not the same. The British 
had retained their two most important acquisitions and had not 
surrendered any possession that they had held prior to the war. Nor 
were they humiliated the way the Austrians or Portuguese had been 
by the French. Certainly, the preliminaries of peace compared 
favourably with the treaties of Luneville or Badajoz.
During the following debate many members concentrated on 
scoring party political points. For example, Thomas Grenville 
complained, "that both in the present treaty, and in the convention 
with the northern powers, ministers had assumed a humble tone, which 
would lead to consequences dangerous to the existence of the 
country. ... To have been victorious, and yet to have treated as a 
vanquished nation, was a galling reflexion to a British mind.12 
Castlereagh's response, on the other hand, was more to the point. 
In his mind the question was whether "to carry on the war alone 
against France, or to make peace with that state, if it could be 
done upon terms consistent with our safety and independence.' He 
then argued that continuing the war without allies would have been
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 41. 
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useless, and that the terms of the preliminaries "were as favourable 
as we could look for in the present state of Europe'.1
The best speech of the night was made by Pitt. Possessing a 
detailed knowledge of the process of the negotiations and having 
advised the government, he was in a good position to understand the 
whole picture. He stated that the failure of the Continental 
alliance meant that the question over peace was one of terms only, 
and on that subject, he made an important point which the opponents 
of the terms overlooked. "It was undoubtedly the duty of every 
government,' he pointed out, "in negotiating a treaty of peace to 
obtain the best possible terms; but it was sometimes difficult to 
know how far particular points might be pressed without running the 
risk of breaking off the negotiation.' As to the colonial 
possessions Hawkesbury had surrendered, "They would only give us a 
little more wealth; but a little more wealth would be badly 
purchased by a little more war.' He compressed the whole issue into 
a nutshell by stating that, "the government had undoubtedly 
endeavoured to obtain the best terms they could for the country; and 
he was ready to contend, that the difference between the terms we 
had obtained and those of retaining all which we had given up, would 
not have justified ministers in protracting the war. '2 It was 
unfortunate for Addington and Hawkesbury that they could not 
describe their policies so concisely.
On 10 October, Fox had made a rather impolitic speech at the 
Shakespeare tavern, stating that he gloried in the triumph of the 
French over the British governments. In standing up in the Commons 
to speak after Pitt, however, he displayed more sense. He conceded 
all of Pitt's arguments about the terms, but had something to add 
about the continuance of the war. He stressed the social damage that 
the war had wrought, referring to the increase in the ranks of the 
poor and the inability of charity to deal with the problem, and 
arguing that the rapid decline in the price of grain when the peace
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 54-5.
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was announced proved that high prices were linked to the war. 'Can 
any man doubt under such circumstances, 1 he added, 'whether it be 
not better for the people to eat, than that we should possess the 
Cape, or even Malta ...?' Noting that the joy expressed at the news 
of the peace was greatest among the lower classes and that they 
never stopped to inquire about the terms, he concluded, 'that the 
people were so goaded by the war, that they preferred peace almost 
upon any terms1 . His only regret was that the peace had not come 
years sooner.1
The debate continued and concluded the next day. The only 
speech of note was Windham's, who in a lengthy tirade denounced the 
peace in the strongest terms and warned of the danger still posed 
by France. Many remarked that he spoke like the 'ghost of Burke'.2 
But as it had been so often with Burke's speeches, Windham was 
'admired but disapproved.'3 Sensing that the House was strongly 
against him, Windham did not even move for a division.
The debate was somewhat less vindictive in the Lords. The 
defence of the government was borne by Pelham who rose in response 
to a weak speech by Spencer criticising the peace. Pelham 
concentrated on a comparison with the proposals of 1797, noting the 
only real difference was that the British did not retain the Cape, 
which was made a free port. Grenville then rose with a lengthy 
criticism of the treaty. He stated that the basis of every 
negotiation must be either status quo ante bellum or uti possidetis, 
but that Addington and Hawkesbury had followed neither. Therefore, 
he predicted that the peace would cause Britain's position vis-a-vis 
France to deteriorate. Eldon answered that the dangers that 
Grenville envisioned would not have been better provided against if 
the British had kept all of their conquests, a point which Nelson
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 72-83.
2Lady Bessborough to Leveson Gower, November 18 01, Leveson 
Gower Correspondence, i. 306.
3Corry to Abbot, 5 Nov. 18 01, Colchester Papers, PRO 
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reiterated in his speech. Nevertheless, Grenville did proceed to 
provoke a division, which the government won 114 to 10. The minority 
included Grenville, Spencer, Buckingham, and Fitzwilliam.1
This episode completely changed the complexion of Parliament. 
For as Yorke had predicted, new parties were aligning.2 Before the 
peace, the same men supported the government as had supported Pitt, 
and the same group remained in opposition. After the peace, however, 
Grenville, Windham, and Spencer had broken from the government 
ranks, taking their adherents into opposition. The ministry was 
compensated, however, by the support of most of the Foxite Whigs. 
This left Fitzwilliam and the rest of the Whigs who could not 
support the peace on the side of Grenville and Windham against the 
ministry supported by the rest of the House. The ministry was in a 
stronger position because the Foxites were a much larger group than 
the Grenvillites. Nevertheless, Addington was not comfortable with 
these developments. He wrote to Windham, "As to the Measure fthe 
peacel. to which you advert, I should indeed have Cause for Shame 
if the Principles upon which it is disapproved of by you, were not 
far more congenial to my own mind, than those upon which some 
Persons are disposed to support it. 13 He would have preferred it if 
Grenville and Windham had continued to support him and Fox had 
continued to oppose. For while he had lost the support of Grenville 
and Windham, he could not be certain of maintaining that of the 
Foxites. In addition, although Grenville and Windham did not take 
many votes with them, they were strong debaters and might in future 
win over a following. This caused a serious problem for Addington's 
ministry which was so weak in debating talent.
Addington was aware of this weakness and tried to attach 
talented speakers to the ministry, though largely without success.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 159-91.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 27 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 3 5701, fos. 
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During November and December 1801, there were rumours that he was 
negotiating a coalition with the Foxite Whigs. The evidence 
available is inconclusive, but it is reasonable to assume that there 
was some truth to these rumours. Tierney told Grey that Addington 
had sent a message through Bragge to meet him on horseback in Hyde 
Park, where they spoke for two hours and then agreed to meet again 
on Wimbledon Common.1 Later Tierney told Moira that he and Addington 
had agreed to an arrangement which would bring Tierney, Moira, 
Erskine, and Thurlow into office with Grey and Bedford entering at 
a later time.2 Upon hearing of the negotiations, Moira asked to 
speak privately with Addington, although according to Tierney the 
meeting never took place.3 Grey, however, did meet privately with St 
Vincent and explained that he wanted a guarantee that the system 
under which the government was to be conducted would be changed, 
either by strong new policies or by stacking the ministry with 
Whigs.4 Moira also refused to sit in the same Cabinet with Portland, 
who, the Whigs felt had betrayed them.5 Thus, the negotiations 
appeared terminated by the end of December, but in January, the 
Prince of Wales pressed a reluctant Addington to form a junction.6 
Moira met with Addington in February, but they failed to reach 
agreement and the negotiations were suspended.7
While Tierney presented all this evidence of activity, there
is reason to believe that he was exaggerating the nature of his
1Tierney to Grey, Oct, 1801, Grey Papers.
2Tierney to Moira, n. d., Tierney Papers, 30M70/52G; H. K.
Olphin, George Tierney (London, 1934), pp. 75-6.
3Moira to Addington, 9 Nov. 1801, Sidmouth Papers,
152M/cl801/OZ41; Tierney to Grey, 19 Dec. 1801, Grey Papers.
4Grey to Tierney, 24 Dec. 1801, Tierney Papers, 31M70/33b; 
Smith, Lord Grev. p. 79.
5Moira to Tierney, 18 Nov. 1801, and Bute to Tierney, 18 
Nov. 1801, Tierney Papers 31M70/52c and 13c.
6Tierney to Grey, 19 Dec. 1801 and Jan. 1802, Grey Papers.
7Tierney to Grey, Feb. 18 02, Grey Papers.
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discussions with Addington. For Addington never envisioned a 
coalition with the Whigs. Rather he hoped to gain further talent and 
support for the ministry by offering some lesser offices to Tierney, 
Grey, or Erskine.1 The changes to the ministry were to be only 
partial and Addington was to remain at its head.2 It was already a 
hodgepodge of parties, and one or two additions from the Whigs would 
not have tipped the balance. Addington had already discussed with 
Pitt the possibility of giving office to Tierney and Pitt had 
approved, although he thought it would be a post in the East 
Indies.3 Pitt refused to believe, however, that Addington had made 
offers to Moira or Grey. Moreover, St Vincent was a personal friend
of Grey's father and might have discussed his accession to the
ministry without Addington's knowledge. For Lady Holland thought 
that the main negotiations were taking place between Grey and St 
Vincent.4 In addition, it was probably Tierney who was pushing to 
have more of his colleagues admitted into office. Nevertheless, a 
coalition would have alarmed Pitt and infuriated the King, and such 
behaviour would have been completely out of character for Addington.
The question remains why Addington allowed himself to get
caught at all in a series of negotiations with members of the
opposition, when he had the overwhelming support of Parliament for 
his policy. The reason was that the situation was much less stable 
than it appeared. He admitted to Hiley that the position of the 
government was precarious.5 For he could not count on the continued 
support of the Foxites for all of his polices, and he had strong
1Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 15 Nov. 1801, Add. MSS 38235, fo.
300 .
2Otto to Talleyrand, 9 Pluviose X (28 Jan. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/597.
3Rose to Tomline, 12 Nov. 1801, Pretyman Papers, HA 
119/T108/44; Canning to Frere, 21 Nov. 1801, Add. MSS 38833, fo. 
62 .
4Ladv Holland Journal, ii. 147.
5Addington to Hiley Addington, 27 Nov. 1801, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl80l/OZ142.
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reason to believe that many of Pitt's friends would move into 
decided opposition. Moreover, as the negotiations for the definitive 
treaty dragged on, he began to wonder whether peace would ever be 
firmly established, and he knew that his government would be in deep 
trouble if it were not.
The Congress of Amiens
During the negotiations of 1801, Hawkesbury and Otto had wanted 
to announce an agreement as early as possible. Finding that agreeing 
in principle was easier than spelling out all of the details, they 
agreed to sign merely a preliminary treaty and to leave the final 
details to be settled at a peace congress in Amiens. Thus, the peace 
as of 1 October was, in effect, an armistice or truce: Britain and 
France were no longer at war, but peace had not yet been firmly 
established.
Yet the Addington ministry was quite confident that the
negotiations for the definitive treaty would be merely a formality
and following the signing of the preliminary treaty it began the
initial phases of demobilization. It was owing to this
overconfidence that Addington chose Cornwallis to negotiate the
definitive treaty at Amiens. Glenbervie later acknowledged that
Those who know him best are readiest to acknowledge his 
unfitness for such a business--but it seems he was of a 
different opinion for he certainly asked for it, & our 
ministry, who fancied the Preliminaries had settled every 
thing thought the popularity of his name would give a 
splendor [sic] to the formal conclusion of the Peace.1
Addington and Hawkesbury believed that the preliminaries had settled
all the essential points and that it would take little time and
effort to flesh out the final details of the few articles which Otto
and Hawkesbury had postponed.2 They chose Cornwallis rather than an
experienced negotiator, such as Whitworth, because they thought that
1Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, vii. 12 Mar. 18 02.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 15 Nov. 1801, Add. MSS 38235, fo.
300.
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his distinguished military career would make him more agreeable to 
Bonaparte. Hawkesbury wrote to the King that he was "convinced that 
the military reputation and character of Marquis Cornwallis will 
give him advantages in treating with the French Government which no 
other person would possess in an equal degree'.1 Moreover, 
Addington, Hawkesbury, and Cornwallis believed that the congress 
would take little time and that the treaty would be ready by the 
middle of November.2
Consequently, Hawkesbury's initial instructions to Cornwallis 
were not very detailed. He noted that the article on Malta was the 
most important and directed Cornwallis to stipulate that the island 
be restored to the Order of St John. He also directed Cornwallis to 
define whom that order included, as the British government hoped 
that the Maltese could be allowed into the order, from which they 
were for the time being excluded, so as to improve relations between 
the knights and the natives. Finally, Hawkesbury stipulated that a 
garrison of troops, ideally Russian, should be provided. 
Subsequently, however, on 14 November Hawkesbury had to report to 
Cornwallis that the Russians had refused to guarantee Malta, and 
that the Tsar wished that the King of Naples garrison the island. 
Acknowledging that the French would probably oppose a Russian 
garrison for Malta, he directed Cornwallis to comply with their 
objection as a "concession1.3 The only other article he emphasized 
was that which stipulated payment for the maintenance of the 
prisoners of war, indicating, however, that the British would accept 
the island of Tobago instead of payment.4 Later, Hawkesbury added
1Hawkesbury to the King, 5 Oct. 1801, Aspinall, iii. 615.
2Tierney to Grey, 9 Oct. 1801, Grey Papers; Rufus King to 
Secretary of State, Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence 
of Rufus King (6 vols., New York, 1896), iii. 523; Franklin and 
Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis; The Imperial Years (Chapel Hill, N.
C., 1980), p. 257.
3Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 14 Nov. 1801, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/267, fos. 1-2; Same to same, 16 Nov. 1801, FO 27/59.
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that a provision for the Prince of Orange had been withdrawn from
the preliminary treaty on the understanding that the French and
Prussians would provide an indemnity, but he told Cornwallis to
insert a new clause, if nothing had been done for the Prince of
Orange by the time the treaty was ready for signature.1
Cornwallis arrived in Paris on 7 November, while back in London
on the same day Otto informed the British government that the French
were sending a fleet of twenty-three ships of the line, sixteen
frigates, and 20,000 men to St Domingue to crush the rebellion.
Hawkesbury and Addington were alarmed at the size of the fleet, and
decided to send one of proportional size to the West Indies to watch
it. Hawkesbury instructed Cornwallis to assure the French that the
British did not object to the expedition, but that such actions
could create considerable distrust.2
Upon arrival in Paris Cornwallis met privately with Talleyrand
and Joseph Bonaparte, who had been appointed the French negotiator
for the definitive treaty. Hawkesbury had told Cornwallis that there
would be no objection if he wished to settle the principal points
of the negotiation with Joseph Bonaparte before they left Paris for
Amiens, if this would help to expedite the process afterwards.
Cornwallis, on the other hand, felt that it would be disadvantageous
to stay in Paris for any length of time as
I should have to deal with Talleyrand on the spot, 
instead of negotiating with him through the medium of 
Joseph Bonaparte, who had the character of being a well 
meaning, altho' not a very able Man, and whose near 
connexion with the first Consul might perhaps be in some 
degree a check on the spirit of chicanery and intrigue 
which the Minister of the exterior so eminently 
possesses.3
He therefore hoped to set out for Amiens by the end of the month, 
but he did meet with Joseph on 24 November, and to his surprise was 
quite satisfied, as Joseph accepted Hawkesbury's plan for Malta. The
hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 1 Nov. 1801, FO 27/59.
hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 7 and 8 Nov. 1801, FO 27/59.
3Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 2 0 Nov. 1801, FO 27/59.
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only problem appeared to be the settlement of the prisoner of war 
accounts. But when on 28 November, Cornwallis met privately with the 
First Consul, the meeting though friendly, was unpromising. For 
Bonaparte refused to consider any provisions for the Prince of 
Orange, rejected the idea that the French should pay for the 
prisoners of war, and refused to give up Tobago unless the British 
would trade another West Indian island for it. In addition, he made 
some new suggestions of his own. Better to neutralize the value of 
Malta, he proposed that the fortifications of the island be 
destroyed. He also requested a revision of the treaties concerning 
the Newfoundland fisheries and a mutual agreement to deport 
dangerous persons requested by the other.1
Realizing that he was making little progress in Paris, 
Cornwallis insisted on proceeding to Amiens, where he arrived on 1 
December. He believed that once he and Joseph sat down together, 
without the interference of Talleyrand and the First Consul, they 
could conclude the treaty in little time. He told Hawkesbury, "I 
have little Doubt, as soon as I shall receive it [a proposal for a 
definitive treaty] from Your Lordship, together with His Majesty's 
final Commands in regard to Malta, that this Business will be 
arranged with Expedition.12
Hawkesbury was pleased with the progress in the negotiations 
described in Cornwallis's reports of his meetings with Joseph and 
Napoleon Bonaparte and on 16 December he sent a proposal for a 
definitive treaty. In it the article on Malta conformed to the tone 
of the discussion Cornwallis had had with Joseph: the British would 
evacuate the island in three months, to give the King of Naples 
sufficient time to provide a garrison.3 In a private letter 
accompanying these dispatches, he added,
I hope we shall be able to form some Judgement in the
Course of a week or ten Days of the probable Duration of
1Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 3 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
2Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 6 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
3Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 16 and 17 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
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the Negotiation. I confess I should be very much inclined 
Personally (but This is not official) if every other 
point could be satisfactorily settled and a Spanish 
Minister should not arrive within a certain time to sign 
the Treaty with the Plenipotentiaries who were at that 
time at Amiens & to insert an article similar to that 
respecting the Ottoman Porte inviting the King of Spain 
to accede to the Treaty.1
Cornwallis's assistant, Anthony Merry, remarked, "They are in such
a Hurry at Home . . . that we are even authorized to conclude and sign
before the Arrival of the Spanish P [1]en[ipotentiar]y if there
should be a Prospect of any Delay in [sic] the Consequence of his
non-Presence.12
Cornwallis delivered the British project of treaty on 21 
December, but instead of discussing the terms, Joseph responded with 
a counter-project. The French had realized that the British were in 
haste and took advantage of it. Merry was slightly exaggerating when 
he claimed that Cornwallis demonstrated a "Disposition ... to give 
way on every Point, in order to get through the Business the more 
easily'.3 Nevertheless, Cornwallis had been careless enough to give 
Joseph the initiative. Hawkesbury had made the mistake of 
introducing issues, such as Tobago and the Prince of Orange, which 
were not mentioned in the preliminaries, and the French responded 
by introducing new issues of their own. They demanded better terms 
in the Newfoundland fisheries and in India, possession of the 
Falkland Islands, protection for fishermen in war-time, and the 
abolition of naval salutes.4 Merry described the counter-project as 
tending, "no less than to take away in some instances, to leave in
1Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 17 Dec. 1801, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/266, fos. 3-4. The Dutch representative arrived at 
Amiens on 7 December, but the Spanish had not appointed one.
2Merry to Jackson, 21 Dec. 1801, Jackson Papers, FO 353/76.
3Merry to Jackson, 16 Dec. 1801, Jackson Papers, FO 353/76.
4Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 27 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
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doubt in others, all the Advantages given us by the Preliminaries 
in return for the Sacrifices we have made1.1
This counter-project threw the negotiations into chaos. 
Cornwallis complained that the cessions of Trinidad and Ceylon had 
not been admitted, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
neglected, the prisoner of war indemnity not addressed, and the 
arrangement for Malta altered. When Cornwallis proposed that Joseph 
and he have their secretaries draw up an official protocol, the two 
negotiators could not agree what was to be written down. Cornwallis 
concluded that Joseph's strategy was to 'throw upon me the Odium of 
the Delay (which now appears to be the aim of the French Government) 
and, upon the whole, to create a Confusion in our Proceedings'.2
Unfortunately for the British, Cornwallis was not the right man 
to handle this situation. While he might have been the best choice 
for a ceremonial occasion, he did not possess the mental toughness 
to deal with Joseph Bonaparte. Instead he became despondent too 
easily: 'I feel it as the most unpleasant circumstance attending
this business, that after I have obtained his acquiescence on any 
point, I can have no confidence that it is finally settled, and that 
he will not recede from it in our next conversation'.3 Moreover, 
according to Merry's account of the negotiations, Cornwallis's 
ignorance of the subjects under discussion often played into 
Joseph's hands. While Merry fought to incorporate Hawkesbury's 
instructions, Cornwallis's interference worked to the advantage of 
the French. In short, Merry thought Cornwallis utterly incompetent, 
referring to his superior as an 'old woman', and stating that 'He 
is completely in a state of Dotage, and literally fit for Nothing 
but a Nap after Dinner.'4
3Merry to Jackson, 30 Dec. 1801, Jackson Papers, FO 353/76.
2Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 30 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
3Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 30 Dec. 1801, FO 27/59.
4Merry to Jackson, 30 Dec. 1801, 19 and 30 Jan., 6 and 25
Feb., and 5 Mar. 1802, Jackson Papers, FO 353/76.
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Merry was unduly hard on Cornwallis, but it is clear that the 
latter was showing too much of his hand. The First Consul, for his 
part, was eager as the British for a quick conclusion to the 
treaty.1 He wrote to his brother, Lucien, on 1 December, vLe congres 
d 1Amiens est reuni, et la paix definitive sera promptement signee.12 
A month later he had become annoyed with the delay and demanded to 
know the precise day on which the treaty would be signed,3 and when 
the treaty still had not been concluded by March, he instructed Otto 
to place greater pressure on the British government.4 Nevertheless, 
these delays were not the responsibility of the British or the 
Spanish as has been claimed.5 For Joseph realized that the British 
were in a hurry and used this to his advantage.6 He told the First 
Consul that he was causing the delays intentionally to break the 
patience of the British, but was trying to make it appear that it 
was the fault of Cornwallis. Joseph could sense that Cornwallis was 
eager to conclude the treaty, and took advantage of it. The longer 
he kept Cornwallis at Amiens, the more impatient and ready to 
concede better terms he believed Cornwallis would become.7
1Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 21 Oct. 1801, Letters and 
Documents of Napoleon. 1769-1822. ed. John Howard (London,
1961), p. 505.
2Bonaparte to Lucien Bonaparte, 1 Dec. 1801, Lettres 
inedites de Napoleon, ed. Leon Lecestre (Paris, 1897), p. 35.
3Bonaparte to Joseph Bonaparte, 2 9 Dec. 1801, Memoires et 
Correspondance politique et militaire du Roi Joseph, pub. par le 
Baron Du Casse (9 vols, Paris, 1856), i. 215.
4Bonaparte to Otto, 12 Mar. 1802, Correspondance du 
Napoleon, vii. 519.
5Albert Sorel L 1Europe et la Revolution francaise (8 vols, 
Paris, 1949), vi. 186; Mowat, p. 99.
6Joseph Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 3 Nivose X (24 Dec. 1801), 
AE Angleterre/598; Same to same, 16 Pluviose X (4 Feb. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/599.
7Joseph Bonaparte to Bonaparte, 12 & 17 Mar. 1802, 
Correspondance du Joseph, i. 227, 231.
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To a large degree Joseph's plan worked. Cornwallis was not the
only one who was impatient to sign the treaty. As mentioned,
Addington and Hawkesbury had expected that the whole business would
have been completed by the end of November, and when the
negotiations dragged into January, they became quite anxious. As
doubts grew over whether peace would be concluded, public confidence
in the government started to wane. This uncertainty was also
impeding the formulation of policy in other important areas. For
Hawkesbury informed Cornwallis on 10 January that,
it is difficult for us to arrange our Finances till the 
Peace is actually concluded. As Parliament must meet for 
the Dispatch of Business before the End of this Month it 
will be impossible for Mr Addington to bring forward the 
Budget before the Completion of the Definitive Treaty & 
we may therefore be placed in a very embarrassing 
Situation and shall certainly be exposed to perpetual 
Importunities.1
Addington was anxious to bring in a peace-time budget. The price of
bread had begun to rise again despite the good harvest, and
according to Starhemberg, "II est impossible au gouvernment de
retacher aucunne taxe; et, par consequent le peuple est egalement
greve, la misere redouble, et le mecontentement reparait
insensiblement.12 Thus the government was under considerable
pressure to sign a treaty as soon as possible.
The British position became even more difficult as the
negotiations dragged on into February. The news that Bonaparte had
assumed the Presidency of the Cisalpine Republic appeared to justify
the position of critics of the preliminary treaty who claimed that
French aggression would continue despite the peace. Consequently,
Hawkesbury instructed Cornwallis that it was even more essential for
him to hold a firm line with Joseph:
The Business of Lyons [where Bonaparte proclaimed himself 
President of the Cisalpine Republic] however makes it
1Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 10 Jan. 1802, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/267, fos. 11-2.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 15 Jan. 1802, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/143.
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important for us to be more firm than ever upon our own 
Rights and more determined than ever to resist all new 
Pretensions as far as respect British objects on the Part
of the French government. If we do not adopt this as our
policy We shall be exposed to perpetual insults.1
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the British were
partly to blame for the delay. First, in his haste to conclude the
preliminary treaty, Hawkesbury had agreed to postpone until the
congress at Amiens the final negotiation of the clauses on which he
had had the most difficulty reaching agreement with Otto. He should
not, therefore, have expected that Cornwallis would have any easier
a time reaching agreement with Joseph Bonaparte. Yet Addington and
Hawkesbury chose Cornwallis because they thought the negotiations
would be merely a formality. Hawkesbury should have realized from
his own experience that a great deal of work remained before a
definitive treaty could have been concluded. Second, Addington and
Hawkesbury complicated the negotiations by including issues which
had not been covered by the preliminary treaty. Hawkesbury took it
for granted that the French government would honour Otto's verbal
assurances that provision would be made for the Prince of Orange and
that Tobago would be given up in compensation for the prisoner of
war claims. He should not have been so naive. Bringing up these
issues at Amiens not only prolonged the negotiations themselves, but
also permitted the French to introduce other issues as well, which
further prolonged the affair. Finally, the British wasted a lot of
time arguing over points of relatively little importance--the
prisoner of war question, whether Portugal and Turkey should sign
the treaty, and the indemnity for the Prince of Orange when they
should have concentrated almost exclusively on the one question of
vital importance: the settlement for Malta. Although the benefit of
hindsight puts these questions into better perspective, Hawkesbury
had acknowledged that Malta was the essential issue and it was clear
at the time that the other questions mattered little by comparison.
The British should have made a better assessment of their
1Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 12 Feb. 18 02, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/267, fo. 15.
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priorities, and offered to exchange the lesser issues for a better 
settlement of Malta.
Addington and Hawkesbury had nevertheless realized that they 
could not allow the negotiations merely to drag on. For while they 
were stuck in limbo, Bonaparte had already increased his power. At 
the end of January they were even considering sending Lord Hervey, 
under-secretary in the Foreign Office, to Amiens to take over the 
negotiations.1 After dismissing that idea, they decided that if 
peace were not concluded within a short period they would have to 
resume the war. On 12 February, the same day that Hawkesbury ordered 
Cornwallis to be more firm with Joseph, Hobart instructed the 
Admiralty to prepare for war on account of a likely rupture in the 
negotiations. Three weeks later he ordered the Admiralty to send six 
ships of the line to the West Indies in addition to those already 
sent to watch the French fleet at St Domingue.2 The government was 
unable to make any final decisions at that time, however, because 
Addington and his daughter were seriously ill. Addington spent most 
of the month of February at home recuperating and watching over his 
daughter who very nearly died. By the beginning of March, the 
government doubted whether, in Yorke1s words, the "Infinitive' 
treaty would ever arrive. Addington and Hobart, along with many 
others began to expect that the negotiations would break off.3
The problem facing the ministry was that they could not afford 
to allow the negotiations to carry on indefinitely, but at the same 
time they could not appear to be the party that broke off the 
negotiations.4 While the uncertainty of the negotiations was 
impeding the formulation of government policy, to declare war would
1Starhemberg to Colloredo, 29 Jan. 1802, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/143.
2Hobart to Clephane, Feb. 18 02, WO 6/55; Hobart to 
Admiralty, 12 Feb and 4 Mar. 1802, WO 6/149.
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 23 Feb. and 2 Mar. 1802, Add. MSS 
35701, fos. 252-5, 261-70; Starhemberg to Colloredo, 23 Feb. 
1802, HHSA, Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/143.
4Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 16 Feb. 1802, FO 27/60.
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have outraged parliamentary and popular opinion. Therefore,
Hawkesbury combined the threat of naval mobilization with a
softening of the British terms on some of the minor points in the
treaty, such as relaxing his insistence that the Turks must sign,
and this line seems to have succeeded. For Joseph appeared quite
surprised and alarmed at the prospect of British naval armament and
suddenly became amenable to British terms on some of the outstanding
articles of the treaty.1
Hawkesbury then directed Cornwallis to present an ultimatum to
the French, and sent a copy of a new draft treaty to propose to all
the plenipotentiaries. He added that
If, however, any new demands should be insisted on, or if 
the Plenipotentiaries of the other Powers should object 
to signing the Treaty conformably to the Articles, of the 
inclosed Draft, it is His Majesty's Pleasure, that you 
inform the Minister of the Congress, that you have gone 
to the utmost extent of you instructions, and that in 
obedience to the orders of your Court, you must leave 
Amiens in eight days from the period of that Declaration; 
unless the Treaty is concluded within that time.2
The British proposal was similar in many respects to the latest
French project, but included numerous amendments to the article
concerning Malta. Hawkesbury hoped that the spirit of conciliation
incorporated in it would be met by a similar response on the side
of the French. He reiterated, however, that the British had gone as
far as they could.
Cornwallis presented the British proposal to Joseph, but
because he found the latter disposed to peace, he withheld the
threat of the ultimatum as "it might indicate strongly a Disposition
of a contrary Tendency1. Joseph claimed that there were still many
differences between the British and French positions, but that they
were more in wording than in substance.3 Addington and Hawkesbury
both wrote to assure Cornwallis that they approved of his discretion
1Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 10 Mar. 1802, FO 27/60.
2Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, 14 Mar. 1802, FO 27/60.
3Cornwallis to Hawkesbury, 17 Mar. 1802, FO 27/60.
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in not implementing the ultimatum, and agreed to a few more 
alterations to the terms of the treaty. Nevertheless, Addington 
stressed that "Under the present Circumstances, Dispatch is of the 
utmost Importance on all Accounts, & particularly with a view to the 
financial Arrangements for the Year.'1
As it appeared to Cornwallis that the differences over the 
terms were merely semantic, he consulted the Dutch plenipotentiary, 
R. J. Schimmelpenninck, who advised some modifications that Joseph 
found acceptable. On the evening of 24 March, Cornwallis sat down 
with Joseph and hammered out the final details. The French press 
announced the signing of the peace the next day, but it was not 
until 2 7 March that an official treaty was drawn up and signed. Six 
months after the signing of the preliminaries, and one year after 
the initial negotiations had commenced, the Addington ministry 
finally had a definitive peace.
In the end the definitive treaty very closely resembled the 
preliminaries. The most important article was the provision for 
Malta, and the settlement of this issue was a compromise. The 
British demands that the fortifications remain intact, that Maltese 
could join the Order of St John, and that a garrison be provided 
were all met. On the other hand, the British had to agree that the 
garrison be Neapolitan, and that the French, Austrians, Prussians, 
Spanish, and themselves join the Russians in guaranteeing the 
neutrality of the island. As the Russians had already refused either 
to garrison or to be the sole guarantor of the island, this could 
hardly be considered a concession on the part of the British. A 
compromise was also reached on the question of the prisoners of war: 
the British received recognition that each country was liable for 
payment, while the French received such vague terms for the 
provision of the payment that in the end they could avoid paying 
anything.
1 Addington to Cornwallis, 22 Mar. 18 02, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/267, fo. 21.
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During the negotiations numerous new issues were also brought 
forward that wasted a great deal of time. Of these the British were 
able to include an article promising indemnity for the Prince of 
Orange, although no specific arrangement was stipulated, and the 
French obtained an agreement over mutual extradition for specified 
crimes. All in all, therefore, Merry's belief that the definitive 
treaty was much worse than the preliminaries and his fear that he 
would be blamed for it were exaggerated.1 For although the 
definitive treaty did not meet the expectations of Addington and 
Hawkesbury, it did provide an adequate settlement of the issues left 
outstanding by the preliminary treaty.
This did not mean, however, that the situation was as 
favourable as it had been in October 1801, or that the terms of the 
definitive treaty were as well received as those of the 
preliminaries. For the situation had indeed changed. France had sent 
a large fleet to the West Indies, and Bonaparte had increased his 
power by having himself elected the president of the Cisalpine 
Republic and forcing the Spanish to cede Louisiana. In addition, the 
delaying tactics of Joseph Bonaparte at Amiens had caused the 
British ministry considerable alarm. When Addington and Hawkesbury 
had first come to power they had not known whether they could trust 
the French government but they had felt they had to give Bonaparte 
the benefit of the doubt. Developments since the signing of the 
preliminary treaty, however, seemed to confirm that they could not 
trust the French to contain their aggression. Therefore, Addington 
and Hawkesbury had to be more on their guard, and more willing to 
accept that the peace might be of a shorter duration.
Other members of Parliament thought the same. For Grenville and 
Windham the past six months had justified their opposition to the 
peace terms. Pitt, while still supporting the peace, was more 
willing to concede that he distrusted the French and that the 
British would have to be prepared for a renewal of war. Addington 
and Hawkesbury also realized that the climate of opinion had soured.
xMerry to Jackson, 5 Mar. 1802, Jackson Papers, FO 353/76.
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Hawkesbury tried to get away without a debate or vote on the treaty, 
by stating to the House that none were necessary as the treaty 
conformed to the preliminaries which had already been debated. 
Windham for one, however, insisted on a debate. He used the debate 
on the motion to set a time for debate on the treaty to launch 
another attack on the idea of peace with Revolutionary France. 
Consequently, the government had to concede a debate.
During the course of the debate, there were only two new 
subjects discussed in it that had not been covered in the 
preliminaries. The first was the increase in the power of France in 
the previous few months as a result of the cession of Louisiana by 
Spain and of Bonaparte accepting the presidency of the Cisalpine 
Republic. From the standpoint of the British government, the 
preliminaries had been signed on the understanding that the relative 
positions of power between Britain and France would remain what they 
had been at the time of the signing of the preliminary treaty. 
Nevertheless, Louisiana and the Cisalpine Republic were not covered 
by the terms of the treaty, and the British could hardly dictate 
what territories other states could or could not give to France. 
French power was increased by these acquisitions, but as Addington 
and Hawkesbury stated in the Commons, the question was whether these 
acquisitions justified a renewal of war on the part of Britain, and 
they thought not.
The other question related to the renewal of ancient treaties 
which had been rendered void by the outbreak of war. It was unclear 
whether accepted diplomatic practice required that these treaties 
be mentioned by name in the peace treaty in order to have them 
reinstated, or whether their reinstatement was implied. Those who 
criticized the treaty took the position that, as the government had 
not stipulated the renewals of these treaties in the treaty of 
Amiens, they had carelessly sacrificed many advantages important to 
British trade. There was nothing careless, however, about the 
omission. For Addington and Hawkesbury had deliberately ignored the 
question of renewal. Liverpool, who had a vast experience in matters 
of trade and trade treaties, advised against renewing these
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treaties, as did Eldon.1 In the first place, Bonaparte was unlikely
to agree to the terms of the 1786 treaty because they were too
advantageous to Britain. Second, so much had changed in terms of
diplomacy and international trade since the beginning of the war
that the old treaties were no longer practical. Liverpool explained:
It is the lot of all the Governments of Europe but 
particularly of that of Great Britain, to have fallen on 
Times when new Principles and new Systems must be
adopted. We can no longer resort to those on which our
ancestors have hitherto acted. The Events of the present 
War have not only changed the Government of France-- 
extended its Territory, and added to its political 
Influence; but they have subverted almost every Political 
Relation that before subsisted between the different 
Powers of Europe. We must depend for our future Security, 
on a new System of Policy adapted to the wonderful 
Changes that have taken place.2
The British had also obtained some important advantages in their
trade with Portugal, in particular, which could not be accommodated
by a renewal of the old treaties. Therefore, Addington and
Hawkesbury preferred a vague commercial agreement with France to a
comprehensive treaty.3 Dundas expressed concern that the failure to
renew the treaties with reference to India might deprive Britain of
its special rights in that region, but Wellesley did not agree. He
saw nothing in the treaty of Amiens which was likely to have any
effect on the British position in India.
The most important consequence of the Amiens negotiations was,
however, the divisions which arose within the government. Pelham
objected to accepting the peace terms until the government had
received a satisfactory explanation of French actions and
intentions. He considered resigning, but as this would have caused
great difficulties for the government and as he agreed with his
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 7 Dec. 1801, Add. MSS 38311, fo. 
116; Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 11 Dec. 1801, Add. MSS 61818, fos. 
21-3 .
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 23 Dec. 1801, FO 27/66.
3Otto to Talleyrand, 1 Brumaire X (23 Oct. 1801), and 7 
Nivose X (28 Dec. 1801), AE Angleterre/597.
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colleagues on all the rest of the important issues, he chose to 
remain.1 When Auckland publicly admitted that he was dissatisfied 
with the provisions for the Prince of Orange, he received a stern 
rebuke from Addington: "This Information has necessarily led me to 
suppose, that it cannot be the Wish or Intention of your Lordship 
to continue to hold an office, connected with a government, of whose 
Conduct you have publickly declared your Disapprobation upon an 
occasion so important.'2 Addington was able to silence this 
criticism, but it had already proved politically embarrassing and 
emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the position which the 
negotiations for the Treaty of Amiens had placed the government.
As far as the government was concerned, the political climate 
in Britain had certainly deteriorated between the signing of the 
preliminaries and the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Addington 
and Hawkesbury had expected that the congress would be short and 
mostly a formality. Thus they were greatly alarmed and infuriated 
when it dragged into a long and complicated negotiation which 
resulted in final terms which were even less favourable to the 
British. The government even had to mobilize the navy to get Joseph 
Bonaparte to sign. Moreover, during that time Bonaparte had expanded 
his power, and as Otto noted British opinion on the peace soured 
with each new French acquisition.3 Thus the long delay and the 
deterioration of the British position gave ammunition to the 
opposition. Although this group was very small, it was beginning to 
grow and was led by some of the most talented and influential 
parliamentary speakers. Nevertheless, the government felt that at 
that time the benefits of the peace still outweighed the costs of 
renewing the war. They were less inclined, however, to believe that 
the period of peace would last very long.
\Aspinall, iv. 17n; Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 73-4.
2Addington to Auckland, 7 May 1802, Add. MSS 34455, fo.
492 .
30tto to Talleyrand, 14 Ventose X (5 Mar. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/597.
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Chapter Five
Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform, April to December 1802
vThe system of terror, of alarm, and of espionage, has been laid 
aside, the most burthensome of the taxes repealed, and a sincere 
desire manifested on the part of the new minister to meet the wishes 
of the nation. ...
They call him the Doctor ... a minister of healing he has truly 
been; he has poured balm and oil into the wounds of the country, and 
the country is blessing him.
Robert Southey1
The news of the signing of the definitive treaty was a 
tremendous relief to the ministry. The way in which Cornwallis had 
allowed Joseph Bonaparte to redefine some of the articles of the 
preliminary treaty was unsatisfactory, but at least the dreadful 
uncertainty that had impeded government policy in all areas had 
dissipated. This did not mean, however, that the ministry could 
relax. Peace was an important end in itself, but it was also a means 
to several other necessary ends. The poor state of the country's 
finances and the consequences of economic distress had been, 
according to Addington, two of the most important incentives for 
seeking peace. In addition, St Vincent desired peace to give him the 
opportunity to reform abuses and inefficiency in the administration 
of the navy. The indefinite period of peace granted by the signing 
of the treaty automatically eliminated certain expenditures, injected 
greater confidence into the stock market, and led to a further 
decrease in the price of wheat, but there was still plenty of work 
for the ministry before all of its objectives were attained.
1Robert Southey, Letters from England, ed. Jack Simmons 
(London, 1951), pp. 71-4.
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The Finances
One of Addington's primary concerns during his period in office 
was to ensure that the government obtained sufficient funds to meet 
all of its commitments. Prior to the signing of the preliminaries of 
peace, Addington believed that the time was approaching when the 
government would require drastic and unpopular measures to remain 
solvent. For the expense of the war establishments was increasing 
every year, and with no allies to distract the enemy, the British 
faced the full brunt of the French military forces and the 
possibility of invasion, while at the same time money was becoming 
more difficult to obtain. The wartime levels of taxation were already 
extremely unpopular, and loans were the only means of paying for the 
war. The money markets, however, were becoming increasingly 
restricted, as the interruption of foreign trade and the collapse of 
the domestic markets, owing to the high price of wheat, ate into 
profits. Thus the City had less money available to lend to the 
government and this caused a rise in interest rates.1 The scarcity of 
money and high interest rates caused by the war and government 
borrowing exacerbated the problem by restricting the capital 
available to the private sector, which in turn intensified the 
general economic slump. Thus the government was caught in a vicious 
circle and the prospects for the immediate future appeared bleak.
The signing of the preliminary treaty brought initial relief, 
but the manner in which the negotiations for the definitive treaty 
dragged on caused great uncertainty in the money markets. For few 
were willing to lend money even to the government while they were 
unsure whether peace would last. Consequently, if Addington had tried 
to negotiate a loan at that time, he would have had to accept 
extremely disadvantageous terms. Nor could he bring down a budget as 
projections of expenditure and income were dependent on whether or 
not the war would be resumed. Therefore, he postponed the loan and 
the budget until after he was certain of the outcome of the Amiens
1Polden, p. 141.
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negotiations.1
When the news of the signing of the treaty arrived on 2 9 March, 
Addington set immediately to arranging Britain's first peace-time 
budget in ten years. He relied heavily on Vansittart and consulted 
Pitt often, keeping him supplied through correspondence with trade, 
taxation, and other economic returns.2 For Addington's first budget 
was extremely important, and he was anxious to obtain all the help 
he could.
Nevertheless, the responsibility for the general direction of 
the budget belonged to Addington. This budget did not respond merely 
to the financial needs of the government but also to the larger 
pressures which pervaded all aspects of the ministry's policy-making. 
Peace had become desirable because the consequences of the war had 
severely strained the economy and caused considerable financial 
hardship, and during the war the public endured unprecedentedly rapid 
increases in taxation.3 Now that peace had been obtained, Addington 
had to pass the benefits on to the country.4 The only means of 
accomplishing this was to reduce taxes by cutting expenditure, and 
the largest item of expenditure other than interest payments was the 
military establishment. But while he recognized that peace would 
permit large cuts in the army and the navy, he was nevertheless aware 
that the peace would be extremely precarious; for though he supported 
the treaty, he too had become suspicious of Bonaparte's intentions. 
He recognized that the French might take advantage of the peace to 
increase their power or even provoke a renewal of war,5 and so, he
1Ziegler, p. 148.
2Pellew, ii. 57-63; P. K. O'Brien, "English Government 
Revenue, 1793-1815: A Study in Fiscal and Financial Policy in 
the Wars against France' (D. Phil., Oxford, 1967), p. 29; 
Polden, pp. 45, 91, 143; Steele to Pitt, 5 Feb. 1803, Pitt 
Papers, Cambridge University Library 6958/2925.
30'Brien, p. 313.
4Pellew, ii. 58.
5Pellew, ii. 58; Malmesbury Diary, iv. 70.
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felt obliged to maintain British forces on a footing that would 
prepare them for sudden mobilization. Balancing these two conflicting 
priorities was, however, extremely difficult.1
The budget which Addington introduced into the Commons on 5 
April was the most extraordinary in many years. This was to be 
expected as it was the first peace-time budget in nine years, but 
Addington also faced some entirely new problems. The most important 
item in the budget was the repeal of the income tax. This novel 
measure of Pitt's had been tolerated, but only grudgingly, after 
being introduced under the conditions of the war in 1799. Although 
Parliament and the elites in the country seemed to accept Pitt's 
arguments about the necessity of the new tax to enable Britain to 
continue the war, they considered it a distasteful temporary 
expedient. As the war lingered on, however, extra-Parliamentary 
opposition to the tax grew, and criticism of it began to carry over 
into criticism of the war in general. Everyone expected that peace 
would necessarily bring relief from wartime levels of taxation, and 
during the interlude between the signing of the preliminaries and the 
definitive treaties, the City of London petitioned Parliament for the 
repeal of the income tax.2
Addington had long since decided that the repeal of the tax was 
necessary on both political and practical grounds.3 For he wished to 
grant the country as many of the benefits of peace as possible. The 
health of the economy required it, but also the terms of the treaty 
were so unsatisfactory that he needed to win over popular support by 
proving to the country that the benefits of peace compensated for the 
surrender of the conquered colonies. On the practical side, Addington
1Pellew, ii. 56.
2B. E. V. Sabine, A History of Income Tax (London, 1966), 
p. 34; A. Farnsworth, Addington, Author of the Modern Income Tax 
(London, 1951), p. 34; Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax: A 
Study of the History Theory and Practice of Income Tax at Home 
and Abroad (New York, 1911), p. 115; O'Brien, p. 398.
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 3 0 Mar. 1802, Add. MSS 35701, fos. 
279-80.
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was also concerned about the efficiency of the tax. Everyone 
understood that it was an extraordinary measure implemented to meet 
the extraordinary financial demands of the war. Addington told the 
Commons:
The income tax was a measure much too important for the 
House to let go during the continuance of the war. He 
should be sorry if the measure he was about to take was 
the result of a change in his opinion, as to the policy of 
continuing this tax had the war continued. ... He was, 
however, bound to declare, that it was his thorough and 
entire conviction, that it was to the wisdom which 
originated that tax, and the firmness which induced the 
House to persist in it, that the country was indebted for 
the comforts we now had; for it was by that system that we 
were enabled to surmount the difficulties with which, 
during the last three years, we had to struggle; and it 
was from that conviction also he now recommended that this 
burthen should not be left to rest on the shoulders of the 
public in time of peace, because it should be reserved for 
the important occasions which, he trusted, would not soon 
recur.1
Thus, Addington believed that it was better to keep the tax in 
reserve until war resumed. If it had been continued during peace, the 
government would have begun to take it for granted as an ordinary 
source of revenue, and the exchequer would have had to look elsewhere 
to meet the extraordinary demands if war resumed.
The next major concern was the peace-time military 
establishment, and the military and navy were the obvious choices for 
spending cuts because they comprised the areas that had increased 
most dramatically during the war. Nevertheless, two points prevented 
Addington implementing immediate drastic cuts. First, disbanding 
regiments and decommissioning ships took time, up to six months or 
more for those overseas. Second, Addington worried that the French 
might take advantage of Britain's demobilization to make further 
gains in Europe or to attack Britain. The British had to be prepared 
to re-mobilize and have their army and navy up to strength in a short 
period, and this required a large peace-time establishment. 
Consequently, the policy of the government was to provide an
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 447-8.
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effective force at the least expense.1 Thus with the long term future 
so uncertain, Addington decided to provide only for a five months' 
establishment and postpone the request for funds for the further 
seven months until later in the year, when he would have a better 
idea of the forces required.2 In the meantime, he budgeted for a 
naval establishment of 130,000 for the first five months and in June 
he returned to ask provision for 70, 000 for the rest of the year. The 
regular army was reduced to 95,000 which was still twice the number 
of the first peace-time establishment following the American war. He 
also provided for a militia of 48,000 with 24,000 in reserve and an 
Irish militia of 18,000.3
Another financial measure, not technically included in the 
budget but which was related to it and implemented only a few days 
before, was the reform of the Civil List. This was important because 
it was indicative of the originality of Addington's financial 
measures and supports John Breihan's argument that Addington was a 
proponent of reform, not the block-headed conservative depicted by 
some historians.4 At that time, the Civil List included the provision 
for the salaries of most government officials as well as the expenses 
of the royal family. The result was that while the King had exercised 
remarkable economy in managing his household, the Civil List had run 
into arrears owing to the growing expense of the government and the 
diplomatic service during the war, because the Civil List schedules 
had not changed for sixteen years.5 Consequently, after arranging for 
Parliament to pay for the arrears, Addington removed the government 
charges from the heading of the Civil List and arranged for their
1Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl802/OM6.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 446.
3Pellew, ii. 65; Watson, p. 412.
4Breihan, pp. 163-89.
5Pellew, ii. 62-3.
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future payment to be provided by the consolidated fund.1 In this way, 
Parliament and not the King became responsible for the expenses of 
government.2
All of these measures were costly, and in addition to these 
expenditures, Addington was obliged to make up the deficiencies of 
some of Pitt's projections, contribute to the reduction of the 
national debt, pay off some of the existing exchequer bills, and pay 
the interest on the remaining exchequer bills. His dilemma was thus 
to obtain sufficient revenue, while at the same time relieving the 
economy and the country of the burden which the government had caused 
during the previous few years. Moreover, when the income tax had 
failed to produce the revenue projected, Pitt met the shortfall by 
raising loans on the security of the future revenue of the tax, in 
effect mortgaging the tax for another ten years, while the interest 
on those loans absorbed one-third of its revenue.3 Addington 
consequently had to raise in excess of £100 million to accomplish his 
goals.
Addington's solution was to raise an extraordinarily large loan. 
This was controversial because financial orthodoxy dictated that the 
government should raise loans only in war-time and rely solely on 
taxes in peace-time. It would have been impossible, however, for 
Addington to have raised the amount he required through taxes. On the 
whole, there was little complaint in Parliament about this decision; 
even Pitt and his colleagues recognized that unusual financial and 
political circumstances demanded an extraordinary response. The major 
drawback though was that the national debt was to be increased 
considerably during peace-time. Nevertheless, Addington calculated 
that this would be the least onerous means of meeting all his 
financial needs. For provided there were sufficient funds in the
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 322, 372-82.
2D. K. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain 
since 1485 (7th edition, London, 1964), p. 387.
3Pellew, ii. 59-60; Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl802/OTl.
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money markets, government loans provided an attractive investment 
without injuring the economy. In the short term, taxpayers only had 
to pay the interest on the loan, and the provision of the sinking 
fund would gradually eliminate all government debt. This was the thus 
least painful way to raise a large sum.
Having repealed the income tax, Addington was obliged to make 
other provision for the loans which Pitt had secured upon it 
amounting to £56,445,000. To meet this, along with the other expenses 
of government, he raised a total loan of £97,934,437. His timing, 
however, proved excellent. Owing to the prospect of peace, which was 
good for the economy, and an expectation of a reduction of government 
borrowing in the future, there were seven applications for the loan 
and the bids were competitive. Addington was thus able to obtain it 
at a much lower rate of interest than anyone had expected. He was 
also very fortunate in that he obtained the money on the day after 
the Ways and Means had been completely exhausted.1 According to the 
terms of the loan, for every £100 the government received it paid out 
£65 in 3% consols, £60 in 3% reduced stock, and £6 19s. 3d. in 3% 
reduced stock, a total of £131 19s. 3d. As the market value of
government stock was much higher than that, Addington considered this 
"bargain ... as perfectly satisfactory and auspicious to the greatest 
degree. 12 Pitt corroborated this statement by pointing out that after 
nine years of war Addington in effect had obtained "a loan for 25 
millions at the very same price of stocks at which, in the first year 
of the war in 1793, with all the accumulating resources of ten years 
of peace, we made [sic] a loan for only four millions.'3 Addington 
calculated the annual interest on the loans at £3,211,2 02, but to be 
on the safe side he provided additional taxes to cover £4 million. 
This was achieved by raising existing taxes without creating any new 
ones. He raised the taxes on malt and beer by £2 million, the
1Polden, p. 144.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 447; Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OT5.
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assessed taxes by £1 million, and the import and export duties by £1 
million.
The increase in the revenue from the malt and beer tax was 
achieved by raising the hop duty to 3d. per pound weight and the malt 
tax to 2s. 5d. per bushel, along with 2s. extra per barrel of strong 
beer. Samuel Whitbread, the whig brewer, rose to protest these 
measures immediately after Addington's budget speech, but the fears 
he expressed over the damage to the trade proved groundless. For the 
brewing industry had begun to recover after January 1802 and brewers 
were able without problem to increase prices in line with the taxes. 
To raise the additional funds through the import and export duties, 
Addington completely overhauled Pitt1s convoy tax and replaced it 
with a tonnage duty, which increased the duty on imports but reduced 
that on exports. He justified this measure on the grounds that peace 
would bring a return of commercial prosperity. In addition, the 
assessed taxes were increased on average by one third, and some of 
the loopholes for evasion were tightened up.
Two further reforms, which are worth mentioning because they 
increased revenue and the efficiency of debt reduction, were the 
consolidation of the sinking funds and the reform of the state 
lottery. In 1786, Pitt had created a sinking fund of £1 million to 
pay off the national debt. In 1792, he produced another bill to 
provide one percent of every loan to be paid into another sinking 
fund to pay off the new debts. Addington consolidated the two sinking 
funds into a new fund designed to pay off all of the national debt, 
and he relaxed all restrictions on the limit of money which could 
accumulate in the fund. Thus he projected that the new fund would be 
easier to administer, would extinguish the debt in a shorter period, 
and would save the public £900, 000 per year in taxes.1 He also 
abolished private lotteries and overhauled the state lottery to 
increase its produce by £300,000 to a total of £1,650,000 per year.2
The last of Addington's most important financial measures was
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 896; Pellew, ii. 69n.
2Pellew, ii. 66.
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to continue the restriction on cash payments. Many had expected that 
peace would lead to a resumption of the gold standard, for Pitt had 
justified the suspension of cash payments on the grounds of the 
financial necessities of the war. Logically, the end of the war meant 
the end of the need for this measure. Moreover, there were strong 
arguments for resuming cash payments, such as the disadvantageous 
exchange rates, and economic historian Henry MacLeod severely 
chastised Addington for not acting on these grounds.1 Nevertheless, 
there were stronger reasons for not removing the restriction. A 
return to the gold standard would have caused a severe contraction 
of the money supply which would have hurt British trade.2 British 
commercial and industrial interests had cried out for relief from the 
war, and the period of recovery that they desired would have been 
ruined by a further recession.3 As Addington's priority was to give 
the country the benefits of peace, he could not implement a measure 
that made good financial sense but bad commercial and political 
sense. Moreover, the Bank of England preferred a period of six 
months' recuperation before it was obliged to resume cash payments.4 
Addington thus believed it was prudent to wait until he was able to 
judge the effects of peace on British trade before abolishing the 
restrictions.5 Parliament appeared to concur as his bills met with 
little opposition, for even traditional critics of the government 
such as French Laurence and George Tierney approved.6
Addington's budget was a political success. Even Canning 
grudgingly agreed, admitting that, "Pitt's [being] at the head of the
1Henry MacLeod, The Theory and Practice of Banking (2 vols, 
London, 1876), pp. 4-6.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 542-3.
30'Brien, p. 218.
4Edwin Cannan, The Paper Pound of 1797-1821 (London, 1919),
p. 70.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 543.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 545-6.
144
Treasury is no longer essential to the salvation of the Country. 11 No 
one was pleased about the tax increases, but it was clear that these 
measures were necessary in order to allow the government to abolish 
the income tax, which was the greatest source of grievance. The tax 
increases did not prove onerous, however, as peace permitted a 
revival of overseas trade and the fall in the price of wheat aided 
internal markets. Nevertheless, the budget did not satisfy everyone. 
Some in parliament and in the country at large questioned the large 
peace establishment and the rise in the national debt. Addington 
realized, however, that, as Britain's diplomatic and economic 
interests conflicted, a compromise was necessary. He tried to provide 
a military and naval force sufficient for national security on the 
one hand, but not too financially burdensome on the other. Some of 
the war hawks complained that the force was too small, while those 
concerned about economy complained that it was too large. Addington's 
compromise did, however, provide the country with most of the 
benefits of peace that it had expected, while at the same time 
leaving the military prepared for a sudden renewal of war. Pitt and 
the King supported him firmly in his decision, and according to Otto 
and Ziegler, Addington was never more popular than during the months 
which immediately followed the conclusion of peace and the budget.2
Addington brought down another peace-time budget on 10 December. 
This one was more controversial as it contributed to the strain on 
his relationship with Pitt. For Pitt objected to two points. First, 
Addington borrowed £11 million, half in exchequer bills, to pay for 
the military establishment proposed for 1803. Pitt complained that 
he had warned Addington that it was bad financial policy to resort 
to loans in peace-time, and that all expenses should be met through 
taxation, even though strangely enough he had not made a similar
criticism of Addington's first budget.3 Pitt may have been correct in
banning to Frere, 11 Apr. 1802, Add. MSS 38833, fo. 104.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 16 Germinal X (6 Apr. 1802), AE
Angleterre/597; Ziegler, p. 161.
3Stanhope, iii. 86.
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a strictly theoretical sense, but not in a practical political one. 
For Addington did not face a normal peace-time situation.1 French 
aggression on the Continent posed a threat to British interests which 
required that Britain's military remain almost on a war alert.2 Thus 
the circumstances were novel and demanded a level of government 
expenditure far beyond a typical year of peace. Addington's choice 
was to increase either taxes or the national debt. He would have 
provoked violent opposition in Parliament and in the country, 
however, if he had proposed to increase taxes by £11 million. On the 
other hand, the obvious drawback to issuing exchequer bills was the 
danger of flooding the market. Nevertheless, Addington calculated 
that the increase in trade since the beginning of the war would 
permit the market to absorb more bills than prior to 1792, and he 
referred for proof to the high premium on existing bills.3 He could 
have raised money through taxation, but he wished to avoid further 
burdens on the taxpayer; Pitt on the other hand did not propose 
practical alternatives.
The other area of disagreement was over the consolidated fund. 
Using the returns for the first two quarters, Addington estimated the 
surplus on the fund for the entire year would reach £6.5 million. 
Rose and Pitt complained, however, that this was a gross 
exaggeration. They criticized the method Addington used to calculate 
the sum and claimed that he had over-estimated by almost £2.8 
million.4 They were later proved partially correct as Addington had 
failed to take into account the end of season slump in trade. The 
actual surplus was only £5.1 million.5 Nevertheless, charges of gross 
fiscal mismanagement were unfair because Pitt and Rose missed the
1Ziegler, p. 168; Polden, pp. 159-60.
2Addington to the King, 30 Nov. 1802, Aspinall, iv. 64.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1122.
4Rose to Tomline, 24 Dec. 1802, Holland Rose, William Pitt
and the Great War, p. 481; Polden, p. 160.
5Pellew, ii. 103-4.
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most important point. While Addington had estimated the final amount 
would be £6.5 million he only took credit for £4 million. He 
explained:
He had proposed a vote so moderate, because it would 
answer the immediate purpose of enabling him to apply to 
the public service the sums which might be realised as the 
surplus of the consolidated fund in the two next quarters, 
and would afford the means of ascertaining by actual 
experience, whether the expectations, which he thought 
himself fully justified in entertaining of its produce 
during the remainder of the year, were likely to be 
accomplished. By so cautious a proceeding, the public 
service would be guarded against the effects of any 
possible disappointment.1
Addington's projections may have raised expectations that the revenue
would be much higher, but Steele came to Addington's defence by
assuring Pitt that the government would receive most of the money
that it had projected.2 Thus, from a technical standpoint, Pitt and
Rose were justified in their criticism, but they made more of it than
it deserved.3
Having concentrated on Pitt's criticism of this budget, 
contemporaries overlooked the subtle but important innovation in 
Addington's presentation. In the budget speech of December 1802, he 
provided a general overview of the British economy as he described 
at length the financial and commercial situation of the country.4 
This was new, as former budgets had been merely an account of 
projected revenue and expenditure for the following year. Addington 
implemented a more extensive examination of the finances to justify 
his measures, and so provided Parliament and the public with 
information that they had not previously received, enabling them 
better to understand the working of the economy and better to judge 
the budget itself. Consequently, this method was adopted by all
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1124-5.
2Steele to Pitt, 5 Feb. 1803, Pitt Papers, Cambridge
University Library, 6958/2925.
Polden, pp. 162-3.
4Colchester Diary. i. 412.
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successive chancellors of the exchequer.
Despite the criticism of Pitt and Rose, this budget was even
more successful than Addington's first. Castlereagh told Wellesley:
Mr Addington has opened the most prosperous budget this 
country has witnessed, not even excepting 1792. The 
revenue has risen above three millions, and the export of 
British manufactures has increased to an equal amount upon 
the rated value, between six and seven millions. The 
effect of this statement has been to raise the funds above 
four percent.1
Liverpool noted that the foreign exchanges had changed in Britain's 
favour and that the merchant interests were behind the government.2 
Yorke believed that the budget speech did much to stabilize support 
for the government.3 Dr Farquhar, Pitt's physician, informed 
Addington:
I can not suffer this opportunity to escape me of 
congratulating the Prime Minister upon the impression 
which his conduct has made upon the Country in general, & 
in a more particular point of view, the Electrical effect 
upon the Public mind, by his animating, and impressive 
Speech of Friday last. It has warmed every heart, & 
enlivened every Countenance. It has inspired Confidence,
& met the Feeling of the Country at large.4
Even some of Addington's opponents, such as Minto, admitted that the
budget had produced beneficial effects that would strengthen the
government's position.5
1Castlereagh to Wellesley, 17 Dec. 1802, Despatches.
Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, ed. 
Montgomery Martin (5 vols, London, 1837), iii. 96. Abbot also 
claimed that the funds had risen nearly five per cent in one 
day, Colchester Diary, i. 412.
Liverpool to Addington, 15 Dec. 1802, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OZ46.
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 20 Dec. 1802, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 68-
71.
4Farquhar to Addington, 12 Dec. 1802, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1802/OZ103.
5Minto to Lady Minto, 14 Dec. 1802, Life and Letters of 
Gilbert Elliot. First Earl of Minto. from 1751-1806. ed. 
Countess of Minto (3 vols, London, 1874), iii. 263.
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Addington was no financial wizard. Nevertheless, the peace-time 
budgets that he devised with considerable help from Vansittart did 
demonstrate a degree of imagination and a keen determination to 
implement reforms. Their financial measures were far from perfect and 
many of Addington's individual objectives could have been attained 
better through different lines of policy. His position as Prime 
Minister and his role in the formulation of foreign policy, however, 
gave him a greater breadth of vision as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Fiscal policy could not be formulated in isolation or based solely 
on concern for the traditional rules of economic management. 
Addington was equally concerned about Britain's diplomatic position 
and domestic social problems, and he believed that he ought to 
arrange his priorities and sacrifice some minor interests to insure 
that the essential interests were preserved. By December 1802, the 
naval and military establishments were approximately double their 
prewar size, while at the same time ^the total savings already 
resulting from the peace amounted to twenty-five millions sterling 
annually' .1 The compromises he chose to make were justified on these 
grounds.
Social Policy
After the state of the finances, social unrest was the most 
pressing domestic concern of the Addington ministry. As mentioned, 
the greatest problem about social unrest was that the government 
could do little directly to prevent it. For the government could 
never face the problem head on because it lacked the resources. 
Instead, ministers could only try to alleviate the primary causes of 
the unrest, or deploy the military to intimidate the masses. For the 
ministry the whole question of social unrest was intimately linked 
to the war: war conditions exacerbated unemployment and high food 
prices and left fewer troops to suppress riots. Thus the only 
solution was to end the war.
1Pellew, ii. 99-100.
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In terms of social policy, the signing of the peace 
preliminaries proved wise. Social historians of the period agree that 
the peace led to a considerable decline in social unrest, at least 
in the short term. The great decrease in the reports of riots and 
other seditious activities received by the Home Office after 1 
October point to this conclusion. Disagreement remains, however, as 
to the duration of the period in which radical activities had 
effectively ceased. Peace proved an effective deterrent to sedition 
and conspiracy according to J. Ann Hone and Roger Wells. On the other 
hand, E. P. Thompson, J. L. Baxter, and F. K. Donnelly, citing the 
reports of government spies in Yorkshire, suggest that revolutionary 
activities revived after only a few months. John Dinwiddy denies, 
however, that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
existence of a revolutionary movement in Yorkshire in 1801-2, 
referring to the fact that Fitzwilliam consistently questioned the 
reports of his spies. This debate underlines the fact that there is 
no conclusive evidence about the nature and extent of social unrest 
in this period. The government was dependent on information from a 
variety of spies and local officials, some of whom had incentive to 
exaggerate reports of unrest and others who were inclined to play 
them down. Nevertheless, the general impression at the time seems to 
be that radicalism and social unrest within the country as a whole 
had subsided considerably below the apparently dangerous levels of 
the early months of 1801, and this appears to be corroborated by the 
considerable decrease in the report of riots and the logical 
assumption that once the major causes of unrest were removed that 
riots should subside.1
Thus peace had helped to decrease the revolutionary threat posed 
by radicalism and unrest. One of the reasons for this was that the 
announcement of peace coincided with the best harvest in many years, 
causing the price of grain to tumble. Thus once bread became both 
plentiful and affordable the poorer classes were less inclined to
1Hone, pp. 100-1. Wells, Insurrection, pp. 219-225; 
Thompson, Making of the English Working Class, p. 52 0; Baxter 
and Donnelly, p. 12 9; Dinwiddy, pp. 113-23.
150
riot. The other reason was that the war had been a major target of 
radical criticism of the establishment, but as the ministry had put 
an end to it, the grounds for opposing the government were no longer 
as strong. Consequently, peace contributed to reducing social unrest 
by helping to resolve the greatest grievance of the masses, while at 
the same time undermining the radical leadership.
It seemed, moreover, that Addington was not content merely to 
sign the peace and hope that all of the social problems would simply 
disappear, but tried to implement a domestic policy which would 
pacify Britain, in the same spirit that he used foreign policy to 
pacify Europe. For example, he removed a great source of friction 
caused by the suspension of Habeas Corpus for treason and the act 
designed to suppress seditious meetings. While during his first month 
in office he became convinced by a considerable body of reports that 
an insurrectionary movement was afoot that required these repressive 
measures, once the war was over and social unrest had subsided, he 
allowed them to lapse without implementing any new legislation in 
their place, and as a result most of the state prisoners were
released.
Even though peace with France removed many of the motives for 
social unrest, the domestic scene in Britain remained unsettled. 
Trouble continued to erupt periodically in some areas, particularly 
Yorkshire, and the Home Office was obliged to respond. Pelham took 
charge of the Home Office in August 1801 after most of the crises had 
subsided. While as a Cabinet colleague he proved a thorn in
Addington's side, became an absolute anathema to Hardwicke in dealing 
with Irish affairs, and added little strength to the government bench 
in the Lords, he nevertheless brought the right temper to the
problems of social conflict.
Portland, Pelham's predecessor, had been keen to root out and 
suppress all possible sources of unrest for fear of insurrection, and 
where previously local officials had hounded the reluctant Home
Office to take action, he was first to implore magistrates to be more 
vigorous in implementing the laws. Only a lack of resources and 
administrative machinery prevented him from taking more direct action
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himself. Pelham on the contrary was more calm and reserved as
Secretary of State. In fact, his style was reminiscent of the period
previous to Portland's tenure. While the war continued, he
concentrated on using the repressive legislation to remove the
leaders involved in seditious activities. He suggested, for instance,
that an example be made of the ringleader of the United Irishmen in
Leeds,1 and in response to reports of illegal assemblies in the West
Riding, he told Fitzwilliam:
Although I agree with your Lordship in thinking that, from 
the general complexion of these meetings, they appear 
rather to be dwindling away than gaining ground, yet I am 
at the same time of the opinion that, if the Persons of 
any of the most active Members among them, could be
properly identified on sufficient Evidence it might be of 
advantage to lay the case before His Majesty's Law 
Servants, with a view to their being prosecuted for an 
illegal meeting, for such I have no doubt it would be held 
to be; or, if that could not be effected, even to 
apprehend them, under the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus 
Act, by a Warrant from me for that purpose.2
After the war was over, however, Pelham responded to most reports of
unrest by stating that they should be dealt with by the magistrates,
and he refused to send London Police officers out into the country
except in pursuit of criminals who had escaped from London.3 He was
also alarmed by reports of men training in arms without commission,
but insisted that seizures could be made only when evidence was
strong.4
Another example of the moderation of the ministry, was its 
response to an attack on the King. On 31 August 1801, a man named 
McLean charged at the King while he was attending the Drury Lane 
Theatre. McLean was arrested, but Addington, believing him to be mad,
1Pelham to the Mayor of Leeds, 8 Aug. 1801, HO 43/13.
2Pelham to Fitzwilliam, 19 Aug. 1801, HO 43/13.
3Pelham to Sitwell, 11 Dec. 1801, and Pelham to Davies, 18 
June 1802, HO 43/13; Pelham to Pembrooke, 9 Aug. 1802, HO 42/66.
4Pelham to Fitzwilliam, 22 July 1802, and same to Jones, 2 
July 1802, HO 43/13.
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rather than an enemy of the state, recommended that he be sent to 
Bedlam. When it was discovered, however, that McLean was merely 
trying to present a petition to the King, he was released.1
The ministry also faced violence which stemmed from industrial 
disputes. Between April and September 18 02, there were frequent 
outbreaks in the clothing districts of Yorkshire and in Wiltshire, 
which stemmed from unemployment and low wages. This industrial action 
consisted of gangs of croppers breaking machines, setting fire to 
cloth factories, mills, and ricks of manufacturers, and shooting at 
both workmen and manufacturers.2 In Yorkshire, the workers grievances 
centred on declining wages which had resulted from the use of 
machines and violations by the employers of the apprenticeship acts.3 
In Wiltshire, the problem was a surplus of agricultural labour 
exacerbated by the return of ex-servicemen who increased the ranks 
of the unemployed.4
Pelham's first response was to leave the problem to the local 
magistrates, but as the violence continued through the summer he 
agreed to Fitzwilliam1s request to send troops to Yorkshire.5 In 
August, he too travelled to Salisbury to discuss the problems in that 
region with Wiltshire magistrates. As the disturbances continued, the 
ministry became convinced that these outbreaks of violence were not 
merely isolated incidents but that there was a strong connection 
between the events in Yorkshire and Wiltshire.6 In September Pelham
3Ford to King, 1 and 11 Sept. 1801, and William Morton Pitt 
to Ford, 24 Dec. 1801, HO 42/62.
inhabitants of Melksham to Pelham, 26 July 1802, Petition 
of Magistrates, 24 July 1802, and Jones to Pelham, 29 July 1802, 
HO 42/65.
3Polden, p. 213.
4Emsley, p. 96.
5Pelham to Jones, July 1802, Fitzwilliam to Pelham, 20 July 
1802, and Pelham to York, July 1802, HO 42/65.
6Pelham to Fitzwilliam, 30 July 1802, HO 43/13; King to 
Fitzwilliam, 10 August 1802, HO 42/66.
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wrote:
It appears to me from these accounts that the successful 
Establishment of the Machinery is a Subject of great 
National Importance in as much as the Preeminence of our 
Cloths in great measure depends upon it, at the same time 
ye immediate Interest of the Sheermen & others who may be 
deprived of their accustomed support & Means of living is 
not to be disregarded, however irregular & dangerous their 
mode of Maintaining their Interest may have been; It has 
occurred to me that a Meeting of some of the principal 
Clothiers from Yorkshire & Wiltshire might be of use in 
devising Means for satisfying those People who are likely 
to be affected by this Machinery, in order that, when 
Government shall have convinced those who have attempted 
to redress themselves by Acts of Violence, that the Laws 
cannot be transgressed with Impunity, there is a 
disposition to attend to their reasonable complaints & to 
prevent a recurrence of the same outrages.1
This demonstrated a desire on the part of the government not only to
suppress the violence but also to redress the grievances from which
it sprang. Fitzwilliam pointed out, however, that if merchants and
manufacturers from Yorkshire and Wiltshire met on their own they
would be accused of making a combination, so he suggested that the
meeting should be called by the government.2 Within a few week,
however, the workers changed their strategy. Croppers in Leeds went
on strike over the policy of the employers using apprentices under
fifteen years old.3 Other workers abandoned terrorism and appealed to
a statute of Edward VI which prohibited the use of unapprenticed
labour in gig-mills. The manufacturers responded by forming a
pressure group to move the government to suspend the statute. They
carried considerably more clout with the government than did the
workers, but the ministry had some sympathy for the latter. The
government gave way to the employers but Pelham and Eldon delayed the
bill in the Lords until the clothiers modified their proposals. In
the end, the government granted a one-year postponement of the bill
to suspend the statute of Edward VI pending a general revision in
1Pelham to Reed, 2 Sept. 1802, HO 42/66.
2Fitzwilliam to Pelham, 9 Sept. 1802, HO 42/66.
3Fitzwilliam to Pelham, 27 Sept. 1802, HO 42/66.
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1804.1
The most important test of the ministry's social policy during 
peace-time was the Despard conspiracy. Colonel Edward Marcus Despard 
was an embittered Irish ex-soldier who, after serving in Jamaica in 
the 1770s, was promoted to King's Superintendent of British Honduras 
in 1780.2 Grenville recalled him in 1790 as part of an investigation 
into the problems of the settlers, and though he was acquitted of any 
wrongdoing, his post was abolished and he was not offered any new 
employment. Furthermore, the government refused to pay some of the 
expenses he had occurred in line of duty. This experience turned him 
against the entire system of government and he soon became involved 
in the United Irishmen and the London Corresponding Society. 
Implicated in the Irish rebellion, Despard was arrested in 1799, but 
released when the suspension of Habeas Corpus lapsed in April 1801.
During 1802, Despard had concluded that discontent was 
widespread and an armed revolt in London could precipitate a 
revolutionary insurrection. Consequently, he planned a coup d'etat 
and recruited from among disaffected soldiers, whom he assembled 
regularly at a number of different taverns in working-class areas of 
London. After several months of such meetings, the group decided to 
strike on 23 November, the day of the opening of Parliament, because 
the King would be an easy target as he rode in from Windsor. The plan 
was first to attack the Tower to gain munitions, then to capture the 
Bank, and finally to kill the King. The conspirators expected that 
they would succeed because the country would then rise with them.
The government had been fully aware of the conspiracy since the 
summer, as both Pelham and the Duke of York had received 
intelligence. Pelham knew that Despard was recruiting from among the 
soldiers and that he had at least two collaborators in the military. 
The day before the final meeting of the conspiracy, the government
•^Polden, pp. 218-221.
2Charles Oman, Colonel Despard and Other Stories (London, 
1922), pp. 2-21.
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received intelligence of the subject and location of that meeting. 
Pelham had to decide whether to arrest the conspirators at the risk 
of preventing any further discoveries, and chose to arrest the 
meeting provided that Despard and the soldiers were there.1 On 16 
November, London, Surrey, and Kent patrols raided the Oakley Arms 
tavern in Lambeth and found Despard in the company of forty working 
men and soldiers.
Historians have disagreed over the significance of this episode. 
Peter Holt and Malcolm Thomis contend that the conspiracy was little 
more than a farce, a last dying gasp of the Jacobin threat. On the 
other hand, Marianne Elliott and E. P. Thompson insist that there 
were strong links between Despard and the struggles of Irish 
nationalists, the London labouring poor, and the croppers and weavers 
of the north. Elliott claims that Despard looked forward instead of 
backward: the conspiracy was a premature manifestation of a larger 
conspiracy which included risings in England and Ireland coinciding 
with a French invasion. Consequently, the affair seemed to justify 
government alarm.2
The question remains as to what the government thought of the 
whole episode. Unfortunately, there is little direct evidence, but 
a few conclusions can be drawn. The ministry believed that the 
conspiracy was serious enough to require the arrests, and that it 
ought to be nipped in the bud, even if this meant missing the 
opportunity of discovering all the influences behind it.3 The 
government also gave considerable prominence to the trial by having 
Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough preside and employing Attorney- 
General Perceval to prosecute the case. Despite strong rhetoric, 
however, Perceval admitted that the government did not believe that 
the conspiracy posed a serious threat to the security of the
Memorandum on the Despard Conspiracy, HO 42/66.
2Holt and Thomis, p. 23; Thompson, Making of the English 
Working Class, pp. 523-7; Marianne Elliott, "The Despard
Conspiracy Reconsidered', Past and Present. lxxv (1977), 46-61.
3Hone, p. 108.
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Kingdom.1 The refusal of the government to reimpose the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus and the Seditious Meetings Act, demonstrates clearly 
that the ministers believed that Despard was an isolated case. The 
explanation that the ministry was too weak politically or too afraid 
of alarming the magistrates to reintroduce Pitt's legislation is 
questionable.2 First, there is little reason to suspect that just 
because the Foxite Whigs would have opposed the legislation that they 
would then have also opposed the ministry's foreign policy. Second, 
experience had proved that if the situation was serious enough to 
demand this legislation, it was better to have the magistrates become 
alarmed. For sometimes the government had trouble motivating local 
officials. The most probable explanation is that the ministry felt 
no need for the legislation. Despard and his colleagues were clearly 
guilty of treason and the government acted wisely in executing them,3 
but the situation did not require systematic repression. For as 
Pelham told the King few of the Guards had been seriously involved 
in the business.4 Addington and Pelham's decision proved wise, as 
there was ample evidence to convict Despard and yet during the time 
the peace lasted there were no further conspiracies of that nature 
which came to light.
It is surprising to note that in several ways Despard was not 
treated like the leader of an insurrection. General Antoine Frangois 
Andreossy, the new French ambassador in London, claimed that the 
affair made little sensation.5 Despard had known Nelson well enough 
to call him as a character witness at his trial, and just before the 
execution, he sent a petition for reprieve to the admiral, who passed
^otes of a Speech, Feb. 1803, Add. MSS 49176, fo. 50.
2Wells, Insurrection, pp. 247-8.
3Starhemberg, to Colloredo, 21 Jan. and 22 Feb. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
4Pelham to the King, 20 Nov. 1802, Aspinall, iv. 61.
5Andreossy to Talleyrand, 4 Frimaire XI (2 5 Nov. 18 02), AE 
Angleterre/600.
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it on to Addington. After reading the letter, Addington and his 
family wept.1 This was an unusual display of sympathy by a Prime 
Minister for a man who had planned a revolution. Nor was Despard 
given the infamous attention usually granted to state executions, as 
Fox noted, "Of Despard nothing is said more than of any housebreaker, 
who may have been hanged the same day.12
The ministry's mild response to the Despard conspiracy is 
further illuminated by a contrast with its response to Emmet's 
abortive insurrection in Dublin in July 1803. A group of United 
Irishmen led by Robert Emmet had been storing arms in preparation for 
an insurrection planned to occur simultaneously with a French 
invasion of Ireland. While the conspirators waited, an accidental 
explosion at their arms cache in July 1803 alerted British 
authorities, and so Emmet decided to initiate the insurrection early. 
Hardwicke was informed of the plot on 21 July, the eve of the 
insurrection, but the Irish Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General 
Henry Fox, refused to take the reports seriously, and as a result, 
British forces arrived on the scene several hours late. Fortunately 
for them, only a few hundred of the expected several thousand rebels 
materialized, and the insurrection was easily crushed, but not before 
Lord Kilwarden, the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, and 
several others were murdered.3
In this case Addington suspended Habeas Corpus and declared 
Martial Law, though both measures were restricted to Ireland. Emmet's
3Minto to Lady Minto, 14 Dec. 1802, Minto Letters, iii. 
274-5.
2Fox to Grey, 28 Feb. 1803, Add. MSS 47565, fo. 73.
3Hardwicke to Addington, 21 July 18 03, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl803/OZ289; Hardwicke to Pelham, 24 July 1803, HO 100/112; 
Hardwicke to Yorke, 24 July 1803, and 5 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 
35702, fos. 240-41, 289-91; Pelham to the King, 28 July 1803, 
Aspinall, iv. 115; Wickham to Addington, 9 Aug. 18 03, and 
Addington to Wickham, 15 Aug. 1803, Wickham Papers,
38M49/1/45/26 and 48/4; Marsden to Castlereagh, 2 Nov. 1803,
Add. MSS 38239, f os. 77-8; Account of Emmet's Rebellion by W. 
Wickham, 5 Dec. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl803/OL12.
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rebellion required these strong measures because it occurred when 
Britain was at war with France and there was some fear that the 
French were planning an invasion of Ireland.1 Moreover, as the Irish 
rebellion of 1798 had proved, Ireland possessed a greater potential 
for general insurrection. In the words of Yorke, emergency 
legislation was 'necessary to the safety of the King's Government in 
this Country, which is not yet in a State to be governed entirely 
upon the mild principles of Law and justice which have so long 
prevailed in England'.2
Thus in many ways the Addington ministry merely followed the 
lead of its predecessor in terms of social policy. The Home Office 
responded to reports of serious social unrest with instructions to 
implement existing laws to punish the ringleaders, but deployed 
troops sparingly. Nevertheless, there was a considerable change in 
the tone of the government in dealing with these issues, which was 
evident to Lord Holland, who wrote that after the reimposition of the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus in April 1801: "Mr Addington seemed
disposed to lower the high and insolent tone which his predecessors 
had assumed both at home and abroad. ' This "had a very beneficial 
effect on the country, and assuaged, if it did not heal the wounds 
which the anti-revolutionary and jealous spirit of Mr Pitt's 
government had inflicted'.3 Southey commented on Addington's dealing 
with Despard:
With such lenity are things conducted in England. No 
arrests have followed, no alarm has been excited; the 
people are perfectly satisfied of his guilt, and only say 
What a blessing that it did not happen under Pitt--Never 
had a nation a more perfect confidence in the rectitude of
3For an examination of the relations between Irish rebels 
and the French Government see Elliott, Partners in Revolution.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 30 July 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 
270-71.
3Lord Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i. 183, ii. 214 
quoted in Ziegler, p. 153.
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their minister.1
Thus Addington and Pelham tried to resolve problems without 
exacerbating social tension. In the weavers' disputes, they tried to 
balance the best interests of the industry with the concerns of the 
labourers, and with Despard they upheld the law without resorting to 
repression. For Addington's goal was domestic peace as well as 
diplomatic peace. The war had caused considerable disruption in every 
aspect of British life and he wished to return everything to normal.
Addington's social policy during the peace also sheds light on 
his later career as Home Secretary. During his tenure of that office 
in Liverpool's ministry, Addington received a reputation as a hard 
reactionary, and historians have stereotyped him as the typical tory 
politician, alarmist and adamantly opposed to political change. The 
policies he pursued as Prime Minister indicate that either his 
character changed completely between 1802 and 1812, or the 
traditional description of him was false. In fact he did demonstrate 
consistency in dealing with social unrest. When he believed that 
unrest posed a threat to the state, he implemented extraordinarily 
repressive measures, as in 1801 and 1819, and when he believed that 
it posed no threat, he merely arrested the ringleaders, as in 1802. 
It should also be noted that Addington's Six Acts of 1819 were, for 
the most part, merely the reintroduction of Pitt's repressive 
legislation of the 1790s. Thus Liverpool had good reason to appoint 
Addington as Home Secretary rather than leaving him in a less 
efficient office in 1812. For the one had first-hand experience of 
how the other dealt with social policy. Addington was no innovator 
of repressive legislation: he simply adopted tradition measures if 
and when he believed the circumstances required them.
The Election of 1802
Addington concluded that the summer of 18 02 was the ideal time 
to call an election. For his ministry was firmly established; no
1Southey, p. 373.
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longer did the political experts whisper that he was merely a locum 
tenens for Pitt. The ministry was also at the height of its 
popularity, as the platform of peace and retrenchment was very 
successful. He had responded to nearly all the complaints levelled 
at the government during the last years of the war, and as long as 
Pitt demonstrated no desire to return to office, there was really no 
alternative to Addington continuing in office indefinitely.1
June 1802 was also a suitable time administratively, as all of 
the government's important business had been completed during the 
spring session. The budget was concluded and the peace terms 
ratified, and there were no further pressing matters. Thus these were 
truly the halcyon days of the ministry. As a result, the election was 
fought on no particular issue. For with no national issues at stake, 
each vote depended almost entirely on patronage or local 
considerations.
The most remarkable aspect of the 1802 election was the very 
small role played by the government which had only one seat at its 
disposal. Moreover, both Hawkesbury and Hiley Addington had to pay 
considerable sums to ensure their reelection.2 The government did, 
however, give nominal support to candidates in particular 
constituencies, but this consisted of little more than granting them 
the status of government candidates.3 Thus for the most part, the 
ministry merely sat back and hoped that satisfaction with its 
policies would persuade the country to return the government's 
majority.
The reasons the ministry took such a careless attitude towards 
the election are not entirely clear. Part of it probably stemmed from 
overconfidence that the record of the ministry would ensure it 
sufficient support. In addition, financial considerations were
1Glenbervie Diaries, i. 320.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 13 Sept. 1802, Add. MSS 38473, 
fo. 117.
3Addington to Liverpool, 14 July 1802, MS Loan 72/33, fos.
5-6.
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important. For Robinson's techniques were expensive and Addington was 
concerned about depleting the coffers of the Treasury when the 
finances of the government were so precarious.1 Moreover, he realized 
that one of the most persistent complaints of radical and opposition 
critics of the government was political corruption. He was not a 
political animal, for he found many aspects of political life very 
distasteful and did his best to avoid or ignore them. So while 
desiring the government to be successful and popular, he did not wish 
to increase his own personal following by unsavoury methods, such as 
using government money to purchase elections.2
This attitude was a drawback for any politician, let alone the 
Prime Minister. Strong and successful governments had a cost, and 
Addington was not willing to pay it. For example, his relationship 
with Pitt demonstrates this. As he wished to remain on good terms 
with Pitt and his closest friends, he did not dream that Pitt would 
ever become his political rival. Consequently, he had allowed Dundas 
to continue to manage Scotland throughout the term of his ministry, 
and gave him virtually free rein in the elections of 1802, even 
asking his advice on the selections of the representative peerage.3 
The problem here was that the Scottish members were loyal to Dundas 
not to the government, and once Dundas turned against the government, 
the ministry lost the Scottish votes. Addington was clearly in no 
position to challenge Dundas's power in Scotland, however, and 
besides, he considered him a close personal friend. Nevertheless, out 
of a concern about the strength of Dundas's control of Scotland or 
out of personal regard for the Duke of Montrose, he considered 
supporting two of the Duke's candidates in Fife and Stirling against 
Dundas's. This was a grave mistake. Addington either had to wrest 
Scotland from Dundas' s grasp or concede the country to him, doing his
Veiling, p. 227.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 2 Pluviose X (21 Jan. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/597.
3Addington to Dundas, 1802, Sidmouth Papers,
152M/cl802/OZ41.
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best to ensure that he remained a supporter of the government. On the 
other hand, to grant him control of most of Scotland and then to 
alienate him by supporting a few of his opponents was absolute folly. 
In the end, Addington decided not to help Montrose, but as the 
latter's candidates won anyway, Dundas was annoyed with Addington.1
The results of the election were about as unexceptionable as the 
campaign. By estimates on all sides, support for the government and 
opposition were virtually unchanged.2 The only two surprises were 
Windham's defeat at Norwich and Francis Burdett's victory at 
Middlesex. Nevertheless, these results mattered little, as Buckingham 
had been prepared for Windham's defeat and provided him with the safe 
seat of St Mawes, and the defeated candidate in Middlesex challenged 
the eligibility of some of the voters who had supported Burdett and 
when a the Commons found in favour of the challenger Burdett lost his 
seat.3
Addington seemed completely satisfied with the results of the 
election but he should not have been.4 He was very short-sighted in 
believing that the ministry could continue on the basis of the 
support it had at that time. The foundations of that support were too 
weak; they appeared strong only as long as the opposition remained 
discredited, Pitt showed no inclination to return to office, and the 
government followed popular policies. Many MPs would vote for the 
ministry under those conditions, but Addington did not realize that 
he needed more who would vote for him in any circumstances. Once the
1Holden Furber, Henry Dundas. First Viscount Melville, 
1742-1811 (London, 1931), pp. 274-7.
2Addington to Carew, 1 Aug. 18 02, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OZ48; Long to Dundas, 26 Sept. 1802, Melville Castle 
Muniments, GD 51/1/67; Pitt to Rose, 10 July 1802, Add. MSS 
42772, fo. 151.
3This was a double blow to his family, as the government 
had withdrawn its secret service money from the bank of 
Burdett's father-in-law, Thomas Coutts, because of Coutts's
support of his son-in-law's campaign. Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 
24 July 1802, MS Loan 72/54, fo. 244.
4Glenbervie Diaries, i . 32 8.
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government was faced with tough decisions it would understand how 
soft its support really was. Thus Addington wasted an excellent 
opportunity to pack Parliament with more of his own supporters, which 
would have given him the strength to weather tougher times. From the 
standpoint of sound political management, Addington should have 
abandoned Pitt and Dundas and used as much money as he could afford 
to increase loyal support in the Commons. There would have been a 
backlash, but his stronger position in Parliament would almost 
certainly have been able to weather it.
This type of speculation is beside the point, however, because 
Addington was simply incapable of such hard-nosed political tactics. 
For he considered Pitt and Dundas his friends, and probably would 
rather have resigned than knowingly commit acts that would have 
betrayed that friendship. Personal relationships were always more 
important than politics to Addington, and this was his single 
greatest fault as a politician and Prime Minister. Instead of 
building a secure foundation in the Commons that would allow him to 
pursue policies on their own merit, he was sometimes required to mold 
his policies according to parliamentary and popular opinion so as to 
ensure their passage in the House. Moreover, Addington was soon to 
realize that his "friends' were quite willing to betray him for 
political reasons.
The Reform of the Navy
Naval reform was the aspect of Addington's peace-time 
administration that had the most important long-term consequences. 
As the British owed their wealth and position in the world to the 
Royal Navy, any government policy affecting it was bound to be 
granted high priority in parliamentary and public opinion. The naval 
reforms of the Addington ministry were interwoven with the realms of 
both foreign policy and domestic politics. Their origins lay in the 
experience of the war and their consequences stretched beyond the 
resignation of the ministry to include the ending of Henry Dundas's
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career. The following section will deal with the origins and nature 
of the reforms, leaving the political consequences for chapter eight.
The idea of reforming the navy did not initiate with the 
Addington ministry but stretched back to the 1780s. For it was 
apparent after the American war that the dockyards wasted a large 
proportion of public expenditure through both carelessness and 
corruption. Although inefficiency was not peculiar to the navy, as 
it pervaded all departments and levels of government, it was more 
apparent in the navy because that department received a large 
proportion of government expenditure and naval matters received 
considerable political attention. The problem stemmed from the fact 
that, while the size and importance of the navy had grown 
considerably, the administration of the dockyards had hardly changed 
since the seventeenth century. During the 1780s and 1790s, political 
pressure for government efficiency and economy moved the Admiralty 
to force the Navy Board to implement some reforms in dockyard 
procedure. For example in 1798, after the Finance Committee of the 
House of Commons recommended an inquiry Spencer commissioned 
Brigadier General Samuel Bentham, brother of the famous philosopher, 
to devise a system of reforms for the dockyards. Bentham constructed 
a comprehensive plan, but owing to the demands of the war, Spencer 
felt unable to implement many of the reforms until peace was 
concluded, but promised that an inquiry would be made.1
Corruption existed at three levels: the dockyard workers, the 
contractors, and the Navy Board. First, workers cheated the 
government of a considerable amount of money and theft of supplies 
was almost institutionalized. Custom had legitimized the practice of 
workers taking unusable wood ^chips' home for firewood, but it became 
common practice to cut up good pieces of timber into such chips. This 
type of theft had grave consequences when the circumstances of the 
war cut off Britain's timber supplies. Even more serious, some
XW. V. Anson, Life of John Jervis. Admiral Lord St Vincent 
(London, 1913), p. 285; Roger Morriss, The Roval Dockyards 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Leicester, 1983), 
pp. 189-93; Breihan, p. 166.
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workers stole copper bolts and disguised the theft by cutting off the 
ends, replacing the middle section with wood, and putting them into 
the ships being repaired. At least two ships were lost when such 
bolts failed to hold together at sea. In addition, the dockyards 
frequently charged for work that was not done. At Portsmouth, some 
artificers were paid for working twenty-one hours of overtime in one 
day. Moreover, a government survey found that there were 2,361 more 
men on the payroll than actually worked in the dockyard. The 
government was also grossly overcharged. Cooperage at Deptford which 
cost £37 was charged to the government at £1000. As a result of such 
fraudulent practices the HMS Dedalus cost £8,788 to build, but 
£13,802 to repair. These practices robbed the government of at least 
£1 million per year.1
Contractors made enormous fortunes by defrauding the government 
further. The worst abuses concerned timber, as the government often 
paid top price for wood that was rotten. The government was also 
denied the benefit of competition as many contracts remained in the 
same families for generations. For example, at Plymouth, the Navy 
Board gave block contracts to William Taylor of Southampton for 
periods of seven of more years at a time, without even considering 
bids from any other firms. Taylor then subcontracted out to other 
firms for a commission of ten percent. In addition, the cooperage 
contract remained in one family from 1714 to 1782, after which it was 
given to another. Moreover, when competitive bids were issued, some 
firms bid very low and then arranged to increase the price after 
having been given the contract.2
None of the this would have been possible but for the compliance 
of the Navy Board, for instead of preventing these abuses, officials 
of the Board often aided and abetted them. Some officials were
1Brenton, ii. 159-60; Harvey, Britain in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, pp. 128-30.
2Bernard Pool, Navv Board Contracts. 1660-1832; Contract 
Administration under the Navv Board (London, 1966), pp. 118-21; 
O. A. Sherrard, A Life of Lord St Vincent (London, 1933), p.
188 .
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bribed, but usually these oversights were the result of laziness and
habit. In fact, corrupt practices had continued for so long that they
were almost legitimized. The Board was also afraid of antagonizing
the workers or contractors, and therefore officials preferred
inefficiency to the disruption which might have resulted had they
tried to correct it.1
St Vincent was well aware of at least some of the abuses before
he became First Lord of the Admiralty. For during the ten years of
war, his ships had often suffered the consequences of faulty
workmanship, and he had obtained first hand knowledge of the
dockyards while in Gibraltar which convinced him that the navy
required substantial reforms. He had often said that if he were ever
given the power he would change the system,2 and as soon as he was
appointed First Lord he expressed his intention to act:
There is much to do, and a late attempt of my great 
Predecessor meets with every species of opposition and 
obloquy. I mean "a partial reform in our Dock Yards' and 
comparing small things with great (which must come, or we 
are ruined) I shall have a very difficult task to perform, 
if I preside at this Board in times of Peace.3
Time was all that he required: "I flatter myself, if I have a
reasonable tenure of my present situation, I shall be able to correct
some of the gross abuses, which clog the wheels of the service, and
if permitted to go on much longer must swallow up all the means of
the Country. 14 He believed that all that the Admiralty had lacked
before was will and vigour, and he was determined to succeed. For
during his career in the navy, he had always been very heavy-handed,
and had almost always got his own way. The country admired him for
his success, but many of his own men despised him for his harsh
1Sherrard, p. 189.
2Brenton, ii. 155.
3St Vincent to Collingwood, 15 Mar. 1801, Add. MSS 31158, 
fo. 21.
4St Vincent to Fanshaw, 25 Feb. 1801, Add. MSS 31170, fo.
18.
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treatment.1 The first crisis he faced upon taking office demonstrated 
that he would carry such tactics over into politics. Dockyard workers 
struck for higher pay at the time of preparing for Hyde Parker's 
expedition to Copenhagen in March 1801, and riots ensued at Plymouth 
on 31 March and Sheerness on 13 April. St Vincent considered this 
action as bordering on mutiny and treated it as such. While the rest 
of the Cabinet were prepared to give in to the workers' demands, St 
Vincent ordered the ringleaders discharged and sent troops to drive 
the rest back to work, and he did not stop there. On 27 April, he 
ordered a tour of the dockyards and discharged workmen involved in 
the combination. By May, he had dismissed 34 0 workers.2
St Vincent not only wished to eliminate wastage in the navy but 
also agreed with Addington that naval expenditure should be cut 
substantially when peace was made. At the end of October 1801, Hobart 
directed the Admiralty to begin to reduce expenditure.3 St Vincent 
responded immediately by ordering some ships to be discharged,4 and 
set about trimming the dockyards down to a peace-time establishment. 
In November, he laid off 500 labourers and 3 00 shipwrights from 
Deptford, 325 men at Woolwich Warren, and 150 coopers and yardmen 
from the victualling office.5 After the signing of the definitive 
treaty of peace, Hobart ordered further cuts in Naval expenditure.6 
Believing that the peace would last for some time, St Vincent 
discharged both ships and seamen in great numbers. Consequently, he 
reduced the naval establishment to 13 0,000 with a projected reduction
1Breihan, p. 164.
2Roger Morriss, ^Labour Relations in the Royal Naval 
Dockyards, 1801-5', Mariner's Mirror. lxiii (1976), 38-40; 
Sherrard, p. 174; Breihan, p. 167.
3Hobart to Admiralty, 27 Oct. 1801, Adm 1/4188.
^Admiralty to Duckworth 29 Oct. 1801, and same to Campbell, 
7 Nov. 1801, Adm 2/142.
5Emsley, p. 95.
6Hobart to Admiralty, 5 April 1802, Adm 1/4189.
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to 70,000 by the end of 1802, and a further reduction to 30,000 by 
the end of 1803.1 These reductions were essential to the success of 
Addington's financial policies, and the Prime Minister took the 
opportunity to boast about them during his budget speech of December 
1802 .
While reducing expenditure was important, St Vincent's real 
desire was to reform the abuses in the dockyards. As early as July 
1801, he began investigating 'instances of misconduct lately 
discovered' at Sheerness,2 and by June 1802, he had decided to order 
an inquiry, to seal and secure the yardbooks, and initiate a full 
inspection of the dockyards.3 Addington persuaded him to postpone the 
inquiry until after the election, so as not to alienate government 
supporters in the southwest.4 In August and September, however, St 
Vincent personally visited the dockyards and conducted the 
investigation, and the problems he discovered were worse then he had 
ever imagined. He wrote to Addington from Plymouth on 2 9 August that 
his time had been, 'fully occupied since my arrival at this place 
where we find abuse to such an extent as would require many months 
to go thoroughly into, and the absolute necessity of a Commission of 
enquiry to expose them appears to the Admiralty Board here in a much 
stronger light than ever.'5
The visitations not only uncovered the extent of the abuses but 
also the culpability of the Navy Board in covering them up. Although 
provided with adequate information, the Board refused to investigate 
a number of complaints. For example, Commissioner Isaac Coffin had 
registered a number of complaints to the Board concerning extra
Batson, p. 412.
2Board Minutes, 7 July 1801, Adm. 3/145.
3Letters of Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of St Vincent.
1801-1804. ed. David. B. Smith, Navy Records Society (2 vols,
London, 1922-7), ii. 1-7.
4St Vincent to Grey, 6 Aug. 1801, Smith, ii. 191.
5St Vincent to Addington, 29 Aug. 1802, Add. MSS 31169, fo.
125.
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payments made to workers at Sheerness. It was clear that the master 
shipwright was guilty of involvement but the Board sheltered him from 
punishment. The Board had also given the master blacksmith a rise in 
pay, even though he was accused of corruption. The clerk of the 
cheque had not kept his books current and aged and infirm workers 
were kept on salary, but the Board thought these matters too trivial 
even to investigate. The Board also failed to notice that children 
had been admitted as ropemakers at Woolwich. The Admiralty decided 
to reprimand the Board for "by their failure in the execution of 
their duty, the public has been suffered to be defrauded to a very 
considerable amount, and delinquencies passed unpunished1.1 
Nevertheless, official reprimands alone could not solve the problem.
St Vincent therefore continued to press the Cabinet for a 
parliamentary commission of inquiry to expose these abuses. There was 
also a more personal reason for this policy, as he had concluded that 
he could not reform the dockyards as long as the existing members of 
the Navy Board held their positions. While the regulations allowed 
the First Lord of the Admiralty to appoint new members to any 
vacancies on the Board, he could not dismiss existing members because 
they had been appointed under the Great Seal. Thus St Vincent hoped 
that the inquiry would cause many to resign, leaving him a free hand 
to appoint a more efficient Board.2
The Cabinet was quite reluctant to comply, however, because 
although Addington supported the principle of reform, he was wary of 
the political consequences of a parliamentary inquiry. For his 
experience with the political backlash caused by Abbot's reforms in 
Ireland seems to have made him reluctant to agree to any measure that 
might cause similar problems in England. Nevertheless, St Vincent was 
adamant and eventually carried the Cabinet. Consequently, in December 
1802 the government introduced a motion to establish a commission of
1Board Minutes, 16 Oct. 1802, Adm 3/127.
2Morriss, The Roval Dockyards, p. 150; A Brief Memoir of 
the Life and Writings of the Late William Marsden written by 
Himself with Notes from His Correspondence, ed. Mrs E. W. 
Marsden, (London, 1838), p. 103n.
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inquiry into the navy empowered to call for documents and examine 
witnesses on oath. Eldon, who was concerned with the legal 
implications of this measure, stalled the debate in the Lords, and 
eventually forced through an amendment which enabled a witness to 
avoid self-incrimination while under oath.1
St Vincent also tried to implement some immediate reforms. 
Following Bentham's recommendation he instituted the office of Timber 
Master to examine the wood supplied by contractors. He also 
recognized that the navy's heavy dependency on merchant building was 
costing dearly, and he believed that building ships in government 
dockyards would save money. Therefore, after the peace he abstained 
from making contracts for ships of the line owing to the high price 
of timber. He believed that the price would stabilize and 
availability increase if merchants were not competing in the market. 
His plan was to increase dockyard building by classing shipwrights 
by ability and employing the best to build rather than repair ships. 
For a government study indicated that forty-six shipwrights could 
build a seventy-four-gun ship in one year. Thus under this system the 
dockyards could build ten new ships of the line each year and the 
whole fleet could be kept in repair.2
Overall, St Vincent's reforms were both important and necessary, 
and in the long term almost every one of his ideas was implemented 
with great benefit to the Royal Navy and the country. Nevertheless, 
they caused serious difficulties in the short term. For regardless 
of how much the Admiralty abhorred the inefficiency and corruption 
in the dockyards, contractors, and Navy Board, it could not escape 
the fact that the navy could not function without their cooperation. 
In addition, St Vincent's manner was ill-suited to the task he wished 
to perform. He imputed malevolence to every inefficiency, even though 
many were the result of mere neglect or carelessness. William 
Marsden, who accompanied St Vincent on the visitations, stated that, 
"the general character of the naval administration was one of
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1146.
2Morriss, The Roval Dockyards, p. 29.
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harshness particularly as it respected the officers of the 
subordinate departments, with which some personal ill-will was mixed 
up: the object seeming to be to find grounds for delinquencies
presumed in the first instance'.1 St Vincent's opponents, moreover, 
were not cowed by his hard and uncompromising attitude. Dockyard 
workers pelted him with mud, but more important the contractors 
balked at his reforms. Timber contractors, who became annoyed when 
the Timber Master rejected rotten wood, refused to sell any wood, 
while other contractors also became reluctant to deal with the 
government. At the same time the Navy Board obstructed many of St 
Vincent's reforms. The result was that when the government needed 
ships and repairs upon the renewal of war, they were much more 
difficult to obtain. Thus, in pursuing reforms that would be of 
considerable benefit to the country, St Vincent created problems in 
the naval administration which hurt the interest of the country. The 
British were fortunate that, even in such a weakened state, the Royal 
Navy was still strong enough to accomplish all of its goals.2
In comparison with the rest of the government's peace-time 
policies, St Vincent's naval policies stand out as somewhat 
inconsistent. While Addington tried to obtain benefits from the peace 
through both retrenchment and reform, he was very careful to provide 
for the contingency of an immediate renewal of war. St Vincent, on 
the other hand, managed the navy as if he expected the peace to last 
for many years. His reductions in naval spending were much more 
drastic than those in the military departments, and the chaos he 
created in the dockyards certainly inhibited a sudden return to a 
war-time establishment. If he had been given ten years of peace, he 
might have been able completely to overhaul the system and have it 
in better working order for the next war. The diplomatic situation, 
however, did not justify the assumption that peace would last so 
long. This is an example of how St Vincent's determination to manage 
the navy separately prevented the Cabinet from developing a cohesive
xMarsden Memoirs, p. 103.
2See below, chapter 8, pp. 263-77.
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system of policy. Addington, who assumed that somehow he could bridge 
the gap, must shoulder some of the blame for the failure to 
coordinate the navy with the rest of the government departments.
For the first half of the term of the Addington ministry 
domestic politics held primacy: the stress and strain evident on
society and the economy demanded the immediate attention of the 
government, which was obliged to mould its foreign policy to deal 
with the internal crisis. Addington and Hawkesbury concluded that 
peace was necessary for several reasons, the most important of which 
was the financial and social health of the country. Once peace had 
been concluded, Addington was able to implement measures that 
alleviated the social and economic crises, and on the whole his 
policies were successful. The repeal of the income tax for example 
was extremely popular. Peace also led to a resurgence in overseas 
trade, even though the European ports under French control remained 
closed to British ships. Social unrest decreased dramatically with 
the reduction in the price of grain owing to a good harvest and the 
reopening of the grain trade, and the social policies of the 
government helped to decrease social tension. Finally, financial 
reforms helped to restore the financial health of the government. 
While Addington had been concentrating on domestic policy, however, 
Bonaparte was taking advantage of the peace to strengthen his power 
at the expense of other states. As domestic concerns became less 
pressing for Addington, foreign concerns became more pressing, so 
that by the end of 1802 the entire orientation of government policy 
had to be reversed.
Chapter Six
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The Renewal of War, October 1802 to May 1803
'I do in my conscience believe that the nation anxiously wishes for 
the continuance of peace, but is not afraid of war--it hopes for the 
best, but desires to be prepared for the worst--that it will not 
suffer any unworthy compromise of its honour; but that it will not 
permit any impassioned feelings and exaggerated representations to 
bear down what is due to prudence. ... I have no hesitation in 
confessing, that I consider war as a dreadful evil. But dreadful as 
is that evil, I shall never hesitate between the alternative of the 
sacrifice of our honour and war.1
Henry Addington1
The French proved to be just as difficult to deal with in peace 
time as they had been in war. If for Clausewitz, war was the 
continuation of diplomacy by other means, then for Bonaparte 
diplomacy was the continuation of war by other means, in the sense 
that he was as determined to use the opportunities presented by the 
peace to acquire new territory and increase French power as he had 
been to use the war. In September 1801, however, Addington and 
Hawkesbury had not known that this would be Bonaparte's response to 
the peace. At that time they had had to give him the benefit of the 
doubt by assuming that he would honour the terms of all of his 
treaties and use the period of the peace to concentrate on internal 
affairs.
By April 1802, however, Addington and Hawkesbury had sufficient 
evidence that they could not trust Bonaparte to contain his 
aggression. Nevertheless, peace had been made and there might have 
been a tremendous outcry if the government had declared war again 
at that point. In addition, Addington still believed that peace was 
necessary for the financial and social health of the country. Most 
MPs and the majority of the public seemed to care more about the 
repeal of the income tax than who controlled northern Italy or
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 986.
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Louisiana. Thus as unsatisfactory as the peace was, it was for the 
time being still preferable to war. But Addington believed that 
Bonaparte's continued aggression might sometime in the future push 
the British government to the point that a renewal of war would 
become preferable to continuing peace, and in order to remain 
prepared for this eventuality, he decided that he had to sustain the 
military and naval resources of Britain on a strong footing. This 
detracted, however, from one of the great advantages for which the 
peace had been made: to enable the government to cut spending,
especially in the military sphere. Pushed on one side by social and 
financial pressure, and on the other by the external threat to 
British interests, he chose to compromise. It was an armed peace, 
and the government was determined to resist future French 
aggression.
The Peace of Amiens brought little respite to Anglo-French 
tension, as Bonaparte sustained diplomatic pressure on the British. 
Even before the definitive treaty was signed, he sent accusations 
through Talleyrand to the British representative Francis Jackson 
that the attacks made upon him in the British press were directed 
by the British government. Talleyrand warned that, if the British 
newspapers did not cease to insult the First Consul, the French 
government would direct the French newspapers to attack the British 
and would buy control of a London newspaper to issue Bonapartist 
propaganda.1 The accusation against the British government was 
false, however, and Bonaparte undoubtedly knew it. Although British 
governments of this period had made arrangements with some 
newspapers, trading money and inside information in return for 
favourable bias in the presentation of news, they controlled none.2 
Besides, the British government hardly wished to see open criticism 
of the man with whom it was negotiating a controversial treaty of
1Jackson to Hawkesbury, 4 Mar. 1802, FO 27/61.
2Arthur Aspinall, Politics and the Press. 1780-1850 
(London, 1949), pp. 66-120.
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peace. On the contrary, the government found such criticism of
Bonaparte very embarrassing.
In June, the French renewed the attack. Talleyrand told Merry,
the new British representative, that the French government objected
to the way the British government allowed French royalists and
bishops to parade around the British court. He claimed that this
provided encouragement to the disaffected in France, and the only
remedy was to expel the emigres from Britain.1 Hawkesbury tried to
reassure the French that the British wished to maintain a peaceful
disposition and that they would not aid projects against the French
government, but that as long as the emigres did not break any
British laws he could not deport them. In addition, he insisted that
most of the emigres were in retirement and there was no evidence
that they were plotting against Bonaparte.2 Unsatisfied with this
response, Bonaparte directed Otto to complain to Hawkesbury. On 25
July, Otto pointed out articles written by both English and French
journalists which were highly inflammatory against Bonaparte and
complained of the continued presence of Chouan chiefs on Jersey and
the illicit correspondence between that island and France.3
The Cabinet had difficulty deciding how it should respond. On
the whole, the government considered the British press to be a
nuisance and the new French criticisms justified. The problem, as
Hawkesbury told Merry, was that
We have no power whatever of preventing such
publications--our only power is to punish them; and even 
the Success of prosecution is extremely doubtful, and the 
delay that must necessarily take place between the 
committal of the offence and the conviction and 
punishment of the offender, renders prosecution in most 
cases unadvisable [sic].4
3Merry to Hawkesbury, 4 June 1802, FO 27/62.
2Hawkesbury to Merry, 10 June 1802, FO 27/62.
3Otto to Hawkesbury, 25 July 1802, FO 27/66.
4Hawkesbury to Merry, 13 Aug. 1802, FO 27/63.
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Nevertheless, the government was under considerable pressure to 
prevent the issue from causing a rupture in Anglo-French relations. 
Consequently, Hobart wanted to expel Jean Peltier, the French author 
of the most offensive of the articles of which Bonaparte complained, 
and suppress the offending newspapers. He argued that these articles 
were not based on any evidence, that they attacked a government with 
which Britain was at peace, and that the author was not a British 
subject deserving of the protection of the British constitution.1 
Ellenborough agreed that the government should deport Peltier, but 
Pelham and Hawkesbury demured.2
Consequently, the Cabinet as usual developed a compromise. 
Rather than taking any direct action that might arouse public 
attention, the government referred Peltier's case to the Attorney- 
General ' s office to consider a prosecution for libel.3 To prevent a 
similar offence in future the government placed pressure on 
newspapers not to publish similar articles. Vansittart, for example, 
threatened otherwise to remove government protection from the True 
Briton.4
Unfortunately, the French government was not satisfied, and on 
17 August, Otto delivered another strong rebuke to Hawkesbury. He 
completely dismissed the argument that the British government was 
bound by the British constitution to preserve the freedom of the 
press. He claimed moreover that sometimes one good had to be 
sacrificed for a higher good, and in this case the Law of Nations 
overrode the British constitution. As there existed a conspiracy to 
defame the entire French nation, the French government demanded that 
the British suppress all criticism of the French; expel the Bishops
1Hobart to Addington, 14 Aug. 18 02, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B3 9.
2Glenbervie Manuscript Diary, vii. 31 Aug. 1802; Otto to 
Talleyrand, 11 Vendemiaire XI (3 Oct. 1802), AE Angleterre/600.
3Hawkesbury to Merry, 13 Aug. 18 02, Sackville MSS,
U269/02 00/1.
4Heriot to Addington, 10 Aug. 18 02, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OZ126.
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Arras and St Paul, all emigres who wore royalist orders, and all 
enemies of France from Jersey; deport Georges Cadoudal and his 
adherents to Canada, and the princes of Bourbon to Warsaw.1
The Cabinet was extremely concerned over how seriously the 
French appeared to be taking the issue. Liverpool argued that "those 
who were most disposed to censure the Administration for making the 
peace, will censure them with greater Justice, if they do not take 
every proper Measure to secure the Continuance of it1.2 As a result 
the government began seriously to consider curbing the activities 
of the emigres, and Addington decided to write directly to Bonaparte 
in English in his own hand to refute him on the press issue.3
Hawkesbury believed that the hostile disposition of the French 
government was owing to the ego and bad temper of Bonaparte rather 
than any concerted policy of bullying the British government, and 
he hoped that frank discussions would clear the air. Instead of 
speaking with Otto, however, Hawkesbury thought that directing Merry 
to explain the matter to Talleyrand would be more effective.4 On 28 
August, he outlined the British position to Merry: "His Majesty
cannot, and never will, in consequence of any representation or any 
menace from a Foreign Power, make any concession which can be in the 
smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the Press as secured by 
the constitution of this Country.' The French government, like the 
British government, were entitled to recourse through the existing 
laws of England to prosecute the offenders for libel. The British 
government desired no further protection and would not grant it to 
another. If the French were dissatisfied with British laws they
10tto to Hawkesbury 17 Aug. 1802, FO 27/66.
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 18 Aug. 18 02, MS Loan 72/51, fo.
39.
Liverpool to Eldon, 24 Aug. 1802, Eldon Papers; Memoires 
de M. de Bourrienne. ministre d'etat sous Napoleon, le 
Directoire. le Consulat et la Restauration (10 vols, Paris, 
1829), iv. 306.
4Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 17 Aug. 1802, Add. MSS 38236, 
fo. 129.
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could punish the distributors of the offending articles in France
or prohibit their importation. Although Otto had mentioned employing
the Alien Act, it was designed to remove foreigners who were
fomenting unrest or disorder in Britain or in any other ways
threatening the security of the kingdom. In response to Otto's
demands, Hawkesbury stated that the emigres were already leaving
Jersey, that any of the bishops who were found to be distributing
papers on the coast of France would be deported, that the government
was already considering deporting George Cadoudal and his adherents,
that the Bourbon princes could not be expelled although the British
government wished they would leave, and that emigres could not be
deported merely for wearing ancient orders. Finally, he asserted the
necessity of the British and French coming to a complete
understanding on the issue. He wrote,
That after a War in which the Passions of Men have been 
roused beyond all former examples, it is natural to 
suppose that the Distrust, Jealousy, and other hostile 
Feelings of Individuals should not immediately subside & 
under these circumstances it appears to be both the 
Interest and the Duty of the two Governments by a mild 
and temperate conduct gradually to allay these Feelings, 
and not on the contrary to provoke and . augment them by 
untimely Irritation on their part, and by ascribing 
proceedings like those abovementioned, to causes which 
they have no reference.1
The French, however, were still not satisfied. Rather 
Talleyrand stated that the British could do more to resolve French 
grievances. He argued that they could not claim that they must 
adhere to the constitution, as Pitt had violated it in the 1790s 
when he suspended Habeas Corpus and introduced the other repressive 
legislation, and he had also deployed both legal and financial 
measures to coerce the press. Talleyrand claimed further that the 
British could deport any Frenchmen without redress. Consequently, 
Bonaparte had decided to defer adopting regulations for facilitating 
commercial intercourse until the British granted him redress.2
1Hawkesbury to Merry, 2 8 Aug. 1802, FO 27/ 63.
2Merry to Hawkesbury, 5 Sept. 1802, FO 27/64.
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The issue of Anglo-French trade was also a sore spot. While the 
lack of a commercial agreement was hardly the underlying cause of 
the rupture of the peace,1 it certainly added tension to an already 
delicate situation. The British did wish to resume Anglo-French 
trade in the manner of the prewar period, even though they did not 
want to negotiate a specific commercial treaty,2 and commercial 
interests had pressed for peace in 1801, assuming that it would lead 
to the resumption of Continental trade which had been interrupted 
by the war. The British did not require a commercial treaty with 
France and its allies, but merely permission to trade under such 
tariffs and conditions as each government felt necessary to impose. 
Peace did lead to a revival of British trade with most ports on the 
Continent, but Bonaparte refused to allow any Anglo-French trade 
under any conditions.
The ministry's parliamentary critics and some historians blamed 
Addington and Hawkesbury for the failure to revive trade by 
neglecting to include a commercial agreement in the Treaty of 
Amiens. While it is true that they deliberately avoided such an 
agreement, it is also clear that Bonaparte would not have given them 
one even if they had sought it. For he was determined to strengthen 
the commercial and industrial position of France, where the chaos 
of the Revolution had impeded advanced methods of manufacture and 
caused France to fall behind the British even further. Moreover, the 
commercial treaty of 1786 had been injurious to France, and it was 
clear that French goods would not be competitive with British. 
Bonaparte felt that the British market for French goods would not 
compensate for the loss of Continental markets once the British were 
allowed in. Therefore, he was determined to preserve the markets of 
France and those of its allies and dependencies for French goods. 
Consequently, on 19 May he passed a new series of tariffs and
xConrad Gill, "The Relations between England and France in 
1802', English Historical Review, xxiv (1909), 73.
2See above, chapter 4, pp. 12 9-30.
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invoked an old law of Robespierre which required the seizure of all
British ships of over 100 tons entering French ports.1
Hawkesbury and Liverpool had expected that normal trading
relations would resume after the signing of the peace, and they were
extremely annoyed at the news of Bonaparte's trade restrictions.
Hawkesbury sent a remonstrance through Merry:
Various reports having been received in this Country of 
strict prohibitions being enforced with respect to the 
Admission of British Commodities and Manufactures in 
France, and of very rigorous restrictions being imposed 
on British Vessels entering the Ports of that Country, I 
have to signify . . . that you take an early opportunity to 
impress upon the French Ministers, the necessity of some 
understanding being established between His Majesty's 
Government and that of France, on the subject of the 
commercial intercourse between the two Countries.2
Hawkesbury also sought an explanation from Otto, who indicated that
Bonaparte really wanted a commercial treaty without delay, and this
seems to have satisfied the British government.3
Nevertheless, Bonaparte refused to revoke his restrictions on
British trade. He was prepared, however, to take advantage of the
concern of the British to resume normal trading relations to send
Coquebert Montbret to London as Commissioner General of Commercial
Relations. But he had no intention of resuming trade, and Montbret
under the guise of a consul, was really a spy instructed to gather
intelligence concerning social unrest, public opinion, and the state
of the military in the United Kingdom. Another agent, Louis Mares,
was instructed to obtain a detailed description of the port of Hull,
and a third, Louis Antoine Fauvelet, to obtain similar information
^eutch, pp. 97-8; Sorel, vi. 211-2; Martin Philippson, 
vLa Paix d'Amiens et la Politique generale de Napoleon Ier', 
Revue Historicrue, lxxv (1901), 303-4.
2Hawkesbury to Merry, 20 May 1802, FO 27/62.
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 24 May 1802, Ms Loan 72/51, fo. 
37; Hawkesbury to Merry, 2 9 May 1802, FO 27/62; Liverpool to 
Hawkesbury, 30 May 1802, Add. MSS 38236, fo. 72.
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in Dublin.1 Having intercepted some of the agents1 correspondence, 
Hawkesbury knew that they were spies. Moreover, after receiving 
reports of British ships being seized upon having been driven into 
French ports by storms, Hawkesbury refused to recognize any 
commercial agents until some commercial arrangements had been made.2
The disputes over the press and commercial relations were 
really of relatively minor importance. Although they prevented the 
establishment of truly cordial relations and were a source of minor 
tension, they were in themselves unlikely to provoke a war. Hobart 
argued that, 'If we are to renew the War with France let it be for 
a great Political object--but nothing in my opinion can be so 
impolitic or so wicked as to hazard the interruption of Peace by 
Newspaper invectives against the Government of France.'3 Pitt made 
light of the situation in stating that he would stay at Walmer, 
'till the Pacificator of Europe takes it into his head to send an 
Army from the opposite Coast to revenge himself for some newspaper 
paragraph'.4
Another irritant was the delay by the French in sending their 
new ambassador to Britain. They did not announce that they would 
send Andreossy until June, and he did not arrive until November. 
Correspondingly, the British did not announce the appointment of 
Whitworth until after the French had announced that of Andreossy, 
and he spent several months ready and waiting to sail.
The ministry could deal with these issues without political 
interference as they received little attention in Parliament before 
it was prorogued in June. Very soon after, however, Addington and 
Hawkesbury believed they had found a great political object which
XP. Coquelle, 'Les Responsabilites de la Rupture de la 
Paix d'Amiens en 1803', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, xvi 
(1902), 274-8; Pellew, ii. 164.
2Hawkesbury to Otto, 18 Sept. 1802, FO 27/66; Gill, p. 75.
3Hobart to Auckland, 11 Aug. 1802, Add. MSS 34455, fo.
513 .
4Pitt to Addington, 5 Sept. 1802, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OZ186.
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would justify war, if they chose to resort to it. In September 1802, 
the Swiss had rebelled against the puppet regime that Bonaparte had 
installed. Claiming to be coming to the defence of a legitimate 
government, Bonaparte issued a warning to the rebels to desist and 
restore the old regime, or he would send 30,000 French troops across 
the border to restore order. For he desired a strong frontier to 
cover the Franche-Comte, and this required a firm and settled 
government in Switzerland friendly to France.1 Moreover, he saw his 
proclamation as a defensive not an aggressive measure, as it was 
intended to support an existing government. The British, however, 
considered it as interference in the internal affairs of an 
independent country and an attempt by Bonaparte to incorporate 
further territory more firmly under his control. To them it appeared 
another in an endless series of acquisitions which the French had 
made despite the peace.
On 2 October, Hawkesbury learned from Merry that as the new 
Swiss government had been overthrown and the previous one 
reestablished, the Swiss minister in Paris had requested Bonaparte 
to intervene, and Merry surmised that the French would use the 
crisis as a pretext to occupy Switzerland.2 By 6 October, the 
British government was aware that Bonaparte had issued a warning to 
the Swiss to restore the government, and that the Swiss had sent an 
agent to solicit the support of the British, Austrians, Spaniards, 
Prussians, and Russians to prevent Bonaparte from interfering.
At first, Addington and Hawkesbury thought that this was an 
excellent opportunity to take a stand against French aggression. At 
a hastily assembled Cabinet, the government decided to take several 
lines of attack. The first was to make a firm but mild remonstrance 
to Otto, in hopes of delaying any French action. For the British 
wished to buy time for a special agent to travel to Switzerland, 
acquire information, and offer to grant a subsidy to the Swiss to
1Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 23 Sept. 1802, Napoleon1s
Letters, p. 98.
2Merry to Hawkesbury, 29 Sept. 1802, FO 27/64.
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help them to resist a French invasion. Consequently, on 10 October, 
Hawkesbury presented a note to Otto which expressing alarm at 
Bonaparte's ultimatum to the Swiss. He asserted that Switzerland was 
an independent country and its people should be left to settle their 
own affairs. The ministry's other intention was to concert action 
with the Austrians and Russians, whom Addington and Hawkesbury 
believed had sufficient interest in the future of Switzerland to 
make a strong stand against French interference.1 As early as 
December 1801, the British had been convinced of the necessity of 
securing an alliance with Russia and Austria,2 and the Swiss affair 
appeared to provide an issue around which the three courts could 
unite.
Hawkesbury wrote to Sir Arthur Paget, minister in Vienna, to 
discover whether the Austrians were prepared to send assistance to 
the Swiss.3 He also wrote to Sir John Borlase Warren, the ambassador 
in St Petersburg, to inquire after the Russian response to the news 
of Bonaparte's ultimatum.4 Addington and Hawkesbury had great hopes 
that the Swiss would fight the French, and that with the help of the 
Russians and Austrians, the British could score a decisive 
diplomatic victory over Bonaparte. Such a victory would have greatly 
enhanced the prestige of the ministry in Parliament and might have 
curbed Bonaparte's aggressive schemes in the future. Addington and 
Hawkesbury believed that they had finally gained the upper hand, and 
the Prime Minister ordered the immediate suspension of further
1Cabinet Minute, n.d. 1802, Add. MSS 38357, fo. 185; Yorke 
to Hardwicke, 30 Oct. 18 02, Add. MSS 3 5702, fo. 34; Hervey to 
Liverpool, 9 Oct. 1802, MS Loan 72/13, fo. 21; Hobart to 
Wellesley, 14 Nov. 1802, The Wellesley Papers, ed. L. S. 
Benjamin (London, 1914), pp. 158-9.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 11 Dec. 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142.
3Hawkesbury to Paget, 9 Oct. 1802, FO 7/66.
4Hawkesbury to Warren, 10 Oct. 1802, FO 65/51.
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restitution of colonies until the crisis had been resolved.1 The 
Swiss issue, however, dissolved rather quickly. Francis Moore, the 
British agent sent to Switzerland, was delayed by bad weather, not 
arriving until the Swiss had capitulated, and Hawkesbury knew by 2 0 
October that the Swiss had given in to Bonaparte's demands.2
Although the government played down the Swiss affair for 
parliamentary and public opinion, the ministry was seriously 
considering military action. Camden noted that Addington appeared 
"extremely warlike'.3 Hobart also suggested that if the Portuguese 
went to war with the French, the British should join them.4 On 27 
October, Hawkesbury instructed Warren to take advantage of a recent 
change in the Russian Government, which had brought to power 
Alexander Vorontsov, the brother of the anglophile ambassador to 
London, "to propose a System of Defensive Alliance between His 
Majesty and the Emperor of Russia'. Hawkesbury proposed an agreement 
based on three points: both countries would guarantee their
respective possessions; "make common cause' if France attacked 
either of their possessions; and work together with Austria to 
prevent the further expansion of French power into Europe.5
Unfortunately, while agreeing with all the important points 
that Hawkesbury had raised, Alexander Vorontsov argued that Russia 
required a few more years of peace to restore its finances and 
sources of strength, and that even a defensive treaty would prompt 
the French to build counter-alliances likely provoking a war. While
1 Addington to Hobart, 13 Oct. 1802, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B52; Hobart to Dundas, Wellesley, and Grinfield, 17 
Oct. 1802, WO 6/183.
2Merry to Hawkesbury, 17 Oct. 1802, FO 27/64.
3Camden to Bathurst, 24 Oct. 1802, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission: Report on the Manuscripts of the Seventh Earl 
Bathurst (London, 1923), p. 30.
4Hobart to Addington, 2 8 Oct. 18 02, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B55.
5Hawkesbury to Warren, 27 Oct. 1802, FO 65/51; Beeley,
499. A project of the treaty is in Add. MSS 38357, fos. 238-42.
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being seriously alarmed and annoyed at Bonaparte's violation of 
Swiss independence, the Russians wished to avoid giving the French 
the impression that they were concerting measures with the British.1 
The British received a similar response from Austria.
Nevertheless, while they were waiting for the answers from 
Vienna and St Petersburg, the Cabinet and its friends considered war 
a distinct possibility. Nelson informed Addington on 25 October, 
that he had, "only one object in view (that of giving an early and 
knock down blow to our Enemy and getting again the blessings of 
Peace) ' .2 On 3 0 October Addington told Hardwicke that the government 
was preparing for the renewal of hostilities, "with as little Bustle 
as is consistent with a Degree of Activity, & Exertion, & public 
observation has not reached all the material steps which have been 
take with a View to that object1.3 Hobart had directed the 
Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York, to begin preparing for an 
invasion by the French.4 On 5 November 1802, Hawkesbury told 
Liverpool,
I am inclined to think there will be war. ... I did not 
think it probable that Bonaparte would have ventured to 
march an army into Switzerland & in that case it might 
not have been difficult to have come to some compromise.
But this Circumstance attended with the Defiance which he 
had given us not to interfere in any Continental Concerns 
renders any accommodation extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.5
barren to Hawkesbury, 11 Oct. and 2 7 Nov. 1802, FO 65/51; 
Alexander I to S. Vorontsov, 18 Nov. 1802, VPR, i. 327; 
Alexander I to S. Vorontsov, 20 Jan. 1803, AKV, x. 304-6; A. 
Vorontsov to Morkov, 5 Jan. 18 03, SIRIO, lxx. 616.
2Nelson to Addington, 25 Oct. 1802, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/ON7.
3Addington to Hardwicke, 30 Oct. 1802, Add. MSS, 35706, 
fos. 75-7.
4Hobart to York, 17 Oct. 18 02, Hobart Papers,
D/MH/H/War/C48.
5Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 5 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 38236, fo.
205.
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While Hobart, Hawkesbury, and Addington had begun seriously to
consider war, they first wished to hear from Castlereagh, whom they
had sent to Walmer to ask Pitt's opinion.1 Prior to the Swiss
crisis, Pitt had considered war inevitable, but had hoped that it
would not occur for six months to two years so as to give time for
the funds to rise and for Britain to go to war with better
prospects.2 Pitt told Castlereagh that it was important to determine
if the Swiss were willing to fight, and if the Austrians and
Russians would intervene. If Austria and Russia did not act then war
was out of the question, but the British should refuse restitution
of the remaining colonies if the French were not accommodating.3
After considering the issue further, Pitt wrote to Addington on 10
November, expressing his belief that there was little hope of
support from Austria or Russia and that withholding the restitutions
would be unwise. He added:
I am by no means sure that we should not affectually 
[sic] consult our real security, preserving at the same 
time the advantage of Peace, by contenting ourselves with 
a State of very encreased fsicl and constant Preparation 
both Naval & Military and by endeavouring in the mean 
Time to lay the Foundation of a defensive System in 
Europe; rather than by involving ourselves immediately in 
a separate war for the advantage of being to carry it on 
with their Possessions still in our Hands.4
3Pitt to Castlereagh, 3 Oct. 1802, Castlereagh Papers, 
D3030/1697. Castlereagh had replaced Dartmouth at the Board of 
Control in July and was promoted to the Cabinet in October.
2Canning to Leveson Gower, 23 Sept. 1802, Granville 
Papers, PRO 30/29/8/3, fo. 248.
3Castlereagh's Memorandum on Switzerland written at 
Walmer, October 1802, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl802/OP22; Memo of 
Castlereagh at Walmer 1802, Pitt Papers, Cambridge University 
Library, 6958/2919; Pitt to Tomline, 5 Nov. 1802, Pretyman 
Papers, HA 119/T108/42.
4Pitt to Addington, 10 Nov. 18 02, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl802/OZ193. An inaccurate copy of this letter is in 
Pellew, ii. 86.
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Pitt's response did not so much influence government policy as
merely reinforce a decision that had already been made. In his
response to Pitt's letter Addington stated that
The Opinions, to which you incline, are those to which I 
had previously brought my mind after a good deal of
anxious Reflection. The Question is not one of Justice,
but of Discretion; & after what has passed, it is
somewhat difficult to give the Weight that is due to
prudential Considerations.'1
The Cabinet had met on 8 November and decided that as the Swiss had
already submitted to the French and the Austrians and Russians were
unlikely to give any military support, they could not renew the
war.2 Hawkesbury and Hobart had been ready to resume hostilities,
but St Vincent was adamantly opposed and threatened to resign.3 His
claim that the navy was not fit for battle was not entirely false
(Yorke claimed that it was in good shape4) , but he probably used
this argument to cover up his real concern which was not to let war
interrupt his commission of naval inquiry. The primary consideration
in the ultimate decision of the Cabinet, however, was that, if war
eventually broke out, it was important that British and foreign
opinion believe without a doubt that Britain was acting fairly: in
Addington's words, "We must however take Care, not only to be right,
but very right.'5 Consequently, Hawkesbury told Whitworth,
It is important however for me to inform you that it was 
found upon the whole prudent to adopt a lower and more 
pacific Tone than had been originally intended. ... It
1 Addington to Pitt, 12 Nov. 18 02, Dacres Adams Papers, 
30/58/4/86.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 9 Nov. 18 02, Add. MSS 38236, fo. 
220; Hobart to Wellesley, 14 Nov. 1802, Wellesley Papers, i. 
158-9.
3Minto to Lady Minto, 2 6 Nov. 18 02, Minto Correspondence, 
iii. 259; Thomas Grenville to Buckingham, 26 Nov. 1802, Memoirs 
of the Court and Cabinets of George III, iii. 220.
4Yorke to Hardwicke, 30 Oct. 1802, Add. MSS 35702. fo. 34.
5Addington to Hiley Addington, 4 Nov. 1802, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl802/Fl; Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 210; Hobart to 
Wellesley, 14 Nov. 1802, Wellesley Papers, i. 161.
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would be impossible even if it were prudent to engage the 
Country in a War under the present circumstances on 
account of any of the aggressions which have been 
hitherto committed by France. Our Policy will be to 
endeavour to make those aggressions the Groundwork of a 
Defensive System conjointly with Russia and Austria for 
the future.1
The ministry still hoped that, given time to rebuild their economies 
and armies, the Russians and Austrians would be prepared to form 
either a diplomatic or a military coalition against France. To this 
end, the British decided to play for time in their relations with 
the French, while working hard to win over Russian and Austrian 
support.2
Although the government had ruled out war for the time being,
it was determined to take a stronger stand against France and
prepare for war in the future.3 Addington decided that
Under the present Circumstance, the necessity of 
increased Security, & even of placing ourselves in a 
State of Preparation, is so evident, & the conviction of 
it, as I trust, so general, that I am unwilling to delay 
the Settlement of our Peace Establishment: which, it is 
proposed, shall consist of 40,000 Seamen for the present 
Year, & of a permanent Land Force, which will give 40,000 
Regular Troops to the Defence of England, & Scotland, 
25,000 to Ireland, 15,000 to India, & little short of 
3 0,000 to our other foreign possessions.4
Hobart believed that this policy was the best means of securing
peace, for "Our best security for the Continuance of Peace, until
some imperious Policy drives Bona Parte [sic] into War at all
hazards, is in the respectable Naval and Military Establishments
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 25 Nov. 1802, FO 323/4, also 
quoted in Beeley, p. 502n.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 11 Nov. 1802, MS Loan 72/55, fo. 
8; Yorke to Hardwicke, 22 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 3 5702, fo. 57.
Memorandum on the Treaty of Amiens, 1802, Castlereagh 
Papers, D3030/1728.
4Addington to Pitt, 12 Nov. 1802, Dacres Adams Papers, 
30/58/4/86.
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recently voted, & the Possession of Malta, a Possession which if 
ever relinquished can never be regained.'1
This brings up the one issue which more than any other 
dominated Anglo-French diplomacy in the six months prior to the 
renewal of war. Although Addington insisted that "Malta forms an 
entirely separate Question',2 British policy concerning the island 
was directly influenced by the deterioration in Anglo-French 
relations after the Treaty of Amiens. As late as 6 September 1802, 
the ministry fully intended to evacuate Malta in conformity with the 
treaty, as Hobart had instructed the Admiralty to protect the 
Maltese against the Barbary pirates after the British troops had 
left.3 Less than two weeks later, however, Hobart admitted privately 
to Auckland that, "for the present we have determined to take no 
step respecting Malta being inclined to hold it as long as we can' .4 
This was probably the result of the frustration of the British 
government over obtaining the fulfillment of all the provisions of 
the article on Malta in the treaty. Even though the three months as 
provided in the treaty had elapsed, Russia and Prussia had not yet 
guaranteed the settlement, the Neapolitan garrison was not ready to 
take possession, and the appointment of a new grand master of the 
Knights of St John had not been settled. The British had always 
maintained that they would be willing to evacuate the island as long 
as it remained independent of France. In the circumstances of 
September 1802, however, Malta would have been easy pickings for a 
French invasion.
As mentioned, the Swiss crisis initially persuaded Addington 
to refuse further restitutions, including Malta, but because the
Hobart to Hawkesbury, 21 Dec. 1802, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B60.
2Addington to Pitt, 12 Nov. 1802, Dacres Adams Papers, 
30/58/4/86.
3Hobart to Admiralty, 6 Sept. 1802, WO 6/49.
4Hobart to Auckland, 16 Sept. 1802, Add. MSS 34455, fo.
521.
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ministry did not want to risk war at that time it changed its policy 
and decided to fulfill its end of the Amiens bargain. Hobart thus 
issued new orders to restore the colonial conquests including the 
Cape, but not Malta,1 for although the ministry had not decided to 
keep Malta at all costs, it intended to use it as a bargaining 
counter. In the Cabinet meetings of 6 and 8 November, the ministers 
discussed how the French had made additional conquests by violating 
the spirit of the Treaty of Amiens and the letter of the Treaty of 
Luneville. As during the negotiations the French had recognized the 
principle that French conquests on the Continent had justified the 
British to retain some of their colonial conquests, the ministry 
felt that these further French conquests might justify the British 
withholding some additional colonies, particularly Malta. In 
response to Otto's assertion of ^Tout le Traite d'Amiens et rien que 
le Traite,' Hawkesbury demanded, 'L'Etat du Continent, tel qu'il 
etait alors et rien que cet Etat'.2 According to a Cabinet 
memorandum,
As the System of Encroachment pursued by France since 
that period has not only added greatly & unexpectedly to 
the Power of France, but may lead to further 
Encroachments in other quarters, His Majesty thinks He is 
warranted in not giving up those Securities which He 
still possesses, and particularly that it is His 
Determination, in conformity to the wishes of the 
Inhabitants, to appropriate the Island of Malta as part 
of His dominions.3
Nevertheless, the Cabinet was far from making a final decision.
Instead, the ministers were willing to await the results of further
consultations and negotiations in London and Paris, after the
belated arrivals of the new ambassadors Andreossy and Whitworth.
1Hobart to Grinfield, 15 Nov. 1802, same to Wellesley, 16 
Nov. 1802, same to Dundas, 16 Nov. 1802, and same to Stuart, 26 
Nov. 1802, WO 6/183.
20tto to Talleyrand, 7 Brumaire XI (29 Oct. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/600.
3Cabinet Memorandum, 6 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 38357, fos. 
203-25; Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 9 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 38236, 
fos. 216-21.
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Initially, Andreossy made a good impression on the British 
government. Bonaparte had chosen him because he believed that his 
personality would carry weight with the British. He was of an 
established Italian family, had spent twenty years in the army, and 
had reached the rank of major general in command of Strasbourg.1 
After their first dinner together, Hawkesbury believed him to be a 
man of moderate principles who might be able to facilitate the 
compromise necessary to avoid war. Andreossy's professing to 
disapprove of Bonaparte's intervention in Switzerland was also 
encouraging.2 Nevertheless, he displayed little sympathy for the 
British position in his dispatches to Talleyrand. Otto, on the other 
hand, had tried to relax the stand of his own government as well as 
that of the British while negotiating the preliminaries of peace. 
He had recommended to Talleyrand that the French give in on some 
points to facilitate an agreement, but Andreossy did not. In his 
dispatches he merely blamed the British for all the problems and 
made no suggestions on how they could be resolved.
It is difficult to assess the role played by Andreossy in the 
breakdown of Anglo-French relations, because the real negotiations 
were taking place in Paris. For Addington and Hawkesbury believed 
that the fundamental problem lay with Bonaparte. He was completely 
in charge of French policy and could not be expected to abide by the 
decisions of his diplomats, and therefore the only effective way of 
resolving Anglo-French relations was to negotiate directly with him. 
On the other hand, Hawkesbury spent little time discussing affairs 
with Andreossy, choosing instead to concentrate on writing 
instructions for Whitworth in his discussions with Talleyrand and 
Bonaparte, and the amount of both government and private 
correspondence which passed between Hawkesbury and Whitworth from
1P. Coquelle, Napoleon and England, 1803-13: A Study from 
the unprinted Documents, translated by Gordon D. Knox (London, 
1904), p. 3.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 11 Nov. 1802, MS Loan 72/55, fo. 
8; Lord Hervey's Journal, 3 Jan. 1803, Hervey Papers, 
941/56/15.
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November 1802 to April 1803 was remarkable. Even so, Hawkesbury
respected Whitworth's diplomatic experience and gave him
considerable leeway in his dealings with the French government.
The basic outline of Hawkesbury's initial instructions to
Whitworth was to assert the determination of the British government
to preserve British interests, but not to commit the government to
any particular line of policy on the questions of Malta or peace and
war. Hawkesbury wanted Whitworth to assert that the British
considered the French to have recognized the principle that French
acquisitions on the Continent justified the retention by the British
of some of their colonial conquests as compensation, but not to
indicate which conquests they would keep or in what particular
circumstances. For Addington and Hawkesbury wanted to apply
diplomatic pressure on the French, but they wanted to avoid the
possibility of war for some time yet hoping that eventually the
Russians and Austrians would become willing to form an alliance.1
At the same time, both Hawkesbury and Addington assured Otto
and Andreossy that they desired peace to continue.2 They indicated,
however, that French expansion in Europe made the position of the
British government very difficult and at some point the ministry
would have to respond to preserve its standing in Parliament and in
the country. According to Andreossy,
II est a craindre aujourd'hui que, si Mr Addington n'a 
pour lui que cette bonne cause [peace], et s ' il ne trouve 
par un appui dans quelque condescendance du Gouvernenment 
frangais, le plus grand nombre de ses amis l'aura 
abandonne d'ici en ler Janvier; et, des sous, il n'y aura 
plus du digue a opposer aux efforts de l'ancienne 
administration qui ne manquera pas de l'agiter pour 
ressaisir le timon des affaires.3
^■Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 14 Nov. 1802, FO 27/67, also in 
Oscar Browning, ed., England and Napoleon in 1803 (London,
1887), pp. 6-10.
2Otto to Talleyrand, 23 Vendemiaire and 8 Brumaire XI (15 
and Oct. 1802), Andreossy to Talleyrand, 28 Brumaire XI (19 
Nov. 1802), AE Angleterre/600.
3Andreossy to Talleyrand, 7 Frimaire XI (28 Nov. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/600.
193
Consequently, Anglo-French relations remained in limbo for several 
months. There was no progress in resolving the outstanding issues, 
but neither side was prepared to provoke hostilities. During the 
last two months of 1802, the British government received the 
expected, but nonetheless disappointing, news that the Russians were 
not prepared to form an alliance, so the ministry turned its 
attention to domestic affairs including the military and naval 
establishments and the budget.1
The publication of Colonel Sebastiani's report in Le Moniteur 
on 30 January 1803, however, stirred Anglo-French relations into 
turmoil. In the report, Sebastiani complained that the British had 
not evacuated either Malta or Egypt, as they had pledged to do by 
the Treaty of Amiens, and added that it would take only a small 
French force to dislodge the British troops from Alexandria. The 
British government had been aware that Sebastiani had been sent on 
a mission to the Mediterranean, and both Merry and Whitworth had 
received information that the mission had a much more sinister 
intent than that professed by the French government which was that 
Sebastiani was sent to negotiate trade treaties in the area.2 
Hawkesbury had even heard from Elgin in Constantinople that 
Sebastiani had enquired from the Commander-in-Chief of the British 
forces in Egypt, General Stuart, why the British troops had not 
left.3 The British were not as concerned about the mission as about 
the publication of the report, however, because Le Moniteur was the 
official organ of the French government. Addington and Hawkesbury 
took the publication of the report, which they believed to have been 
on Bonaparte's personal authority, that Egypt could easily be 
reconquered as a sign that the First Consul was considering another 
invasion of Egypt. This rendered Britain's possession of Malta even
xSee above, chapter 5, 133-45.
2Merry to Hawkesbury, 25 Sept. 1802, FO 27/64; Whitworth 
to Hawkesbury, 22 Nov. 1802, FO 27/67, also in Browning, pp.
15-6.
3Elgin to Hawkesbury, 13 Nov. 1802, FO 78/36; Andreossy to 
Talleyrand, 7 Frimaire XI (28 Nov. 1802), AE Angleterre/600.
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more important from a defensive standpoint, as it was the only base 
from which the Royal Navy could effectively protect the Turks.
One problem with retaining Malta was the attitude of the 
Russians. The British did not know at the time, but it seems clear 
that the Russians had long since decided that they preferred the 
British to keep Malta. Alexander Vorontsov had begun hinting to 
Warren, as early as 10 December 1802, that the British should retain 
the island.1 Prince Adam Czartoryski, the new foreign minister, 
suggested on 18 January that the British army's evacuating Malta was 
at that time impossible, and the next day the Chancellor told Warren 
the British might do whatever they wished with the island.2 The 
following day Czartoryski stated that the Tsar wished Britain to 
keep Malta.3 This was the news Hawkesbury and Addington had been 
waiting for: they had decided to keep Malta pending confirmation of 
the attitude of the Russians and, having been given permission, 
fixed their course. They received the news on 8 February, and the 
next day Hawkesbury told Whitworth to refuse to discuss the island 
with the French.4
Believing that the French had confirmed their designs on Egypt, 
on 1 February 18 03 Hawkesbury instructed Warren to propose another 
arrangement to the Russians. If they would not agree to a defensive 
alliance, he hoped they would consent to a more limited arrangement, 
either public or secret, to guarantee the Ottoman Empire against 
French aggression. He argued that, as the distances between London, 
St Petersburg, and Constantinople were so great, the British, 
Russians, and Turks could not cooperate in an emergency unless some 
previous. arrangements had been made, giving authority to their
xWarren to Hawkesbury, 10 Dec. 1802, FO 65/51.
2Warren to Hawkesbury, 18 and 19 Jan. 1803, FO 65/52.
3Warren to Hawkesbury, 20 Jan. 1803, FO 65/52.
4Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 9 Feb. 1803, FO 27/68, also in 
Browning, p. 65; Beeley, p. 500; Same to same, 9 Feb. 1803, FO 
323/4.
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respective ambassadors.1 Again the Russians declined, reiterating 
their old arguments and emphasizing that, as it would be impossible 
to keep such an arrangement secret, it would provoke a war. The only 
consolation they could provide was that they doubted the French 
would attack Naples or Turkey in the near future.2 Between 
themselves, however, the Russians did admit that they would have 
preferred, if secrecy could have been preserved, to continue 
communications with the British over the future of Turkey.3
At the same time, Hawkesbury made preliminary overtures to 
Starhemberg. He did not offer a treaty of alliance but suggested 
that the British and Austrians confer secretly about their relations 
with France. He was particularly interested to know how far the 
Austrians were willing to permit the French to go before declaring 
war. He wished to discover what would be 'la derniere goutte d'eau, 
que ferait repandre le verre'.4 The goal of the British government 
seemed to be to determine at what point it could declare war with 
the expectation that it would be joined by the Austrians. 
Unfortunately, the Austrians were equally unsure about the answer 
themselves.
In many ways Addington and Hawkesbury found themselves in the 
same position on the question of peace and war as in the summer of 
1801, only in reverse. In the first case, the question had been 
whether the costs of war outweighed the sacrifices necessary to 
negotiate peace, and in the second it was whether the sacrifices 
necessary to maintain peace outweighed the likely costs of renewing 
the war. Hawkesbury summarized the position for his father:
there is no precedent to govern ones conduct; but the
sentiment seems to be that it is hardly possible to
3Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 Feb. 1803, FO 65/52.
2A. Vorontsov to Warren, 21 Mar. 18 03, and S. Vorontsov to 
Alexander I, 25 Mar. 1803, VPR, i. 393, 399; Warren to 
Hawkesbury, 25 Mar. 1803, FO 65/52.
3A. Vorontsov to Morkov, 5 Jan. 18 03, SIRIO, lxx. 616.
4Starhemberg to Colloredo, 8 Feb. 1803, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
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continue the relations of peace & amity with a power 
whose conduct & whose language are so professedly hostile 
and on occasion of this nature we might be exposed to the 
clamour of the public and of the Army. On the other hand 
it cannot be denied that the pro-crastination of 
hostilities even if they should ultimately be unavoidable 
for a few months would be very desirable.1
Addington and Hawkesbury believed that the great uncertainty 
in Parliament and the country over the question of peace and war, 
and even greater uncertainty how France and the Continental powers 
would react, meant th^t a final decision should be postponed until 
everyone's position became clearer.2 Once again the complexity of 
the problem persuaded the ministry to compromise. On the question 
of the restitutions required by the Treaty of Amiens, the ministry 
chose to fulfill all of them except for Malta. However, although 
they had no wish to maintain an army in Egypt, the army could not 
leave until a settlement had been arranged between the Mameluke Beys 
and the Turkish government.3 For the Mamelukes were involved in a 
constant struggle trying to resist Turkish control, and if war 
erupted after the British left, it might facilitate French 
intervention. While Hobart did press the British commander to 
evacuate as soon as possible,4 Stuart had great difficulty arranging 
a peaceful settlement. On the contrary, the Turks granted the 
Mamelukes a semi-autonomous province only after failing to subdue 
them by military force in November 1802.5 Hence, the British army 
was not able to embark until 11 March 1803.
hawkesbury to Liverpool, 6 Feb. 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fos. 
17-18.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 14 Jan. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
Memorandum on Egypt enclosed in Hawkesbury to Elgin, 28 
July 1801, Elgin Papers, 60/17/4.
4Hobart to Stuart, n.d. May 1802, Elgin Papers, 60/6/12.
5Elgin to Hawkesbury, 24 Dec. 1802, FO 78/3 6; Same to 
same, 15 Jan. 1803, FO 78/38.
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Addington and Hawkesbury had decided to retain Malta until the 
French government had provided a satisfactory explanation of 
Sebastiani's report, but Hawkesbury admitted that no explanation 
that was likely to be given would be considered wholly 
satisfactory.1 The French government, however, firmly demanded that 
the British evacuate Malta, and Otto told Hawkesbury that there 
would be war if Britain refused.2 On 2 0 February 18 03, Bonaparte 
demanded to see Whitworth at the Tuileries. In a long and stern 
lecture he insisted that he would never acquiesce in Britain's 
retaining Malta, and claimed, in Whitworth's words, that 'of the two 
he had rather see us in possession of the Faubourg St Antoine than 
Malta'. Bonaparte asserted that the question of peace or war 
depended on Malta, and that if war recommenced he would invade 
England.3
Addington and Hawkesbury were stunned by this threat and 
Bonaparte's claim to have 480,000 troops ready for war, but they 
were somewhat confused over how to respond. While emphasizing 
Bonaparte's fiery temper and inclination to fight, Whitworth's 
dispatches and private letters also suggested that he was very 
unpopular in France and that the government finances were in 
extremely poor shape. Addington and Hawkesbury could not predict 
whether he would really risk war or was merely bluffing. For they 
considered that even if he lacked the proper military and financial 
resources, he was so unpredictable and unstable that he might still 
provoke a war. Liverpool speculated rather hopefully, 'It is 
possible that Bonaparte may go mad, and may die in his Delirium.'4
Addington and Hawkesbury therefore decided that the only 
sensible policy was to prepare for war, while continuing to
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 9 Feb. 1803, Whitworth Papers, 
FO 323/4.
2Otto to Hawkesbury, 24 Feb. 1802, MS Loan 72/43, fo. 66.
3Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 21 Feb. 1803, FO 27/67, also in 
Browning, pp. 78-85.
4Liverpool to Hervey, n. d., Hervey Papers, 941/56/8.
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negotiate for a peaceful resolution. On 8 March the King issued a 
proclamation in Parliament to augment the British armed forces in 
response to the naval and military build up on the French and Dutch 
coasts.1 The government then moved to embody the militia and augment 
the navy by 10,000 men. This provoked Whitworth and Robert Liston, 
the ambassador at the Hague, to complain that the British government 
had unnecessarily heightened Anglo-French tension because the French 
military and naval preparations were intended for the West Indies, 
particularly St Domingue, where the French government was still 
trying to suppress the negro rebellion.2 The ministry was already 
aware of this, but believed, quite rightly, that if war resumed 
between Britain and France Bonaparte would divert those military 
resources away from the West Indies and towards Britain.3 The 
government could not afford to leave the country exposed to such a 
threat, as the resumption of war seemed likely. Hawkesbury tried to 
soften the blow this initiative would give to Anglo-French 
relations, by informing Andreossy of it before the message was given 
in Parliament.4 He stressed both to the French ambassador and 
Whitworth that these measures were entirely defensive in nature and 
that they would not be directed towards France.
Bonaparte did not accept these assurances, and on 13 March, he 
accosted Whitworth at the Tuileries, and flying into a rage in front 
of a large audience, began a long and loud diatribe against 
Whitworth and the British government. He went around all the foreign 
ministers yelling that the British wanted war and he would give it
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1162-3.
2Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 17 Mar. 1803, MS Loan 72/18, fo. 
89; Liston to Hawkesbury, 15 Mar. 1803, FO 37/61.
3Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 7 Mar. 1803, Whitworth Papers,
FO 323/4; Yorke to Hardwicke, 8 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 
135-6.
4Andreossy to Talleyrand, 17 Ventose XI (7 Mar. 1803), AE 
Angleterre/600.
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to them.1 Talleyrand later claimed that Bonaparte had merely lost 
his temper,2 but regardless Anglo-French tension and mutual distrust 
had increased considerably. Each side had become more firmly 
committed to its position, and the opportunities for a peaceful 
resolution had decreased even further.
The foreign policy of the ministry had a direct effect on its 
standing in Parliament. As mentioned, by negotiating peace the 
ministry had won over the support of the Foxite Whigs but had lost 
the support of the Grenvillites and others. Despite Grenville's 
denials, his group did form a factious opposition, which opposed 
almost every move the government made, and it seemed that Addington 
had lost their support no matter which policy he pursued. On the 
other hand, he could not count on the support of his new found 
allies among the old opposition. For though Fox was satisfied with 
the peace, he opposed the strong peace establishment and any display 
of firmness towards the French government. In late 1802 and early 
1803, the government's difficult crisis in Anglo-French relations 
was thus complicated further by a curious parliamentary position. 
In trying to determine the best policy in relation to France, the 
ministry was hampered by the realization that anything short of 
outright war would be opposed by the Grenvillites, while any 
defensive precautions would be opposed by the Foxites.
The government still maintained a majority strong enough to 
overcome a united opposition of the Grenvillites and Foxites, which 
in any case appeared unlikely at the time. Nevertheless, it felt 
increasingly vulnerable, especially in parliamentary debate, as 
Anglo-French relations worsened. Addington was also aware that there 
seemed to be general agreement throughout the country that, if war 
were renewed Pitt was the only man capable of managing it 
successfully. Considering his previous record it is strange that
1Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 14 Mar. 1803, FO 27/67, also in
Browning, pp. 115-7.
2Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 17 Mar. 1803, FO 27/67.
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anyone would have come to this conclusion (unless they were misled 
by government propaganda), but many including some members of the 
Cabinet had. By January 1803, Addington had therefore decided that 
it would be for the best if he handed the reins of power back to 
Pitt.
For the ministry had been able to carry on truly confidently 
only so long as it kept Pitt's active support. After the debates of 
the spring of 1802 on the Treaty of Amiens, Pitt left London, and 
physical distance increased the political distance between him and 
Addington. Moreover, in September, Pitt became so ill that he almost 
died, and since Farquhar proscribed complete rest, Pitt was kept 
even longer than he had intended, first at Walmer and, when he was 
well enough to take the waters, at Bath. Addington tried to maintain 
channels of communication with Pitt through Hiley and Castlereagh, 
but over such a distance he could not sustain the kind of intimacy 
of the previous year. Moreover, Canning, Rose, and Tomline tried to 
keep Pitt isolated from Addington as much as possible, hoping to 
create a political rift, and they were largely successful. By 
November 1802, Pitt was discussing the possibility of returning to 
office with Grenville who was being pressed by his family to urge 
that Addington and Hawkesbury be dismissed.1 At the same time as he 
was discussing displacing the ministry, however, he claimed to be 
fully in agreement with its policies.2 Thus it is clear that Pitt 
was as confused as Addington about the best course of action.
Quite ironically, however, Pitt's absence from Westminster in 
the autumn of 18 02 in a strange way appeared to strengthen the 
position of the government, as the ministers were able to 
demonstrate that they could stand on their own. Hawkesbury claimed 
that the ^Government is stronger in Publick Opinion at the present 
moment that it has been at any Time since its formation and that in
1Grenville to Pitt, 8 Nov. 1802, Dropmore Papers, vii. 
123-4; Grenville to Buckingham, 2 Nov. 1802, Stowe Papers.
2Pitt to Tomline, 5 Nov. 1802, Pretyman Papers, HA 
119/T108/42; Pitt to Canning, 31 Oct. 1802, Canning Papers, 30.
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one point of view We have gained Strength even from the absence of 
Pitt'.1 Nevertheless, Addington could see that the position of the 
government was likely to get worse as diplomatic relations with 
France deteriorated, because the Foxites would oppose the government 
taking a line that was too firm while others would oppose a line 
that was too conciliatory. He was also aware that enough pressure 
from Grenville and Canning might persuade Pitt to join the 
opposition, unless the ministry fought hard to tie him to the 
government and the best means of ensuring that was to have him join 
the ministry.
In January 1803, Pitt met Addington to discuss politics at 
Downing Street and then again at Addington's home in Richmond Park, 
where Addington first broached the subject of Pitt's returning to 
office.2 Nothing came of these discussions, possibly because 
Addington's overtures were either too vague or too speculative. 
Moreover, Pitt's physical health was still very poor and he had not 
yet completely made up his mind to return to office. Within two 
months, however, Anglo-French relations had worsened as a result of 
Sebastiani's report and the King's proclamation, and the ministry 
decided that it was still very necessary to gain further support to 
deal with the crisis. Therefore, Addington employed Dundas, to whom 
he persuaded the King to grant a peerage as Viscount Melville in 
December 1802, to negotiate Pitt's accession to the ministry.
Armed with specific proposals, Melville set out for Walmer in 
the middle of March. Addington proposed that he and Pitt should be 
on equal footing in the ministry as secretaries of state with a 
mutually acceptable third party, Chatham, to act nominally as First 
Lord of the Treasury. Pitt refused outright, however, any 
arrangement on that basis. Melville explained in his own peculiar 
syntax,
1Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 9 Jan. 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
16.
2Addington told Abbot that Pitt said at that time that he 
was less disinclined to return to power, Colchester Diary. i. 
413 .
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The moment of a negotiation still in suspense he 
considers in every view unfit for his taking part; but, 
in any event, nothing could induce him to come forward 
except an urgent sense of public duty, and a distinct 
knowledge that his services (such as they may be) are 
wished and thought essential both in the highest quarter 
[the King] , and by all those with whom (in consequence of 
any arrangement that might be formed on that ground) he 
might have to act confidentially. He is firmly of opinion 
that he could not, on this supposition, have any chance 
of answering his own ideas of being useful to the country 
in one of the great points on which he lays a principal 
stress, but by returning to the management of its 
finances. Besides this consideration, he stated, not less 
pointedly and decidedly, his sentiments with regard to 
the absolute necessity there is, in the conduct of the 
affairs of this country, that there should be an avowed 
and real minister possessing the chief weight in council 
and the principal place in the confidence of the King. In 
that respect there can be no rivality [sic] or division 
of power. That power must rest in the person generally 
called the First Minister; and that minister ought, he 
thinks, to be the person at the head of the finances.1
Addington was dismayed at Pitt's cold response, but he did not
wish to let his own personal feelings stand in the way of the great
benefit to the ministry and the country that he believed would have
been provided by Pitt returning to office.2 Therefore, on 3 April he
sent another overture to Pitt through Charles Long, whom Pitt had
authorized to send Addington a counter-proposal. This time he tried
to address all of Pitt's objections as stipulated in Melville's
letter and his discussions with Long. First, Pitt would not return
to office until the negotiations with France had terminated. Second,
he would be head of the government and in charge of finance. Third,
he would have ultimate control over the distribution of offices.
Addington planned to bring in at first Pitt and Melville, whom he
had already arranged to take the Admiralty.3 But while Addington was
Melville to Addington, 22 Mar. 1803, Pellew, ii. 115-6.
2Colchester Diary, i. 414.
3Pelham to Addington, 14 Apr. 1803, Add. MSS 33111, fos. 
162-3; Grenville to Buckingham, 15 Feb. 1803, Stowe Papers; 
Andreossy to Talleyrand, 26 Ventose XI (16 Mar. 1803), AE 
Angleterre/600.
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perfectly willing to dismiss Pelham and Bragge in order to 
accommodate these changes, he hoped that some office could be found 
so as to keep Hobart in the Cabinet. He also proposed that the 
Grenvillites be brought in during a second series of ministerial 
changes sometime in the future, as the immediate admission of them 
would be a public slight to his original colleagues.1
Addington arranged to meet Pitt at Long's home in Bromley Hill 
on 10 April to work out the details of Pitt's returning to office. 
From their subsequent correspondence it is easy to deduce the nature 
of the these negotiations. Addington was shocked to discover that 
Pitt was not prepared to negotiate. For Pitt refused to take office 
unless the ministry resigned en masse and the King asked him to form 
a government granting him a clean slate. Pitt had discussed the 
formation of a new Cabinet with Grenville prior to speaking with 
Addington, and Grenville had insisted that the existing ministry be 
dismissed and that Addington and Hawkesbury not be given positions 
of efficient business.2 Pitt intended that Addington should be Home 
Secretary and a peer, Hawkesbury should be demoted, and Hobart, 
Pelham, Liverpool, Bragge and the rest of the Addingtonians be 
dismissed.3 He also demanded that the new Cabinet include Melville, 
Spencer, Grenville and Windham.4 Realizing that Addington would 
never agree to his proposals, Pitt hoped that the former would 
resign and allow him to design the new ministry as he chose.
Addington was very hurt by this response, but he submitted 
Pitt's proposal to the Cabinet and let the other ministers decide. 
But while several of them, including Eldon, Hawkesbury, and 
Castlereagh, wanted Pitt to join the ministry as much or more than 
Addington did, they were not prepared to hand over their positions
1Long to Pitt, 3 April 1803, Dacres Adams Papers, 
30/58/4/93i.
2Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George III, iii. 
282-90.
3Rose Diaries, ii. 34-7.
4Colchester Diary, i. 416.
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to the Grenvillites, whom they expected Pitt to bring into office. 
Therefore, the Cabinet rejected his proposal.1
Pitt's behaviour, while somewhat understandable, was rather 
unfair. The incessant pleading of Canning, Grenville, and others 
that he must return to office as he was the only man who could save 
the country certainly swelled his ego, while Addington's overtures 
confirmed his exaggerated view of his own importance. Therefore, 
believing that his return to power was inevitable, he thought that 
he did not have to make any compromises. He was also very concerned 
that it should not appear publicly that he was scheming for office. 
In order to preserve the illusion that honour was so important to 
him that it was the sole reason that he resigned in the first place, 
he had to appear to be returning to power solely because it was the 
overwhelming desire of the King and the country. He treated 
Addington as if their relative positions had not changed since 1789, 
but those positions had indeed changed. Pitt had been out of office 
for over two years and his personal power and influence had declined 
considerably. Addington, on the other hand, no matter how strange 
the circumstances, had been Prime Minister for two years and 
therefore deserved to be treated with more respect and deference 
than when he was merely an MP. In the same way, the rest of the 
ministry had gained two years of experience in high office and could 
not merely be pushed around as if they were still Pitt's lackeys. 
No matter how great Pitt's reputation had become, it did not justify 
his treating so lightly men who were in office when he was not. He 
could not expect them to play his puppets and go in and out of 
office when he pulled the strings.
Even some of Pitt's closest supporters believed that he had 
acted unreasonably. For example, Lord Redesdale protested that the 
ministers had only accepted office on his insistence, and that if 
he had remained in office in the first place, there would have been 
no problem. He asserted,
1Pellew, ii. 119-30.
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But, my dear Sir, you have yourself taken steps which 
makes it almost impossible to bring back things, 
immediately, to that state. Permit me to intreat [sic] 
you to consider whether it is not your duty, in some 
degree to submit to a necessity which you have yourself 
in a considerable degree created. ... You have brought 
several persons who were your best friends, into a 
situation, which now brings them to the verge of 
hostility with you; & that you have a duty which you owe 
them. ... You cannot, in honour, permit [them] to suffer 
for acting according to your declared wishes, & sacrifice 
them to those who apparently acted contrary to your 
declared wishes. ... They therefore rendered you a great 
personal service, & you owe them gratitude.1
Melville was also very disturbed by Pitt's response, because he
believed that Addington's ministry had been more loyal to Pitt than
the Grenvillites had been, and that bringing them into a new
ministry would be a mistake. He claimed:
If you professing to adopt a part of the present 
Government as Colleagues in your's [sic], should 
accompany that declaration with an avowed intention of 
commencing your Government with a Measure distinctly 
degrading and hostile to every member of the present 
Government, it would be harsh and unjust, and I mistake 
greatly the general Feeling of the World, if the Public 
would hold you up in refusing at so critical a moment, 
taking the Government upon you, upon such a ground.2
Pitt's conduct was also disapproved of by Chatham, Castlereagh,
Hawkesbury, and Steele.3 Later Cornwallis fairly summarized the
whole episode:
I do not think in the negotiation in March last, that 
Addington, supported as he was by a large and very 
respectable majority in Both Houses of Parliament, and by 
no means unpopular with the nation at large, could have 
been justified in laying the King, his colleagues in 
office, and all his friends in Parliament, at the feet of 
Mr Pitt, without venturing to enquire to what degree of 
humiliation they were to be expected to submit, by a
1Redesdale to Pitt, 31 Oct. 18 03, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/170/2, fos. 211-4.
2Melville to Pitt, 14 April 1803, Add. MSS 40102, fo. 106.
3Colchester Diary. i. 416.
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public declaration of his own total inability to go on
with the Government.1
Pitt was asking more than could have been reasonably expected of 
Addington. The resignation of the ministry at that time would have 
been seen as an admission of failure, and it was clear, however, 
that the ministry had not failed. Each of Addington's major policy 
decisions had been ratified by a majority in Parliament and received 
favourably by popular opinion. Almost everyone other than the 
Grenvillites or Pitt's toadies seemed to believe that the 
performance of the government was satisfactory.
Pitt assumed, quite arrogantly, that the interests of the 
country would be better served if he were running the government. 
This implies that he would have adopted different policies, but his 
correspondence appears to indicate that he was in complete agreement 
with most of Addington's policies. About the only real difference 
in their thinking was demonstrated on 2 March, when Pitt suggested 
that the government prepare for immediate war and strike a blow at 
a vulnerable point.2 Pitt of course did not suggest what this 
vulnerable point might be. Nor did he admit that after nearly ten 
years of fighting the French himself, he had failed to find such a 
point. Moreover, Pitt did not seem to know what he would do if he 
came into office. His absence from Parliament in the early months 
of 1803 was perhaps not so much the result of ill-health as of the 
realization that the political issues involved were so complex that 
he could not with confidence commit himself to a particular line of 
policy.3 If he returned to Westminster he would be asked to declare 
whether he supported the continuance of peace or the renewal of war, 
and he might publicly commit himself to the wrong side. So he
^•Cornwallis to Ross, 8 Dec. 1803, Cornwallis 
Correspondence, iii. 506-7.
2Pitt to Chatham, 2 Mar. 1803, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/101, fo. 177.
3Pitt to Tomline, 18 Mar. 18 03, Pretyman Papers, HA 
119/T108/42.
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preferred to stay away until war was declared at which point the 
difficult decision was no longer necessary.
Addington and Hawkesbury could not afford the luxury of hiding 
away until the issue was resolved. Instead, they had to make a 
decision and take the responsibility for it. It is clear that they 
believed that the eventual renewal of war was inevitable, but wished 
for further time to prepare the military and financial resources of 
the country. Nevertheless, Bonaparte's obvious intention to attack 
Egypt, combined with the perception that the government had made too 
many concessions to him already, convinced Addington and Hawkesbury 
that Britain would have to keep Malta, at least for the time being. 
During the negotiations for peace in 1801, Hawkesbury had believed 
that the benefits of peace outweighed the sacrifice of conquered 
colonies, but by 1803, he had realized that the strategic position 
of the country and the political position of the ministry would 
suffer gravely if it did not resist the aggressive foreign policy 
of the French. Standing firm on Malta was at that point necessary 
to preserve British interests in the eastern Mediterranean and 
likely to prove popular in Parliament.
Having realized that the French would not accept the British 
retaining Malta in violation of the Treaty of Amiens, even though 
several of the stipulations had not been met, Hawkesbury became 
willing to strike a deal with Bonaparte. In a private letter to 
Whitworth of 9 February, he suggested bribing the First Consul with 
an offer of £10-20,000.1 Whitworth looked into the matter further 
and received assurances that members of Bonaparte's family would 
indeed be willing to exert their influence in Britain's favour for 
a satisfactory sum.2 Hawkesbury then raised his offer to £100,000
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 9 Feb. 1803, Whitworth Papers, 
FO 323/4.
2Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 14 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 38238, 
fos. 102-3. This episode is covered in detail in Carl Ludwig 
Lokke, ^Secret Negotiations to Maintain the Peace of Amiens', 
American Historical Review, xlix (1943-4), 55-64.
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and added that the British would recognize the King of Etruria and 
the French acquisition of Elba.1 Whitworth had sounded out Joseph 
Bonaparte, who seemed well disposed, but felt that £100,000 was 
insufficient and that the deal would require at least £1-2 million.2
Nevertheless, these secret negotiations proved unsuccessful. 
For on the one hand, Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand while appearing 
agreeable to the idea never made any firm commitments, and on the 
other, Hawkesbury and Addington changed their minds. The sums of 
money demanded were more than the government could afford, and the 
repercussions for the government, if the details of the deal were 
discovered by the British public, would have been devastating.3
Hawkesbury was still willing, however, to pursue a more open 
line of negotiation. On 4 March, he suggested that the British 
should be allowed to occupy Malta for a period of no less than six 
years, after which they would hand the island over to the Maltese, 
and one month later, he offered to recognize the new regimes in 
Italy in return for keeping Malta.4 The French, however, firmly 
refused to consider these proposals. After Joseph Bonaparte 
suggested unofficially that the French might be willing to allow the 
British to obtain another naval station in the vicinity of Malta, 
Hawkesbury drew up a final proposal which he submitted both directly 
to Andreossy and through Whitworth to Talleyrand. The British were 
to obtain the island of Lampedusa from the King of Naples, British 
troops would remain in Malta until Lampedusa had been fortified and 
prepared as a naval station, and the British would recognize the 
King of Etruria and the Italian and Ligurian Republics. In return 
the French would provide compensation for the King of Sardinia and
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 17 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 38238, 
fos. 104-5.
2Whitworth to Hawkesbury, 24 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 38238, 
fos. 111-2.
3Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 31 Mar. and 7 April 1803, 
Whitworth Papers, FO 323/4.
4Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 4 Apr. 18 03, Whitworth Papers, 
FO 323/4.
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evacuate all French forces from Holland and Switzerland.1 Hawkesbury
was willing to trade Malta for Lampedusa because
It is important . . . that if the effort with respect to 
Malta should be found desperate, the course we have 
proposed should be taken for the purpose of satisfying 
the public here that Malta is not the cause of the war, 
and that if the object for which we require to keep Malta 
can be obtained by any other means we shall be satisfied.2
During the process of these negotiations, the attitude of the
British ministry changed completely. At first, Addington and
Hawkesbury were looking to delay a settlement, as in February
Hawkesbury had told Whitworth that the government wanted more time.
By April, however, the ministry had decided that it could no longer
bear the uncertainty of the protracted negotiations. For commercial
investors had grown weary from this uncertainty, and the favourable
spirit of the country would soon evaporate.3 Even Andreossy noted
that the funds were falling and commercial speculation had been
virtually suspended owing to the uncertainty.4 The main reason that
the ministry had supported a delay in the first place was to
determine whether the Russians would agree to an alliance or some
form of close diplomatic cooperation, but as it had become clear
that the Russians would not agree, the British had to be prepared
to take their own line. On 31 March, Hawkesbury asserted that there
must be "some treaty or Convention by which the differences of the
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 7 May 1803, FO 27/68, also in 
Browning, pp. 224-6; Andreossy to Talleyrand, 17 Floreal XI (7 
May 1803), AE Angleterre/60 0.
2Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 4 Apr. 1803, Whitworth Papers,
FO 323/4.
3Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 4 Apr. 1803, Whitworth Papers,
FO 323/4.
4Andreossy to Talleyrand, 25 Ventose XI (16 Mar. 1803), AE 
Angleterre/600.
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Two countries will be settled or War1 ,1 and two weeks later he 
insisted that the decision be made immediately.2
This determination to bring the negotiations to an end implied 
a willingness to renew the war if necessary, and this point deserves 
examination. That the ministry worked so hard to negotiate peace and 
then within two years was willing to renew the war certainly 
requires explanation. For either the policies of the ministry were 
inconsistent or some considerable changes had occurred. Grenville 
believed mistakenly that the ministry had learned from its errors 
and finally come around to his point of view. On the contrary, there 
was some underlying consistency in its policies. In both 1801 and 
1803 the ministers recognized that there were strong arguments for 
peace and war and came to a final decision only with great 
difficulty. In 1801 there were five important considerations: 
Britain was diplomatically isolated; government finances were in 
poor shape; levels of social unrest were alarming; popular opinion 
in general favoured peace; and peace with France could not be 
evaluated until it had been tried.
By May 1803, all five of these conditions had changed. 
Britain's relations with Russia were much stronger. In March 1801 
Britain had been diplomatically isolated and virtually at war with 
Russia. Even after the Anglo-Russian convention of June 1801, 
diplomatic relations between the two were still cool. But during the 
peace, the careful attention of the British government and the 
aggressive policies of the French rendered the Russians better 
disposed to the British than at any time since the formation of the 
Second Coalition. Even though the Russians refused British overtures 
of alliance for the time being, Hawkesbury could reasonably expect 
that the two governments would cooperate against the French in the 
future.
1Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 31 Mar. 18 03, Whitworth Papers, 
FO 323/4.
2Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 13 Apr. 1803, Whitworth Papers,
FO 323/4.
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Equally important, the domestic situation was much improved. 
The peace and a good harvest had caused a sharp decline in the price 
of bread, which put an end to food riots. Some isolated disturbances 
continued, but potentially revolutionary social unrest appeared to 
have ceased. Even Ireland seemed much more settled. According to 
Liverpool the Despard affair was the only example of disaffection.1
The revival of trade and Addington's financial policies had 
also restored the health of the government finances to a remarkable 
degree in a short a time. The period of peace had provided a 
necessary breathing space for the recovery of the British economy, 
as trade with Russia, Germany, and Italy had resumed to a sufficient 
extent to save many commercial interests in Britain. As a result 
customs and excise duties were more productive, enabling Addington 
to repair the state of the government finances, and permitting the 
government to bear the expense of a war establishment.2 Hawkesbury 
told Lord Holland that it was in fact the remarkable recovery of the 
finances that allowed the government to consider the renewal of war 
as an option.3
Finally, the period of peace had proved to both the ministry 
and the country as a whole that Bonaparte could not be trusted to 
contain his aggressive ambitions and that the British government 
could not merely remain idle while he increased the extent of French 
territory and power. The exuberant joy at the announcement of peace 
in October 1801 had indeed soon subsided. For supporters of the 
peace were disillusioned, first by the long delay in the negotiation 
of the definitive treaty and then by the discovery of Bonaparte's 
further Continental and colonial acquisitions. In October 1802, Otto 
claimed that popular opinion was incensed by each new development
Liverpool to Whitworth, 6 Dec. 1802, Whitworth Papers, FO 
323/4.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 30 Oct. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos.
34-5; Liverpool to Whitworth, 6 Dec. 1802, Whitworth Papers, FO 
323/4.
3Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i. 191.
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on the Continent.1 By 1803, Pitt and many others who had supported 
peace in 1801 had turned against Bonaparte and were willing to 
support a renewal of the war. Consequently, in March 1803 
Starhemberg speculated that the renewal of war would be extremely 
popular.2
Moreover, it was clear that Bonaparte was bent on war 
eventually.3 In early 1803 the French navy was not prepared to 
challenge the British, but the First Consul expected that war would 
be renewed sometime after September 1804.4 Addington and Hawkesbury 
did not know Bonaparte's timetable, but they did realize that if 
they did not make the first move, he would strike when he was ready, 
and as Anglo-French negotiations deteriorated it seemed likely that 
the French would begin to prepare for a rupture. If the British were 
to fight a naval war with any success, they had to strike before the 
French were prepared. At that time, in fact, Bonaparte was not well 
prepared, as the navy needed at least ten years before it could 
challenge the British, and he had just sent off colonial expeditions 
to the West and East Indies which would be easy pickings for the 
Royal Navy. Nevertheless, Bonaparte was unwilling to agree to a 
compromise that would have avoided war, and he continued to insist 
that the British fulfill the Treaty of Amiens.5
Sensing the haste of the British government, the French tried 
to delay Whitworth's departure as long as possible, without actually 
giving in to the British demands. On 2 9 April, in order to keep
1Otto to Talleyrand, 23 Vendemiaire XI, (15 Oct. 1802), AE 
Angleterre/600.
2Starhemberg, to Colloredo, 1 Mar. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
3Coquelle, "Les Reponsabilites de la Rupture de la Paix 
d'Amiens', pp. 294-7.
4Sorel, vi. 211; John Holland Rose, The Life of Napoleon
(2 vols, London, 1916), i. 375; Coquelle, Napoleon and England, 
p. 36; C. Northcote Parkinson, The War in the Eastern Seas. 
1793-1815 (London, 1954), p. 195.
sDeutch, pp. 101-17.
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Whitworth in Paris, the French promised him a favourable response, 
but after a further delay, the proposal turned out merely to consist 
of giving Malta to Russia. After Whitworth had left Paris, the 
French sent him a proposal that the British should keep Malta for 
ten years during which the French would maintain forces in Otranto 
and Taranto, and a similar proposal was made directly to Hawkesbury 
through Andreossy.
Addington and Hawkesbury had already decided to declare war 
because the French were clearly trying to protract the negotiations 
further and the ministry felt that it could no longer bear the 
uncertainty. On 18 May in the Commons, Addington declared war. But 
while the uncertainty was finally over, a whole new series of 
problems began.
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Chapter Seven
The Diplomacy of War, May 1803 to April 1804
"The Court of Vienna appears to be very feeble, that of Petersburgh 
very flat & that of Berlin very false.'
Lord Hawkesbury1
The declaration of the renewal of war seemed very popular. 
Parliament overwhelmingly supported the decision, as speaker after 
speaker rose to criticize the French and entreat the government to 
pursue a vigorous war effort. Even some of the Foxite Whigs 
reluctantly admitted that Bonaparte's policies justified a renewal 
of the war. In fact, Fox was almost the only one to criticize the 
government for making a hasty and unjustifiable decision. Popular 
opinion, which less than two years before had welcomed the peace with 
great joy and celebration, seemed almost to welcome the war. For the 
war began with a display of patriotic fervour, according to Emsley 
who has substantiated this claim by quoting opinions from a cross- 
section of British society.2 Moreover, the voices which had demanded 
peace in 1801 did not press the government to maintain it in 1803. 
For example, commercial interests, which required the breathing space 
in 1801, found the prospect of war preferable to the uncertainty of 
the early months of 1803. Thus Addington had timed his decision well. 
He had sustained the peace long enough to demonstrate that he did not 
enter the war lightly and to allow the continued aggressions and 
arrogant attitude of Bonaparte to alienate both British and foreign 
opinion.
While winning over domestic opinion was essential to the 
survival of the ministry, securing favourable foreign opinion was
1Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 16 July 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
30 .
2Emsley, pp. 112-5.
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necessary for a successful prosecution of the war. For Addington had 
no grand illusions about defeating the French singlehandedly, and he 
knew that only a strong Continental alliance could overcome the 
French army and impose a durable peace. One of the major reasons that 
he had chosen to negotiate peace in 1801 was because the prospects 
of a coalition were remote and the British could not fight 
effectively on their own. Having declared war, Addington was faced 
with a similar problem. Nevertheless, the prospects for a Continental 
coalition were much better in May 1803 than they had been two years 
before. As Hawkesbury had confided to Minto in May 1801, the policy 
of the British government had been to cultivate close relations with 
the powers on the Continent,1 and this policy had been largely 
successful. Britain's relations with Russia, in particular, had 
improved dramatically, even though it was still reluctant to enter 
a formal alliance. Thus the British no longer had to worry that the 
Russians would be working against them, as had been the case with the 
League of Armed Neutrality, and it seemed only a matter of time 
before the Russians had developed sufficient resources to enable them 
to enter the war against France. The problem was, however, that the 
British could not afford to wait. For they could not survive for long 
on their own against the French without suffering severe strains on 
their economic and military resources. Consequently, Addington and 
Hawkesbury set out immediately to win the support or at least the 
neutrality of the other powers of Europe.
Origins of the Third Coalition
Addington's declaration of war had caught Bonaparte off guard, 
for the First Consul had not expected that war would resume for at 
least another year and a half and consequently was not prepared. Thus 
Bonaparte found the rupture of the peace inopportune,2 and his first 
response to the declaration was to pursue a negotiated settlement.
xSee above, chapter 3, pp. 62-77.
2Deutch, p. 147.
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While Britain and France had been moving closer to war in March 1803, 
Bonaparte had asked the Russians to mediate in the dispute. He did 
not want the Russians to offer a compromise but to chastise the 
British and insist that they evacuate Malta.1 The British, who had 
hoped for the cooperation of the Russians in the event of a renewal 
of hostilities,2 also looked favourably on Russian mediation as they 
believed mistakenly that the Russians would officially condone their 
possession of Malta, thus justifying the British position in the eyes 
of the world. The Russians, however, did not want to commit 
themselves in this dispute for fear of antagonizing either side, as 
they were not yet prepared militarily or financially to enter another 
war. On the other hand, they had realized that if they did not 
mediate, war would ensue. Thus to preserve peace for themselves in 
the long run, they had to prevent war between France and Britain.3
As Anglo-French relations approached a crisis, the Tsar proposed 
to mediate and on 22 April, sent an offer direct to London through 
Simon Vorontsov. Unfortunately, the usual delay in correspondence 
between St Petersburg and London prevented the note from arriving 
until 14 May,4 by which date Whitworth had already left Paris and war 
had effectively resumed. The problem caused by this bad timing was 
exacerbated by a serious misunderstanding on Simon Vorontsov's part. 
For on 24 May, he read a report in the newspapers that in the Commons 
Addington had declared a willingness to welcome the intervention of 
the Tsar or anyone else. Vorontsov accused Addington of lying, as the 
British had rejected the Tsar's offer when it arrived, and he was 
seriously worried that the Russian government would accuse him of
xBonaparte to Alexander I, 20 Ventose XI (11 Mar. 1803), 
SIRIO, lxxvii. 55; Jacques Petrel, 'La Russie et la Rupture de 
la Paix d'Amiens', Annales de l'Ecole Libre de Science 
Politicrues 12e annee. (1887), p. 72.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 1 Apr. 1803, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
3S. Vorontsov to A. Vorontsov, 18 May 1803, AKV, x. 205-6.
4Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsov, 26 May 1803, FO 65/52.
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failing in his duty.1 Hawkesbury tried to repair the damage quickly.
He insisted that what Addington had said was not inconsistent with
his own reply to the Russian offer, which in any case was only a
vague proposal to be a channel of communication between Britain and
France.2 With the declaration of war the situation had changed
completely, and it would be impossible for Britain "to suffer the
Negotiation to be further continued, except on the Basis of some
distinct proposition by which the present Differences might be
immediately and satisfactorily adjusted'.3 Realizing that Vorontsov
was not sufficiently convinced, Hawkesbury wrote again, explaining
that the British were indeed anxious for the intervention of Russia,
provided that it did not require them to suspend their military
activities until the French were brought into line. He stated:
Your Excellency must be aware, from the communications 
which I have had the Honor of making to you during the 
course of the negotiation, that the French Government, 
without having ever shown a sincere Disposition to listen 
to the just pretensions of this Country, have manifested 
a considerable anxiety to defer the period of a Rupture, 
and have thought it material to their interests to employ 
every means in their power for that purpose. This Country 
has, on the other hand, undergone serious inconvenience 
from the great expense of the armament, from a long and 
irksome state of Suspense, and from the opportunity which 
has been thereby afforded to France for extending her 
Preparations. It is clear therefore that the delay arising 
from any new negotiation would, in the first instance, 
operate to the advantage of France and to the Injury of 
Great Britain, whilst its ultimate success would remain 
extremely precarious.4
Addington and Hawkesbury had good reason to suspect that the French
were trying to manipulate the Russians. For the French seemed to
XS. Vorontsov to Hawkesbury, 25 May 1803, FO 65/52.
2Hawkesbury's interpretation is verified by the text of
the document, a copy of which is in SIRIO, lxxvii. 98-100, the 
Tsar's covering letter, VPR, i. 410, and the report of 
Addington's speech in Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1489.
3Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsov, 26 May 1803, FO 65/52.
4Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsov, 28 May 1803, FO 65/52.
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desire a suspension of hostilities, not as a prelude to an 
arrangement which would satisfy British interests, but to nullify the 
advantage gained by the British with their unexpected declaration of 
war. There was thus no reason to expect that these new negotiations 
would be any more satisfactory than those that had been carried on 
by Whitworth in Paris. Nevertheless, the British had to justify their 
refusal to the Russians in order not to alienate their support, as 
the British could not appear unreasonable in their determination to 
continue with the war.
Even though the prospects of a resolution of the dispute were 
remote, the Russians persevered. On 8 June, Alexander I offered to 
take Malta, if it would prevent bloodshed,1 while Simon Vorontsov and 
Count A. I. Morkov, the Russian ambassador in Paris, sent peace 
proposals back and forth across the Channel. On 12 June, Bonaparte 
proposed to Morkov that if the Russians would take Malta, the British 
could have Lampedusa and the French would agree to a European 
settlement which provided indemnity for the King of Sardinia.2 
Bonaparte also claimed that if the Tsar insisted that the British 
keep Malta, he would abide by the decision.3 Simon Vorontsov passed 
on the offer to Hawkesbury on 16 June, and discussed it with him the 
next day. Britain's answer relayed to Morkov was, however, that it 
would only accept the state of possessions at the beginning of the 
war which would require the French to retreat from north Germany and 
the British to retain Malta.4
By this time, Addington and Hawkesbury's policy of conciliating 
Russia was beginning to show benefits, as during the negotiations, 
Morkov and Vorontsov were sympathetic to the British and gave them
xPetrel, p. 87.
2Morkov to S. Vorontsov, 13 June 1803, FO 65/52; Petrel, 
p. 76.
3Petrel, p. 77.
4Draft of Declaration against France, n.d., FO 27/69.
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effective support.1 Vorontsov even reciprocated one of Hawkesbury's
established policies by showing him copies of Morkov's correspondence
with Talleyrand.2 Moreover, Alexander I had become annoyed with
Bonaparte for refusing to accept Russian terms for a peace
settlement. In fact, the Russians finally had become convinced that
the French could not be trusted, as Alexander Vorontsov told Morkov:
Si je ne m'etonne pas du peu d'ouvertures qui vous ont ete 
faites par m. d. Talleyrand au sujet de leurs dernieres 
explications avec 1'Angleterre, apres les offres de nos 
bons offices agrees par eux, c'est que j ' en trouve les 
motifs dans la duplicite et 1'arrogance extreme, qui 
caracterise [sic] le gouvernement frangais et qui lui fait 
envisager les demarches meme des principales puissances de 
l 1Europe comme de simples instruments de la volonte 
frangaise.3
At this point, having read the signs that the Russians were 
becoming increasingly more favourable to the British position, 
Addington and Hawkesbury decided that the time was right to reap the 
harvest of their Russian diplomacy. They were also impelled by their 
military position which had stagnated. For having already sent 
amphibious operations to recapture the French colonies, they realized 
that there was little else they could do on their own to strike a 
blow at French power. Moreover, the possibility that the French would 
invade became increasingly more likely.4 Thus the only solution was 
to persuade the Russians to reenter the war, and Hawkesbury made two 
overtures. The first was to Simon Vorontsov. On 11 July, Hawkesbury 
attempted to justify Britain's actions once again as defending 
European, not solely British interests. He then emphasized that 
Europe could not be saved without the assistance of Russia and, 
instead of merely trying to strike a political deal, appealed to the 
vanity of the Tsar and the true interests of Russia. He claimed:
1Petrel, pp. 84-90.
2Ibid., p. 92.
3A. Vorontsov to Morkov, 18 June 1803, SIRIO, lxxvii. 217.
4See below, chapter 8, pp. 243, 247.
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The Emperor of Russia is placed in a Situation which may 
enable Him to render the most important Services to 
Europe. It is in consequence of His Interposition that 
Europe can alone expect that the Cabinets of Vienna and 
Berlin should suspend their ancient Jealousies; should 
relinquish those lesser Interests which have hitherto 
divided them, and which by dividing them, have left them 
successively at the mercy of a common Enemy. It is to him 
that they look for that General Concert which can alone 
effectually remedy those evils, which must in a great 
measure be ascribed to the Separate Treaties of Peace 
which have been so improvidently concluded by many other 
Powers with the French Government. ... His Majesty trusts 
that the Emperor of Russia will view the causes of the 
present War in their true light . . . and that He will 
perceive, that the only hopes of Tranquility for Europe, 
must be derived from a Combination of the Great Powers of 
the Continent, with His Imperial Majesty at their Head,
who shall be steadfastly determined to make new and
extraordinary efforts for the purpose of circumscribing 
the Power, and restraining the Ambition of the Government 
of France.1
The British were also prepared to play their traditional role: on 12 
July, Hawkesbury sent the other offer to St Petersburg through Warren 
proposing that, if the Russians would arrange a coalition of the
Continental powers against the French, the British would sign a
treaty to provide subsidies.2
Hawkesbury's overtures were premature, for the Russians were 
still not ready either militarily or financially to reenter the war. 
In fact, Hawkesbury's dispatch to Warren crossed with one of Warren's 
relaying the Tsar's latest suggestions for peace terms. Alexander 
Vorontsov had also pointed out to Warren that the distance between 
France and Russia was so great that there was little the Russians 
could do effectively to reduce French power.3 The Russians had to 
wait until the Austrians were strong enough to reenter the war and 
provide the Russian army with safe passage to French territory. When 
the Russian chancellor received the formal offer of alliance on 10
1Hawkesbury to S. Vorontsov, 11 July 1803, FO 65/53.
2Hawkesbury to Warren, 12 July 18 03, FO 65/53.
3Warren to Hawkesbury, 19 July 1803, FO 65/53.
221
August, he argued that the Tsar was not yet ready to fight and still 
retained hopes that his peace proposals would succeed. He intimated 
that if the French did not cooperate something might have to be done 
to protect northern Germany and the Turkish empire. Warren did hold 
out some hope for the future, however, as "The Chancellor observed 
that if Bonaparte made His attack on England and failed, as every one 
here hoped and wished He might; that then perhaps the Courts of 
Vienna and Berlin might be induced to come forward with effect.11 At 
the time this was little consolation for the British.
Addington and Hawkesbury were also trying to win the support of 
Austria and Prussia. The first moves Bonaparte made after the renewal 
of the war were to invade Hanover and occupy the port of Hamburg, and 
the British hoped that by advancing into Germany he would provoke a 
response from the two German powers.2 This may have been a foolish 
hope considering that they had refused to oppose French intervention 
in Switzerland only nine months before. In January 1803, Arch Duke 
Charles had told Paget that Austria would require six to eight years 
of peace to restore its financial and military resources,3 but 
Hawkesbury still believed that Austria would continue to play an 
important role in European affairs. Hawkesbury had always intended 
that Austria should be a third partner in an alliance with Russia,4 
and therefore it was necessary to keep the Austrians well disposed, 
even if they refused to enter the war immediately.
Consequently, Addington and Hawkesbury worked hard to gain the 
cooperation of Starhemberg. From the moment Addington took office, 
he tried to remove all grounds of conflict between Britain and 
Austria. The key issue was the repayment of the Austrian loans 
contracted during the 1790s. Under the terms of the loans, Austria
xWarren to Hawkesbury, 10 Aug. 1803, FO 65/53.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 21 June 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
3Paget to Hawkesbury, 21 Jan. 1803, FO 7/67.
4Hawkesbury to Warren, 11 Sept. 1802, FO 65/51.
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was to have begun to repay within six months of the conclusion of 
peace, but owing to the expenses of the war, they were unable to do 
so in 1801. Addington was willing to postpone the payments to 
maintain Austrian goodwill, but this carried a political price as 
Parliament had guaranteed the loans and was committed to pay the 
interest. Nevertheless, Addington was so anxious to obtain Austria■s 
assistance that he went far out of his way to conciliate them, by 
cooperating with Starhemberg to provide pretext for delaying the 
payments.1
After the war resumed, Hawkesbury discussed with Starhemberg 
Austria's reentry into the war. Starhemberg insisted that Austrian 
policy was to maintain strict neutrality, but if it did consider 
entering the war in the future, it would require a subsidy of £2 
million.2 Hawkesbury claimed that the British government could not 
afford that amount, but in July, Hawkesbury promised £3-400,000 and 
proposed that they enter a secret convention immediately.3 The 
Austrians, however, did not consider the amount to be sufficient. 
Moreover, Starhemberg recognized that Britain's foreign policy was 
focused on Russia and that her relationship with Austria was only of 
secondary importance.4 This was true. Austria was important to 
Britain, but the attitude of Russia was more vital. The same reasons 
for the British to focus on Russia existed in 1803 as had in 1801,5
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 24 July 1801, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/142; Karl, Helleiner, The 
Imperial Loans: A Study in Financial and Diplomatic History 
(Oxford, 1965), p. 136.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 24 June 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 26 July 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144. This offer was 
increased to £500,000 in March 1804, but the Austrians refused. 
Same to same, 3 0 Mar. 1804, HHSA, Staatskanzlei England 
Korrespondenz/145.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 1 July 1803, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
See above, chapter 3, p. 76.
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but moreover Russia had begun to demonstrate a greater interest in
curbing French expansion, and the Tsar's attitude towards Malta was
always an important consideration.
While discussing the war with Starhemberg, Hawkesbury also
directed Paget to try to win the support of the Austrian government.
He instructed Paget to convince the Austrians that
the whole of His Majesty's conduct during the late 
discussion with France, has been dictated by no other 
motive than by His solicitude to provide for the safety of 
His own Dominions and in as far as his single exertions 
conduce to that salutary end, to promote the tranquility 
and independence of the Continent, so seriously menaced by 
that restless spirit of ambition and aggrandizement by 
which the councils of France appear at present to be 
uniformly actuated.1
To corroborate these assertions, Hawkesbury sent along copies of the
papers presented to Parliament. This was important because Talleyrand
was also presenting the Austrians with the French version of the
negotiations.2 The British and French were in effect involved in a
diplomatic as well as a military and naval struggle, both sides vying
for the support of the other powers of Europe. This competition was
important because the disposition of these powers, even if they
remained neutral, could influence the course of the war. The British
had no hope of winning the war without the support of the Russians
and Austrians, but, more significant, they had no hope of surviving
the war, if these powers supported the French.
Hawkesbury believed that the Austrians had the right inclination
but lacked the resources. The problem with the Prussians was the
exact opposite: they possessed the resources but lacked the
inclination. The British view was that the Prussians had adopted a
position of neutrality benevolent towards the French after having so
cowardly abandoned the war and left their allies in the lurch in
1795. The Prussians' view, on the contrary, was that they had made
the best of a bad situation, striking a deal with the French before
1Hawkesbury to Paget, 28 May 1803, FO 7/67.
2Paget to Hawkesbury, 8 June 1803, FO 7/67.
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their own position deteriorated. As part of the deal Prussia obtained 
recognition of its predominance in northern Germany. The French 
invasion of Hanover, however, was a direct threat to that position, 
and Hawkesbury hoped to take advantage of that development by 
instructing Francis Jackson, the minister in Berlin, to make an 
overture:
If the Prussian Government should appear to be at last 
sensible of the difficulties of their own situation in 
consequence of the System of Inertness and Indifference 
which they have been induced to adopt--if they should be 
really disposed to make a sincere and vigourous effort for 
the defence of the North of Germany--but if you should 
judge it impracticable to secure their exertion without 
some promise of pecuniary succours, you are authorized to 
make them the following offer: That upon the commencement 
of Hostilities against the French Armies, His Majesty will 
advance to them the Sum of Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand 
Pounds, and that upon the Evacuation of the Electorate of 
Hanover by the French Forces (for the purpose of it's 
[sic] being restored to His Majesty and of the repassage 
of the Rhine by the French Army) His Majesty will make a 
further advance of Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pounds.1
Hawkesbury did caution Jackson to make the offer only if the
Prussians appeared likely to accept, but, unfortunately that was not
the case. For Jackson realized that the Prussians were averse to
assuming the risks that would be required by engaging the French.
There was some hope that the Prussians would be willing to act in
future, however, if they were assured of Russian military support.
In the mean time, Jackson chose to withhold the offer.2 Six months
later, Hawkesbury asserted that the subsidy offer should remain open
but reiterated that it should not be made unless it was likely to be
accepted.3
During the remainder of 1803, Russia and Britain continued to 
move closer together but without the Russians entering the war. In 
London, Hawkesbury took Simon Vorontsov further into his confidence,
1Hawkesbury to Jackson, 28 June 1803, FO 64/63.
2Jackson to Hawkesbury, 16 July 1803, FO 64/63.
3Hawkesbury to Jackson, 6 Dec. 18 03, Jackson Papers, FO 
353/43.
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even inviting him along in September to an interview at Coombe Wood 
with the emigre, General Pichegru, to discuss a proposal to finance 
insurgents in eastern France.1 Hawkesbury also continued to warn 
Warren:
to abstain from every thing which can have the effect of 
irritating the Russian Government. It is highly desirable 
that all conciliatory means should be used to bring them 
to a just Sense of the present situation of Europe, and of 
the exertions which their own Security and Honor must at 
last infallibly require from them.2
Although the British had made no visible progress in bringing the
Russians into the war, Hawkesbury was determined to pursue his line
of policy, as "Changes of opinion & of Men are in such Govts.
frequently sudden; We should never lose sight of this, & consequently
never be discouraged in pursuit of our Ultimate object.'3
Addington and Hawkesbury's hopes of drawing the Russians into
the war revived at the beginning of 1804, as Alexander Vorontsov
retired owing to poor health and was replaced by Czartoryski, who had
concluded that Anglo-Russian cooperation was vital. He believed that
Hawkesbury's overtures deserved serious consideration because Britain
was a necessary ally in the defence of Turkey, which he feared would
soon be under threat. He was also convinced that the Russians had to
persuade the British that their confidence was well placed or they
would turn to the Austrians to find support in the war.4 Although he
believed that Russia was ready to declare war, when circumstances
required, the time had not quite arrived.5 Thus, when Warren pressed
1S. Vorontsov to Hammond, 16 Sept. 1803, FO 65/53. See 
below, pp. 224-6.
2Hawkesbury to Warren, 23 Sept. 1803, FO 65/53.
3Hawkesbury to Warren, 23 Sept. 1803, Warren Papers in the 
possession of Lord Vernon, Sudbury House, Derbyshire.
4Czartoryski to Alexander I, 29 Feb. 1804, VPR, i. 619-24, 
also in SIRIO, lxxvii. 486-98.
5Czartoryski to S. Vorontsov, 9 Mar. 18 04, VPR. i. 638; 
Czartorvski Memoirs, ii. 14.
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him once again to join a coalition, he refused.1 He was struggling 
with the dilemma of having to postpone Russia's entry into the war, 
while keeping the British in line. Consequently, as the tenure of the 
Addington ministry drew to a close, Czartoryski continued to argue 
that Russia should not move until Austria and Prussia were ready.2
This contradicts the assertion of John Sherwig that in early 
1804 Czartoryski made a offer of a alliance to the British, upon 
which Hawkesbury placed some unreasonable conditions.3 Sherwig's 
references include a letter from Hawkesbury to Simon Vorontsov which 
is no longer in the Foreign Office file 65/54, and a letter from 
Czartoryski to Vorontsov, which he seems to have misinterpreted. 
Warren had suggested that the British would prefer that Austria and 
Prussia join in a grand alliance and that the status quo ante bellum 
would be the best basis for a peace settlement, but he never asserted 
that British offers of subsidies would be contingent upon these two 
points.4 Nor is there any record of Hawkesbury stipulating these 
conditions to either Warren or Vorontsov. Moreover, from both the 
British and Russian diplomatic documents it is clear that it was 
indeed the Russians who were holding back from joining the war.
The failure to persuade the Russians, Austrians, or Prussians 
to form a coalition left the British in a very difficult position. 
Unless the French were somehow diverted on the Continent, they would 
concentrate all their forces on the Channel in preparation for an 
invasion of England. In this situation, even the reckless schemes of 
the French royalists appeared attractive. During the previous war, 
Addington and Hawkesbury had ignored the royalists, as having decided
3Warren to Hawkesbury, 2 Dec. 1803, FO 65/53; Same to 
same, 17 Feb. 1804, FO 65/54.
2Warren to Hawkesbury, 2 7 Apr. 18 04, FO 65/54; Same to 
same, 12 May 1804, FO 65/55.
3Sherwig, p. 146.
4Warren to Hawkesbury, 12 May 1804, FO 65/55; Czartoryski 
to S. Vorontsov, 12 May 1804, FO 65/54 (This is the same letter 
referred to by Sherwig dated 3 0 April old style). A copy in 
Russian is in VPR, ii. 52-3.
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to negotiate peace with Bonaparte, they could hardly scheme at his 
overthrow. Moreover, they considered the royalists a spent force: all 
their plans had failed, and few in France appeared to favour a 
restoration because Bonaparte had appeared to have achieved political 
stability and quelled the spirit of Jacobinism. Thus, British had 
only used the royalist for their own ends and they were no longer 
useful.1
By October 1803, the British government had received a series 
of reports that opposition to Bonaparte was growing in France. 
Royalist and republican conspiracies were forming throughout the 
country, and in this context the emigre General Pichegru met with 
Hawkesbury and Vorontsov at Coombe Wood to discuss his plan for the 
overthrow of Bonaparte. In addition, Addington, although 
reluctantly,2 met with Mehee de la Touche and Prince Jablonowski, who 
claimed to be royalists and offered to travel to Paris and provide 
intelligence for the British government.3 They proposed to determine 
the sentiments of the French people and to stimulate resistance and 
rebellion to overthrow the French government. Consequently, 
Hawkesbury arranged for Francis Drake, the minister at Ratisbon, to 
correspond with de la Touche and Jablonowski and to provide them with 
funds from the secret service accounts.
Unfortunately, de la Touche was a spy for Bonaparte and passed 
all this information on to the French government, while providing 
faulty information to the British.4 In February 1804, Pichegru was 
exposed and arrested, along with his accomplices Georges Cadoudal and 
General Moreau. The French were unable to arrest Drake because he was 
not on French territory, but reports of his activities were published
Borman F. Richards, 'British Policy and the Problem of 
the Monarchy in France, 1789-1802', (Ph. D., London, 1955), pp. 
444-5.
2Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 262.
3The detailed correspondence concerning this conspiracy is 
located in Add. MSS 38239, 38240, and 38569.
4Holland Rose, Life of Napoleon, i. 448-9.
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in the French press, and at the beginning of April, Talleyrand sent 
copies of these reports to the Russian and other governments accusing 
the British ministry conspiring to assassinate Bonaparte. This 
prompted a quick denial by Addington in the Commons on 16 April, and 
a circular letter from Hawkesbury to all foreign ministers on 3 0 
April.1
While the British government was not involved in a plot to
assassinate Bonaparte, it was involved in a conspiracy of another
sort. Between October 1803 and April 1804, Drake corresponded with
disaffected royalists and republicans in eastern France. These groups
were planning local insurrections in Besangon, Auxonne, Dijon, Macon,
and Auxerre with the intention of declaring the independence of these
districts and establishing arsenals and magazines. The goals of the
insurrections were to be proclaimed in France, Switzerland, Holland,
and Italy and all those who opposed the French government were to be
invited to join at Auxerre.2 In April, Hawkesbury told Drake that the
British government approved of these plans but was in no position to
give them any direction, and therefore he gave Drake considerable
latitude in dealing with the conspiracy:
As nothing more than a general outline of the plan in 
agitation has as yet been received from you, as it must 
ultimately be regulated by the course of Events, and as 
its success may, in great degree, depend upon prompt and 
immediate decision, it is impossible for me to furnish you 
with any instructions upon the Subject. The final 
arrangements of the plan itself with Mr Jablonski [sic], 
the details of its execution, and the objects which it is 
intended to effect, must therefore be left entirely to 
your own discretion.3
Therefore, Addington and Hawkesbury were aware of the conspiracy and
provided a small amount of funds but had neither initiated the plan
nor taken any part in the direction of events. In fact, the French
1Circular to Foreign Ministers, 30 Apr. 1804, FO 115/13.
2Drake to Hawkesbury, 8 Mar. 1804, Add. MSS 38569, fos.
57-9.
3Hawkesbury to Drake, 3 April 1804, Add. MSS 38240, fos.
279-80.
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government exposed Drake before any of the insurrections had begun. 
Drake then offered to be the scapegoat for the government and 
arranged to destroy his private papers.1 Consequently, while this 
policy ended in absolute failure, Addington and Hawkesbury were able 
to keep the episode secret.
Defensive Diplomacy
Hawkesbury's approach to diplomacy was certainly more realistic 
than his predecessor's because he better understood the limitations 
of other European states. Grenville expected other governments to 
consider French aggression as important a threat to them as it was 
to the British, and hoped that they would continue to fight even when 
their financial and military resources were exhausted and their 
existence as a great power was threatened.2 Hawkesbury realized that 
other states would fight effectively only for their own interests, 
and that they sometimes found continuing the war against France to 
be contrary to those interests. Rather than pressing them to sustain 
a failing war effort, Hawkesbury often encouraged them to strike a 
deal with the French. As mentioned, soon after assuming office, he 
had advised both the Neapolitan and Portuguese governments to 
accommodate France, even if this meant agreeing to terms which were 
contrary to British interests, such as excluding British shipping 
from their ports.
When the war resumed in 1803, Hawkesbury divided the states of 
Europe into two classes. In the first group he included those powers 
which possessed the potential military strength to manage a 
successful offensive war against the French. These were Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia. In attempting to build a Continental coalition, 
he concentrated on these three because they were the only states that 
could be expected to fight the French with some hope of success. He
1Drake to Hawkesbury, 8 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 38569, fos.
150-51.
2Schroeder, p. 283.
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also realized that there were several states that were unhappy with 
the position of dominance obtained by the French but were unable to 
enter the war on the side of the British because the French would 
attack and defeat them. So instead of pressing them to enter the war, 
he tried to persuade them to remain neutral. His diplomacy therefore 
had two sides. On the one hand, he was trying to win over allies for 
Britain, and on the other, he was trying to prevent France from doing 
the same.
On the subject of possible French allies, the most important 
were Spain and Holland. They had been France's strongest allies 
during the Revolutionary Wars, and their proximity to vital British 
interests rendered it important that they not join the French again. 
The problem with Holland was that French troops were still stationed 
in the country despite that fact that their presence contravened both 
the Luneville and Amiens treaties. Holland could not become 
effectively neutral until the French soldiers left the country, which 
they were unlikely to do. Nevertheless, Hawkesbury tried to use 
persuasion mixed with threats to get them out. On 20 May 1803, he 
instructed Robert Liston, the British minister at The Hague, to tell 
the Dutch that if the French troops withdrew and respected the 
neutrality of Holland, Britain would also respect the neutrality and 
return all of the captured Dutch ships. On the other hand, if the 
French used Dutch territory or shipping to attack the British, 
Britain would have to take military measures against Holland.1 The 
French, however, began arresting British subjects in Holland, and 
Hawkesbury felt obliged to sever diplomatic ties.2
Hawkesbury had better hopes for Spain, as it was not occupied 
by French troops and possessed much greater military resources with 
which to resist them. Hawkesbury fully expected that the French would 
press the Spaniards to join the war, and right from the commencement 
of hostilities the Admiralty instructed the navy to watch the Spanish
1Hawkesbury to Liston, 20 May 1803, FO 37/ 61.
2Hawkesbury to Liston, 29 May, FO 37/61.
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fleet.1 Hawkesbury told John Hookham Frere, the minister at Madrid, 
that the British wished that the Spaniards would remain neutral, but 
if they gave any assistance to the French, or allowed the French to 
cross Spanish territory to attack the Portuguese, the British would 
declare war.2 Frere replied that the Spaniards were trying to avoid 
war with the British, but had not decided how to act. They had hoped 
to join Russia in mediating between the British and French. The 
French, however, were blackmailing the Spaniards to join them by 
demanding 24 million livres a month in return for recognizing Spanish 
neutrality. The Spaniards did their best to delay, but in the end it 
was cheaper to fight the British than pay the French. They hoped, 
however, that the British would consider their declaration of war 
merely nominal and that they would not attack them or interrupt 
Anglo-Spanish commercial dealings.
The Spaniards did declare war on 12 August 1803, but the British 
retained their minister in Madrid. Frere explained that the Spaniards 
were still well disposed to the British and had persuaded the French 
to drop the price of recognizing their neutrality in the event that 
Spain withdrew from the war to 6 million livres per month.3 
Considering the circumstances, Hawkesbury had difficulty deciding 
what to do with Spain. Preserving peace was his constant goal, but 
the Spaniards had to be truly neutral and the French had to respect 
that neutrality. Even the payment of 6 million livres a month was not 
acceptable, as it aided the French war effort. Hawkesbury was 
willing, however, to excuse the payments on the understanding that 
it would be only a temporary expedient. Nevertheless, he demanded 
that French not use the Spanish navy to attack the British and French 
troops not cross the Spanish border, and he insisted the Spanish
^Admiralty to Admiral Cornwallis 18 May 1803, FO 72/48.
2Hawkesbury to Frere, 8 June 1803, FO 72/48.
3Frere to Hawkesbury, 9 Oct. 1803, FO 72/50.
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ports remain open to British shipping. If these demands were not met
he was determined to begin a real war with Spain.1
Although this dispute dragged on for months without a
satisfactory resolution, the delay actually benefitted the British.
Hawkesbury was in fact trying to forestall Spain's effectively
entering the war. He explained to Frere in January 1804:
The intelligence which had been received from the Court of 
Saint Petersburgh, and from the other Courts of Europe, 
though it affords no certain prospect of any confederacy 
being formed amongst the principal Powers of the 
Continent, for the purpose of opposing the extravagant 
ambition of the present government of France, is however 
so far more favourable with a view to that object than any 
communications which have been made from the same quarters 
since the renewal of Hostilities that his Majesty feels 
additional reasons, (conformably to the system of Policy 
which He had already laid down) for endeavouring to 
preserve the relations of Peace with Spain as long as is 
compatible with his Honour, and a due attention to the 
essential interests of His Dominions.2
Hawkesbury was still disturbed by the financial assistance that Spain
was giving France, but this alone was not a sufficient justification
for hostilities, especially while the British were anxiously waiting
for the Russians to enter the war. Therefore, Hawkesbury wished to
preserve the status quo unless French troops invaded Spain.
Hawkesbury also realized the importance of maintaining good
relations with Denmark and Sweden. The League of Armed Neutrality had
posed a serious threat to Britain in 1801, and Hawkesbury wished to
avoid a repetition. Although Russia, the key to the League of Armed
Neutrality, was this time well disposed, Danish and Swedish navies
could still cause trouble if they became allied with the French. In
addition, with the French invasion of Hanover, the position of
Denmark became even more important. Hawkesbury realized that the
French would probably close the Elbe and Weser rivers to British
shipping. As these rivers were important lifelines for British trade
into Europe, British merchants would have had to look for alternative
1Hawkesbury to Frere, 24 Nov. 18 03, FO 72/5 0.
2Hawkesbury to Frere, 21 Jan. 1804, FO 72/51.
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routes, and Hawkesbury was hoping to use Denmark as an entreport. To 
this end, in June 1803, he sent Liston, whom he had recalled from The 
Hague, on a special mission to Denmark. His instructions were to 
persuade the Danes to remain neutral and to keep their ports open to 
British shipping. Hawkesbury also instructed Liston to propose an 
alliance to Denmark, by which the British would agree not to make 
peace with the French until all of Denmark's possessions were 
restored, if the Danes would agree not to make peace until the French 
had evacuated northern Germany.1
Hawkesbury did not expect that the Danes would accept the offer 
of alliance but did hope that they would acquiesce with his other 
proposals. The Danes were very alarmed by the French invasion of 
Hanover and feared that their own territory was in danger. Therefore, 
they took precautions by sending 15,000 troops into Holstein.2 They 
became even more concerned in November 18 03, when the French began 
enforcing requisitions from the imperial towns of Hamburg, Bremen, 
and Lubeck. Their only consolation was a promise from Russia to come 
to their aid if they were attacked.3 As a result, the Danes wished 
to maintain good relations with the British, and complied with most 
of Hawkesbury's requests, including removing Gyldenpalm, the charge 
d'affaires in London, who had become odious to the British 
government.4 Nevertheless, they could not join a military alliance 
with the British for fear of being attacked by the French.
The position of Sweden was not as important as that of Denmark, 
but Hawkesbury still wished to cultivate good relations to secure 
access to the Baltic and to keep the Swedish fleet out of French 
control. Anglo-Swedish relations had remained cool during the peace, 
as the Swedes were late in acceding to the Anglo-Russian Convention
1Hawkesbury to Liston, 23 June 1803, FO 22/43.
2Hill to Hawkesbury, 30 May 1803, FO 22/43.
3Liston to Hawkesbury 15 Oct. and 22 Nov. 1803, FO 22/43.
4Hawkesbury to Liston, 26 July and 20 Sept. 1803, FO
22/43.
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of 1801. The Swedes, moreover, were still attached to the principles 
of the Armed Neutrality and were angry at having been betrayed by the 
Russians. They were also unhappy with some of the provisions of their 
existing trade treaty with Britain. Nevertheless, in 1803, they 
favoured an accommodation because they were on very poor terms with 
the Russians, and after the French invasion of Hanover they feared 
for their territory in Pomerania. Having been informed that the 
Swedes favoured an accommodation, Hawkesbury in July agreed to 
negotiate a new trade convention and to compensate them for the two 
Swedish convoys which the British had captured during the previous 
war.1 Hawkesbury also agreed to resolve Swedish claims on the island 
of St Bartholomew and the Swedish East India ships detained in 1801. 
His intention was to remove all grounds for complaint on the part of 
Sweden.2 These demonstrations of good will did achieve his modest 
aims and helped to lay the groundwork for Sweden's accession to the 
Third Coalition in 1805.
Persuading the Kingdom of Naples to stay neutral was more 
difficult. Although Naples was technically independent, the French 
had refused to remove their garrisons from Otranto and Taranto until 
the British had evacuated Malta, which meant that they were still 
there when the war resumed. The Neapolitans also feared that a large 
French force would invade from the north through France's Italian 
satellites. Nevertheless, Naples was important commercially and 
strategically to the British, and before the war resumed, Hawkesbury 
had sent Hugh Elliot on a special mission to Naples. Hawkesbury hoped 
that Naples would remain neutral, but his most important 
consideration was that the British should receive equal treatment 
with the French in Neapolitan ports. If the Neapolitans refused 
entrance to British ships of war, Hawkesbury would only accept it as 
long as the French were excluded as well. The centre of British 
attention was the island of Sicily. Besides being the major supplier
1Hawkesbury to the King, 21 July 1803, Aspinall, iv. 113; 
Hawkesbury to Silverhjelm, 25 July 1803, FO 73/30.
2Hawkesbury to Hobart, 19 Jan. 18 04, FO 73/32.
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of food and water for Malta, Sicily was an important naval base in 
itself. Thus the British position in the Mediterranean would have 
been in serious jeopardy, if the French obtained control of the 
island. Consequently, Hawkesbury was determined that the British 
should man the Forts of Messina, if the French received special 
privileges in Naples.1
Considering the difficult pressures upon the Neapolitan 
government, the British were fortunate to receive the cooperation 
they did. First, the Neapolitan government kept its ports open to the 
British as in times of peace.2 Second, General Sir John Acton, 
principal advisor to King Ferdinand, cooperated fully with British 
representatives. He consented to a proposal to permit the British 
forces to take the Forts of Messina, but only when the French had put 
Sicily in real danger. Together the British and Acton devised a plan 
under which the Neapolitan forces intended for Malta would be 
transferred to the Forts of Messina, and the British would provide 
financial assistance to renovate the fortifications.3 During the term 
of the Addington ministry, the Neapolitan government was able to keep 
the French forces at bay, but when the full-scale invasion finally 
began in 1806, the British felt obliged to seize the island of 
Sicily.4
Hawkesbury also feared that Bonaparte had designs on Portugal 
and the Turkish empire, Britain's only remaining allies at the end 
of the last war. The British did not even dream that their old allies 
would provide any real assistance in the war against the French, but 
rather merely hoped that these allies would withstand French 
aggression. In June 1803, Hawkesbury informed Baron de Souza, the
1Hawkesbury to Elliot, 18 May 1803, FO 70/21.
2Elliot to Hawkesbury, 19 July 1803, FO 70/21.
3Hawkesbury to Elliot, 11 Nov. 1803, FO 70/21; Elliot to
Hawkesbury, 10 Jan. 18 04, FO 70/22.
4Desmond Gregory, Sicily: The Insecure Base. A History of 
the British Occupation of Sicily. 1806-1815 (Rutherford, NJ,
1988) .
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Portuguese minister in London, that the British expected Portugal to 
remain neutral. If the French attacked Portugal, the British would 
help, he said, but he could not make any firm promises concerning 
men, equipment, or subsidies.1 For the Addington ministry was not 
prepared to commit itself to the defence of Portugal until it had 
discovered whether the Portuguese were absolutely determined to 
resist the French. In July, despite the King's observation that it 
was "impossible for troops to be in a more hopeless state than the 
Portuguese are at present1, Hobart sent Colonel Robert Stewart to 
Portugal to assess the state of the Portuguese troops. Both Colonel 
Stewart and Donald Campbell, a British officer who acted as commander 
of the Portuguese naval forces in Brazil, informed the Cabinet that 
the Portuguese were in no state to resist the French. Recruiting for 
the peace establishment was poor owing to low levels of pay, and the 
Portuguese army suffered from poor leadership and a lack of 
discipline in the ranks, which meant that irrespective of its 
physical means, its morale was too low to resist a French attack. 
Therefore, sending a small British force to aid the Portuguese would 
have been a waste of valuable resources.2
While the independence of Portugal was important for strategic 
reasons, Hawkesbury's greatest concern was over the future of Brazil 
because he feared that recent French failures in Louisiana and St 
Domingue would direct the French towards South America. Therefore, 
the prime consideration was to ensure that the French did not obtain 
control of the Portuguese fleet and Brazil. Consequently, Hawkesbury 
suggested that the Prince Regent of Portugal prepare to sail with his 
fleet to Brazil "and endeavour to establish there a great, powerful 
and independent Empire' . He promised that the British navy would help 
facilitate the evacuation and provide protection for the Portuguese
1Hawkesbury to de Souza, June 1803, FO 63/41.
2Hawkesbury to the King, 3 0 June 18 03, and the King to 
Hawkesbury, 1 July 1803, Aspinall, iv. 111-12; Abstract of 
Colonel Stuart's final report upon his mission to Portugal, 25 
Sept. 1803, and Donald Campbell to the Cabinet, 26 Sept. 1803, 
FO 63/42.
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navy.1 Hawkesbury had, in effect, anticipated the policy Canning was 
to adopt towards Portugal five years later, when the British navy did 
facilitate the evacuation of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil. 
In Hawkesbury's time, however, this proved unnecessary because the 
Portuguese acceded to the Spanish treaty of neutrality signed with 
the French on 8 November 1803. Under the terms of the treaty, 
Portugal agreed to pay the French one million livres, but as there 
were no territorial concessions, the British were satisfied with the 
arrangement.2
The Turkish empire was in less immediate danger, but the threat 
of a French attack on Egypt or the Morea greatly influenced the 
planning of the British Cabinet. Sebastiani's report seemed to 
corroborate these threats, and fear concerning the future of the 
Turkish empire was one of the most important reasons that the British 
decided to keep Malta. After the war resumed, Hawkesbury merely hoped 
that the Turks would avoid giving any territory to the French. 
Therefore, it was better that the Turks remain neutral because if 
they formed an alliance with the British, they might encourage the 
French to attack them. Hawkesbury was prepared to form an alliance, 
only after the French attacked the Turkish empire, or if Russia 
joined Britain in a coalition, as the Russians would divert most of 
the French forces into central Europe.3
The Turkish government agreed to cooperate fully with 
Hawkesbury's suggestion and continued to profess great friendship for 
the British. As a symbol of that friendship the Grand Vizier granted 
Hawkesbury the Order of the Crescent.4 Harmonious relations between 
the British and the Turks were soon strained, however, not by the 
French but by the Mameluke Beys. The relationship between the Beys
hawkesbury to Fitzgerald, 6 Oct. 1803, FO 63/42.
hawkesbury to Fitzgerald, 21 Jan. 1804, and Fitzgerald to 
Hawkesbury, 23 Feb. 1804, FO 63/43.
hawkesbury to Drummond, 31 May 1803, FO 78/40.
4Grand Vizier Youssuf Pasha to Hawkesbury, enclosed in
Drummond to Hawkesbury, 12 July 1803, FO 78/40.
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and the Turkish government had caused the British trouble before. 
British troops remained in Egypt for a year after the Treaty of 
Amiens because they were the only means of maintaining peace between 
the Beys and the Turkish troops.1 Stuart thought that he had arranged 
a permanent settlement before he withdrew the British troops, but the 
conflict broke out again in the summer of 1803.
A rebellion by the Beys in Egypt soon spread to disaffected 
regions of Asiatic Turkey to the point at which William Drummond, the 
new ambassador at Constantinople, believed that the empire was in 
great danger.2 The Beys had also sent Elphi Bey to London to try to 
win the support of the British government. Hawkesbury was thus caught 
in the middle. On one hand, he wished to preserve the integrity of 
the Turkish empire and to avoid any measure which might harm Anglo- 
Turkish relations. On the other, the Beys had proved valued allies 
during the Egyptian campaign, and, if the British did not support 
them, they might look towards the French. The greatest danger posed 
by the entire situation was that it would give the French an excuse 
and an opportunity to intervene. Consequently, Hawkesbury decided to 
press the Turks to arrange a compromise with the Beys, in order to 
avoid a prolonged struggle which would play into the hands of 
France.3 The Turks refused, however, to follow these suggestions, and 
the British were fortunate that Bonaparte was either unwilling or 
unable to take advantage of the situation.
The other country that the British had to watch closely was the 
United States. Relations between Britain and the United States had 
improved dramatically since the Treaty of Paris of 1783. John Jay had 
been able to resolve many outstanding Anglo-American disputes with 
Grenville in 1794, initiating what Bradford Perkins has termed the
3See above, chapter 6, p. 194-5.
2Drummond to Hawkesbury, 19 Aug. 1803, FO 78/40.
3Hawkesbury to Drummond, 20 Dec. 1803, FO 78/40
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first rapprochement between the two countries.1 Nevertheless, by 1801 
the Americans along with the Danes and the Swedes had become annoyed 
by the way that the British navy was interfering with their attempts 
to acquire the French trading routes that had been interrupted by the 
war, and the impressment by the Royal Navy of British and sometimes 
American seamen on American ships was an added source of grievance.
Upon the accession of the Addington ministry, Rufus King, the 
American minister was on the verge of negotiating an amendment to the 
Jay-Grenville Treaty. The Americans had become dissatisfied with the 
sixth article of the treaty which provided for a commission to 
resolve outstanding private debts owed by Americans to British 
creditors. The Americans hoped to settle the question by paying a 
lump sum to be distributed to the creditors by the British 
government. The Americans suggested the sum of £600,000,2 but British 
estimates of the outstanding debts were closer to £6 million.3 King 
pressed Hawkesbury to come to a quick settlement on American terms 
and became extremely annoyed at the way the British Cabinet neglected 
the issue. As Addington and Hawkesbury were completely preoccupied 
with the course of the negotiations with Otto,4 it is not surprising 
that they found little time for an issue that was rather trifling in 
comparison. Hawkesbury did, however, find some time to discuss the 
matter with Eldon during the summer of 1801,5 but a final settlement 
was not reached until January 1802.
King then pressed Hawkesbury to arrange further agreements on 
the subjects of British impressment of American seamen, American
Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and 
the United States. 1795-1805 (Philadelphia, 1955) .
2King to Hawkesbury, 16 Apr. and 20 Aug. 1801, FO 5/32.
3Document of British Claims against US, undated, enclosed 
in Committee of North American Merchants to Hawkesbury, 18 Mar. 
1803, FO 5/40.
4Rufus King Correspondence, iii. 521.
5Eldon to Addington, 16 June 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl80l/OZ137.
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access to the British West Indian Trade, and the British Crown's 
possession of Maryland stock which was left over from the time of the 
American war. But as King proposed settlements that were unattractive 
to the British,1 Hawkesbury refused to negotiate. In the spring of 
1803, Hawkesbury and King were able to negotiate a boundary through 
disputed territory west of the Great Lakes and between Maine and New 
Brunswick.2 Nevertheless, the treaty was never ratified because the 
United States Senate made amendments that were unacceptable to the 
British.
The crux of Anglo-American-French relations in 1803 was, 
however, the territory of Louisiana. The Americans were alarmed when 
they discovered that Spain had ceded the territory to France because 
the French were more likely to establish a lasting presence on the 
frontier of the United States. As a result, the Americans became 
increasingly hostile towards the French and looked towards the
British for support. Edward Thornton, the British minister in
Washington, informed Hawkesbury on 3 July 1802, that President 
Jefferson
not only regards the cession of Louisiana and New Orleans 
as a certain cause of war between the two countries, but 
makes no scruple to say, that if the force of the United
States should be unable to expel the French from those
settlements, they must have recourse to the assistance of 
other powers, meaning unquestionably Great Britain.3
By May 1802, Hawkesbury had already deduced that the Louisiana
question was likely to facilitate closer relations between Britain
and the United States.4 Even though at that time France and Britain
were no longer at war, he was looking to obtain as many diplomatic
allies as possible. To this end Thornton suggested that the British
should seize the island of New Orleans and hand it over to the
3See King to Hawkesbury, 9 Mar. 1801, FO 5/34; Same to 
same, 3 Feb. 1802, FO 5/37; Same to same, 7 May 1803, FO 5/40.
Convention of 12 May 1803, FO 5/40.
3Thornton to Hawkesbury, 3 July 1802, FO 5/35.
4Hawkesbury to King, 7 May 1802, FO 5/37.
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Americans, as a means of cementing stronger Anglo-American 
relations.1 This was not feasible, however, as long as Britain and 
France remained at peace, but by April 1803, when the resumption of 
war appeared inevitable, Addington proposed such an enterprise to 
King.2
At the time the war resumed, Anglo-American relations were more
favourable than ever, but this rapprochement was short lived.
Immediately after the British declared war, the American government
learned that James Monroe, the American minister in France, had
successfully negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana territory. This
single event completely transformed the nature of Anglo-American
relations, as Thornton noted:
when I compare the Complexion of Mr Merry's Correspondence 
with that of my own, particularly during the Course of the 
last summer, before the Intelligence of the Louisiana 
Purchase reached this Country, I can scarcely credit the 
Testimony of my own Senses in examining the Turn which 
Affairs have taken, and the manifest Ill-Will discovered 
towards us by the Government of the present moment.3
It is easy to exaggerate the nature of the apparently sudden shifts
in Anglo-American relations. For the improvement of relations during
1802 and 1803 was based solely on common hostility to France, which
on the Americans side was caused by the French acquisition of
Louisiana. Once the question of Louisiana evaporated Anglo-American
relations merely returned to normal.
For Addington and Hawkesbury the issue of the Louisiana purchase
became a dilemma. At first, they were extremely pleased that the
territory was out of French control. For example, Addington told Sir
Francis Baring that he approved of the Franco-American treaty and
believed that it would have been worthwhile even for the British
1Thornton to Hawkesbury, 3 Jan. 1803, FO 5/38.
2King to Secretary of State, 2 Apr. 1803, Rufus King
Correspondence. iv. 241.
3Thornton to Hammond, 29 Jan. 1804, FO 5/41.
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government to pay £1 million to facilitate the transfer.1 Upon 
reflection, however, Addington began to have doubts. The British 
Cabinet soon realized that the Americans had decided to raise the 
capital to pay the French through the London stock exchange, and as 
a result, the Baring bank was paying the French government two 
million francs a month. On the one hand, this was providing the 
French with much needed capital to finance the war with Britain, 
while on the other, these payments constricted the money markets in 
Britain, hurting both industry and the government. Consequently, in 
December 18 03 Addington instructed Baring that, as the French were 
going to use the money to finance their invasion of England, the 
government could not allow British subjects to facilitate the 
transfer. He therefore suggested that the bank abandon its 
involvement with the Louisiana purchase and that it could claim that 
government interference had forced the move.2
The Baring's continued to pay the money, however, and in the end 
Addington and Hawkesbury decided to do nothing about it. Although 
these funds were aiding the French, to have overtly interfered could 
have produced grave consequences. For if the Americans learned that 
the British government had prevented the completion of the Louisiana 
purchase, the American government might have formed a military 
alliance with the French and invaded Canada, which would have placed 
an enormous strain on Britain's resources. If the American war had 
taught the British anything, it was that Britain had at all cost to 
avoid fighting the Americans while allied with the French.
Hawkesbury's war diplomacy achieved mixed success. Although able 
to improve Britain's relations with most countries, he failed to 
persuade the Russians, Austrians, or Prussians to put troops in the 
field. Thus Britain remained alone in the war, unable to strike an
1Philip Ziegler, The Sixth Great Power: Baring's, 1762- 
1929 (London, 1988), p. 71.
2Addington to Baring, 16 Dec. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1803/OZ214.
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effective blow at French power. As financial subsidies could not 
entice powers that were not already disposed to enter the war, 
Britain possessed very little leverage with these powers. 
Consequently, Britain's position in the war was based largely on 
forces beyond its control. Hawkesbury was unfortunate that the 
Russians, Austrians, and Prussians would not form a grand coalition 
in 1803. Conversely, he was fortunate ten years later, when for their 
own reasons they did form such a coalition. Thus the British 
government could do little beyond merely ensuring that it did not 
alienate the Continental powers. In this at least, Hawkesbury was 
successful.
Hawkesbury also helped to ensure that most of the lesser powers 
remained neutral rather than joining an alliance with France. Again, 
this was largely a result of their own inclination, but Hawkesbury's 
flexible attitude towards developments that might have provoked a 
British declaration of hostilities kept several small states out of 
the war. This was important because the problems of the war would 
have been compounded, if the French had obtained effective allies. 
Nevertheless, sustaining the good will of Russia and the neutrality 
of Spain and Naples was not sufficient to enable the British to 
survive the war. Britain could not win a long war of attrition. 
Fortunately, however, Hawkesbury's policies did lay the groundwork 
for the formation of the Third Coalition in 1805, which diverted the 
French forces towards central Europe and gave the British a respite.
Moreover, it is clear that Addington and Hawkesbury handled 
Foreign diplomats with more skill than they have been given credit 
for. The traditional view of the ministry's relations with diplomats 
was derived from George Rose, who claimed that all foreign ministers 
said that the ministry was held in contempt.1 Rose's source was Simon 
Vorontsov, whose strong friendship with Grenville prejudiced him 
against Addington and Hawkesbury. Starhemberg, on the other hand, 
told a completely different story:
1Rose Diaries, ii. 41-2.
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J'etais personnellement au moins aussi lie d'amitie avec 
Lord Grenville et Monsieur Pitt, mais malgre leurs talens 
aussi distingues qu1 incontestables je ne puis nier que 
leurs successeurs ne soient infiniment mieux pour nous. Je 
trouve dans Mr Addington et Lord Hawkesbury moins 
d'egotisme et surtout moins d 1obstination que les 
precedens, qui meme actuellement et quoique hors de place 
ne nous pardonnent point de n'etre pas en guerre avec la 
France.1
He often reiterated that the previous ministry was not as reasonable 
towards Austria as was Addington's.2 He had criticized Addington 
severely for signing the Treaty of Amiens, but he stated that it took 
great courage to declare war again after having made such sacrifices 
to obtain the peace. From the moment Addington declared war, 
Starhemberg was completely satisfied with what he called Mes 
Ministres les plus sages, qu'ayant peut-etre depuis longtems gouverne 
11Angleterre1.3 Starhemberg looked unfavourably upon the prospect of 
Pitt's returning to power and criticized severely the way the 
opposition attacked Addington's ministry. The sentiments of most of 
the foreign diplomats including, Otto, Rufus King, and Bernstorff 
were closer to those of Starhemberg than Vorontsov.4 Therefore, the 
refusal of the Continental powers to reenter the war prior to 1805 
cannot be attributed to either the substance or the manner of 
Addington and Hawkesbury's diplomacy.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 21 Oct. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 6 Mar. 1804, HHSA Staatskanzlei 
England Korrespondenz/145.
Starhemberg to Colloredo, 1 May 1804, HHSA Staatskanzlei 
England Korrespondenz/145.
4For the opinions of Otto see his letters to Talleyrand in 
AE, Angleterre/594-597; For King see Rufus King Correspondence, 
iii and iv; For Bernstorff see his intercepted dispatches in 
the Liverpool Papers, Add. MSS 3 8237.
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Military and Naval Policy, May 1803 to April 1804
vBut this is a War unlike any former and must be Differently treated. 
Defence and Security in the first Instance is the first Duty owed to
the Kingdom after which New Scenes might open.'
Admiral Lord Keith1
Although as mentioned the declaration of war received 
considerable support in the country and overwhelming support in 
Parliament, it also proved to be the first major step toward the 
collapse of the ministry. For while the war continued popular, the 
way that the Addington ministry managed it did not. After one year 
of fighting, enough MPs had been persuaded to join the opposition in
questioning the wisdom of the military and naval policies of the
ministry that its parliamentary majority was reduced to the point at 
which defeat appeared imminent. Managing the war presented the 
government with many complex problems, the ministry's solutions to 
which were never wholly satisfactory. That the ministry's 
predecessors and successors never found adequate solutions either, 
did not stop contemporaries or historians from singling out military 
policy as a prime example of the incompetence of the Addington 
government.
Addington was not accused of incompetence, however, in the way 
he managed the war between February and October 1801 because British 
forces enjoyed success against the French in Egypt and the League of 
Armed Neutrality in the Baltic. Moreover, diplomacy took precedence 
over military planning as the government concentrated on negotiating 
peace. The situation in 1803 was completely different, however, for 
having just declared war, the ministry was expected to take 
aggressive action. Nevertheless, Addington faced the perennial
1Keith to Pitt, 10 Mar. 1804, Chatham Papers, PRO
30/8/149/1, fo. 37.
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question of how to deploy the resources of a naval and colonial power 
to strike an effective blow against a strong Continental military 
power. The only answer was to enlist the aid of another strong 
Continental power, and until then the British remained essentially 
on the defensive.
Home Defence
The new war began where the last had ended: Bonaparte soon had 
100,000 soldiers poised to cross the Channel, as the troops that the 
French had claimed were intended originally for Louisiana or St 
Domingue were redirected towards England. At the end of the previous 
war during the summer of 1801, Addington had begun to take seriously 
reports of Bonaparte's military preparations along the Channel coast 
and had discussed plans for responding to an invasion with Pitt and 
Colonel Twiss.1 Therefore, in 1803, he expected that Bonaparte would 
again consider an invasion of either England or Ireland, and early 
intelligence reports confirmed this view. For other than invading 
Hanover, the French had no other means of striking a major blow 
against Britain, and as the British had no allies, Bonaparte could 
concentrate a large force on this mission without the fear of having 
to divert troops to another front. Thus, this time it appeared that 
the war between France and Britain would be fought across the Channel 
rather than in Europe or overseas.
That Bonaparte never actually attempted an invasion has raised 
the question as to whether he really intended to. Was he merely 
trying to intimidate the British? Holland Rose concludes that 
Bonaparte did plan seriously to invade England on several different 
occasions between 1803 and 1805. Such an invasion was well within 
traditional French military strategy and characteristic of the First 
Consul, who was always willing to take a risk if the odds were in his
xSee above, chapter 3, p. 95.
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favour and the reward sufficient.1 His extensive preparations along 
the coast appear to indicate that he wished to give himself the 
option of attempting a crossing, if favourable circumstances arose.
From the point of view of defensive strategy, Bonaparte's true 
intentions were not as important, however, as the British 
government's perception of them. In fact, the general opinion in 
Britain, and among foreign governments, was that Bonaparte would have 
to have been mad to have attempted an invasion, because he would have 
had little chance of success.2 Nevertheless, almost everyone was 
willing to grant that he was so reckless that he might attempt it 
regardless. For example, Hobart told Wellesley that "This Country I 
can almost venture to assure you is out of the reach of Danger from 
Invasion but I am not sufficiently sanguine to think that no attempt 
will be made.'3 In any case, the Addington ministry could not afford 
to take the threat lightly, and Hawkesbury stated that the country 
had to be prepared for an invasion regardless of how unlikely it 
was.4 Moreover, the Royal Navy could not guarantee that it would be 
able to defeat the invasion force at sea. For Admiral Lord Keith 
admitted that the right combination of weather conditions could 
disperse the Channel fleet and present a short opportunity for the 
French to cross safely.5
Consequently, the Addington ministry spent most of its time and 
energy raising a large force for home defence. Addington's foresight 
in maintaining large peace-time establishments for the army, meant 
that Britain entered the war better prepared than ever before. The
1John Holland Rose, "Did Napoleon intend to Invade 
England?', in Pitt and Napoleon: Essays and Letters (London, 
1912) .
Liverpool to Mrs Johnson, 28 Nov. 1803, Add. MSS 38311, 
fo. 167.
3Hobart to Wellesley, 29 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 37309, fos 9-
10 .
4Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 272.
5Keith to York, 21 Oct. 1803, Keith Papers, ii. 52.
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British had 132,000 regular forces, 80,000 of which were stationed 
at home. After the crisis over Switzerland in October 1802, the 
government had also suspended many of the army reductions.1 This was 
exclusive of supplementary forces, such as the militia and the 
volunteers, to which the government had also paid careful attention 
during the peace. The spending cuts required by the poor state of the 
government finances and the necessity of repealing the income tax 
meant the government had to disband a large proportion of the regular 
forces as well as the militia and volunteer regiments, and many
enrolled in these services wished to leave. In the event of the
renewal of war, however, Addington wished to reassemble these forces 
as quickly as possible.
The period of peace provided an excellent opportunity for 
revising the laws concerning the militia. Pitt had made several 
haphazard amendments to the militia but there had been no
comprehensive legislation since 1756. Addington's militia bill of 
1802 was designed to increase the size of the militia and to
consolidate various reforms into one bill. J. R. Western points out, 
however, that Addington neglected to take advantage of an opportunity 
to make sweeping changes to facilitate a rational defensive system.2 
The main reason was that there were almost insurmountable political 
obstacles to permitting the regular army to recruit from the militia 
or to eliminating the provision for substitutes. The main priority 
of the ministry was to provide a large but inexpensive force that 
could be raised and disbanded quickly. For it was important to raise 
the force quickly in the event of an invasion, but it was also 
necessary that the men be able to be return easily to their civilian 
occupations.
The bill Yorke presented to the Commons on 12 April 1802 
provided for a militia of 70,000, which was an increase of 10,000
1John Fortescue, A History of the British Army (14 vols, 
London, 1899-1930), v. 175.
2J. R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth 
Century (London, 1965), p. 240.
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over the bill of 1756. Hobart justified this increase on the basis 
on the increased length of the French coastline which resulted from 
the annexation of Belgium and the subjugation of Holland. Of this 
force, 50,000 was to be raised in the first instance as the old 
militia and then 20, 000 as a new or supplementary militia. The 
militiamen were to be divided into five classes according to their 
suitability for service based on age and number of dependents. Each 
county was given a quota to be raised by ballot, with the provision 
that those balloted could pay a substitute to serve. Counties were 
to be fined £10 per man for deficiencies in their quota, and the 
Lords Lieutenant were to use the money to hire recruits. To save 
money the government cut the annual period of peacetime training from 
twenty-eight to twenty-one days. The total estimated cost was 
£230,000 in peace-time.1
This new legislation was first implemented on 11 March 1803, 
when in response to the French military preparations on the Dutch 
coast, Hobart called out the old militia. After the renewal of war 
two months later, he called out the supplementary militia on 28 May.2 
Therefore, in the first few months of the war the combined force of 
the regular army and militia in Britain was over 13 0,000, and this 
was greater than the size of the army the French could have sent 
across.3
There were several problems with the militia legislation, 
however, the most apparent of which was the principle of 
substitution. For by permitting those balloted to pay a substitute 
to serve, the militia cut into the market from which the regular army 
recruited. This problem was exacerbated by the rise in the price of 
the bounties paid to militia substitutes to the point at which it was
1Statutes at Large from Magna Charta to 1806. ed. Danby 
Pickering (Cambridge, 1807), 42 Geo. Ill, cap. 90; Western, pp. 
236-40.
2Hobart circular to Lords Lieutenant, 11 Mar. and 2 8 May 
1803, WO 6/190.
3Richard Glover, Britain at Bay: Defence against Bonaparte. 
1803-14 (London, 1973), p. 43.
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much higher than those paid by the army to new recruits. Fortescue 
compared the price for substitutes of £20 to £30 with £7 12s. 6d. by 
the army.1 Thus men who might otherwise have been looking for a 
career in the army were enticed away by higher bounties and better 
terms as a substitute in the militia. Nevertheless, there were 
insurmountable political obstacles to eliminating the provision of 
substitution. For any attempt to enforce conscription on the French 
model would have met strong resistance in Parliament and the country, 
because the extent of the power of the crown was an important 
political issue, and the suggestion of the crown forcibly creating 
a strong standing army would have been perceived as an attack on the 
rights of Englishmen.
Another criticism of the militia voiced by Windham and supported 
by Pitt was that it comprised too large a proportion of the nation's 
military force: by concentrating too heavily on home defence the 
government was neglecting to provide for offensive operations. "A war 
that should be completely defensive, would ... be both dishonourable 
and ruinous,1 claimed Pitt.2 Addington agreed in principle with these 
remarks, but the government could not ignore that the most pressing 
concern was the extensive preparations being made by the French for 
an invasion. The home base had to be secure before the government 
could even consider offensive operations. Thus, there was an urgency 
to the situation that Pitt and Windham did not perceive, as the Duke 
of York believed that the French would try to take advantage of 
Britain's unprepared state to launch an early invasion. He expected 
the French to cross the Channel by the summer of 1803, as did St 
Vincent, who told Keith to refrain from leaving his post to come to 
London.3 The only way that the British could defeat a large force of 
veteran French soldiers, according to York, was to meet it with an 
even larger British force as soon as possible after it had landed,
1Fortescue, History of the British Army, v. 202.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1578.
3St Vincent to Keith, 24 June 1803, Add. MSS, 31169, fo.
65.
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in order to deprive the French of the opportunity to organize. Under 
these conditions a massive but relatively untrained force was 
preferable to a small, well-trained one.
In response to this immediate necessity of greatly increased 
manpower, in June 1803 the government brought forward the Additional 
Forces Act, usually referred to as the army of reserve.1 This was to 
provide a further 50,000 men under terms similar to the militia. All 
men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were eligible to be 
balloted for the army of reserve unless they were already serving in 
another branch of the British forces. The force was to be divided 
into five classes along the lines of the militia, and the principle 
of substitution was also permitted. There were two important 
differences, however, between the army of reserve and the militia. 
One was that the reserve could be stationed anywhere in the United 
Kingdom, whereas the militia was restricted to its particular parish 
or county. The other, adopted upon the suggestion of the King, was 
that members of the reserve were permitted and encouraged to 
volunteer for the regular army.2 One of the most serious problems 
with the militia was that militia officers wanted to keep it separate 
from the regular army and strongly objected to the officers from the 
regular forces recruiting from the militia, but the regular army, on 
the other hand, was starved for recruits. The Addington ministry 
tried to please both parties by structuring the militia on a basis 
satisfactory to the militia officers and providing the army of 
reserve from which the regular army could recruit. Addington and 
Yorke succeeded in winning over the support of Pitt and Melville, 
contrary to the former's comments on the militia.3 This owed 
something to Yorke1s having requested Pitt's advice on the measure, 
although claims that he was responsible for the idea appear
1Statutes at Large, 43 Geo. Ill, cap. 82, 83, and 85; 
Hobart to the King, 17 June 1803, Aspinall, iv. 107.
2The King to Hobart, 18 June 1803, Aspinall, iv. 108.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1622; Melville to Robert 
Dundas, 26 July 1803, Melville Castle Muniments, GD 1/51/63/10.
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unfounded.1
While the government implemented these measures immediately, it 
was aware that even further provisions might be necessary in the 
future. Instead of waiting for an emergency to arise, Addington 
decided to have legislation ready enabling the government to call 
upon the services of the entire country. In July, Yorke introduced 
the Military Services Bill which became the Defence of the Realm Act, 
often referred to as the Levy en Masse.2 This legislation merely 
confirmed a constitutional precedent that the King could exercise an 
ancient prerogative to require military service of all his subjects 
in case of invasion. The bill, besides stating that all subjects not 
already enrolled in some branch of the military forces could be 
called to arms to resist an invasion, also provided for measures to 
ascertain the strength and resources of the different parts of the 
country and to indemnify individuals who suffered by measures taken 
by the government for internal defence. On one hand, the legislation 
was a measure to be held in reserve only to be used in case of actual 
invasion. On the other, it was also to press men into volunteering 
for another branch of the military forces.
The branch most successful in obtaining recruits, however, was 
the volunteer force. The volunteers were raised and administered by 
a local aristocrat or Lord Lieutenant. In return for a period of 
annual training, the government granted a small payment, arms and 
equipment, and an exemption from the ballots for the other military 
services. Coordinated loosely by the Home Office, the volunteers 
often acted as a police force in regions where social unrest was 
prevalent but were also on guard to resist invasion. As the members 
had joined the force voluntarily, there was often strong loyalty 
within the regiments, although they might have been of limited 
effectiveness if faced by a foreign army. Volunteer forces were
xThe legislation was devised largely by the Duke of York 
and Charles Yorke. See Yorke to Hardwicke, 14 June 18 03, Add. 
MSS 35702, fos. 203-6 and Brownrigg to York, 18 June 1803, WO 
133/12.
2Statutes at Large, 43 Geo. Ill, cap. 96.
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usually disbanded during peace-time, but in 1802 Addington decided 
to permit certain regiments to continue service. This was part of a 
policy of maintaining a strong peace establishment, but also owed 
something to the desire of the troops to remain embodied and the fear 
of the government over a resurgence of social unrest.1
At the beginning of the war, Addington was reluctant to allow 
the creation of further volunteer regiments owing to their expense,2 
but York required a large force immediately. In Addington's haste, 
he gave little thought to the size, function, and character of the 
volunteer force, and consequently, the new legislation caused 
administrative chaos.3 The government did not believe that it had the 
time to develop a comprehensive plan for utilizing the force. 
Instead, in June 1803 Hobart merely informed Lords Lieutenant of the 
terms under which offers to join the volunteers would be accepted and 
the provisions that the government would grant. The usual incentive 
of an exemption from the ballot for the militia was supplemented by 
a provision that suspended the Levy en Masse in districts that raised 
a sufficient volunteer force. These incentives combined with a 
massive outpouring of patriotic fervour resulted in overwhelming 
numbers of offers to join the volunteers.4
The government was extremely pleased by the sentiment behind 
this response and the assistance that this would provide in resisting 
an invasion, but despite the necessity of raising a large force in 
a short period of time, too many men volunteered. Addington would 
have concurred with Melville's comment that, 'I would have greatly 
preferred a much smaller number to have secured more effectively
xHobart to Pembroke, 2 6 Apr. 1802, and same to Wyse, 31 
Mar. 1803, WO 6/201.
2Twiss, i. 416.
3Hobart to Buckingham, 1 Aug. 18 03, Courts and Cabinets of 
George III, iii. 318; Polden, p. 342.
4Philip J. Haythornthwaite, "The Volunteer Force, 1803-04', 
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, lxiv 
(1986), 193-4.
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their uniform efficiency.11 A government memo of 18 March 1803 stated
that, as the volunteer force was originally intended to counteract
seditious activities and preserve the public peace, a large force was
very desirable. In the event of foreign invasion, however, vIt may
be less desirable to have a very numerous body of Volunteers, than
a well regulated one.'2 Hobart had told Melville that he wished to
discourage volunteers, for there were two problems.3 First, the
exemptions provided by the volunteer legislation rendered it
difficult for many districts to raise their militia and army of
reserve quotas. As the militia and army of reserve were better
trained and under closer government control, they would have been
more effective in resisting the French. While a large volunteer force
was desirable, the government could not let this impede the
recruiting of the other military forces.4
The second problem was that the government was unable to provide
sufficient weapons and allowances for all the regiments offering
service. At the beginning of the war the stocks of arms at the
Ordnance were low. They were higher than usual for peacetime--twice
as high as in 1801--but too low to meet the initial demand at the
beginning of the war.5 Yorke told Hardwicke in September 1803:
Entre Nous, the Ordnance have much to answer for in 
various ways; Except the actual Military State of the 
Battalions of Artillery, Horse Brigade and Field train 
which I understand to be very good, very little attention 
appears to have been paid to other objects during the 
Peace and the great arrangements appear very little
Melville to Hope, 16 Dec. 1803, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/157/2, fos. 294-7.
2Memo on the Volunteers, 18 Mar. 1803, WO 1/407.
3Melville to Addington, 29 July 1803, Melville Castle 
Muniments, GD 51/1/63/9.
4Sullivan to the Bishop of Durham, 3 Sept. 1803, WO 6/120.
5State of Ordnance: Guns and Equipment, 1801 and 1803, 7 
Dec. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl803/OMl.
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provided for.1
The Ordnance could supply enough weapons for about 150,000 soldiers, 
but returns for the volunteers alone soon approached 300,000 and the 
total force, including those stationed in Great Britain, Ireland, and 
overseas, was projected at 600,000.2 The production of weapons was 
slow, however, as gun making was not on production line, and the 
governments had difficulty procuring foreign supplies.3 Nor could the 
Treasury afford the allowances as stipulated in June for all the 
regiments offering service. Therefore, while York was busy training 
the growing ranks of the British forces and the Ordnance was 
overburdened with a desperate search for arms, Addington, Hobart, and 
Yorke were struggling with the political problems caused by their 
legislation.
Having issued the original volunteer legislation in haste, the 
government later had to make several amendments. The first was to 
suspend accepting offers to form volunteer regiments until the 
ballots for the supplementary militia were completed. This was 
followed in August by a new schedule of allowances, despite Pitt's 
objections that they were insufficient, for all offers of service 
from volunteer regiments accepted after 22 July, as a means of 
decreasing the cost.4 The effect of cutting the time of paid exercise 
from eighty-five to twenty-one days was expected to save the 
government £138,727.5 The original allowances had been based on the 
expectation that a much smaller force would volunteer.6 When the 
offers kept pouring in, Addington decided that the government should
xYorke to Hardwicke, 21 Sept. 1803, Add. MSS 35393, fo.
137.
2Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the 
British Army. 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 1963), p. 57.
3Polden, p. 346.
4Pitt to Hobart, 8 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 40862, fo. 21.
Memorandum on the Volunteers, Add. MSS 38357, fo. 254.
6Sullivan to the Bishop of Durham, 21 Sept. 1803, WO 6/120.
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place a limit on those that would be accepted. On 31 August, Yorke, 
who had just replaced Pelham as Home Secretary and to the great 
relief of Hobart had assumed responsibility for the volunteers,1 
issued a circular to the Lords Lieutenant which stated that the 
government would not accept further offers of volunteer service in 
any district where the number of volunteers already exceeded six 
times the number of the old militia. In these circumstances, men 
could still volunteer but they would not receive the allowances or 
an exemption from the ballots for the other services.
While these amendments repaired some of the administrative 
problems, they caused a whole series of new political difficulties. 
In general, the attempts to curb the volunteers dampened some of the 
patriotic spirit in the country.2 Consequently, public morale was not 
as high as it had been at the beginning of the war. Addington deeply 
regretted the disappointment caused by the changes to the volunteers 
but insisted that "no other Course could have been taken' .3 In 
addition, the amendments caused great confusion among volunteer 
commanders and the Lords Lieutenant, and many volunteers were unsure 
of the terms under which they had accepted service. Misunderstandings 
were largely the result of the poor system of communication within 
the country which caused the delays in correspondence between the 
government and local officials. As recruiting for the volunteers was 
continual, many recruits were unaware of the changes in the terms at 
the time they volunteered. Addington rather carelessly remarked that 
if they were dissatisfied they could resign, but under the terms of 
the volunteer legislation resignation was not that simple.4 In fact,
1Hobart to Buckingham, 25 Aug. 1803, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/G.
2Sheridan to Addington, 29 Aug. 1803, Letters of Sheridan, 
ii. 201-2.
3Addington to Hiley Addington, 26 Aug. 1803, Sidmouth
Papers, 152M/cl803/F114.
Westmorland to Yorke, 15 Dec. 1803, Add. MSS 38239, fo.
278 .
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the issue was so complex that the government had to refer it to
Perceval, the Attorney-General.
The most serious problem was, however, the lack of weapons. Men
who had volunteered their time to prepare for the defence of their
country were discouraged by being asked to drill without proper
weapons. The Ordnance had plenty of pikes, but they would be rather
useless in event of invasion, and the men wanted guns. Yorke
complained in October 1803:
I am excessively harassed & worried by this Volunteer 
business which I fear is incurable owing to the 
impossibility of supplying the great number with Arms. In 
truth I think this, with other circumstances, has 
contributed to place Government in a very awkward 
situation; and knowing, as I do now what the actual state 
of Ordnance supplies, for Volunteer Service, are, I cannot 
help being very uneasy.1
This mass of relatively untrained men lacking proper weapons was
an easy target for criticism by the Lords Lieutenant, MPs, and the
public at large. The government was completely overwhelmed by the
extent of the correspondence and Yorke's duties at the Home Office
were severely curtailed by the need to answer requests for arms and
clarification of the laws:
But in fact for the present this unlucky Volunteering 
System absorbs all our Faculties & engrosses all our Time.
In truth, it has really run awav with the Government & 
with the Nation, & will I fear lead us into inextricable 
difficulties of all kinds. If the office cannot soon bring 
it into some regularity & order we shall not be able to go 
on, in the mean time the Impatience, the 111 humour. the 
Petulance, the wrongheadedness & the obstinacy which are 
afloat, add most materially to the excessive difficulties 
& embarrassments of Government, & I may really say to the 
Dangers of the Country.2
Towards the end of 1803 the subject of the volunteers also took 
up a great deal of the time in Parliament. This was not owing so much 
to the seriousness of the crisis as to the fact that most MP's were 
members or commanding officers of volunteer regiments and believed
xYorke to Hardwicke, 5 Oct. 1803, Add. MSS 35393, fo. 143.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 10 Sept. 1803, Add. MSS 35703, fo.
106-9.
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themselves experts on the subject. Many blew minor grievances out of
proportion as an excuse to try to censure the government for its
defence policies. By keeping the debate on the minor questions of
administration and supply, the opposition was able to place the
government, which lacked debating talent, in an extremely awkward
position. Hobart acknowledged to Auckland:
We are however to hear much of the Volunteer system after 
Christmas, & if we do not take care it will be wholly lost 
in the attempt to bring it to a state of perfection of 
which it is not capable--Tho' I would at the same time 
acknowledge that some gentle touches of improvement may 
not be inadvisable.1
Addington was rather more optimistic, as he told Hiley, "I am fully
convinced that all the present Difficulties respecting the volunteers
will be speedily, & satisfactorily surmounted.'2 Unfortunately, he
could not have been further from the truth.
While Addington's volunteer measures put the ministry into
political danger, they did not place the country in military danger.
With over 380,000 volunteers (not including 70,000 in Ireland) and
a combined military force of over 615,000 by December 1803, the
government had raised the largest army in British history.3 While
most of these men individually were no match for Bonaparte's seasoned
veterans, the Duke of York had ensured that many were well trained,
and as time passed the quality of these troops improved greatly. Thus
Addington's military measures had achieved their most important goal:
raising a large force in a short period. Owing to haste and lack of
experience, the ministry made many mistakes but none which seriously
endangered the security of the country or were not eventually
resolved. Eldon also pointed out that much of the confusion over the
1Hobart to Auckland, 19 Dec. 1803, Add. MSS 34456, fo. 41.
2Addington to Hiley Addington, 24 Jan. 1804, Sidmouth 
Papers, 152M/cl804/OZ62.
3John Fortescue, The Countv Lieutenancies and the Army, 
1803-1814 (London, 1909), p. 69; Pellew, ii. 235; C. D. Hall, 
'Factors Influencing British Strategic Planning and Execution 
during the Napoleonic Wars' (Ph. D., Exeter, 1985), pp. 21-2.
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volunteer legislation was caused by the process of Parliament:
The fact, he said, was that a bill, originally prepared 
with the greatest care, underwent so many modifications in 
its progress through both Houses, and received so many 
amendments from what was called (how properly he would not 
take upon himself to say) the conjunctive wisdom of 
parliament, that it became at last in a great degree 
inexplicable.1
Addington's military measures have also received severe 
criticism from historians. Fortescue made the first detailed study 
of the government's military policies, and many subsequent historians 
have accepted his criticisms without question. He concentrated his 
attack on the failure of the government to raise the number of men 
projected in the legislation. By 28 May 1803, almost three months 
after the government had called out the old militia, only 40,000 out 
of the projected 51,000 had been raised. He claimed that the army of 
reserve was an "Utter Failure' because it had only raised 30,000 
effective troops out of a projected total of 50, 000.2 He also blamed 
the government for allowing substitutions and exempting the 
volunteers from the ballot of the army of reserve. Thus, the 
criticisms made by the opposition, having been largely corroborated 
by Britain's premier military historian at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, have remained almost unquestioned ever since.
However, Addington has had an able defender in Glover, who quite 
rightly claims that the government could not be held responsible for 
the deaths and desertion which cut into the ranks, and the enlistment 
of unfit troops such as boys and weaklings was the fault of local 
officials not the government. Moveover, even gaining a further 30,000 
troops for national service--including 7,500 that had volunteered for 
the regular army by December 1803,3--was a valuable achievement. 
Glover also argues that Fortescue had unrealistic expectations about 
the skill and discipline which could be achieved in the volunteer
1Twiss, i. 428.
2Fortescue, Country Lieutenants and the Army, pp. 54, 73.
3Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl803/OM10.
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force, for the volunteers could not have been made into skilled light
infantry in a short period of time. Nevertheless, under the
supervision of the Duke of York, they were formed into a decent
army.1 In the words of Cornwallis, who was the most experienced
military commander in the country:
Government have [sic] acted properly in endeavouring only 
to make as much soldiers as it was possible to render a 
force so composed, and no man, whether civil or military, 
will persuade me that 300,000 men, trained as the 
volunteers at present are, do not add very materially to 
the confidence and to the actual security of this country.2
Glover also points out that subsequent governments were unable
to devise more successful measures. Pitt abolished the army of
reserve and replaced it with a Permanent Additional Forces Act which
raised only 13,000 in two years. This drew the remark from Abbot that
it was hard to justify Pitt's hostility to Addington's policies when
his own measures did not bear out that he was superior.3 After
Windham took the War Office during the ministry of All the Talents,
he dismantled the volunteers and revised the Levy en Masse with
measures which were so confusing that he was unable to explain them
in Parliament. On the whole the generals hated Windham's reforms, his
defence of which was more pitiful and incoherent than anything
uttered by members of the Addington ministry. Windham clearly
demonstrated that although he could find fault with Addington's
measures, he could only do a worse job than those whom he had
criticized.4
According to the Duke of York, the actual size of the defence 
forces was not as important as how and when they were deployed. His 
preparations for the invasion were based on two assumptions. The
1Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 230-7.
2Cornwallis to Ross, Dec. 1803, Cornwallis Correspondence, 
iii. 509.
3Colchester Diary. ii. 29.
4Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 238-44.
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first was that the French would take advantage of Britain's
unpreparedness to strike before British defence forces were assembled
and trained. The second was that the French would attack only points
of strategic importance and would probably follow the shortest route
to London. This meant either invading the Kentish coast and marching
northwest, or invading the Sussex coast and marching north. The first
was the shortest route by sea, the second the shortest by land.
Therefore, the best means of preparing to repel this attack was to
concentrate all available defence forces in the southeast of England
as quickly as possible. He informed Hobart:
with the exception of Plymouth the greater Portions of the 
Troops in the distant parts of England should be 
immediately collected in the Eastern and Southern 
Districts to Frustrate any attempt which may be made upon 
the Capital, before the full measure of intended 
Preparation is Effective.1
While this would weaken the defence forces in the other parts of the
country, York suggested that the volunteers and yeomanry take over
police duties, and he would send a ^Regiment of Heavy Cavalry from
the Eastern district to be stationed in the manufacturing and
populous Towns in the Center and North of England'.2 Local officials
in these regions would have complained but, because it was unlikely
that the French would land in these regions, moving troops to the
southeast was in the best interests of the defence of the country.
It was also necessary that these forces receive top priority for the
limited number of weapons available from the Ordnance.3 In many ways,
the overall shortage of manpower and weapons was unimportant as long
as the forces in the southeast were properly supplied.
As time passed, York's strategy for deploying the forces at his
disposal changed. At first, he knew he would only have relatively
untrained volunteer and other irregular forces at his disposal. Such
forces would have difficulty overcoming the French in open battle,
3York to Hobart, 3 0 June 1803, WO 1/62 5.
2Idem.
Memorandum on Arming, 25 July 1803, WO 1/625.
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but they could wear down the enemy in a strategy of guerrilla 
warfare:
From the first moment of a landing being made, the great 
object of the irregular Troops must be to Harass, alarm 
and Fatigue an enemy--nothing can more effectually 
contribute to this object than the operations of small 
bodies of men well acquainted with the country who will 
approach and fire upon the advanced Post of His army 
without ever engaging in serious action or hazarding 
themselves.1
When the enemy advanced from the coast, these forces were to attack 
his flank and rear and cut off small detachments in search of 
plunder.
By the end of August, when more troops had been assembled and
better trained, York became more confident in the country's ability
to resist the invasion and decided that the best strategy would be
to meet the French right on the beaches:
Short of a total Defeat perhaps the period of the Enemy's 
greatest weakness, would be the moment of His landing, and 
the time He is preparing His artillery and Stores to 
commence his March.
There will be no opportunity for manoeuvre, it must 
be a contest of valour in which every Briton will find his 
value, and I should therefore look upon 2,000 additional 
Men which could be brought to the Beach in the first 24 
Hours as of greater importance than treble the number 
which might join the Army at a later period of the 
Contest.2
While the government was more confident in its ability to defeat 
an invasion, it still continued to expect that the French would cross 
at any time. At several times during the autumn and winter, the 
government received intelligence that the invasion was imminent or 
had been launched. For example, at the end of December, Admiral Sir 
William Cornwallis's squadron blockading Brest was blown off station 
by a storm and had to take refuge at Torbay, leaving the French 
forty-eight hours during which their fleet could have sailed to join
1York to General Officers Commanding Districts, 1 July 
1803, WO 1/625.
2York to Hobart, 25 Aug. 1803, WO 30/76.
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an invasion force.1 Upon hearing the news, the government sent orders 
to the coast to prepare for an invasion.2 Consequently, York and the 
Cabinet continued to take measures to further the defence of southern 
England.
As early as July 1803, York had advocated constructing an 
selective system of field fortifications as quickly as possible, as 
'the Erection of such Works must be immediate with a view to their 
probable utility'.3 He wished them placed at, 'Points where a Landing 
threatens the most important interests of the Country' , as they would 
provide important advantages over an enemy short of artillery.4 In 
August, he began pressing the Cabinet for further funds for 
fortifications. At first, Addington was concerned about the costs 
involved but gradually consented to all of the Duke's requests.5 
York's priorities were first to construct substantial fortifications 
on the Western Heights overlooking the Port of Dover, and to build 
ten Martello Towers along the coasts of Kent and Sussex. These towers 
were not built until after the Addington ministry fell, but the 
decision to proceed was made by Addington and Hobart.6 The delays 
were caused by the Ordnance and the Royal Engineers which were 
overburdened by other work. Hobart had first referred the idea of the 
fortifications to Chatham on 12 September 1803, but by 9 February 
1804, the Royal Engineers still had not been able to study the
^Addington to the King, 1 Jan. 1804, Aspinall, iv. 148; 
Steele to Pitt, 3 Jan. 1804, Chatham Papers, PRO 30/8/180/2, 
fos. 241-2.
2Starhemberg to Colloredo, 27 Dec. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
3York to Chatham, 4 July 1803, WO 30/76.
4York to Hobart 4 July and 25 Aug. 1803, WO 1/625.
5York to Hobart, 14 Sept. 1803, WO 1/62 6; Hobart to York, 
26 Mar. 1804, WO 1/627.
6Hobart to York, 6 & 7 Apr. 1804 and York to Hobart, 31 
Mar. and 10 Apr. 1804, WO 1/625.
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question of the Western Heights or the Martello Towers.1
The government also considered several other methods of slowing 
down a French advance, in the event that a landing proved successful. 
In 1801, the Colonel Twiss of the Royal Engineers first discussed 
plans for inundating Romney Marsh and the Penvensey Level, and by 
July 1803 York fully supported the plan.2 Twiss stated that he could 
fix gates in the sluices to retain water in case of invasion for a 
cost of £200.3 The government also planned to flood the Royal 
Military Canal. If the French were able to cross these flooded 
territories, however, the British wished to ensure that they could 
not eat off the land. The War Office had plans for the removal of 
horses, carts, and stock (both live and dead), and the destructions 
of everything that could not be carried away. By October 1803, 
however, York was more confident of the forces at his disposal and 
believed that, as the British troops were unlikely to be retreating, 
they would need such stock as remained.4
The government was making administrative as well as military 
preparations in event of invasion. If the French landed in Essex, 
Addington and the King planned to move to Chelmsford and if in Kent 
to Dartford. The Queen and the royal treasure were to be transported 
to Worcester. The press was to be censored and the books of the Bank 
of England were to be stored in the Tower.5 Moreover, Addington had 
already asked Perceval to devise legislation for the enforcing of 
martial law,6 and expecting that an invasion would deflate the paper
Hobart to Chatham, 12 Sept. 1803, and Chatham to Hobart, 9 
Feb. 1804, WO 1/625.
2York to Hobart, 8 July 1803, WO 30/76.
3Twiss to Dundas, 3 Aug. 1803, WO 3 0/62.
4York to Yorke, 24 Oct. 1803, WO 30/76.
5Pellew, ii. 238; Ziegler, p. 206.
6Perceval and Manners-Sutton to Yorke, 23 Jan. 1804, Add. 
MSS 38240, fo. 117; Spencer Walpole, The Life of the Right Hon. 
Spencer Perceval, including correspondence with Numerous 
Distinguished Persons, (2 vols, London, 1874), i. 115.
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currency, York tried to arrange to pay the army with gold.1
The navy also played an important role in home defence. If the
French were able to evade the British fleet in the Channel it was
necessary to have some squadrons for coastal defence. In response to
York's request for a permanent squadron to defend the Eastern
District at the mouth of the Thames at Hollesley Bay, St Vincent sent
Admiral Lord Keith assisted by Sir James Craig.2 York believed that
the squadron was insufficient, but St Vincent was adamantly opposed
to weakening the already stretched blockading squadrons.3 The
government had also ordered the reestablishment of the sea fencibles,
a branch of the volunteer force stationed in port towns. St Vincent
deferred implementing this request, as he explained,
in order to give an opportunity to the officers employed 
on the Impress Service, of Securing as many of the Seamen 
or Seafaring Men employed on the Coast as possible, for 
the equipment of which, your Lordship is aware has been 
considerable retarded from the want of those Classes of 
men of which description most of the people who Served as 
Sea fencibles during the last War were composed.4
This was completed soon after, and by February 1804 over 25,000 sea
fencibles had been raised.5
Despite the incessant criticism of these defence measures by the
opposition in Parliament, Addington and the rest of the government
were confident that British forces would defeat a French invasion.
Man for man, the British were no match for the French soldiers, but
an overwhelming superiority of numbers and the advantages of fighting
on their own soil should have enabled them to resist. As York pointed
out, "The extent of army which an Enemy may land, depends not upon
xYork to Addington, 19 Oct. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl803/OZ124.
2York to Hobart 21 June 1803, WO 30/76; St Vincent to 
Hobart, 9 July 1803, WO 1/100.
3Polden, p. 362.
4St Vincent to Hobart, 23 June 1803, Adm. 2/1360.
5Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl804/ON7.
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His numbers at Home but upon His means of transporting them to this 
Country.'1 The French could embark only a limited force, some of 
which were bound to be lost while in transit, and the defence plans 
of the Addington ministry appeared sufficient to handle the 
remainder. The government was so confident, in fact, that it almost 
wished the French would attempt the invasion. Hawkesbury claimed 
that, 'If they should come we are prepared to meet them & I trust the 
Question of Invasion will be settled for ever.'2 Liverpool went even 
further, 'The Majority certainly wish that the French may attempt to 
invade us, in order to prove by Example to future Times, that the 
Conquest of this Country, by a Foreign Enemy, is impracticable.'3 
Perceval added that, 'In this Country we begin to think the suspense 
of Expectation worse than the attempt, and there are more wishes 
expressed for their making it than their delaying it.'4 An invasion 
might have provided other benefits, as the Russian had suggested 
that, if the French invaded and were defeated, they and Austrians 
would join the war.5
Even though the invasion was never attempted, this in itself 
indirectly vindicated the defence policies of the Addington ministry. 
The ultimate goal of the government was to prevent the French from 
conquering Britain. This could have been achieved in two ways: first, 
by providing sufficient defensive measures to enable the British 
forces to defeat an invading force, and second, by adopting naval and 
military policies which would dissuade the enemy from even attempting 
the invasion. Bonaparte had two years during which nothing on the 
Continent diverted his attention from the Channel, yet he never took
xYork to Hobart, 30 June 1803, WO 1/625.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 1 Nov. 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
34.
Liverpool to Mrs Johnson, 28 Nov. 1803, Add. MSS 38311, 
fo. 167.
4Perceval to Redesdale, 27 Dec. 1803, Holland (Perceval)
Papers, Bundle XI.
5See above, chapter 7, p. 218.
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the risk. Therefore, Addington's defence policies did help to achieve 
their most important objective, and the extraordinary fervour of the 
parliamentary criticism was largely unjustified.
Grand Strategy
A few months before Addington declared war, Pitt advised Chatham 
that the government should prepare for immediate hostilities and 
"strike in the first instance some sudden blow on any vulnerable 
point'.1 The man, whom many considered as the only one capable of 
leading the country in war, did not suggest what these vulnerable 
points might be. The answer was of course that he did not know. After 
managing the war for almost a decade he still had not found a truly 
vulnerable point which the British could attack with some hope of 
success. Therefore, it was unrealistic of him to expect that 
Addington should find one. The only two successful campaigns for the 
British during the French Wars were the Egyptian expedition and the 
Peninsular campaign. In 1803, French troops were not stationed in 
either Egypt or Spain.
Addington was accused of having lacked imagination. A truly 
great war leader, on the other hand, would have developed a new 
strategy to deal with the French: he would have found some place to 
send British troops to some effect. Nevertheless, it is hardly fair 
to measure Addington against such a standard. For no other leader 
during the course of the war discovered another place where British 
troops could be sent with some hope of success. The only other major 
offensives besides Egypt and the Peninsula were the invasions of the 
Dutch coast in 1799 and 1809, and both were dramatic failures. But 
while Addington would have been looked upon less favourably if he had 
sent a disastrous expedition to the Continent, no one gave him credit 
for having resisted the temptation to risk one.
Addington's approach to the war was both cautious and 
traditional. During the previous war, Grenville and Dundas had
xPitt to Chatham, 2 Mar. 1803, Stanhope, iii. 106.
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disagreed fundamentally about how to fight the war. Grenville argued 
that France would only be beaten by a grand coalition fighting on the 
Continent, and that money and troops spent on colonial adventures 
wasted the resources required to win the battles where they really 
mattered. Dundas, on the contrary, believed that Continental allies 
could not be trusted to fight for British objectives, and, therefore, 
that the British had to concentrate their resources in the theatres 
of war where they had a chance to win and to pursue polices that 
strengthened the Royal Navy and the British economy in order to 
enable the country to survive a war of attrition.
Addington, like Pitt before him, tried to implement both 
policies simultaneously. As mentioned, the British could never defeat 
France on their own and they were unlikely to win a war of attrition 
because French control of the Continental ports would place a greater 
strain on the British economy than a British blockade would on the 
French.1 So to be able to survive the war for a lengthy period, the 
British required a Continental ally to engage the French. Addington 
thought he had found that ally in Russia, who appeared to agree that 
the French posed a threat in central Europe and the Near East and 
consented to close cooperation though short of a formal alliance. As 
mentioned the course of Anglo-Russian diplomacy convinced Addington 
and Hawkesbury that the Russians were on the verge of signing a 
formal alliance and joining the war. The decisions to retain Malta 
and later to renew the war were based on the false assumption that 
the British had Russian support. Addington and Hawkesbury were 
startled by the Russian decision to propose mediation, but the 
dispatches of the Foreign Secretary clearly indicate that he 
continued to believe that if the British could merely survive the 
early stages of the war, the Russians would eventually join, bringing
1Charles John Fedorak, "Maritime Versus Continental 
Strategy: Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon', Proceedings of 
the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. 1750-1850. (1989),
forthcoming.
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in the Austrians and possibly the Prussians with them.1
Pursuing policies dependent on the actions of another power was 
somewhat reckless. For what if the Russians did not enter the war as 
expected? The formation of the Third Coalition in 1805 proved 
Addington and Hawkesbury right, but by then it was too late to save 
the ministry. The central point is, however, that Addington had 
little choice, for there were no alternatives to pursuing a 
Continental alliance because the British did not have sufficient 
troops to land on the Continent and defeat the French singlehandedly, 
nor could other options such as colonial or naval warfare cause the 
overthrow of the French government or force that government to 
negotiate peace on terms favourable to Britain. There were only two 
real options for the British: accept peace on whatever terms the 
French would grant, or go to war hoping that they could survive until 
joined by a Continental ally. Thus the British were literally at the 
mercy of the Continental powers.
While waiting for his Russian alliance to materialize, Addington 
decided to take the offensive in the naval and colonial spheres where 
the British possessed the advantage. In March 1803, when relations 
with France appeared to be deteriorating rapidly, Hobart began to 
prepare the navy for action. The three most important theatres of war 
for the Royal Navy were the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the 
Caribbean. After Hobart had ordered impressment to increase the 
supply of seamen in March 1803, the Admiralty directed a squadron to 
gather intelligence off Cherbourg. By the end of March, Yorke claimed 
that, "This week we shall have at least 10 sail of the Line off the 
Lizard, or in Cauford [? Cawrand] Bay, & as all the Frigates are 
armed, a Night[']s time will suffice to block up all the Ports from 
the Texel to Brest.'2 In April, the Admiralty increased the home 
squadron and the defence of the Medway and Thames, and the Channel
1See above, chapter 7, pp. 212-25.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 28 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos.
155-6.
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squadron was further reinforced in early May.1
Immediately after Addington declared war, Admiral Cornwallis 
sailed to blockade Brest, which he accomplished within thirty-six 
hours. This was important because, as Brest was the only French 
harbour on the Channel coast capable of servicing a large fleet and 
the commercial port of the French West Indian trade, it was the most 
important French port outside of the Mediterranean, and in order to 
maintain command of the Channel, the Royal Navy had to contain the 
French fleet in port. The Royal Navy also established blockades at 
Rochefort and Lorient.2
St Vincent's blockade policy included two lines of defence. The 
first sealed the ports as closely as possible with warships and 
strategically placed frigates which would cruise the harbour. The 
inshore squadron of battleships remained close behind and the rest 
of the fleet not far away. The second line consisted of various 
squadrons falling back on the strategic centre close to the Lizard, 
able to follow the French to Ireland or up the Channel.3 Thus the 
close blockade not only prevented French war ships from joining the 
invasion forces, but also cut France's overseas commercial lifeline.
Next in strategic importance was the Mediterranean. During the 
peace Bonaparte had made alarming acquisition in the region, as he 
had annexed Leghorn and Elba, signed treaties with the Barbary 
States, and obtained access to the Black Sea. By dominating the 
Mediterranean, he could exclude Britain from the Levant trade, 
capture the Russian trade, and ultimately threaten British India. 
Sebastiani's report had reinforced British fears that Bonaparte would 
reoccupy Egypt once Malta had been surrendered, and so on 5 March 
Hobart directed the Admiralty to instruct the Mediterranean squadron 
to be on alert in case the French tried an amphibious attack on the
Admiralty to Bickerton, 20 Mar. 1803, Nepean to Rainier, 7 
Apr. 1803, and Admiralty to Saumerez, 11 Apr. 1803, Adm. 2/1360; 
Admiralty to Williams, 7 May 1803, Adm. 2/145.
2Reilly, p. 417.
3Sherrard, p. 2 06.
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Turkish Empire.1
On 17 May, Nelson sailed to take command of the Mediterranean 
fleet, and his major objective was to prevent the French fleet from 
leaving the other important French port at Toulon, a mission that he 
had failed to accomplish in 1798. While Cornwallis was directed to 
resume St Vincent's policy of a close blockade of Brest, Nelson's 
mission was more complicated, for he was to blockade Toulon from a 
distance. Besides causing more wear and tear on the ships, this 
strategy left the blockading force short of supplies and easily 
scouted by the French.2 Moreover, Nelson had several other 
responsibilities. He had to watch Leghorn and Genoa in case the 
French tried to avoid the blockade by launching an invasion of Egypt 
from Italy. In effect, he was to blockade three ports simultaneously. 
The other important strategic interest in the Mediterranean was 
Malta. Having placed such importance on the island in the 
negotiations with the French government, the Addington ministry was 
determined that Malta should remain in British hands. Finally, Nelson 
was to try to protect the King of Naples and to monitor the 
activities of the Spanish fleet.3
Hobart had also been watching closely the situation in the West 
Indies. By the end of March, he decided that, even if the French 
ships and troops in Holland were intended for Louisiana, the Royal 
Navy should intercept the fleet if it ever sailed from Helveotsluys.4 
Even though Britain and France were still at peace, he reinforced the 
squadron in the Leeward Islands and ordered it to intercept any 
French reinforcements sent to the region.5 On 16 May, two days before 
the actual declaration of war, Hobart sent instructions to both the
1Hobart to Admiralty, 5 Mar. 1803, WO 6/183.
2Piers Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean. 1803-1810 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 29.
3Hobart to Admiralty, 17 May 1803, WO 6/183.
4Hobart to Admiralty, 31 Mar. 1803, WO 6/183.
5Hobart to Admiralty, 1 Apr. and 7 May 1803, Adm. 6/183.
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East and West Indies. He ordered Wellesley to capture Cochin and the 
Dutch islands but not to attack Mauritius or Batavia without further 
instructions. In the West Indies, he ordered Grinfield to capture St 
Lucia and Tobago in the first instance and to attack Martinique if 
the chances of success appeared reasonable, while in North America 
he directed British troops to attack St Pierre and Miquelon. By 10 
June, having received intelligence that the proprietors of Surinam, 
Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo wanted British protection, Hobart 
ordered that these colonies also be captured, and he did not expect 
that there would be much resistance except at Martinique and St 
Lucia.1
These colonial initiatives were remarkably successful, as St 
Lucia and Tobago, along with St Pierre and Miquelon were recaptured 
by the end of June. British West Indian forces then recaptured 
Demerera, Essequibo, and Berbice by the end of September, and by May 
1804 had recaptured Surinam. All of these operations were 
accomplished without substantial reinforcements, as the government 
sent only 159 troops to the West Indies in 1803, and two new 
regiments were sufficient to aid the force invading Surinam in 1804.2 
Thus, of the colonies returned by the Treaty of Amiens, the British 
recaptured all but the Cape and Martinique during the term of the 
Addington ministry. Martinique was the most difficult to subdue, 
owing to its size and the strength of the French garrison, but having 
recaptured Tobago the British were able to establish an effective 
blockade of Martinique which prevented the French from deriving any 
military or commercial advantage from the island. The only other 
French island left in the West Indies was St Domingue. The British 
were not in possession of the island at the time of the peace, and
1Hobart to Wellesley, 16 May, 1803, and Hobart to 
Grinfield, 16 May, and 10 June 1803, WO 6/183; Hobart to 
Grinfield, 16 May and 11 June 1803, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/C86 and C87; Hobart to Admiralty, 4 June 1803, WO 
6/49.
2C. D. Hall, "Addington at War: Unspectacular but not 
Unsuccessful1, Historical Research, lxi (1988), 311.
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were in no position to capture it after the renewal of war. The 
command of the sea enjoyed by the Royal Navy, however, prevented the 
French from sending reinforcements that were necessary to subdue the 
negro rebellion on the island.
This re-implementation of the colonial warfare policy of Dundas 
went no further towards defeating the French, however, than the 
original attempts had during the previous war. Ever since the 
beginning of the Revolution, the French considered their colonies of 
relatively little importance compared with the situation in Europe. 
Thus, contrary to British expectations, they would not exchange 
territory in Europe for a return of their conquered colonies. 
Nevertheless, this policy of colonial warfare was still important to 
Addington, for having declared war catching Bonaparte off guard, 
Addington wanted to make use of all of the advantages presented to 
him. The element of surprise left the French with inadequate 
garrisons and only a small fleet in the West Indies, while 
Addington's high peace-time military and naval establishments gave 
the British an opportunity for some easy success in the Caribbean. 
Even victories of such limited importance were necessary to sustain 
morale and confidence in the government. These expeditions also 
permitted Addington to answer Grenville's assertion that these 
colonies were so necessary for strategic reasons to Britain to have 
been worth continuing the war in 1801, with the response that once 
the war was renewed the colonies were easily reconquered and in this 
way the British had lost nothing by the Treaty of Amiens.
Beyond capturing French colonies, however, there was little the 
British could do to harm the French war effort. The French advance 
through northern Germany to attack Hanover shortly after the war 
began led to their gaining control of the Elbe and Weser rivers. In 
June and July, the British responded with a blockade of these rivers 
because the French excluded British shipping through these outlets.1 
In an attempt to increase the economic pressure on France, in 
September, Hobart directed that a squadron in the Channel blockade
1Hobart to Admiralty, 25 June and 26 July 1803, WO 6/183.
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Havre de Grace to sever the life-line to Paris.1 These blockades, 
particularly at Brest, were on the whole quite effective, according 
to Frangois Crouzet, Paul Kennedy and Charles Arthur, as the British 
were able to interrupt French and foreign trade to French ports and 
to bottle up the French navy, depriving it the ability to attack the 
Royal Navy through a guerre de course or even to practice 
manoeuvres.2 Nevertheless, they did not do serious harm to the French 
economy because the French were able to tap the resources of the 
Continent. The British were able to deprive the French of some luxury 
items such as sugar, coffee, and spices, but this had only a marginal 
effect on the ability of the French to continue the war, as 
demonstrated by Crouzet.3 The blockades also ran the risk of 
seriously alienating the neutral powers, particulary Prussia, who 
were hurt by them. Thus the blockade was hardly the key to the defeat 
of the French as claimed by Arthur.4
The one policy option that Addington considered but did not try 
was a major amphibious operation. By the autumn of 1803, Addington 
believed that as a sufficient defence force had been raised, he would 
soon have 20,000 men available for some type of offensive operation 
either in Europe or South America.5 On 4 September, Addington claimed 
that, 'The Time is not, I trust, very remote, when we shall find 
ourselves in such a State, as to admit of the Application of a large
1Hobart to Admiralty, 6 Sept. 1803, WO 6/183.
2Frangois Crouzet, 'La Guerre Maritime1 and 'Le Systeme 
Continental et ses Consequences1, in Jean Mistier ed., Napoleon 
et L 1Empire: L 1apoge et la chute (Paris, 1979), pp. 50, 152;
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery 
(London, 1976), p. 122; Charles B. Arthur, The Remaking of the 
English N a w  bv Admiral St. Vincent--Key to Victory over 
Napoleon; The Great Unclaimed Naval Revolution. 1795-1805 
(London, 1986), pp. 182, 188-9, 196-9, 223.
3Frangois Crouzet, 'La Guerre Maritime1, p. 50.
4Arthur, p. iv.
5Starhemberg to Colloredo, 20 Oct. 1803, HHSA,
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144; York to Hobart, 13 Jan. 
1804, WO 1/627.
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Force to other Purposes than those of mere Defence, & of domestic 
Security.11 Moreover, by April 1804 Yorke had decided to suspend the 
army of reserve legislation because the army for home defence was 
already sufficient and the government wanted to decrease competition 
to enable the regular army to recruit greater numbers.2 As to 
deploying this force, Vansittart and Hobart favoured an expedition 
to capture the Portuguese and Spanish colonies in South America.3 
Hobart had suggested such a plan as early as July 1801,4 but 
Addington and Hawkesbury ruled this out, because they were trying to 
preserve the neutrality of Spain and did not wish to harm their 
relations with Portugal.5 The other important point was that these 
proposals were very risky and even if successful would have done 
little to harm the French war effort. The Cabinet also considered 
plans which foreshadowed the Walcheren invasion of 1809 and the 
Peninsular campaign.6 The problems with these schemes, however, were 
that, on one hand, the chances of success in Holland appeared slight 
considering that such a large French force was already present on the 
Channel coast, and, on the other, the French army was not yet even 
in Portugal. The government finally decided not to risk the small 
number of troops it could raise for such an operation until the 
chances of success appeared much greater.
Fortescue's criticism of Addington for not sending a force of
^Addington to Simcoe, 4 Sept. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl803/OZ354.
Parliamentary Debates, ii. 279-82.
3Vansittart to Addington, 22 Sept. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl803/OZ2 75; Hawkesbury to Hobart, 2 9 Sept. 18 03, Hobart 
Papers, D/MH/H/War/B74.
4Hobart to Addington, 16 July 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl80l/OM4.
5Rufus King Correspondence, iv. 321.
6Starhemberg to Colloredo, 15 Dec. 1803, HHSA, 
Staatskanzlei England Korrespondenz/144.
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30-40,000 to southern Italy has already been answered by C. D. Hall.1 
Besides the logistical problems that he outlines, it is also
questionable whether the British could have succeeded in that 
theatre. For they discovered in North Holland in 1799 that they were 
not necessarily welcome in a country simply because it had been
occupied by the French. Moreover, the King of Naples did not want
British troops on his soil, because they would undermine his
authority and act as a magnet for a large French counter-invasion. 
Even when the French did invade, he was very reluctant to allow 
British troops to secure possession of Sicily.2 In Italian territory 
already controlled by France, it is unclear whether the natives would 
have preferred the British troops to the French, and the Dutch had 
already demonstrated that they seemed to prefer French control to a 
restoration of the old regime.
Nevertheless, Addington's war policies have had some defenders. 
Ziegler argues that Addington deliberately avoided an offensive war 
policy to entice Bonaparte into a showdown on the Channel. Either the 
French would send a large force across to be defeated, or Bonaparte 
would suffer a national humiliation for assembling the invasion force 
and then not demonstrating the courage to embark.3 Addington did not 
adopt a strategy of masterly inactivity out of choice, however, as 
Ziegler seems to claim. For as mentioned he had a force of 20,000 
ready to attack the French at some vulnerable point as soon as he 
found one. Hall presents a more accurate and detailed analysis of 
Addington's general strategy, but his description of them as being 
"unspectacular but not unsuccessful' begs the question as to whether 
or not spectacular results were achievable.4 On the contrary, a more 
effective war strategy was beyond the means of the British
1Fortescue, A History of the British Army, v. 196-202; 
Hall, "Addington at War', pp. 310-11.
2See above, chapter 7, p. 232.
3Ziegler, pp. 197-8.
4Hall, "Addington at War', pp. 3 06-15.
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government. The Royal Navy achieved the goals outlined by Addington 
and Hobart. These goals were very limited, reflected traditional 
British policy, and probably would have been achieved regardless of 
who was Prime Minister. Addington only deserves credit for not 
risking his limited manpower on schemes which, even if they had have 
succeeded, would not have had a decisive effect on the war. Years 
later, when conditions on the Continent had changed substantially, 
such risks were worth taking and did contribute to the defeat of the 
French. The Peninsular campaign played an important auxiliary role 
to the allied offensive in central Europe. In 1803 and 1804, however, 
there was no opportunity for the British to play that role. As at 
most points during the war, there was, in the words of Piers Mackesy 
a ^dearth of strategic options1.1
A fair point of contention is whether Addington should have 
declared war when he did, knowing full well that Britain could not 
win the war on its own and that unless the Russians and Austrians 
entered the war in the near future the British would have found 
themselves in a similar situation as in 1801. It is difficult, 
however, to speculate what would have happened if he had not declared 
war. While he took a considerable risk, it is clear that he felt that 
he had no choice. For France was threatening to make even further 
requisitions if the British surrendered Malta, and Bonaparte had 
declared that there would be war if the British kept the island. 
Thus, Addington believed that war was inevitable anyway, and Britain 
was in a better position to preserve its interests than if the French 
had been given more time to prepare. Moreover, although Addington and 
Hawkesbury were wrong in the short term, it was reasonable to assume 
from the course of Anglo-Russian diplomacy, that the Russians would 
probably join the war in the near future. Declaring war in May 1803 
was a gamble, but allowing Anglo-French relations to have continued 
as they were would also have involved serious risks.
1Piers Mackesy, ^Strategic Problems of the British War 
Effort', Dickinson ed., Britain and the French Revolution, p. 
157.
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This analysis puts St Vincent's naval reforms into better
context. In March 1804, the focus of opposition criticism shifted
from the army to the navy, because when Pitt finally went into open
opposition, he justified his action on the grounds that the naval
policies of the government did not provide the country with adequate
security.1 In proposing an alternative naval strategy, however, Pitt
made errors that were pointed out by Admiral Edward Pellew.2
Moreover, Addington later stated:
Lord St Vincent's System of naval Defence is highly
approved of by all the Seafaring People whom I have met 
with, who are acquainted with the navigation of the
Channel, & with the opposite Coasts of England & France;
& I have good Reason for believing, that it is by no means 
discountenanced by the present Board of Admiralty.3
The real controversy arose over St Vincent's naval reforms and the
consequences of the commission of inquiry.
St Vincent's desire to reform abuses in the naval administration
was entirely justified, and most of his policies were eventually
adopted to the benefit of the navy. Nevertheless, at the time, these
policies caused serious problems. For men who made a fortune cheating
the government had no qualms about resorting to blackmail, when the
government tried to deprive them of their easy pickings. As the new
Timber Masters were more particular about the supplies which they
purchased and often rejected rotten stock, the timber merchants
responded by raising their prices by thirty-two percent or refusing
to sell to the government.4 As St Vincent was stubborn and refused to
concede to this blackmail, navy stocks fell below the three years
supply which was the customary minimum. Moreover, having dismissed
a large number of dockyard workers in peace-time, St Vincent had
xSee below, chapter 9, pp. 293-4.
2Idem.
3Addington to Bragge, 4 Sept. 1804, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1804/OZ130.
Memorandum on Timber and building Ships by contract, 
Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl804/ON21.
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difficulty rehiring them when the war resumed. As a consequence, the
navy fell behind in both repair and construction of new ships.
Initially, none of this really mattered because upon the renewal
of war the number of ships of all classes still in commission in the
British navy was far greater than that of the French. Even by the
time the ministry resigned in May 1804, the British still held
superiority. At Brest the British outnumbered the French in ships of
all classes by fifty-six to forty-three and at Toulon by forty-six
to sixteen.1 In addition, as mentioned the navy accomplished all of
its goals in terms of blockade and colonial warfare. Thus, there was
little else for the navy to do, and several hundred more ships would
not markedly have improved the British position in the war.
Nevertheless, while in the short term the Royal Navy was able
to accomplish these goals despite the detrimental effects of St
Vincent's naval reforms, in the long term the Royal Navy might have
faced real trouble. For although the number of ships available at the
beginning of the war was adequate, the dockyards were not able to
keep up with repairs to sustain the navy at that strength. Wear and
tear took a considerable toll, as Keith explained to Pitt:
The Violence of this Winter has Crippled or nearly 
Destroyed all the King's ships which were in service at 
the beginning of the War for they had not undergone such 
repair if any at the Close of the former War and [as] they 
had none to supply their places at my Instance they were 
induced to purchase Merchant Ships and equip them in July 
and August last but unfortunately this has been so ill 
Managed that they are of so bad a Class the pilots refuse 
to take charge of them and the Commanders represent them 
in an unfit state.2
Under such conditions the navy could not sustain its superiority over
a long period, but St Vincent's policies were overturned before any
lasting damage was done.
Therefore, St Vincent's naval reforms were deserving of some
^Abstract of British and Enemy Ships and Vessels 13 May 
1804, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl804/ON18.
2Keith to Pitt, 10 Mar. 1804, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/149/1, fos. 37-8.
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criticism. Regardless of how noble or just were his intentions, the 
practical results of his policies could have placed the Royal Navy 
in serious danger if they had been left in place for an extended 
period. In this way, his naval policies were out of character with 
the rest of the policies of the ministry. For although Addington was 
a firm advocate of reform in many fields, he was very cautious when 
implementing it. For example, he initially supported Abbot's Irish 
reforms but backed down in the face of considerable public pressure. 
Even though he truly desired peace for reasons of economy, he was 
prudent enough to maintain high peace-time establishments in case the 
war was renewed suddenly. St Vincent, instead, had counted on the 
peace to last in order to facilitate his naval reforms. While 
Addington planned a long, defensive war, St. Vincent continued to 
pursue policies that could have proved disastrous in the long term. 
Finally, Addington and the rest of the ministry were far more 
flexible in formulating and implementing policy than was St Vincent. 
The First Lord of the Admiralty was truly the odd man out. Addington 
also demonstrated a lack of leadership in his inability to 
consolidate naval policy with the rest of the measures of his 
ministry. From a political standpoint, St Vincent's naval reforms and 
his unconciliatory manner gave the opposition considerable ammunition 
against the government, and the parliamentary fuss created by the 
reforms enabled the opposition to obscure the successful measures of 
the naval administration. Thus the reforms caused an enormous 
political problem that led Addington in later years to attribute the 
actions of the Admiralty Board as one of the prominent causes of the 
downfall of his ministry.1
War Finance
The ability to wage a long and expensive war during this period 
was limited by the health of the government finances. As mentioned 
Addington's decision to negotiate peace in 1801 was largely
1Pellew, ii. 260-61.
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influenced by his belief that the poor state of the government
finances would not permit him to continue the war much longer.
Financial reform and the respite granted by the peace improved the
financial position of the government to the point at which Addington
was given the option of renewing the war, but the cumulative
government debt remained large, and the government required greater
sources of revenue to continue the war for a long period. Thus
Addington realized that he had to introduce important new measures,
if Britain were to survive the war.
In February 1803, a few months before the war resumed, Pitt was
considering the question of war finance. He stated:
The greatest object of my anxiety is our Finance, on which 
every thing must so much depend. I do not however (after 
full Reflection) doubt the sufficiency of the Country to 
provide for the Expenses of Seven or even Ten years of War 
without imposing Burdens, that would materially entrench 
on the Comfort of the great Body of the People, or 
ultimately affect our Prosperity and Credit. But I am 
convinced this can only be done by meeting at once the 
whole extent of our difficulties; and by raising within 
the year a still larger Proportion of the Supplies than 
was done even in the last four years of the late War.1
Pitt stressed that it was important to raise sufficient war taxes so
as to avoid large loans that would burden the country with interest
payments. Although he believed that Addington was incapable of
implementing these measures, the Prime Minister, following the advice
of Vansittart, was in fact thinking precisely along the same lines.
A memorandum on the financial measures of the ministry which appears
to be in Vansittart's handwriting declares that 'It was proposed by
a System of War Taxes to raise a Sum for the service of the year so
considerable as to supercede the necessity of borrowing any sum
materially exceeding that which would be applicable to the reduction
of the public debt.'2
Addington and Vansittart, as well as Pitt, were concerned that,
xPitt to Chatham, 28 Feb. 1803, Chatham Papers, PRO 
30/8/101, fos. 170-71.
2Private Memoir on Finance, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1804/OT29.
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if the government met the demands of war by borrowing, the national 
debt would become unmanageable. They believed that by raising as much 
money as possible at the beginning of the war through war taxes, 
rather than borrowing the necessary funds each year, they would 
decrease the long term burden to the nation. Moreover, large loans 
drove up interests rates which hurt British trade as well as the 
government's finances. In devising the first war budget, Addington 
and Vansittart calculated that the nation could afford £10-12 million 
in war taxes, and as they felt that they could not raise the Customs 
and Excise beyond £8 million, to make up the difference Addington 
decided to reintroduce the income tax.1
Pitt's income tax first introduced in 1799 had presented both 
political and administrative problems. First, in requiring the 
taxpayer to declare his aggregate income it violated the privacy of 
the individual. Most people, especially in the commercial interests, 
strongly objected to making their total worth public knowledge.2 
Second, relying on the individual to submit an honest assessment of 
his income, without adequate means of ensuring that these 
declarations were accurate, defrauded the government of a substantial 
amount. Basing his projections on a total national income of £100 
million, Pitt estimated that a tax of ten percent would yield £10 
million, but in three years it failed to reach an annual yield of 
£6.25 million.3
At the time of abolishing Pitt's tax in 1802, Addington knew 
that if it were to be reintroduced in future it would require 
substantial modifications. Consequently, when he re-introduced the 
tax as part of his budget for 1803, he addressed the two most 
important flaws of Pitt's original tax. To eliminate the concern 
about the invasion of privacy, he abolished the requirement of 
declaring aggregate income, and instead he divided all income into
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1594-1602; Private Memoir on 
Finance, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl803/OT29.
2Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl801/OT24.
3Seligman, pp. 78, 115; Sabine, p. 33.
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a series of five schedules based on income from property, trade or 
profession, government stock, government offices, and all other 
income. The second and most fundamental reform was to require that 
the tax be collected at the source, rather than from the taxpayer. 
Renters deducted the tax from the rent paid to the landlord, 
employers deducted the tax from wages paid to employees, and the bank 
deducted the tax from interest paid to bond and shareholders. In this 
way, individuals made no declarations of their total income and the 
opportunities for evading the tax were severely curtailed.
Although many of the reforms implemented by Addington were
contained in a letter received by Vansittart in 1801,1 it is wrong to
assume that Addington and his Treasury Secretary were merely adopting 
someone else's suggestions. For as early as 1798, Addington had 
displayed a sound understanding in Parliament of the history of 
taxation, and he received the inspiration for his reforms from
legislation that had been implemented during the reign of William and 
Mary when England was also at war with France.2
Realizing that his tax would be far more efficient than Pitt's, 
Addington tried to make it politically palatable by cutting the rate 
in half to five percent. In his original proposal, he set the rate 
at five percent on all schedules of income, but to make it fairer to 
the poor, who did not own land or stock, he exempted all incomes 
below £60 per year, and arranged a sliding scale for those between 
£60 and £150. Based on his original proposals Addington projected 
that his tax would raise £4.5 million, and, even after some
modifications that cut the yield of the tax, it actually produced 
£4.7 million, only twenty percent below the yield of Pitt's tax set 
at twice the rate.3
The modifications that Addington chose to make were owing to 
some political problems centering around Pitt. For the man who had
Mackenzie to Vansittart, 8 Oct. 1801, Add. MSS 31229, fo.
21.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 160 0; Farnsworth, pp. 42-5.
3Sabine, p. 38.
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framed the original tax did not like being upstaged by one of his 
former political followers. Although Pitt had approved of the copy 
of the budget which Steele had delivered to him, and had remained 
silent when Addington introduced the tax in the Commons in June 
1803 ,* he soon tried to lead a parliamentary assault upon the 
measure. At first, he tried to persuade the government to reintroduce 
his old tax, but after that failed he attacked two specific 
provisions. First, he declared that the government ought not to 
distinguish between earned and unearned income, and that deductions 
for one should be granted to another. Second, he claimed that the 
taxing of the interest from the government stock was a violation of 
the public trust because the government was taxing money that it paid 
to its creditors. Addington responded well to these criticisms and 
even won the debates in the Commons by large margins but in the end 
consented to Pitt's amendments. This was not owing to Pitt's 'inborn 
ascendancy of genius' or to pressure from the Bank of England, which 
had previously given Addington its consent, but rather to Addington's 
desire to facilitate a speedy passage of the bill. For he required 
the legislation to be implemented quickly and wished to avoid fueling 
Pitt's animosity or inciting further opposition.2
Despite these political problems, Addington's income tax reforms 
were tremendously successful. Revenue from the tax allowed him to 
avoid further increases in the customs and excise and other war 
taxes. Future ministries recognized the value of these reforms. For 
even Pitt, who had made such strong criticism, did not substantially 
alter the tax when he returned to power in 1804. In addition, in 1806 
the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Henry Petty, reintroduced 
Addington's original measure to tax the government stock. Moreover, 
the income tax proved vital to the ability of the British to survive 
the war in later years, and without it they would not have been able
1Colchester Diary. i. 427; Fox to Lauderdale, 21 June 1803, 
Add. MSS 47564, fo. Ill; Pitt to Rose, 12 June 1803, Add. MSS 
42772, fo. 184.
2Colchester Diary. i. 432; Farnsworth, p. 64.
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to afford the large financial subsidies that they granted to the 
Continental allies in 1813 and 1814.
The point of this analysis of the war policies of the Addington
ministry has been to put into context the parliamentary criticism of
those policies during the months that preceded Addington's
resignation. The general impression among the leading politicians at
the time, and one which has pervaded the historiography of the period
ever since, was that Addington proved incapable of carrying on the
war and Britain turned once again to the "Pilot that Weathered the
Storm'. Addington, however, ridiculed the nature of parliamentary
criticism of his military measures as
. . .one man objecting to too great an extension of one part 
of our force, another lamenting any attempt at its 
diminution; some recommending a greater and some a lesser 
addition to the regular army, and others who differ as to 
that particular species of naval force we should employ; 
some preferring a large number of small vessels, and some 
a small number of large vessels...1
On the contrary, Addington and his colleagues presented a reasonable
response to the military situation which they faced. Years later,
Grey declared that, "Lord Sidmouth's Military measures were the only
ones which had hitherto produced any speedy or large augmentation of
our army.'2 In addition, Starhemberg praised the government for
"l'energie qu'il a su inspirer a la Nation dans la crise actuelle,
la plus essentielle peut-etre dans laquelle la Grande Bretagne ne
soit jamais trouve encore'.3 Many of the measures were based on the
advice of the King, the Duke of York, St Vincent, and even Pitt.
Although, several serious mistakes were made, usually owing to the
haste with which the ministers believed it was necessary to introduce
the legislation, the ministry cannot be blamed for the overwhelming
response to join the volunteers which was not foreseen by anyone
Parliamentary Debates, ii, 201-2.
2Pellew, ii. 307.
3Starhemberg to Colloredo, 6 Mar. 1804, HHSA, Staatskanzlei 
England Korrespondenz/145.
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else. Finally, it is important to note that, although Addington's 
immediate predecessors were unable to devise more effective policies, 
they did not suffer the same barrage of criticism. This dichotomy was 
epitomized by Holland Rose, who ruthlessly attacked Addington's 
failure to settle the problems with Britain's defence forces but then 
excused Pitt's failure for the same on the basis that no one else had 
been able to solve them.1 Why should anyone expect more from 
Addington than from Pitt?
Expectations were indeed high because the British were proud and 
patriotic. They felt extremely insulted when Bonaparte declared that 
Britain alone could not harm France, and wished to teach him a 
lesson. Bolstered by a series of naval victories in the 1790s, 
parliamentary and popular opinion seemed to expect that the Royal 
Navy would compensate for the lack of a large army and defeat the 
French. Nevertheless, Bonaparte was largely correct. For there was 
little the British could do to harm the French beyond capturing 
colonies, which the Addington ministry did with considerable success. 
Having proceeded with the war without allied support, the British 
were faced with either a French invasion or a war of attrition. The 
ministry was about as well prepared as it could have been for the 
former, although St Vincent's reform policies meant that the navy was 
not so well prepared for the latter. Thus, as much of the 
parliamentary criticism was misplaced, the claim that the ministry 
collapsed simply because it followed incompetent policies is 
untenable. Consequently, a better explanation for its collapse is 
required.
1cf. Rose, vThe Struggle with Napoleon', p. 330 with Pitt 
and the Great War, p. 510.
Chapter Nine
287
The Collapse of the Ministry, January to April 1804
"A declared and regular opposition to the present Government was now 
more than ever an indispensable public Duty.'
Lord Grenville1
'Let us first get rid of the Doctor is my principle of action.' 
Charles Fox2
The Revival of Opposition
Addington was in effect deposed by a coalition of the 
supporters of Pitt, Grenville, and Fox. The foundations of this 
unlikely alliance were laid by Grenville. He had not really wished 
to resign in 1801, but did so because he had long been a confirmed 
supporter of Catholic Emancipation. The decision of the new ministry 
to sign peace with France without achieving his unrealistic aims, 
convinced him that the ministers were incompetent, however, and he 
set himself in virtually unwavering opposition to the government 
after October 1801. Granted, he believed it to be his patriotic duty 
to point out the errors of the government, and he did consider the 
peace a terrible mistake. Nevertheless, despite his protestations 
that he was not setting himself up in factious opposition, he along 
with his brothers, Thomas and Buckingham, and their colleagues, 
Windham and Spencer, did oppose the government on almost every 
important measure for the duration of the ministry. By the autumn 
of 1802, Grenville had declared that his only political objective 
was to restore Pitt to power and that he had no view to obtaining 
political office for himself. Nevertheless, his brothers were
1Grenville to Pitt, 31 Jan. 1804, Dropmore Papers, vii.
211.
2Fox to Grey, 13 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 46575, fo. 121.
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already planning a new ministry and discussing the distribution of 
offices among themselves and their friends. Grenville was in fact 
moving further away from Pitt both politically and personally, to 
the extent at which some of Pitt' s friends even accused him of 
attempting to displace his cousin. According to Mulgrave, "from the 
period of the peace of Amiens he began to set up for himself, and 
to endeavour to collect as many as he could detach from Pitt on that 
question into a body of which he should be the leader and oracle, 
and I have no doubt that he considered himself from that period as 
the leader of a distinct party1.1
The Grenvillites and their allies for all their sounds and 
fury, however, really signified little. Between October 1801 and 
December 1803 they were able to win few votes in either House of 
Parliament beyond the immediate patronage of Buckingham and 
Fitzwilliam. The Grenvilles in fact were extremely unpopular in 
Parliament.2 For they epitomized the corrupt professional 
politicians whom the independent country gentlemen so despised.3 
Liverpool claimed that they were, "so self important & troublesome, 
that it is better to have them as Enemies than Friends ... 1 .4
Indeed, initially having Grenville as an opponent worked to 
Addington's advantage. For example, Tierney told Lady Holland in 
December 1802 that, "Mr Addington is daily acquiring additional 
strength & popularity. Seriously, the violence of the new opposition 
(the Grenvilles, Canning ect [sic]) has wrought wonders in his favor 
... '5 In August 1803, Canning lamented, "I see no reason now why
3Mulgrave to Lowther, 3 0 Nov. 1806, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission: Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Lonsdale 
(London, 1893), pp. 224-5.
2Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, pp. 142-
3 .
3Ingram, Commitment to Empire, pp. 24, 94.
4Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 1 June 1803, Add. MSS 38236, fo.
259.
5Tierney to Lady Holland, 26 Dec. 1802, Add. MSS 51585,
fo. 23.
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A's administration should not hobble on, & outlast the Country.11 In 
the long term, however, the Grenvillites' debating talent, their 
determination, and their political intrigue played an important role 
in undermining Addington's parliamentary majority.
Addington's position did not suffer in the short term from the 
opposition of the Grenvilles because the issue which provoked that 
opposition at the same time won over the support of the Foxite 
Whigs. As Fox possessed a greater following than Grenville, 
government majorities were actually increased by these changes of 
alignment. Nevertheless, Fox's support for Addington was unreliable, 
and by resuming the war, Addington completely alienated him.2 Fox 
was unable, however, to take all of the Whigs with him back into 
opposition. For many of the friends of the Prince of Wales had 
become estranged from Fox during the peace, and several were moving 
closer to Addington. Tierney, who had tried to negotiate a coalition 
with the new ministry in 18 01, continued to support Addington and 
eventually accepted office in May 1803. Sheridan was also on 
extremely good personal terms with Addington and continued to 
support the ministry with both his votes and debating skill. Erskine 
seemed undecided but at one point seriously considered an offer of 
office. Even Grey felt unable to oppose the resumption of the war, 
and had to content himself with criticizing the manner in which the 
ministry had conducted the negotiations.3
Consequently, the Addington ministry remained in a strong 
position until the end of 1803. From the division lists it is clear 
that the Prime Minister retained the support most of the members who 
had supported Pitt's ministry and even some of the Whigs.4 Only the 
small followings of Grenville, Windham, and Fitzwilliam on one hand 
and that of Fox on the other provided any sustained opposition, and
banning to Frere, 25 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 38833, fo. 155.
2Fox to Lauderdale, [1803], Add. MSS 47564, fo. 184.
Parliamentary History, xxxvi. 1408.
4See the lists in Parliamentary History, xxxvi and
Parliamentary Debates, i .
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the two groups voted for different reasons and often on different 
issues. Thus Addington's strong parliamentary majorities remained 
intact, and there was no reason to suspect that this position was 
about to crumble.
One of the reasons that Addington and Hawkesbury were so 
confident about the ministry's prospects for 1804 was that they 
believed that Grenville and Fox would never join forces against the 
government.1 For Grenville had always been a greater adversary of 
Fox than even Pitt had been. Since 1791, Grenville had been the 
strongest spokesman for Pitt's ministry in the Lords, and Fox its 
strongest critic in the Commons. They had been poles apart on issues 
such as the repression of social unrest and the prosecution of the 
war. Moreover, Grenville was always far more committed to continuing 
the war than Pitt. After Pitt resigned Grenville supported 
Addington, while Fox opposed, until the preliminaries of peace were 
announced, when they switched sides, and they did not find 
themselves in agreement until Addington resumed the war. Even then 
they criticized Addington for completely opposite reasons: Fox for 
resuming the war; Grenville for not fighting it vigorously enough. 
Thus there were no two political leaders who had found themselves 
on the opposite sides of political questions as often as Grenville 
and Fox. How could these two ever form a political alliance?
Grenville had been trying desperately without success to 
convince Pitt to join him in outright opposition. For he had 
realized that the small numbers his allies could muster in both 
Houses of Parliament were having little effect. He did notice, 
however, that Fox had been speaking out strongly against the 
government especially on the volunteer legislation. After two 
unsuccessful attempts to bring Pitt into opposition on 9 and 10 
January 1804, Grenville decided to look for assistance elsewhere.2
Liverpool to Hervey, [1802], Hervey Papers 941/56/8.
2Tomline to Mrs Tomline, 10 Jan. 1804, Pretyman Papers, HA 
119/562/1; Grenville to Thomas Grenville, 14 Jan. 1804, Add.
MSS 41852, fos. 188-9.
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Thomas Grenville proposed to meet Fox and discuss some form of 
cooperation against the government to give their opposition more 
effect. Fox proved willing, and by the end of the month Grenville 
and Fox had agreed on two fundamental points. The first was that it 
was necessary to have Addington dismissed, and the second was that 
a new ministry should include all the greatest political weight and 
talents in the country.1 This really meant little more than that 
when Pitt formed the new ministry he should include the friends of 
both Grenville and Fox. When Grenville stated that the new ministry 
should not be based on a principle of exclusion, he meant that it 
should not exclude Fox but that it should exclude all of the 
Addingtonians. For he refused to acknowledge that any of Addington's 
colleagues had any redeeming attributes.
This strange marriage received a generally negative reaction. 
Cornwallis stated that, "The present coalition appears to me to be 
full as profligate as that of Fox and Lord North, without holding 
out a prospect of the same benefit to the country. '2 The government 
on the other hand was more surprised than alarmed. For Fox and 
Grenville were both unpopular and unlikely to gather a large 
following. Nevertheless, as Hobart acknowledged, "although the 
arrangement does not appear a good one for forming an 
administration, it seems admirably calculated for annoying his 
Majesty's present ministers'.3 However, few were as distressed by 
the coalition as Pitt. On a personal level he was shocked that his 
cousin and colleague would form a junction with his greatest 
adversary. On a practical level, the coalition threatened his 
political plans, because he feared that Grenville's action would 
appear as though he were trying to force a new ministry upon the 
King, who would certainly respond with determined resistance. This
xFox to Grey 29 Jan. 1804, Add. MSS 47565, fo. 114.
2Cornwallis to Ross, 13 Feb. 1804, Cornwallis
Correspondence, iii. 510-11.
3Hobart to Auckland, 3 0 Jan. 1804, Auckland
Correspondence. iv. 189.
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would render more difficult the formation of a new ministry, if 
Addington resigned, as the King would insist on excluding both 
Grenville and Fox. As they were unlikely to achieve very large 
divisions anyway, Pitt felt this action to be foolish and 
dangerous.1
It was Pitt, however, who held the key to the future of British 
parliamentary politics, as he possessed a loyal following and the 
potential to sway many of the independent members in the Commons. 
If he entered Addington's ministry, it would easily withstand the 
combined assault of Grenville and Fox. On the other hand, if he had 
joined the opposition, Addington's majority would have been in 
serious danger. During the first year of Addington's ministry, Pitt 
had given the government solid support, but by the end of 1802 
illness, which had kept Pitt away from London, had caused an 
estrangement between him and the Prime Minister. It was then that 
he admitted he was willing to resume office, but only under certain 
conditions, and thereafter he withdrew his support for the 
government and left his options open.
Pitt did not enter into systematic opposition but his 
withdrawal of support from the government persuaded Addington to try 
to bring him directly into the ministry. As mentioned a protracted 
series of negotiations lasting from January to April 1803 failed. 
For Pitt, who claimed that his only ambition was honour and public 
duty, wanted it to appear to the public that the King had called 
upon him as the only man who could save the country, and while 
Addington was prepared to resign his position, he was unwilling to 
admit publicly that his ministry was a failure. If Pitt had truly 
been concerned solely for the best interests of his country he would 
have accepted Addington's compromise, but instead he decided to hold 
out until he got his own way. In the meantime, he planned a 
parliamentary attack on the government which, owing to the poor 
impression it made in the Commons, has led Richard Pares to conclude
xPitt to Grenville, 4 Feb. 1804, Dropmore Papers. vii.
212-4.
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that it was designed so as to attract the attention of the King and
convince him of the incapacity of his ministers.1
He made a small step towards outright opposition in June 1803
with an orchestrated attempt to demonstrate his own power. After
assuring the government of his support,2 he arranged for Colonel
Patten to move a motion of censure upon the ministers, but before
the vote was taken, Pitt moved the orders of the day, to "save1 the
ministers without giving them a chance to defend themselves. He told
Malmesbury that his intention was to "evince to the public that ...
he was at liberty to remove them if he pleased ... 1.3 The scheme
backfired, however, as the ministers opposed Pitt's motion with a
vociferous debate and won the vote by a large majority.
Subsequently, Pitt left the House and the ministry defeated Patten's
motion by an even larger majority. Hawkesbury and Liverpool
were completely baffled by Pitt's action. Hawkesbury thought the
only reasonable explanation was that:
He has been worked upon by such of his personal Friends 
as are Enemies to the present Govt until his mind is 
compleatly [sic] unhinged--his Health has certainly 
suffered most seriously--he looks dreadfully & his 
Physician says that his nerves have been compleatly shook 
by a state of agitation & uncertainly in wh[ich] he has 
been kept.4
Liverpool believed that the whole affair had severely hurt Pitt's 
reputation.5 Nevertheless, it was clear that Pitt was separated from 
Addington. Years later Addington wrote, "Mr Pitt's amendment on 
Patten's motion was an act of explicit hostility: it was universally
1Richard Pares, Kina George III and the Politicians 
(London, 1957), pp. 136-7.
2Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 31 May 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
22 .
3Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 264.
4Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 5 June 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
23 .
5Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 7 June 18 03, MS Loan 72/49, fo.
64 .
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so considered & from that time his opposition never relaxed whenever 
it could be shown.At the time, Addington spoke truthfully when he 
said, "I have not had a happy hour since the coolness arose between 
Mr P[itt] & me, & I would take sixty steps towards a reconciliation 
if I thought he would take one',2 but Pitt refused to make that 
step.
In July Pitt's opposition to some clauses regarding the new 
income tax caused further friction between him and Addington, but 
the government majority remained unshaken until 1804.3 But over the 
next six months a newspaper and pamphlet war, led on one side by 
Canning, Rose, Long, and Tomline,4 and on the other by Hiley 
Addington virtually ruined any chance that Pitt and Addington would 
be reconciled. In September, Pitt refused to speak with Castlereagh, 
because he was a member of a government that had taken an injurious 
and offensive line towards him, and he rejected Castlereagh's 
assurances that Addington was not responsible for the pamphlets.5 
Nevertheless, Pitt continued to hold back from outright opposition, 
probably over concern about his relationship with the King.
By January 1804, Pitt realized how ambiguous his position 
appeared and knew that he had to make his line clear. Yet, the whole 
crux of his problem was that he was completely undecided.6 He wanted 
Addington to resign but he did not want to be seen as actively 
having forced the resignation. His policy of supporting the
1Lord Sidmouth's Notes, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl803/Z10.
2Quoted in Tomline to Mrs Tomline, 10 Jan. 1804, Pretyman 
Papers, HA 119/562/1.
3Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 16 July 1803, MS Loan 72/55, 
fos. 29-30; Eldon to Redesdale, 10 Oct. 1803, Redesdale Papers, 
D2002/C11.
4Tomline to Rose, 7 Nov. 1803, Add. MSS 42773, fo. 27.
5Pitt to Castlereagh, 21 Sept. 1803 and Castlereagh to
Pitt, 6 Oct. 1803, Dacres Adams Papers PRO 30/58/3/107 and 109.
6Pitt to Tomline, 7 Jan. 1804, Pretyman Papers, HA
119/T108/42.
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government in general, while hoping to weaken its majority by 
pointing out its mistakes was not working well. His attack on the 
government' s volunteer system in late January did not have the 
effect that he had hoped, as the ministerial majority remained 
firm.1 Nevertheless, he still refused to join Grenville and Fox in 
outright opposition, leaving Hobart to declare confidently, "Neither 
Mr Fox's principles nor Lord Grenville's manners are popular; and 
Mr Pitt, standing aloof with a Catholic millstone about his neck 
will not be an object to attract a large body of political 
speculators.'2
The formation of the Grenville-Fox coalition was overshadowed 
in February by the King suffering another attack of porphyria. As 
had happened on the two previous occasions in 1788 and 18 01, the 
government hoped that the King would recover soon, while the Prince 
of Wales planned for a Regency. Although the doctor's reports were 
promising, the Prince demanded to speak with both Addington and Pitt 
about new arrangements, and this caused a great deal of political 
uncertainty. The King did recover but there was concern about his 
ability to handle the normal load of government business, and 
everyone's political future remained uncertain. Soon after the 
King's recovery, on 5 March Eldon met with Pitt without informing 
Addington. Three weeks later they met again and Eldon informed Pitt 
that most of the Cabinet wished that he would resume office.3
It was at this point that Pitt finally decided to make a 
concerted attempt to force Addington's resignation so that he could 
assume office, for as late as 23 February he had told Chatham and 
Steele that he had no grounds for complaint against the ministers.4 
This decision was largely influenced by the news that many of the
3Morpeth to Holland, 22 Jan. 1804, Add. MSS 51577, fo. 35.
2Hobart to Auckland, 3 0 Jan. 1804, Auckland 
Correspondence, iv. 190-91.
3Diary of Alexander Hope, Hope of Luffness Muniments, GD
364/1/1154.
4Colchester Diary, i. 482.
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ministers desired his return, but there were several other reasons. 
The uncertainty concerning the King's health and the relentless 
pressure from Canning, Rose, Grenville, and others also played 
important roles. Moreover, Pitt realized that his personal following 
had decreased during his period out of office, as some supporters 
had become committed to Addington and others to Grenville. If he 
stayed out of office much longer he might have lost all but his most 
devoted supporters.1
By the beginning of January, the opposition had become more 
active, if not more effective. According to Malmesbury, party spirit 
ran high: 'The debates in the House of Commons grew more long, and 
more contested, and none of the measures of Government, for the 
volunteers, or indeed for any other purpose, were allowed to pass 
unnoticed or unopposed.'2 The ministerial majority remained intact, 
but the government was persistently harassed by the opposition.
In February, Pitt told Malmesbury that 'he would never make the 
turning out of this Administration the object of his endeavours,1 
but from the middle of March he was conspiring with Melville to 
overthrow Addington.3 Pitt's plan consisted of two stages. The first 
was to organize a sustained parliamentary assault on all aspects of 
government policy. The second was to write directly to the King to 
explain his sentiments once he was fully recovered.4 Pitt began his 
assault on 15 March, with an comprehensive attack on St Vincent's 
naval policies and a call for government papers on the navy to be 
laid before the House, because he questioned 'whether the 
preparations which have been made by his Majesty's ministers, in the 
direction of naval affairs, have been commensurate to the magnitude
1Ziegler, p. 210; Leveson Gower to his mother, 14 June 
1803, Leveson Gower Correspondence, i. 423.
2Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 285.
3Malmesburv Diaries, iv. 288; Matheson, pp. 332-3.
4Pitt to Melville, 29 Mar. 1804, Secret Correspondence 
Connected with Mr. Pitt's Return to Office in 1804. ed. Earl 
Stanhope printed privately (London, 1852), pp. 13-4; Hope 
Diary, Hope of Luffness Muniments, GD 364/1/1154.
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of the crisis in which we are placed'.1 Liverpool later stated that 
Pitt did not disagree fundamentally with these or other policies of 
the government, but "in order to destroy the . . . Government 
pretended to do so'.2 Consequently, he did not make a strong case 
against St Vincent.3 His assertions that the best mode of defence 
against invasion was by deploying small gun-boats in shallow waters 
were answered by Admiral Pellew, who ridiculed the "mosquito fleet' 
and claimed that the close blockades of the French ports were in 
fact the best means of defence.4 Pitt was out-debated and out-voted, 
but the ministerial majority of seventy-one was forty to fifty votes 
lower than was expected by the government.5
Pitt then moved his attack onto Yorke' s measures for home 
defence and the government's majority continued to decrease. This 
was not so much a result of the force of the arguments as from 
Pitt's parliamentary management. For Pitt and Melville worked hard 
gathering their supporters for votes in both Houses.6 On 2 9 March, 
Pitt ordered Melville to bring out the Scottish vote and by 4 April 
he wanted a statement of its strength.7 Pitt was also already 
planning the new ministry that he would form. At this point it was 
to exclude Addington and Fox, but Melville was negotiating a
Parliamentary Debates, i. 878.
2Liverpool to Hervey, 2 6 Dec. 1804, Hervey Papers, 
941/56/8.
3Hardwicke to Yorke, 23 Mar. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos. 
190-91.
Parliamentary Debates, i. 891-3.
5Yorke to Hardwicke, 16 Mar. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos. 
172-3; Glenbervie Diaries, i. 372-3.
6Melville was reluctant to get involved in hostile actions 
against the government but gave in to Pitt's wishes. Melville 
to Hope, 5 Apr. 1804, Dacres Adams Papers, PRO 3 0/58/5/9.
Pitt to Melville, 29 Mar. 1804, Secret Correspondence, p. 
16; Same to same, 4 Apr. 1804, Pitt Papers, John Rylands 
Library, Eng. MSS 907.
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junction with Moira and the party of the Prince of Wales.1 By the 
middle of April, Pitt realized that the government was taking 
serious alarm, and he organized his attacks to have the greatest 
effects in Parliament. On 18 April, he decided to delay his motion 
on the Army of Reserve Suspension Bill until more of his supporters 
had arrived in Westminster so his division would be larger.2 
Privately he predicted that the issue would be settled within two 
weeks.3
At this time Addington sent an overture to Pitt through 
Castlereagh to discuss the best means of carrying on the government. 
Addington offered to resign if Pitt would give him assurance that 
he was not committed to bringing Fox and Grenville into office. Pitt 
refused, however, to discuss the matter with anyone but the King.4 
This overture convinced Pitt that the ministry was on the verge of 
resigning, so he took the opportunity to write a letter to the King. 
On 22 April, he presented the letter to Eldon, who promised to show 
it to no one but the King. Eldon did not deliver the letter until 
27 April as he wished to wait until after the debates in the Commons 
of 23 and 25 April and the King had held his first council meeting 
since the onset of his latest illness.5
In the intervening period, the decrease in the government's 
majorities had convinced Addington to resign. Thus Pitt, Grenville, 
and Fox had finally succeeded in overthrowing the government. 
Although Grenville and Fox were the first to enter systematic 
opposition, the responsibility for building the opposition to the
Melville to Pitt, 3 and 6 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 40102, fos. 
128-34.
2Pitt to Melville, 18 Apr. 1804, Secret Correspondence, p.
34 .
3Pitt to Tomline, 13 Apr. 1804, Pretyman Papers, HA 
119/T108/42.
4Bathurst's memorandum, May 1804, HMC Bathurst. pp. 34-5.
5Eldon to Pitt, 22 Apr. 1804, Chatham Papers, PRO
30/8/132/1.
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point at which it could defeat the government belonged to Pitt. As 
Starhemberg pointed out, the resignation of the government was not 
ven consequence du voeu general de la Nation, mais uniquement d'un 
enthousiasme exagere de quelques personnes marquantes en faveur de 
Mr Pitt, et du desir commun des individus de tous les partis, de se 
faire une chance d'obtenir une place quelconque'.1 Once Pitt had 
finally decided to oppose Addington, he was able to arrange his own 
accession to office in a very short space of time. The key to his 
success lay in political management, a skill which he and Melville 
possessed, while Addington did not.
Addington and Political Management
The Addington ministry ought to have survived the parliamentary 
onslaught of Pitt, Grenville, and Fox. For Addington's parliamentary 
majorities had held up well throughout 18 03, even when Pitt divided 
against the government on Patten's motion and the clauses of the 
income tax. Moreover, Addington possessed the complete confidence 
of the King. In fact, if the question had been left to George III 
alone, he would have kept Addington in office. Addington also 
remained popular in the country at large.2 Nevertheless, between 
January and April 1804 the opposition was able to whittle away at 
Addington's majorities in both Houses of Parliament to the point at 
which he was not sure that the government would win the next vote.
Pitt's role in forcing Addington's resignation is not as 
straight forward as it seemed. If Addington's majority was based on 
supporters of Pitt who only continued to vote for the government as 
long as he suffered the ministers to remain in office, then why were
1Starhemberg to Colloredo, 1 May 1804, HHSA, Staatskanzlei 
England Korrespondenz/145.
2Holland later claimed that Addington's resignation was 
premature, as he still retained a majority in Parliament and 
strong support in the country. Mary Anne Addington's Notes, 
Sidmouth Papers, Box 51, Public Office 2.
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the latter's divisions so small until April 1804? Pitt's own 
personal following was much smaller than anyone expected and it was 
decreasing as time passed. Thus his merely deciding to oppose the 
government did not mean necessarily that a majority in Parliament 
would follow him. The reason that it was on the verge of doing just 
that was because Pitt was able to get out the vote better than 
Addington.
It is curious that the man with the confidence of the King, 
support in the country, and the powers of government patronage was 
unable to sustain his support in the face of the combination of two 
very unpopular leaders and a third whose political assets were 
declining. The problem, however, was political management. Addington 
was unable to use all of the advantages that he possessed to bind 
to his ministry enough of the right kinds of men. This only became 
apparent in March and April 1804, but the strange alignment of 
parties in Parliament obscured problems whose roots dated back to 
the formation of the ministry. At the beginning of 1801, Addington 
was not a competitor for office with a following of his own, but 
rather a close friend of Pitt. Finding himself in the unexpected 
position of forming a ministry he did not try to gather around him 
men who would be loyal solely to him, but instead he relied on the 
help of Pitt and the King to persuade the best men available to take 
office.1 This was sensible at the time because without the help of 
Pitt and the King Addington probably would have been unable to find 
men to fill the offices. Nevertheless, those who were persuaded to 
accept had mixed loyalties, and the ministry lacked sufficient 
cohesion. This was not unusual for eighteenth century ministries on 
the whole, but combined with a series of other problems it helped 
to undermine Addington's government.
The lack of landed magnates was the most glaring omission in 
the original formation of Addington's ministry. Magnates were 
required for the parliamentary seats that they controlled but also 
for the aura of nobility that they gave to the ministry, the
1See above, chapter 2, pp. 3 8-53.
301
importance of which is difficult to measure in terms of votes. 
Landed aristocrats expected to be represented in the government and 
were often suspicious of governments dominated by professional 
politicians. Many looked down upon Addington for his middle-class 
origins but would have been satisfied if his colleagues had enough 
breeding and acres to compensate, which unfortunately for Addington 
they did not. While Pitt had included several magnates in his first 
ministry, Portland and Westmorland were the only magnates in 
Addington's ministry, and the former controlled only a small number 
of seats considering his lineage and political experience. Moreover, 
many of the great Whig magnates were poorly disposed towards 
Portland for having joined Pitt in 1794, and Fitzwilliam in 
particular felt betrayed by him over the Irish issue of 1795. 
Therefore, on the whole the landed aristocracy did not look 
favourable on the ministry.
Addington did win over the support of a few minor magnates such 
as Viscount Falmouth and Lord De Dunstanville from Cornwall. In 
addition, Pelham was related to the Duke of Newcastle and controlled 
the votes of four or five in the Lords.1 Nevertheless, these men 
could not match the patronage of Buckingham, Bedford, Fitzwilliam, 
Devonshire, Norfolk, Rutland, or Stafford. According to James Sack's 
calculations, Lonsdale controlled as many seats as Portland, 
Westmorland, and Newcastle combined.2 Addington needed the security 
that control over pocket-boroughs would bring to the ministry. 
Moreover, he could not afford to have such parliamentary strength 
harnessed by the opposition. Initially, the strong parliamentary 
position of the ministry meant that the lack of magnates did not 
seem to matter, but in the long run it proved a serious handicap.
1Hobart to Hawkesbury, 1 Oct 1803, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B75.
2Lonsdale had nine, Newcastle seven, Portland and 
Westmorland one each. Of the others Rutland had eight and 
Stafford seven. James J. Sack, vThe House of Lords and 
Parliamentary Patronage in Great Britain, 1802-1832', 
Historical Journal. (1980), 931-7.
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The peculiar conditions under which the ministry was formed 
meant that it lacked both magnates and men with strong 
administrative and parliamentary skills. Glenbervie had predicted 
that, if the ministry could weather the initial storm, then magnates 
and men of talent would seek shelter under it, but unfortunately for 
Addington this did not happen. A great weight of talents lay beyond 
government control and many were restless for office, but Addington 
was unable to recruit them. During the course of the ministry many 
opportunities arose, but Addington only took advantage of a few of 
them. The most successful one was to shuffle Dartmouth out of the 
Board of Control to bring in Castlereagh. Ryder's resignation as 
Treasurer of the Navy in September 18 01 gave Addington an 
opportunity to bring in greater strength, but after Canning refused 
the office and Yorke preferred to remain at the War Office, 
Addington gave the post to Bragge who, although capable, did not 
help to fill the ministry's void of acres or talents. Addington did 
consider adding Tierney, Grey, or Moira to the ministry, but he 
would not consent to the concessions that Grey and Moira demanded. 
For Addington desired only to strengthen the ministry not to 
reconstruct it. These Whigs certainly possessed some of the talents 
he required, but the political problems which they would have caused 
outweighed their advantages.
The signing of the definitive treaty of peace and the repeal 
of the income tax gave Addington a great opportunity to bring in 
added strength to the ministry. According to Ziegler, his popularity 
in the country was extremely high, and there appeared little 
prospect that his ministry would fall in the near future.1 
Nevertheless, Addington probably derived a false sense of security 
during his short lived halcyon days that could have persuaded him 
that the ministry required no alterations, as he did not look for 
added strength again until relations with France reached a crisis.
That Addington went straight to Pitt for help seems to indicate 
that he realized that the renewal of war would place a greater
1Ziegler, p. 161.
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strain on his ministry.1 The nature of their negotiations suggests 
that he hoped to reconstruct the ministry by bringing in Pitt and 
Melville rather than merely handing power back to Pitt and 
Grenville. Pitt, however, appeared to sense Addington's weakness and 
he demanded complete control over the formation of a new ministry. 
While Pitt's unreasonable response eliminated that option, Addington 
still possessed several others. For he had the plum offices of Home 
Secretary and First Lord of the Admiralty at his disposal. In March 
1803, St Vincent offered to resign on the grounds of ill health.2 
There was also speculation that he was on poor terms with Addington 
and that he had grown weary of the struggle caused by his naval 
reforms. Addington had also decided to get rid of Pelham. The Home 
Secretary had always been a troublesome colleague,3 as demonstrated 
by the difficulty of getting him into the ministry in the first 
place. In the Cabinet, he often opposed the ministry's foreign 
policy and tried to resist Addington's attempts to redistribute some 
of the responsibilities of the Home Office. He was also constantly 
fighting with Hardwicke over Irish affairs to the point at which the 
latter was ready to resign. He had been appointed in the first place 
based on his administrative and parliamentary experience, as well 
as for his friendship with the Royal family, but he proved a bitter 
disappointment in debate and managing government supporters in the 
Lords. In the end, Addington realized that Hardwicke was more 
valuable than Pelham and decided to demote the latter.4
It is probable that the reason Addington did not make these 
changes earlier is because he wished to use the offices as
3See above, chapter 6, pp. 196-2 04.
2St Vincent to Addington, 30 Mar. 1803, Add. MSS 31169, 
fo. 134.
3Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 1 Nov. 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo. 
33; Redesdale to Perceval, 23 Oct. 1803, Add. MSS 49188, fo. 
110.
4Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 31 May 18 03, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
21; Yorke to Hardwicke, 30 May 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 195-
6.
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bargaining counters in his negotiations with Pitt. It would have 
been foolish to appoint new ministers only to sack them shortly 
thereafter as part of an arrangement to bring in Pitt and Melville. 
There were several rumours spread that Melville was to take the 
Admiralty whether Pitt came in or not, and indeed it appears that 
Addington may have made him such an offer.1 Regardless, it was clear 
that Addington intended to shuffled out Pelham and St Vincent.2
Once Addington had given up hope that Pitt would join the
ministry he turned towards his other options. On 31 May, he
appointed Tierney as Treasurer of the Navy.3 For he hoped that 
Tierney could take over the debating responsibilities of Hawkesbury, 
whom he had decided to promote to the Lords to take over the
leadership from Pelham. Liverpool thought this was a bad move 
because he believed that Hawkesbury was much more valuable in the 
Commons.4 The truth was that Hawkesbury was not as great a debater 
as Liverpool and Addington thought he was, but regardless, Addington 
had to face the prospect of Hawkesbury moving to the Lords anyway 
upon the death of Liverpool which was expected very soon, and 
Addington preferred to make the transfer of responsibilities in the 
Lords and Commons on his own timetable. Moreover, Eldon and Hobart 
were having trouble handling Grenville in the Lords, and the
Chancellor had requested Hawkesbury's assistance.5
1Pelham to Addington, 14 Apr. 1803, Add. MSS 33111, fos. 
162-3.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 30 May 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 
195-6.
3Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 31 May 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
21.
4Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 1 June 1803, Add. MSS 38236, 
fos. 258-61.
5Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 1 June 1803, Add. MSS 38571, fo. 
38; Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 31 May 18 03, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
21; A. S. Turberville, The House of Lords in the Age of Reform. 
1784-1837 (London, 1958), p. 132.
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Addington was able to shuffle Pelham out of the Home Office by- 
granting him the Duchy of Lancaster, which had belonged to 
Liverpool. It was important to keep Pelham happy, according to 
Hobart:
As a minor point for consideration you must expect, if 
nothing should be done, to see him driven into 
opposition--with four or five noble Lords in his suite-- 
which in addition to the Grenville & Pitt Party in the 
House of Lords, & those who may be induced to speculate 
upon their strength may be productive of inconvenience.1
The whole episode worked out poorly as Liverpool was disappointed
and Pelham was piqued because Addington refused to give him the
Duchy for life.
Addington promoted Yorke to the Home Office and Bragge to the 
latter's place as Secretary at War. Yorke accepted very reluctantly 
after Addington insisted that he was the best man for the job.2 
Yorke told Hardwicke that "Addington has got rid of a tolerable 
Secretary at War, to make a very indifferent Secretary of State.,3 
Addington chose him because his experience in the War Office made 
it easier for him to handle the difficult responsibilities of home 
defence and his relationship with Hardwicke would better facilitate 
the running of Irish affairs. He soon regretted the move, however, 
and pointed out that Addington should have used the office to bring 
in greater strength to the ministry, rather than mere shuffling the 
existing ministers around.4 He told Addington "you ought to 
endeavour to strengthen your Government on some more afficacious
xHobart to Hawkesbury, 1 Oct. 1803, Hobart Papers, 
D/MH/H/War/B75.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 5 May 1803, Add. MSS 38702, fos. 185- 
8; Addington to Yorke, 17 Aug. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/C1803/OZ335.
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 12 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos.
326-7.
4Yorke to Hardwicke, 5 May and 18 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS
35702, fos. 185-8, 339-40.
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[sic] & comprehensive Plan'.1 Yorke was right. Addington placed 
unreasonable expectations on the advantages to be gained by 
Tierney's accession and should have used the Home Office to attract 
greater talent. Especially as, in the words of Tierney, there was 
a "vast weight of Talents over which Ministers have no control1.2 
Upon hearing that Pelham was to leave the Home Office, Liverpool 
expected that his replacement would be Melville or Moira.3 While, it 
is doubtful whether there were any men of talent who would have been 
willing to take the office,4 Addington should still have made a 
greater effort to obtain some added strength.
Addington and Tierney tried to persuade Sheridan and Erskine 
to join the ministry. Both had continued to support Addington after 
the renewal of the war, and consequently Addington did offer the 
post of Attorney-General to Erskine and that of Secretary at War to 
Sheridan.5 Fox got wind of these negotiations, however, and 
convinced the Prince of Wales to prevent this junction with 
Addington.6 While the Prince initially had been well disposed 
towards Addington, after July 1803, he resented the Prime Minister 
for failing to persuade the King to grant him a military 
commission.7 The Prince thus held a grudge against Addington, and
xYorke to Addington, 17 Aug. 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl803/OZ334.
2Tierney to Lady Holland, 26 Dec. 1802, Add. MSS 51585, 
fo. 24.
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 1 June 18 03, Add. MSS 38236, fo.
261.
4Ziegler, pp. 203-4.
5Petty to Holland, 6 June 1803, Add. MSS 51686, fo. 16-7; 
Diary of Joseph Farinoton, ed. Kenneth Garlick and Angus 
Macintyre (16 vols, London, 1979), vi. 2048; Thomas Moore, 
Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honourable Richard Brinsley 
Sheridan. (London, 1825), pp. 606-7.
6Bathurst's memorandum, May 1804, HMC Bathurst. pp. 40-41.
7The correspondence between the prince and Addington on 
this issue is in Add. MSS 46750, fos. 55-63.
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his decision to withdraw support from the ministry in April 1804 was 
an important contribution to Addington's resignation.
It is also quite puzzling why Addington never promoted 
Castlereagh further. Hawkesbury and others claimed that Castlereagh 
was to replace St Vincent at the Admiralty, but in the end it never 
came about.1 Addington certainly thought highly of Castlereagh and 
planned to make him his right-hand man in the Commons, so it is 
curious that he never granted him higher office.2 He would have been 
an excellent candidate for the Home Office, but his sentiments on 
Catholic Emancipation would have made him disagreeable to the King. 
Had Castlereagh been appointed to the Admiralty he might have 
resolved many of the problems created by St Vincent and rendered the 
subject of the navy more difficult for the opposition to use to bait 
the government. The only explanation for his remaining at the Board 
of Control was that Wellesley and Melville were so pleased with him. 
Nevertheless, the office of President of the Board of Control was 
less important than the Admiralty or the Home Office, and the 
ministry would have benefitted from placing a man of the calibre of 
Castlereagh at either.
While Addington squandered opportunities to obtain added 
strength for the ministry, he also had trouble managing the existing 
ministers. The most important reason for this was the problem of 
conflicting loyalties. The inability of St Vincent and Pelham to get 
along with the rest of the ministry has already been mentioned.3 
This stemmed largely from their political independence. St Vincent 
was independent but had close personal ties with some of the Foxite 
Whigs, while Pelham's attachment was to the Royal Family. 
Consequently, their opinions on policy often conflicted with the 
rest of the Cabinet to the point at which they both considered
1Hawkesbury to Liverpool, 31 May 1803, MS Loan 72/55, fo.
21; Yorke to Hardwicke, 14 June 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 203- 
6; Colchester Diary, i. 424.
2Mary Anne Addington's Notes, Sidmouth Papers, Box 51,
Public Office 2.
3See above, chapter 2, pp. 43-5, 48-9.
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resigning. This lack of cohesion in the ministry hampered its 
ability to withstand the parliamentary onslaught of 1804.
That the rest of the ministers were followers of Pitt also 
caused Addington trouble.1 This meant that the first loyalty of most 
of them was toward Pitt not Addington. Many had only taken office 
at the insistence of Pitt and on the condition that he would 
continue to support the ministry. When political distance opened 
between Pitt and Addington, several lost faith in the ability of the 
ministry to continue. As early as November 1802, Eldon desired 
changes to the administration, the most important of which was that 
Pitt should return to its head.2 Portland and the Duke of York also 
admitted that they preferred the old ministry.3 By the spring of 
1803, there was a consensus among the ministers, including 
Addington, that they wished Pitt would return to his old office. The 
failure of the series of negotiations between Pitt and Addington, 
even led Hobart and Yorke to consider resigning although Eldon 
persuaded them not to.4
Yorke painted an extremely bleak picture of the ministry in his 
correspondence with Hardwicke between 1803 and 1804. It is wrong to 
assume, however, that all the ministers were as despondent. For 
Addington, Hawkesbury, and Hobart spoke more positively of the 
ministry's prospects until close to the end. Nevertheless, Yorke's 
opinions were illustrative of some of the important problems the 
ministry faced. His main concerns stemmed from a strong belief in 
his own inadequacy for the offices which he held. Claiming to be "a
1Portland was not a follower of Pitt but after 1794 had 
become closely allied with Pitt and his political descendants.
2Hardwicke to Yorke, 15 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 35702, fos.
48-9.
3Portland to Crewe, 4 Nov. 1802, Add. MSS 37845, fos. 102;
Malmesbury Diaries, iv. 255.
4Eldon to Hobart, 12 May 1803, Hobart Papers,
D/MH/H/War/B65.
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Tenant by sufferance',1 he had joined the ministry very reluctantly 
in the first place and knew that he had neither the talent nor 
inclination to run the affairs of the Home Office. He could hardly 
have a good impression of a ministry in which he was convinced that 
one of the most important members was insufficiently qualified for 
his office. Nor did he have much confidence in many of his 
colleagues. For he claimed that only Castlereagh, Hobart, and
Hawkesbury were suited for office.2 Yorke also persistently 
complained of the unbearable burden caused by the volunteer
controversy and of the inability of the ministry to face up to the
hostile opposition. He considered resigning on several occasions, 
but relented because that would only have weakened the ministry 
further. He also conspired with other members of the administration 
about pressing Addington to give way to Pitt, but in the end he 
realized that the Prime Minister had already gone as far as he could 
to accommodate Pitt.3 Yorke summed up the dilemma by describing his 
distress at
the present extremely embarrassing & awkward situations 
in which the Government and the Publick affairs are
placed, which in my conscience, I believe, neither can or 
ought to go on as they are; it is utterly impossible--at 
the same time, where is the Remedy, & what sort of a 
prospect have we before us? It makes me sick to think of 
it ... 4
In many ways, the ministry had lost faith in its own ability to 
govern.5
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 14 Nov. 1803, Add. MSS 35393, fo.
141.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 2 Aug. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos. 
281-4.
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 17 Apr. 1803, Add. MSS 35702, fos.
169-74; Same to same, 21 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1803, Add. MSS 35393,
fos. 144-8; Colchester Diary, i. 417.
4Yorke to Hardwicke, 11 Mar. 1804, Add. MSS 35393, fos.
156-9.
5Ziegler, p. 205.
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Hawkesbury and Liverpool were two of Addington's most loyal 
supporters, and both were more optimistic than Yorke about the 
prospects of the ministry and harshly criticized Pitt for his 
opposition. Nevertheless, they did not possess a high opinion of 
Addington's leadership qualities. In fact, Liverpool claimed that 
Hawkesbury was the de facto leader of the ministry. In June 1803, 
he told his son, 'you are therefore in fact the principal Ornament 
and Support of the present Government; and Mr Addington is in Truth 
little more than an Instrument supported by you; If you withdraw 
Your support & Countenance, He would fall at once'.1 Liverpool 
therefore felt that his son should be treated as at least 
Addington's equal, 'In short you should be on the same Footing with 
respect to Mr Addington, that the late L [or]d Chatham was to the 
Duke of Newcastle.'2 Consequently, Liverpool opposed Hawkesbury's 
elevation to the Lords, as it would hamper his chances of becoming 
Prime Minister, which, considering Pitt's illness and Addington's 
deficiencies, he believed to be a likely prospect.
Therefore, one of Addington most serious deficiencies as Prime 
Minister was his inability to win the complete loyalty, confidence, 
and respect of his colleagues. For a ministry to survive periods of 
crisis, it required a belief in itself and its leader. Addington's 
ministry was plagued by self-doubt and a general belief that the 
best man to lead the government was Pitt and not Addington. Only 
strong leadership could have overcome these problems, and Addington 
failed to demonstrate that leadership. In many ways the fall of the 
ministry was as much a result of internal collapse as the decline 
of its support in Parliament.
Addington's failure to develop a strong and cohesive ministry 
was mirrored by his difficulty in managing the lesser forms of 
patronage at his disposal. Previous Prime Ministers had won the
Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 1 June 1803, Add. MSS 38336, fo.
258.
2Liverpool to Hawkesbury, 7 June 1803, MS Loan 72/49, fo.
66.
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support of influential men by granting them government offices to 
give them a stake in the ministry's political survival, and purged 
offices of all the leader's political enemies. But Addington, who 
was on the whole a good student of parliamentary history, neglected 
these considerations. When filling government offices, the effects 
on the parliamentary strength of the ministry were not his first 
considerations. His reasons for making appointments varied. 
Sometimes he appointed the man he believed most suitable for the 
job, while on other occasions, he selected the candidate most 
agreeable to the King or someone else in the ministry. He also 
appointed his own personal friends and members of his family, for 
which he was severely criticized. All these reasons were sensible 
in themselves, but the bottom line was that Addington often 
squandered opportunities to strengthen his ministry further.
Addington also failed to maintain control of government 
patronage in his own hands. Achieving a proper balance of power 
between ministers was difficult in any circumstances, as Prime 
Ministers ran the risk of alienating their colleagues, who had often 
accepted office for the patronage it entailed. Nevertheless, 
Addington let too much control slip out of his hands. He granted 
virtually unlimited control of naval patronage to St Vincent, as one 
of the conditions under which the latter agreed to take office. 
Addington's only apparent interference was in refusing St Vincent's 
request to appoint Benjamin Tucker as the senior Secretary of the 
Admiralty to replace Evan Nepean, whom Addington had appointed to 
fill Wickham's office as Chief Secretary in Ireland.1 He also left 
control of the Foreign Office in Hawkesbury's hands. This proved to 
have been a mistake on at least one occasion, as Hawkesbury 
appointed Charles Arbuthnot to replace Hervey as under-secretary, 
not knowing that Arbuthnot held the ministry in utter contempt. In
xSt Vincent to Addington, 10 and 18 Jan. 1804, and 
Addington to Yorke, 5 Jan. 1804, Sidmouth Papers,
152M/cl804/ON2 6, ON28, and 012 .
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addition, the distribution of minor offices Addington appears to 
have left to his brother Hiley and Charles Bragge.1
Addington did retain control of several areas of government 
patronage, but even then he did not always exercise that control 
judiciously. He managed appointments to the Church jointly with the 
King. George III usually deferred to Addington's suggestions, but 
the Prime Minister took the King's proclivities into consideration 
beforehand. Addington also played a large role in Irish patronage. 
He made all the appointments which were directly under the control 
of the British government, such as Lord Lieutenant, Chief Secretary, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord Chancellor, but also had a say 
in those under the control of the Irish government. While Hardwicke 
and Pelham fought for control of the Irish appointments, Addington 
usually supported the former. Moreover, his first principle was to 
honour all promises made to ensure the passage of the Act of Union.2 
Again, this decreased the scope for building support loyal to the 
new ministry, but he was fortunate that the Irish MPs decided to 
support the ministry anyway.3
Addington's management of the other offices at his disposal 
often showed a lack of judgement. Granting the Clerkship of the 
Pells to his son was a mistake but not so much because it smacked 
of corruption. For he had offered the sinecure first to Pitt and 
Steele who had both refused, and Pitt had approved of giving it to 
Harry.4 It was common for ministers to arrange for sinecures for 
members of their immediate family, as their salaries were
3Bragge's existing correspondence for this period is 
predominantly concerned with applications for office. Bragge- 
Bathurst Papers, D421/C19.
2Hardwicke to Addington,7 Sept. 1801, Sidmouth Papers, 
152M/cl801/OI10.
3Rose claimed that two-thirds of the Irish MPs would 
support Addington. Rose to Pitt, 7 May 1804, Add. MSS 42772, 
fo. 196.
4Pitt to Addington, 29 July 1802, and Addington to Hiley 
Addington, 27 July 1803, Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl802/OZ180 and 
F6.
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insufficient to sustain them in the style of life required by their 
office. Nevertheless, the Clerkship was a coveted prize that should 
have been used to attract further support for the ministry. 
Addington also seriously mismanaged the offices of Joint Paymaster 
of the Forces and Surveyor of the Royal Woods and Forests. In first 
forming his administration Addington sought to include Glenbervie, 
but he refused several times to take the Board of Control and only 
agreed in the end to accept the Joint Paymastership. A year later, 
Hiley, who was dissatisfied with the office of Secretary of the 
Treasury, pressed his brother to give him something better. He was 
looking for a Cabinet office but Addington was able to silence him 
with the Joint Paymastership because it came with a house.1 To 
facilitate this move, however, he had to shuffle Glenbervie over to 
Surveyor of the Woods. But although this entailed an increase in 
salary, Glenbervie was very unhappy because the new office was 
merely a sinecure, while he preferred a more efficient office and 
regretted the loss of the house. Therefore, Addington lost 
considerable good will from Glenbervie without completely pleasing 
Hiley. While this affair did not cost him anything in terms of 
votes, it was symptomatic of his inability to manage the 
distribution of offices.
Addington also alienated some of the support of the East India 
Company interest. The ministry was caught in the middle of a 
struggle between the Court of Directors and Wellesley. For 
Wellesley's plans for opening the Indian trade to private shipping 
and establishing a college at Calcutta to train company bureaucrats 
provoked strong opposition at the Court. Addington and Castlereagh 
had difficulty playing the role of mediators. Although they were 
able to persuade Wellesley to withdraw his resignation, fear of 
offending the Court prevented them from giving him wholehearted 
support. In the end, however, they were able to satisfy Wellesley 
but not the Court. As a result, Addington was deserted in the
xAddington to Hiley Addington, 24 Dec. 1802, Sidmouth
Papers, 152M/cl802/F3.
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Commons by twenty-three East India members. This left the ministry 
with the support of only thirteen by April 1804, while the 
opposition had increased its total to at least fifty-six.1
The election of 1802 has already been discussed,2 but it is 
important to reiterate in this context how carelessly it was 
managed. Although Addington could not have known at the time, his 
failure to secure greater support for the government cost him dearly 
in the parliamentary crunch of March and April 1804. Instead of 
taking control of the management of elections in the interest of the 
government, Addington remained almost aloof, allowing Rose and 
Dundas to secure control of many seats,3 which were turned against 
the government in the end. At the time, of course, Addington mistook 
Dundas and Rose for allies and believed that Pitt's closest friends 
would continue to support the ministry. An astute politician would 
have seen the rift that was growing and would have prepared for the 
possibility that Pitt and his allies would change sides, no matter 
how unlikely this appeared. Addington, however, was not an astute 
politician. He was naive to believe that pledges and political 
friendships would always be honoured. Hardwicke stated that 
Addington's greatest fault was his fear of giving offence.4 In this 
way, he helped to sow the seeds of his own ministry's destruction.
Addington not only failed to get out the vote at election time 
but also during crucial divisions in Parliament, because the 
ministry did a poor job of whipping. The problem was not so much 
winning over the support of the undecided or members of the 
opposition as merely retaining the votes of traditional government 
supporters. In describing the division on Pitt's motion against St 
Vincent on 15 March, Yorke noted that about fifty "of our Friends
1Philips, pp. 112-141.
2See above, chapter 3, pp. 157-61.
3Hardwicke to Yorke, 3 0 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos.
298-301.
4Hardwicke to Yorke, 11 Oct. 1803, Add. MSS 35703, fos.
253-60.
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went away and would not vote.'1 Yorke also admitted that the 
government did not do a good job of whipping for the division on 17 
April.2 While Pitt and Melville had been organizing their support 
since the end of March, the government did not begin to canvass for 
votes until a few days before the important divisions. Hawkesbury's 
carelessness actually led to a defeat of the government in the Lords 
on a minor motion in April. The government finally made a concerted 
effort to rally its support for the vote on Stafford's motion on the 
defence of the country scheduled for 3 0 April, but by then it was 
too late. Addington realized that at best the government could hope 
for a majority of ten. Spencer's detailed lists of peers who would 
have voted for and against the motion projected for the government 
a majority of thirteen.3 To illustrate how bad things had become for 
the ministry, Spencer expected that even Hobart's father would vote 
for the motion.
Addington's failure to act earlier meant that the opposition 
to the government began to gather a momentum of its own. The strong 
division against Pitt on Patten's motion in June 1803 helped to keep 
the government's majority solid for several months. The government 
failed to ensure equally strong divisions, however, once Pitt 
decided to enter systematic opposition in March 1804. This probably 
led many to speculate that the political tide was turning away from 
Addington and toward Pitt. Those who were politically ambitious
3Yorke to Hardwicke, 16 Mar. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos. 
172-3. There is no direct evidence to determine why such a 
large number of members who had previously supported the 
government stayed away on this occasion and then later joined 
Pitt in opposition. However, it is probable that the 
combination of the illness of the King and Pitt's finally 
moving into open opposition seemed to indicate to many members 
that a change in the government was imminent, and it would have 
been better for their political careers to be seen to have been 
supporting the side that was going in rather than the one that 
was going out.
2Yorke to Hardwicke, 17 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos.
244-5.
3Althorp Papers, G57.
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wished to support the man who was likely to be in office in the near 
future. As more gambled that this would be Pitt, the trend shifted 
more strongly in his favour which in turn brought over even more 
supporters. Thus as Addington's ship appeared to be sinking many 
jumped overboard.
The strength of the opposition increased dramatically during 
the month after Pitt declared open hostility to the government. 
Superior organization and the general expectation that Pitt was 
about to replace Addington enabled the opposition to undermine the 
previously strong government majority. Just prior to the decisive 
divisions, the Prince of Wales pressed Sheridan and Erskine to 
withdraw their support from Addington. Thereafter, in a division in 
the Commons on 23 April, the government majority dropped to fifty- 
two and Yorke declared that the game was up.1 Two days later the 
majority dropped to thirty-nine. On 26 April without consulting his 
colleagues Addington went to the King and informed him of the 
necessity of resigning.2 Michael McCahill, citing the delay between 
the division on 25 April and the Cabinet meeting on 2 9 April, argues 
that Addington did not decide to resign until he had realized how 
close the vote in the Lords on Stafford's motion was likely to be.3 
While McCahill is correct to emphasize that the divisions in the 
Lords were just as important as those in the Commons, it is unlikely 
that Addington would have remained in office, even if the 
government's prospects for Stafford's motion had been better. For 
the divisions in the Commons were conclusive. The King tried to 
persuade Addington not to resign, offering to dissolve Parliament 
and call new election, but Addington refused. Addington then asked 
the King to consult Eldon about approaching Pitt to form a new
1Yorke to Hardwicke, 24 Apr. 1804, Add. MSS 35705, fos. 
268-9.
2Pellew, ii. 279; Memorandum on the Change of Government, 
Melville Castle Muniments, GD 51/1/76.
3Michael McCahill, "The House of Lords and the Collapse of 
Henry Addington's Administration', Parliamentary History, vi 
(1987), 69-94.
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ministry, unaware that Eldon had already been discussing this with 
Pitt for almost two months. Eldon showed the King Pitt's letter on 
27 April, and two days later Addington met his Cabinet and declared
his intention to resign. The delay between his telling the King and
his colleagues was probably intended to give the King a chance to 
speak with Eldon and to give Addington time to regain his 
composure.1 On 30 April, Hawkesbury asked that Stafford's motion be 
postponed owing to some important new developments, which everyone 
understood to mean that the ministry was to resign. A few hours
later, in the Commons Fox asked Addington if this were so, which he
affirmed. The House then broke up amidst somber silence.2 There was 
no triumphal roar from the opposition. For it was if they realized 
that they should not have been proud of what they had done.
The collapse of the Addington ministry was the result of the 
combination of two factors. The first was the decision of Pitt, 
Grenville, and Fox to storm the closet. For various personal and 
political reasons, Pitt abandoned his support for the King's 
prerogative and forced himself upon George III. He had hoped that 
the King would have asked him to form a ministry earlier, as he did 
not wish to appear to be grasping at power. Nevertheless, by March 
1804, he had become impatient and decided to force Addington's 
resignation, leaving himself as the only suitable successor. He 
chose to attack the government on its defence policies, probably not 
so much because he really believed them misguided, but because he 
believed that issues of national security were more likely to grab 
parliamentary attention.
The Addington ministry should have been able to parry these 
attacks and weather the political storm. For despite the problem of 
arming the volunteers and a deficiency in the army of reserve, the 
war policies of the ministry had been as successful as could have
^Addington appeared emotionally unstable for a few days. 
Glenbervie Diaries, i. 390.
2Colchester Diary, i . 500-01.
318
been expected in the circumstances. The reason that the ministry was 
unable to withstand the political pressure was that it was 
collapsing from within because the ministers lacked sufficient self- 
confidence to continue. Yorke, Eldon, and Hobart had been expecting 
the ministry to collapse for more than a year, and most of the 
ministers openly declared that they preferred Pitt as Prime 
Minister. Eldon had even been conspiring with Pitt to overturn the 
ministry, causing St Vincent to describe the Pitt's return to office 
as vthe enemy having a friend in the citadel, who opened the gates 
to him'.1 In addition, Liverpool was virtually pressing Hawkesbury 
to take the reins of power away from Addington. The Prime Minister 
was thus unable to manage the different personalties in the Cabinet 
and win their absolute loyalty. Nevertheless, his greatest failing 
was his unwillingness to implement the methods necessary to secure 
solid support in Parliament. For he refused to fight other 
politicians on their own terms with weapons traditionally 
implemented by government. If the only way he could remain in office 
was to provoke an election and engage Pitt in a bitter fight for 
control of seats, then he did not wish to remain in office. His 
failure was a failure of political will: he had no stomach for a 
political fight and lacked the ambition to remain Prime Minister. 
He could face tough policy decisions, but he could not face the 
personal acrimony and underhandedness involved in a prolonged 
parliamentary struggle.
Holland and others thought that Addington resigned to prevent 
the King from being forced to accept a ministry against his will and 
to prevent the political crisis from causing a relapse in the King's 
health.2 Addington himself told Abbot that the King dreaded the 
prospect of a defeat in Parliament as a forerunner to a Regency, and 
thus he had resigned for the same reason that he had taken office, 
for the sake of the King's mind.3 The King was still forced to take
1Campbell, ix, 245.
2Holland, Memoirs of the Whig Party, i. 191.
3Colchester Diary, i. 498 and 501.
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Pitt against his will, but it is likely that, had Addington hung on 
longer, Pitt would have become more committed to including Fox in 
his ministry.
Yet there was more to Addington's decision than mere concern 
for the King. For it seems evident that Addington no longer wished 
to be Prime Minister. For his last few weeks in office were 
miserable.1 Pitt had long been Addington's most valued friend, and 
the loss of that friendship was probably more devastating than the 
political attacks on his ministry. He had never wanted office in the 
first place, and he resented being used as a tool, being pushed in 
and pulled out of office according to Pitt's whim. Leaving office 
was actually a great relief to Addington, even though the process 
was humiliating and left considerable personal ill-will on both 
sides. Therefore, the most valid criticisms of Henry Addington as 
Prime Minister centre on his lack of political determination. Strong 
personal ambition was necessary for successful leadership of the 
government, and Addington did not possess that quality. He was not 
willing to pay the price to remain in office when the situation in 
Parliament became tough. If he had remained steadfast and utilized 
all the weapons at his disposal, his ministry might have survived. 
Pitt in 1784 and Perceval in 1810 remained firm in the face of 
repeated parliamentary defeats, eventually winning over sufficient 
support to sustain their ministries. Addington, however, lacked such 
mettle. Consequently, when many contemporaries complained that 
Addington was ill-suited for the office of Prime Minister, they were 
probably right, but for the wrong reason.
1Looking back on the year, Addington described it as 
"gloomy in almost all respects & to me the most painful of my 
life'. Sidmouth to Bond, 1 Jan. 1805, Bond Papers, D367/C24.
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Conclusion
The Legacy of the Addington Ministry
"Very much that has passed in the course of the last two years has 
been sufficient to excite disgust and distaste for a political life, 
especially in the breasts of those, who love moral occupations & 
quiet, and are content with domestic Enjoyments. To such, the 
intrigues of faction, the perfidity of false Friends, the bare faced 
prostitution of public character, and (perhaps I may add) the caprice 
of Kings, cannot fail to produce an indisposition to be any longer 
exposed to or to redress them.'
Hiley Addington1
The reason many of its contemporaries and historians later have 
called the Addington ministry weak and inefficient is because they 
have looked at it from a very narrow perspective. Their first step 
was to compare it with its immediate predecessor, and measured 
against Pitt's ministry, Addington's appeared inexperienced, less 
prestigious, and weaker in debating talent. Yet only Ziegler has 
bothered to ask why this was the case and to suggest that these 
problems were largely unavoidable. In evaluating the performance of 
the ministry on its own, most other historians have placed the 
greatest emphasis on the Treaty of Amiens, which was the most 
important development during Addington's term in office. Those who 
argued that the signing of the treaty was a mistake based their 
conclusions on the short duration of the peace and on the terms, 
which were much more favourable to the French. This appeared to prove 
that the ministry was incapable of managing foreign affairs and that, 
once the war resumed, the continuation of the ministry posed a threat 
to the security of the country.
Presented in this narrow perspective the argument was 
convincing. Nevertheless, this view ignored the much wider context 
in which parliamentary politics and government policy operated.
^iley Addington to Bond, 15 Dec. 1805, Bond Papers,
D367/C25.
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Social and economic questions played an important role during this 
period. Pitt's resignation was caused by more than his disagreement 
with the King over Catholic emancipation, for his physical and mental 
health had suffered considerably under the strains of managing the 
government during a severe crisis. The consequences of the long and 
unsuccessful war culminated in economic distress and dangerous levels 
of social unrest owing to the high price of grain. Pitt resigned in 
part because he was physically and mentally too weak to guide his 
strongly divided Cabinet through the crisis. Even the question of 
Catholic emancipation was directly related to both the war and social 
unrest. Pitt supported emancipation as a means of pacifying Ireland, 
which was a strategic liability to Britain and a severe drain on 
British troops. In fact, he did not begin seriously to consider 
emancipation until after the Irish Rebellion of 1798 had demonstrated 
the dangers that disaffected Irish posed to the British government.
Therefore, in 1801 Pitt for all his talents was temporarily a 
broken reed, as were his closest adherents within his ministry who 
had decided to resign with him. When Addington was persuaded against 
his own inclination to take office, he had to form a new ministry 
without the most talented and experienced candidates. Thus 
comparisons were unavoidable and Addington's men could never measure 
up, but there was nothing he could have done, because he had had to 
form a ministry from second-rate candidates.
On the whole, however, these ministers did a remarkably good 
job. For rarely had a ministry come into office during such a serious 
crisis. Pitt, who had governed the country for seventeen years, had 
proved unable to manage it. Thus the new government faced a series 
of very difficult decisions. Although Addington did not wish to 
capitulate to the French and he would have preferred to continue the 
war rather than accept peace terms which were clearly favourable to 
France, he simply could not ignore the social and economic crises 
that the government faced. Despite the denials of the disciples of 
Adam Smith, the war had played an important role in causing the 
dramatic increase in the price of bread. In many ways the war was 
responsible for the alarming levels of social unrest, and it was
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clear that the only way to end the unrest was to end the war. In 
addition, the war had almost ruined the government finances. While 
British commerce had expanded greatly during the first years of the 
war, by 1801 the French had virtually severed British trade with the 
Continent. Several industries were severely hurt by the loss of 
external markets, while the high price of grain caused the collapse 
of many internal markets. Moreover, the government was accumulating 
a massive debt by borrowing to pay for the war, while the economy was 
under a severe strain. This restricted money markets causing a rise 
in interest rates. Consequently, continuing the war would have forced 
the government to borrow more money on very disadvantageous terms. 
Peace was clearly the only means of alleviating these strains.
The course of the negotiations with the French, however, made 
the government's decisions more difficult. For it was evident from 
Hawkesbury's discussions with Otto and Conrwallis's with Joseph 
Bonaparte that the French were determined to maintain a firm line. 
Consequently, if the British desired peace, they had to make 
considerable sacrifices. Addington and Hawkesbury might have wished 
to remain firm but they could not afford to cause a rupture in the 
negotiations, and every time the negotiations stalled the social and 
economic pressures upon the government forced the British to make 
further concessions. The whole experience was extremely frustrating 
for Addington and Hawkesbury, and they shared many sentiments with 
the critics of the peace. Nevertheless, the government had other 
important responsibilities besides foreign affairs, and when there 
were conflicting interests the ministers had to chose the line of 
policy that was in the best interests of the country as a whole. 
Addington concluded that the benefits of peace at that time were more 
important than whether the Britain retained French and Dutch 
colonies. Pitt, the majority in Parliament, and what was perceivable 
of public opinion, seemed to agree.
The peace appeared popular throughout the country, although many 
prominent politicians were dissatisfied with the terms. Most 
important for Addington, the peace enabled him to reform the 
government finances. Cuts in expenditure and a drop in interest
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rates, as a result of the end of the war, allowed him to repeal the 
income tax which had become very unpopular. Tax cuts, a revival in 
British trade, and a fall in the price of grain led to a great 
decrease in social tension. Thus Addington had alleviated both the 
internal and external crises that plagued the government when he took 
office. Nevertheless, foreign policy interests interfered with 
Addington's domestic policies, because the long and complex 
negotiations of the peace preliminaries and the disappointment at the 
course of the peace congress demonstrated that the peace would remain 
precarious. Consequently, Addington decided to sustain unusually 
large military establishments in the event that war would be renewed, 
but this prevented him from cutting as much expenditure as he desired 
and required that he leave some of the war taxes in place. Therefore, 
Addington was unable to obtain the full benefits of the peace. At 
best he struck a balance between measures necessary to alleviate 
social tension and being prepared for a renewal of war.
Having removed the consequences of the war as a source of social 
tension and having allowed Pitt's repressive legislation to lapse, 
Addington had helped to heal the social wounds, as social unrest and 
radical agitation subsided considerably. His financial reforms also 
contributed to the revival of the economy. Consequently, by 1803 the 
two major factors which had hampered Britain's war effort in 1801 
were removed. This gave the government the option of resorting to 
war, if the French refused to compromise on issues of future 
conflict. Addington hoped to preserve the peace but was unwilling to 
make any further substantial concessions to the French, and so when 
Bonaparte continued to pursue an aggressive policy during the peace 
and refused to accommodate the British on the issue of Malta, 
Addington resorted to war.
The war that began in 1803 was at first rather more popular than 
the one that ended in 1801, and this was largely a result of the 
threat that the French would invade England. The large numbers who 
enlisted in the volunteers seemed to indicate that many who opposed 
foreign wars were willing to defend their own country against attack. 
Other than Emmet's abortive rebellion in Dublin in 1803, Addington
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does not seem to have faced any serious social unrest or opposition 
to the war during the remainder of his term. Nevertheless, this 
popular support for the war did have drawbacks. As the Duke of York 
wanted the government to raise a large force as quickly to repel an 
apparently imminent French invasion, the government hastily 
implemented military legislation embodying the militia, financing the 
volunteers, and creating a new army of reserve. Owing to popular 
support for the war and several imperfections within the legislation, 
the infrastructure could not cope with the vast number of 
applications and the ordnance was unable to meet all the requests for 
arms, and so the government had to limit the number of volunteers 
that it would accept for service. Unfortunately, these measures 
dampened public support for the war and opened the ministry to 
considerable criticism.
The problems with the military legislation were not serious in 
themselves, but several politicians used them for political purposes. 
By 1803, there were a few prominent politicians who for various 
reasons wished to have Addington dismissed. Canning, Rose, and other 
of Pitt's closest friends had resented Addington for displacing their 
mentor and had been striving ever since Pitt resigned to put him back 
into office. Grenville had supported Addington at the start but 
either honestly felt that he could not support peace terms that he 
would never have accepted had he remained in office or perceived them 
as placing his own administration of foreign affairs in a poor light, 
and from October 18 01 he had become a determined opponent of the 
government. Fox had supported the ministry during the peace but, 
having opposed the previous war, went back into opposition upon the 
renewal of hostilities in 1803. In January 1804, Fox joined Grenville 
in an alliance against the government, but they could not make an 
impression on Parliament without the help of Pitt, who had wished to 
avoid entering systematic opposition. Nevertheless, under the 
relentless pressure of Canning and Rose, Pitt finally succumbed in 
March 1804.
Pitt then attacked the government on its military legislation 
and naval polices. This strategy was well calculated to win support
325
for Pitt away from the government because most of the country 
perceived Pitt to be the only one capable of successfully managing 
the war. In a dispute over war policies between Pitt and Addington 
many MPs were inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
former. Thus the combined assault of the most talented speakers in 
Parliament against the government on issues of national security 
successfully whittled away the ministry's majority.
Addington was unable to overcome this parliamentary onslaught 
for two reasons. First, he lacked skill of political management. He 
failed to use the patronage at his disposal to increase the support 
for the government or to strengthen his ministry with men of talent, 
and instead he left much of the control over electoral patronage to 
Pitt's friends Dundas and Rose. Consequently, he was out-manoeuvred 
politically. Second, he did not possess the stomach for a hard 
political fight. He had never desired office in the first place and 
refused to employ the hard-nosed tactics necessary to keep him in. 
He was deeply hurt by Pitt's opposition, and his last few weeks in 
office were completely miserable. For while he could face tough 
policy decisions, he could not cope with being betrayed by his 
friends.
Those who had helped to force Addington's resignation, under the 
assumption that a new ministry led by Pitt would provide greater 
political stability, were severely disappointed. The events of the 
previous three years had in fact completely altered the face of 
parliamentary politics. Pitt's position was severely undermined 
because his cousin and colleague, Grenville, refused to join the new 
ministry if Fox were excluded. As the King was adamantly opposed to 
Fox, Pitt lost the assistance and political support of one of his 
strongest allies. The unsavoury manner in which Pitt had forced 
Addington from office had also swung a great deal of popular support 
away from the former towards the latter. Addington received a deluge 
of letters consoling him for how unfairly he had been treated,1 and
lA large collection is in Sidmouth Papers, 152M/cl804/OZ.
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many of Pitt's former supporters joined Addington out of sympathy. 
For example, Charles Yorke, who had previously desired that Pitt 
should take over from Addington, was so sickened by the manner in 
which it eventually happened that he refused to have anything to do 
with the new ministry and joined Addington in opposition. He 
explained:
I have no reason to think that I shall be asked, & I have 
determined to have nothing to do with it. 1. Because from 
the Part I have taken in arranging the measures of 
Defence, I cannot consent to eat my words; & 2ndly because 
I foresee nothing like the confidence or comfort [which he 
had enjoyed with Addington], now, in the society of Pitt 
& his associates.1
When Addington had taken office in 1801 he possessed no political
following, but by the summer of 1804 he could count on the support
of about forty in the House of Commons, a party second in size only
to that of Pitt.2 Thus, when Addington voted with Fox and the
Grenvillites in opposition, Pitt's majority was only slightly larger
than that of Addington's when he resigned.
Pitt therefore had difficulty forming a strong administration.
As Grenville, Windham, and their followers refused to join, he was
left with constructing a ministry out of his closest friends and some
of the members of Addington's ministry, whom he had just turned out
of office. Liverpool, who can be considered unbiased as his son was
a member of both ministries, claimed that "If We compare the
Individuals of which the late administration was composed, with those
of the present, We shall find the present much weaker than the
preceding one, except in the single Case of Mr Pitt.'3 The ministry
proved unable to carry on, and in December 1804, Pitt chose to invite
Addington to join. It is ironic that if in the spring of 1803, Pitt
1Yorke to Hardwicke, 8 May, 1804, Add. MSS 35706, fos. 13-
14.
2Liverpool to Hervey, 26 Dec. 1804, Hervey Papers,
941/56/8.
Liverpool to the Bishop of Hereford, 16 July 1804, MS
Loan 72/51, fo. 88.
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had only agreed to form a ministry that included Hawkesbury, 
Castlereagh, Eldon, and Addington but excluded Grenville he would 
probably have avoided most of the trouble and animosity which ensued. 
Moreover, if that arrangement had been made in 1803 it probably would 
have lasted longer than the Pitt-Addington coalition of 1804-5.
Problems stemming from the manner in which Pitt had treated him 
during 1803 and 1804 led to Addington seceding from the ministry in 
1805. This left Parliament divided into three groups: the Pittites, 
the Addingtonians, and the Grenville-Fox coalition. None of these 
groups was strong enough on its own to sustain a parliamentary 
majority, and it was clear that if Pitt had not died in January 1806, 
his ministry would probably have been forced out of office shortly 
thereafter. When Grenville was asked to form a ministry after Pitt's 
death, he realized that he required the security of the support of 
the solid block of Addingtonians. The Ministry of All the Talents 
survived in fact only as long as the Whigs and the Addingtonians 
could agree on policy, which was not very long. Thus the 
parliamentary stability developed under Pitt's first ministry had 
been shattered completely by developments during Addington's 
ministry. There followed a series of weak ministries that had as much 
trouble keeping themselves in office as fighting the war with France. 
This problem was not resolved until the remnants of Pitt's party were 
able to form a solid junction with the Addingtonians in 1812.
The formation and longevity of the Liverpool ministry cannot be 
explained without reference to the Addington ministry. The leading 
members of Liverpool's Cabinet--Castlereagh, Eldon, Sidmouth, and 
Liverpool himself--all received their first experience of Cabinet 
office under Addington. This experience helped them to achieve posts 
in subsequent ministries which left them as the best qualified 
candidates for office in 1812. The ill-will created by Addington's 
seceding from Pitt's ministry in 1805, however, prevented a junction 
between the Pittites and the Addingtonians until 1812, when Perceval, 
who had also obtained his first experience of office under Addington, 
asked him to take the office of Lord President of the Council. 
Perceval's assassination and the new crisis with the United States
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rendered a strong and united government even more important, and thus 
when the task of forming a new ministry was to left Liverpool, the 
best he could devise was a version of the Addington ministry 
reshuffled.
Liverpool's ministry was more successful than Addington's 
because the ministers were placed in offices to which they were 
better suited. Liverpool was much better at managing men than was 
Addington and, therefore, was a more effective Prime Minister. 
Castlereagh had taken a strong interest in foreign affairs during 
Addington's ministry and his aristocratic manner and broader vision 
made him a better foreign secretary than Liverpool. Sidmouth's 
strengths were his calm and reasonable manner along with a 
willingness to make tough decisions. In addition, his social policies 
while Prime Minister had demonstrated that he was not a reactionary 
but was willing to take strong measures only when he believed that 
they were absolutely necessary. Consequently, Liverpool recognized 
that Sidmouth was best qualified for the Home Office. As it was 
necessary to appoint a Chancellor of the Exchequer from the House of 
Commons, Liverpool turned to Vansittart who, as Secretary of the 
Treasury under Addington, had played an important role in devising 
Addington's successful financial reforms including the income tax. 
Thus Liverpool's skill as Prime Minister was best demonstrated by his 
ability to place the right man in the right office.
The legacy of the Addington ministry can be measured in terms 
of policies as well as men. Several measures introduced by the 
ministry endured throughout the period of the Napoleonic Wars and 
beyond. The most significant were some of Addington's financial 
measures. The income tax, as reformed by Addington, was retained 
until 1816. It was revived again by Sir Robert Peel in 1842 and by 
the end of the nineteenth century it had become an important source 
of government revenue. Although subsequent governments made many 
changes to the tax they all retained the system of schedules and the 
principle of taxation at the source introduced by Addington. The 
practice of reviewing the state of the economy during the budget 
speech was also introduced by Addington in 1802. Subsequent
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Chancellors of the Exchequer would provide a more detailed analysis 
of the economy, but it was Addington who in this way first placed the 
government finances in a larger context.
Despite the political crisis caused by the commission of naval 
inquiry, most of St Vincent's naval reforms were eventually adopted. 
St Vincent's immediate successors, Melville and Barham, completely 
reversed his policies, but after the reports of the commission of 
inquiry were placed before Parliament, the Ministry of All the 
Talents successfully re-implemented them. Thereafter, the navy was 
administered on more rational and efficient lines. In addition, 
although Addington's militia and volunteer legislation was largely 
dismantled by Pitt and Windham, from it Castlereagh borrowed some of 
the ideas for his successful military reforms. Finally, even some of 
the ministry's foreign policies were either continued or revived. 
Addington and Hawkesbury's concentration on building a Continental 
alliance around Russia was continued by Pitt in forming the Third 
Coalition in 1805. The strategy of the Peninsular War and the idea 
of escorting the King of Portugal to Brazil had also been 
foreshadowed in the discussion of Addington's Cabinet.
The Addington ministry was not, therefore, an aberration but a 
crucial link in a long chain of developments in diplomacy, military 
strategy, social policy, financial affairs, and parliamentary 
politics. Moreover, the example of the Addington ministry 
demonstrates the strong interconnection between each of these issues. 
As a case study, it does not validate either side in the theoretical 
debate over the primacy of foreign policy or domestic politics. On 
the contrary, during the Addington ministry the realms of foreign 
policy and domestic politics impinged upon each other to a 
considerable extent, and government policy followed the dictates of 
each at different times depending on the circumstances. Thus it was 
not the primacy of either but their interaction that was most 
important, and without which the rise and fall of the Addington 
ministry cannot properly be understood.
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Note on the Sources
In researching the formulation of government policy I found 
some sources more useful than others. I have listed all the archival 
sources indicating the class numbers where available although I 
consulted mostly only those files for the years 1800-1804. The most 
helpful of the government documents were the British Foreign Office 
files. The out-letters provided most of the information that I was 
looking for in terms of explanation of policy, but the in-letters 
also illuminated certain aspects of the policies of both the British 
and foreign governments. The French and Austrian archives provided 
additional insight and some factual information that was not 
available in the British archives. The Admiralty and War Office 
files required a great deal of sifting through often routine 
administrative correspondence to find letters that described the 
formulation of policy or gave orders for the mobilization of the 
fleet and where it should be sent. The Home Office out-letters were 
very helpful on aspects of domestic policy such as dealing with 
social unrest, but the in-letters were of limited value, as reports 
were sporadic and sometimes unreliable. The rest of the Home Office 
files were of very little use at all as was the routine 
administrative correspondence in the Treasury files, which rarely 
provided any insight on the formulation of policy.
Quite often the private correspondence provided more 
information about the formulation of policy than did the government 
documents. The papers of Addington and Hawkesbury were the most 
useful, particularly their correspondence with Cabinet ministers and 
relatives such as Liverpool and Hiley Addington. The papers of the 
other Cabinet ministers such as Hobart, St Vincent, Pelham, and 
Eldon were less extensive but included some important items. Yorke1s 
correspondence with Hardwicke during the later stages of the 
ministry was extremely valuable. The papers of the diplomats and 
under secretaries varied in quality with that of Hervey, Merry,
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Cornwallis, Whitworth and St Helens being of more use than that of 
Elgin, Warren, or Liston for the reason that the first group 
included more private correspondence especially with Hawkesbury and 
Addington. The papers and published diaries of other politicians 
outside of the ministry were helpful on certain issues and gave some 
indication of the state of parliamentary opinion at different stages 
during the ministry. The Tierney and Grey papers illuminate the 
negotiations between the government and some of the Foxite Whigs and 
the papers of Pitt and Dundas describe some aspects of their 
relationship with the ministry.
Few of the secondary sources were concerned largely with the 
ministry. The biographies of Pellew and Ziegler were of a greater 
scope than merely Addington's premiership, which combined with their 
not having consulted any government sources rendered their comments 
on the formulation of policy less than definitive. More recently, 
articles by Hall and McCahill and a number of doctoral theses have 
dealt with some aspects of the ministry in greater detail. Polden's 
examination of the domestic policies of the ministry was extensive 
and examined the areas of Irish and financial policy to a greater 
extent than I have done. Two studies of the early career of the 
second Earl of Liverpool by Brown and Alter covered the foreign 
policy of the ministry, but each of these, I think, failed to draw 
the necessary connections between domestic affairs, parliamentary 
politics, and diplomacy. This is the gap that I have attempted to 
fill.
Most of the items in the bibliography deal either 
comprehensively with some small aspect of the ministry or lightly 
with the ministry as an aspect of a larger question, and 
consequently they provided merely minor threads in the overall 
pattern of my thesis. While developing my main ideas, I was greatly 
influenced by a number of works on foreign policy and domestic 
politics. On the subject of Britain's role as a great power during 
this era, I was convinced by the arguements of Ingram, Mackesy, 
Glover, and Kennedy to the extent that they emphasize the 
limitations of Britain as a colonial and naval power in attempting
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to defeat the military might of France. The rather poor performance 
of this and other ministries at some points during the course of the 
war was due largely to circumstances beyond their control. On the 
question of social unrest, I believe that Thompson and Wells were 
correct to emphasize the serious nature of the distress and the fuel 
that this provided to unrest and possibly rebellion. Nevertheless, 
I was convinced by Christie and Dinwiddy that the nature of the 
distress, the lack of organization and inclination for revolutions, 
and a number of factors which buttressed the establishment meant 
that a revolution on the French model was highly unlikely. Owing to 
the apparent seriousness of information available to the government, 
however, the ministry did not have complete confidence in its 
ability to weather the strom without taking some action.
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